


































Pastoralists throughout Africa face increasing pressures. In Benin, governmental development policies and programmes in crop farming are changing power relations 
between herders and farmers to favour the latter. How are the Fulani pastoralists responding 
to these threats to their existence? Georges Djohy explores the dynamics in local use of 
natural resources and in inter-ethnic relations resulting from development interventions. He 
combines the approaches of science and technology studies – looking at the co-construction 
of society and technology – and political ecology – looking at the power relations shaping the 
dynamics of economic, environmental and social change – so as to throw light on the forces of 
marginalisation, adaptation and innovation at work in northern Benin. Having worked there for 
many years, Djohy has been able to uncover gradual processes of socio-technological change 
that are happening “behind the scenes” of agricultural development involving mechanisation, 
herbicide use, tree planting, land registration and natural resource conservation. He reveals 
how farmers are using these interventions as “weapons” in order to gain more rights over larger 
areas of land, in other words, to support indigenous land grabbing from herders who had been 
using the land since decades for grazing. He documents how the Fulani are innovating to ensure 
their survival, e.g. by using new technologies for transport and communication, developing new 
strategies of livestock feeding and herd movement, and developing complementary sources of 
household income. The Fulani are organising themselves from local to national level to provide 
technological and socio-cultural services, manage conflicts and gain a stronger political voice, 
e.g. to be able to achieve demarcation of corridors for moving livestock through cultivated areas. 
They even use non-functioning mini-dairies – another example of development intervention – 
to demonstrate their modernity and to open up other opportunities to transform their pastoral 
systems. This book provides insights into normally hidden technical and social dynamics that 
are unexpected outcomes of development interventions.
      Göttingen, November 2016     Ann Waters-Bayer & Wolfgang Bayer
Göttingen University Press Göttingen University Press
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Foreword
The study of pastoralists and nomadic livelihoods in Africa was once an ethnographic 
basis for the structural and ecological analysis of presumably static segmentary soci-
eties shaped by adaptation to a seasonally variable savannah environment. The last 
three decades, however, have witnessed considerable economic and social transfor-
mation in pastoral societies. Anthropologists, therefore, have now turned to high-
light and elucidate nomadic peoples’ capacity not simply to adapt to broad patterns 
of ecological variability but also to deal with constant change and even major shocks 
in an ecological, economic and political environment marked by uncertainty. The 
assessment of African pastoralism under such circumstances alternates between two 
poles: the desperate fate of marginalization, displacement, impoverishment, loss of 
livelihood and disappearance of truly pastoral identity, culture and social structure, 
on the one hand; resilience and the capacity of adaptation to ever changing envi-
ronments based on knowledge, social institutions, flexibility, opportunistic manage-
ment, nomadic mobility, and creative innovation, on the other hand.
Georges Djohy has provided us with a rich and ethnographically detailed case 
study of the pastoral Fulani in northern Benin that covers most recent trends in West 
African pastoralism. His analysis takes a close look at the pastoral situation in the 
second decade of the 21st century and it does so by using a very interesting combina-
tion of theoretical perspectives. Georges Djohy clearly realizes that while certain ef-
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fects of climate change have to be acknowledged for his research area, the Gogounou 
District in Alibori Province, this much-debated phenomenon does not explain the 
loss of pastoral resources that threatens Fulani livestock keeping. Nor does climate 
change constitute a framework of understanding and action upon which the Fu-
lani herders themselves, suffering from deteriorating resource and living conditions, 
draw. Djohy selects political ecology as a more comprehensive theoretical perspec-
tive that allows considering the interplay of ecological, economic and political pro-
cesses, the conflict dynamics of various stakeholders engaged in the appropriation of 
natural resources, the power of symbols and discourse, and the path dependencies 
established by history. To this, he adds an emphasis on technology as inspired by 
Science and Technology Studies (STS). This choice seems highly appropriate since 
technological innovations in the form of artifacts and procedures that are not simply 
adopted, but locally appropriated according to specific interests and goals, mark the 
changing relations among the various groups that compete for access to land and 
resources in northern Benin. The sophisticated understanding of technology, drawn 
from STS, not as a determinant of social action but as a crucial element in a locally 
specific configuration of actors, understandings and power relations allows Djohy to 
explain the changing relations between Bariba farmers and Fulani livestock keepers 
whose reciprocal actions are themselves caught in the economic and political dynam-
ics of Benin as a whole.
Göttingen, December 2016
Nikolaus Schareika
General introduction:  1 
Pastoralism, technological change and  
associative struggle as concerns
The impetus for this study came from previous studies I carried out among Fulani 
pastoralists in northern Benin from 2008 to 2012. While working to obtain my 
degree in Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at the University of Parakou 
(Benin), I conducted a research through the province of Alibori (northern Benin), on 
the socio-political and organizational strategies of pastoralists in coping with climate 
change. This research was part of the socio-anthropological component of the “Trans-
humance and Climate Change” project funded by RIPIECSA (Interdisciplinary and 
Participatory Research on Interactions between Ecosystem, Climate and Society in 
West Africa), an EU-funded research program in West Africa. Similarly, I received 
a grant from the African Climate Change Fellowship Program (ACCFP), making it 
possible for me to carry out in 2012 a study on the vulnerability and adaptation of 
nomadic herders to water scarcity under a changing climate in the same region of 
Alibori. These experiences enabled me to have a basic knowledge of the complexities 
of pastoralism in northern Benin. This was reinforced by my own observations of 
the Fulani, who were normally known as “bush people with their animals”, but are 
now users of many technologies such as mobile phones, and motorcycles. They have 
also developed advocacy groups and leadership that appears to defend their rights 
for better access to productive resources and better socio-political integration. This 
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was the starting point of my thoughts for a study on these aspects. The research was 
guided by the desire to first understand the changes in pastoral resources availability 
and secondly, the socio-technological responses applied by Fulani herders to these 
changes. Beyond my scientific ambition, I also ultimately intend to contribute to 
the improvement of the precarious living conditions of Fulani pastoralists in my 
home country, Benin Republic. But, I will begin by first of all clearly setting out my 
research problem. I will then present the main objectives and research questions. 
I will end this chapter by showing the scope of my study as well as the outline of the 
whole document.
Research problem1.1 
The importance of livestock production for the West African economy is undeni-
able. It is an insurance against risks and an important source of food and income for 
many people (SWAC-OECD/ECOWAS, 2008: IX). The regional contribution to 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated at 35%, with a livestock popula-
tion including more than 60 million head of cattle and 160 million small ruminants 
(ECOWAS, 2012). In Benin, livestock is the second economic activity accounting 
for 5.8% of the GDP and averaging 15% of the agricultural GDP. The size of the 
national animal population is estimated in 2012 at 2.11 and 2.52 million, respec-
tively of cattle and small ruminants (MAEP, 2013: 6ff.). Despite this significant con-
tribution to the economy, the animal production systems across the country remain 
largely traditional. The efforts addressing genetic performance, training, information 
and animal health have failed to transform significantly this old pastoral economy 
(Aregheore, 2009: 9).
According to the agro-ecological conditions, cattle farming in Benin can be ex-
clusively transhumant, semi-transhumant or sedentary (Adjou Moumouni, 2006: 
16ff.; 2012: 8; Mama Sambo, 2013: 4). The mobility of the herd, to varying extents, 
remains an important element within these different cattle husbandry practices. The 
sedentary agro-pastoral systems mobilize an average of 10 to 80 cattle, kept in a lim-
ited area strongly integrated with agriculture. In the semi-transhumant system, about 
40 to 100 cattle are managed between a settled homestead and grazing areas through 
seasonal mobility, ranging from 10 to 50 kilometers (km). Transhumant pastoralism 
includes larger herds of 200 to 300 cattle and consists of the largest movements (on 
average 200–300 km) that are cyclic and synchronous with rainfall patterns (Adjou 
Moumouni, 2006: 16ff.; 2012: 8ff.). 
In Benin, Fulani herders who settled mostly in the northern part of the country 
some decades ago, dominate the livestock sector by holding 85–95% of the national 
herd (Dehoux and Hounsou-Ve, 1993; UNESCO, 2007: 16; Mama Sambo, 2013: 
5). This activity of the Fulani defines their social organization and their ethnic iden-
tity, distinguishing them from other ethnic groups and represents the great socio-
economic wealth they rely upon (Bierschenk and Forster, 2004: 13). One might 
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conclude in light of the technical, economic and socio-cultural considerations in-
volved, livestock management on rangelands is the dominant livelihood of Fulani 
(Van Driel, 2002: 9; Djedjebi, 2009: 2).
Despite the importance of livestock to the economy both locally and nationally, 
land access issues remain a long-standing problem. The Fulani herders, although 
they are citizens,1 are still considered strangers, and they are de facto landless. They 
access land only with the permission of farmers who have the longest-standing rights 
(De Haan, 1995: 134; 1998: 212; Guichard, 2000: 114; Van Santen, 2000: 154). 
This situation has prevailed since pre-colonial times, but the French domination of 
the Colonial Period and the various changes of political regime since the 1960s have 
brought little change (Boutrais, 1999a: 33; Bierschenk, 1999: 196). Fulani herd-
ers are therefore subject to various forms of marginalization and have difficulties in 
accessing land and natural resources to meet the needs of their animals (De Haan, 
1997: 12 & 30). This situation, which had deteriorated during the post-colonial era, 
resulted in a strong mobilization of Fulani in 1987 in order to claim a better socio-
political situation from the central power. The first seminar of Kandi, organized 
by Fulani intellectuals, gave birth to the largest socio-cultural association, “Laawol2 
Fulfulde”. This opened the way for plurality and the emergence of many other Fulani 
associations in the pastoral areas of the country. During the last few decades, several 
pastoralist associations have been created to defend the interests of Fulani herders 
and to help them improve their access to resources and their socio-political condi-
tions. There are more than twenty associations and organizations3 throughout the 
country working for the welfare of Fulani. With support from international donors 
and partners, guided by various development rationales and backgrounds, pastoral-
ist associations now implement various projects oriented towards the development 
1 The issue of citizenship of Fulani does not generally pose a problem in Benin. The Fulani who have 
been settled for several decades are perfectly integrated into the socio-economic and political life 
of the country. The Fulani who speak the Pular or Fulfulde language are part of the map of ethnic 
identities in Benin (Heldmann, 2009: 109). They are often distinguished from transhumant Fulani 
from neighboring countries who return back to their country when the rainy season starts (Djenon-
tin, 2010: 17). They are also different from the migrant Fulani who settled more recently (Adégbidi, 
2003: 36; Droy et al. 2014: 87). The citizenship in Benin is defined by the age-old Law No. 65-17 of 
23 June 1965 that established the Code of Citizenship in Dahomey (Government of Benin, 1965). 
According to this law, citizenship is obtained at birth or through parentage, marriage or residence. 
There are also possibilities for naturalization. Considering all these criteria, one could assume that 
most Fulani in Gogounou, where my research took place, are Beninese. Treating the Fulani as a whole 
as strangers as is often the case in rural northern Benin, appears to be a violation of the Benin Consti-
tution of 11 December 1990; particularly its Articles 11, 22, 26 and 36 respectively on (i) Freedom 
of communities part of the Nation, (ii) Property right for all citizens, (iii) Equality of citizens and (iv) 
Ban on discrimination (Government of Benin, 1990).
2 The writing “Lawool” is also available in the literature, but in this document, I will instead use 
“Laawol” confirmed locally as the most correct.
3 I made myself this appraisal based on the information I have collected during my exploratory visit 
to Benin in July-September 2013.
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of pastoralism and the fulfillment of Fulani herders. Some of these associations are 
members of regional and international pastoralist networks, which are involved in 
building the capacity of their members, with a focus on advocacy and lobbying. 
Pastoralist networks have gained fame with some even becoming essential to both 
regional and international politicians as development actors in sub-Saharan Africa 
(IRDR/SOS-Faim, 2012). 
In a globalized world of technological progress, there are now different tech-
nological tools used in pastoralism. Information and communication technologies, 
transportation technologies and many other modern conveniences are now being 
used in pastoral areas, where Fulani herders have access, using them in various forms. 
Similar to the Afar pastoralists in northeast Ethiopia, mobile and media technologies 
have improved livelihoods, even replacing their powerful indigenous information 
system called dagu4 (Menbere and Skjerdal, 2008). Through mobile phone calls, 
radio and TV programs, information is now rapidly shared on rangelands patterns, 
climate conditions, animal marketing prices, and political and safety issues along 
animal corridors (Tafere and Teklu, 2013). Similarly, other pastoralists (e.g. Maasai, 
Turkana) in Eastern Africa use mobile phones to access markets and get informa-
tion on climate, pasture and water conditions to make decisions for mobility (De 
Jode, 2010). The use of mobile phones has also enabled Fulani herders of Douentza 
Province in Mali to maintain social ties with kinsmen and employers when graz-
ing animals far away on open ranges (Sangare, 2010; Keita, 2015). Mobile phone 
technology is assumed to improve the integration of farmers in landlocked areas to 
the market, increasing their business sensitiveness (Muto and Yamano, 2009). The 
use of mobile phones reduces the informational asymmetry and transactional costs 
and increases economic productivity of farmers (Sife et al. 2010; Crandall, 2012). 
The access to the mobile phone network has improved the responsiveness and the 
adaptability of pastoralists in Niger to price fluctuations in the markets, with a posi-
tive impact on their food security (TSF, 2012). In short, access to mobile technology 
enables poor rural communities to reduce socio-economic boundaries between the 
“centers” and the “marginal peripheries” (De Bruijn, 2008; De Bruijn et al. 2013). 
Other technologies are sometimes innovated by the pastoralists themselves to 
face the difficulty of access to pastoral resources and its corollaries. For example, don-
key carts and inner tubes were technologies that favored the transport of water and 
livestock feeds among pastoralists in the Senegalese Ferlo (Santoir, 1994: 249; Juul, 
1996; 2005a: 116ff.; 2005b: 98ff.; Adriansen and Nielsen, 2002: 218; Adriansen, 
2006: 221). These facilitated greater mobility in a context where the animals were 
forced to travel longer distances, causing severe consequences on their production 
and reproduction. Phone calls from public phone booths allowed those pastoralists 
4 Dagu is a traditional mode of communication through which all information of public relevance 
(social, economic, political, herding and security issues) is “transmitted in the form of relay where an 
Afar must quickly share with one or more people on his way to daily practice” (Menbere and Skjerdal, 
2008: 19–20).
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to disseminate their problems and be quickly connected with people (politicians, 
police officers, medical workers, etc.) necessary for the resolutions of their concerns 
and issues (Juul, 2005a: 126f.). Dieye and Roy (2012) also reported that Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS) and cell phones play a role in the mobility of pastoralists 
to fodder and water sites in northern Senegal. 
Within this context, my research aims at understanding how “technologies”, on 
the one hand, and “associations”, on the other hand, have influenced pastoralism in 
the northern part of Benin Republic. This calls for analyzing how the current socio-
technological transformations have enhanced the Fulani socio-economic adaptations 
in working out solutions to their daily challenges of resource access and livelihood 
improvement. 
Research objectives1.2 
The main objective of my anthropological research has been to analyze how differ-
ent technologies and pastoralist associations have influenced pastoralism in northern 
Benin. The specific objectives of my study include: (i) to investigate the situation of 
resource access for pastoralists in northern Benin; (ii) to explore how Fulani pasto-
ralists individually address challenges to resource access with regard to the different 
technologies available; and (iii) to investigate the associative approach of handling 
the long-standing land rights and resource access problems encountered by Fulani 
pastoralists.
Research questions1.3 
After the brief presentation of the problem that addresses my research and the main 
objectives, it is important to highlight the key questions which guided me through-
out the study. To obtain insight into the socio-technological transformations occur-
ring within pastoral communities in northern Benin, three main questions were put 
forward: (i) to what extent is the access to pastoral resources for Fulani pastoralists 
determined by the technological revolution brought about by development policies 
and interventions in rural Benin? (ii) to what extent are the household-level adaptive 
strategies of Fulani pastoralists determined by various technological tools to which 
they have access in their communities?; and (iii) how do the pastoralist associations 
fare in defense of Fulani herders to ensure them better resource access, improved 
livelihoods and a secure future?
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Scope of the study1.4 
My research is local in scope. I conducted the study in Gogounou District, located 
in Alibori Province, in the northern part of Benin Republic. I sought, essentially, 
to find out how the advent of pastoralist associations and technological tools has 
been transforming pastoralism in Benin Republic. In my study site, I focused on the 
shortage of pasture for Fulani pastoralists, as determined by the interactions of vari-
ous socio-economic, political and technological forces. The ethnographic approach 
that I used to gather most of the field data used for this analysis, included participant 
observation in farms, herder camps, Fulani association headquarters and so on, and 
semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders at the local and regional levels. 
Secondary data, provided by Fulani associations, extension services, local and inter-
national partners with regards to their interventions in pastoralism, were also drawn 
upon. I tried as best I could, and within the limits of my research means, to travel to 
other districts of northern Benin (Kandi, Nikki, N’Dali, Bembéréké) to see briefly 
the trend regarding some phenomena I have studied in Gogounou. Some short stays 
in the economic capital of Benin (Cotonou) and the metropolis of northern Benin 
(Parakou) allowed me also to fulfill institutional steps, to gain access to documents 
and to have valuable discussions with key resource persons. My field research was 
divided into two phases: an exploratory phase for two months (July – September, 
2013), and an in-depth study phase for eight months (February – October, 2014). 
I will give more details of my ethnographic approach in Chapter 5.
Structure of the book1.5 
This book contains nine chapters: An introductory chapter, a literature review chap-
ter, a conceptual framework chapter, a field chapter, a methodological chapter, three 
empirical chapters and a concluding chapter. The introductory chapter addresses my 
personal motivation for this research, along with the problem statement, the research 
objectives and questions and the scope of the study, which help to understand the 
local perspective of the study. Throughout the second chapter, I have presented the 
overall scientific debate to which my research is intending to contribute, namely, to 
the sustainability of pastoralism in Africa. Through a comprehensive review of litera-
ture, I have recalled the main challenges of pastoralism in our contemporary world, 
and the main pathways perceived by scientists about its future. The third chapter 
deals with the conceptual framework of the study. The main concepts considered in 
my data analysis are clarified therein. By combining elements of political ecology, 
science and technology studies, and civil society organization politics, I have con-
cluded this chapter by drawing the analytical framework that highlights the linkages 
investigated and illuminates the analysis of my field data. The fourth chapter presents 
general information for a better understanding of my study area. The first part is 
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devoted to placing the Republic of Benin in its geographic, socio-economic and de-
mographic context. Then I have focused on the local context of Gogounou District, 
which was my research site. I have presented the most significant elements to under-
stand pastoralism and its evolution with emphasis on the ecological, socio-cultural 
and economic context in which the Fulani herders practice their activity locally. The 
fifth chapter of the book is devoted to my ethnographic approach. I have tried to 
provide a detailed insight into how I have implemented research methods and col-
lected empirical data. My exploratory visit and my in-depth fieldwork are presented 
in detail as well as the main challenges of the research. The sixth chapter of the book 
presents the conditions of pastoral resource access in the district of Gogounou. I have 
demonstrated how farmers, through the unequal power relations fed by different 
state rural development policies, control land and local rangelands to the detriment 
of the pastoralists. The agricultural development, natural resource management and 
land tenure policies are presented as well as their direct and indirect impacts on 
pastoralism. The seventh chapter exposes the pastoralist household-level adaptive 
options to deal with the dwindling of pastoral resources in Gogounou District. Three 
groups of Fulani are distinguished and their livestock farming dynamics are analyzed 
in relation to their mobility and settlement practices. Different technological tools 
(communication and transportation technologies) and various alternative livelihood 
options are also presented as they are used by pastoralists. The eighth chapter looks 
at the association politics to resolve the problem of resource access for pastoralists. 
I have comprised an analysis focused on the largest Fulani association of Benin, 
ANOPER and its local and regional branches operating in Gogounou District. Their 
structure, functioning and various activities are presented as well as their impact on 
the daily life of Fulani pastoralists. The ninth chapter of the book is the concluding 
one. First, I have summarized the main findings of the study to answer the research 
questions. Second, I have highlighted and discussed the key contributions of the 
study. Third, the policy implications and general recommendations are included in 
this chapter to contribute in some way to the improvement of the welfare of Fulani 
pastoralists of Gogounou in particular and Benin in general.
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Does African pastoralism have a future?
The state of scientific debate
There is no doubt that livestock is the most important asset of African pastoralists, 
providing a set of socio-economic and symbolic services as significant as economic 
capital, social positioning, manure, draft power, and much more (cf. Djenontin et 
al. 2004; Hesse and MacGregor, 2006; Boureima, 2010; Alary et al. 2011; IRDR/
SOS-Faim, 2012; Vigne et al. 2015). The concern is rather to what extent pastoral-
ism will resist threats and be sustainable; to borrow the title of the Be-troplive5 sym-
posium held in Brussels on 14 November 2013 “Pastoralism: where does it go in an 
ever-changing context?”. Researchers have been very concerned about the future of 
African pastoralism over the last three decades. The scientific discussions were much 
enriched in the period between the conferences “The Future of Pastoral Peoples” 
held in Nairobi on 4–8 August 1980 (cf. Galaty et al. 1981) and “The Future of 
Pastoralism” held in Addis Ababa on 21–23 March 2011 (cf. Catley et al. 2013a). In 
a global context of uncertainty and complexity, driven by issues of socio-economic, 
ecological, technological and political order, questions about development in mar-
ginal areas have become commonplace. Questioning the future by assessing the past, 
5 Be-troplive is the Belgian Platform on Tropical Animal Health and Production (cf. http: //www .be-tr 
oplive.be, last accessed 20/07/15).
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observing the present-day situation and generating substantial knowledge and then 
theorizing the likely routes of transformation constitute the way researchers contrib-
ute to sustainability. In these discussions, pastoral systems and peoples in Africa and 
other parts of the world have been at the heart of the scientific debate. Range man-
agers, economists, ecologists, geographers, ethnologists and other specialists have 
done extensive research that has led to various assumptions. Pastoralism is almost 
always perceived to be in a sorry state, described by several types and stereotypes of 
which I would like to cite a few: “pastoralism under pressure”, “pastoralism under 
stress”, “pastoralism in crisis”, “pastoralism in distress”, “pastoralism under shock”, 
“pastoralism under uncertainty”, “pastoralism under insecurity”, “pastoralism in de-
cline”, “pastoralism in collapse”, “pastoralism doomed to extinction”. I could fill all 
the pages of this book with these melodic turns of phrase feeding the dialectic about 
pastoralism. Most of these terms, rightly or wrongly, could fall into what Ramisch 
(1996: 5) called populism, which emotionally sees the imminent end of the pastoral-
ist. But what is the fate of pastoralism in Africa as seen by scholars? The answer to 
this question is explored throughout this chapter, which is devoted to examining the 
main assumptions and debates on the future of pastoralism in Africa, to which my 
study is intended to contribute.
Will African pastoralism be sustainable?2.1 
The scientific world seems divided on the future of pastoralism in Africa. With a 
negative view on various aspects of its practice and in light of the threats to which it 
is subjected, some authors have proposed the idea of rethinking African pastoralism 
(cf. Hodgson, 2000; Kandagor, 2005; Sandford, 2011). It seems to be a scientific 
drive which is crystallized around saving pastoralism in order to have more “viable 
pastoralists” or “sustainable pastoralists” facing an increasing the trend of “ex-pas-
toralists” or “vulnerable pastoralists” who could not withstand the various shocks 
(climate, socio-economic, political, etc.) to which they are subjected, or are enrolled 
in a vicious cycle of poverty, vulnerability and marginality (Eneyew, 2012: 95). Two 
main types of narrative about the future of pastoralism in Africa can be summarized 
as: The pessimist discourse that postulates the disappearance of this type of livelihood 
and the optimistic discourse that reveres the resilience and adaptive capacity of pas-
toral systems. Now, I will present the main content of each discourse.
Pessimist narratives on pastoralism
Uncertainty over the fate of pastoralism has increased over years. Many authors who 
have studied various pastoral societies in Africa and have also followed the develop-
ment trends in these communities ended up doubting a secure future for this lifestyle. 
The concern becomes especially great where mobility and flexibility are challenged 
by various stressors with ecological, socio-economic or political foundations. Com-
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paring the past of the superbly resilient pastoral peoples to the unfavorable present-
day indicators of their livelihoods, Grayzel (1990: 64) emphasized that the future 
of pastoralism remains enigmatic and cannot be accurately guessed. Fratkin (1997: 
254) also argued that “The future of pastoralist populations is far from certain”. The 
author based his argument on the fact that pastoralists, who have always survived 
various shocks to living and producing in the harshest environments, are increasingly 
stuck and have become unable to cope with their current situations in many regards. 
Population growth, increasing urbanization, agricultural expansion, wildlife conser-
vation and land implications, and insecurity issues weigh heavily on pastoralists and 
their livelihoods. Regrettably, their responses are not likely to overcome all the in-
equalities and injustices created by these risk-prone contexts within which they live. 
Many scholars pursued this argument, for example most prominently in a collective 
volume by Markakis (1993) and a book by Squires and Sidahmed (1998).
Helland (2001) was also very concerned about how pastoralism is pressured be-
tween disenfranchising state policies and interventions of NGOs and various agencies 
involved in trying to develop pastoral areas in Eastern Africa. Focusing specifically on 
Borana pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, the author began his article by stating:
A sense of crisis is a common theme running through all contemporary re-
ports and descriptions from the pastoral societies of Eastern Africa. Pastoral 
societies, once robust and vigorous, are disintegrating. They seem no longer able 
to contend with the challenges posed on them by the environments in which 
they must exist, by the ecological foundations of their economies, or by the 
effects created by their interrelationships to the larger social, economic, politi-
cal, military contexts in which they find themselves. The structures and insti-
tutions of pastoral societies are apparently no longer able to maintain these 
societies as going concerns. (Helland, 2001: 56; emphasis added) 
The author went even further in revealing a very skeptical position on the sustain-
ability of pastoral systems, adding:
The most pessimistic outlook asserts that pastoralism as a way of life in Eastern 
Africa has outlived its own well-established successes and that pastoral societ-
ies now are locked in a downward spiral of ecological crises, famine, depen-
dency and permanent destitution. The outcome of these processes can only be 
the disappearance of pastoralism as a way of life. (Helland, 2001: 56) 
Helland in his argument stressed that development approaches have seriously un-
dermined pastoral structures and institutions, and have limited the capabilities of 
pastoralists to face threats in their living and production settings. He postulated that 
“disintegration” and “disappearance” will certainly be the end, if nothing is done to 
prevent this.
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Another more recently developed neo-Malthusian argument assumes that pastoral-
ism is in crisis with the downfall of basic resources, facing ever smaller herds shared 
by too many pastoralists in the Horn of Africa. In a thesis entitled “Too many peo-
ple, too few livestock: the crisis affecting pastoralists in the Greater Horn of Africa”, 
Sandford (2006),8 who is one of the best known leaders of this pessimistic view, 
presented in ten points an argument of a completely uncertain future for pastoralism 
(Table 2.1).
6 Tropical Livestock Unit is livestock number converted to a common unit. Conversion factors are:  
1 head of cattle = 0.7 TLU, 1 sheep or 1 goat = 0.1 TLU.
7 I chose to use this summary of Moritz et al, as Sandford himself validated that it is fairly consis-
tent with his thesis (Sandford, 2011: 5). Another synthesis is also available in Devereux and Scoones 
(2008). Stephen Sandford presented at the 2006 ALIVE/LEAD e-conference “Maintaining Mobility 
and Managing Drought: Policy Options for Pastoral Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa” a keynote 
where his argument was presented in ten points (http: //www.future-agricultures.org/wp-content/up 
loads/pdf-archive/Sandford_thesis.pdf, accessed 19/11/17).
8 This argument of too many people sharing too few animals is also echoed by many development 
agencies including the World Bank (cf. World Bank, 2009: 15).
Table 2.1: The points of Sandford’s argument
The pastoral human population is growing at about 2.5 per cent per year (despite steady 1. 
out-migration);
A certain minimum number of livestock are needed to support these humans as pastoral-2. 
ists (5–6 tropical livestock units (TLU)6 per person in pure pastoral systems, three TLU in 
agropastoral systems);
The number of animals is not equitably distributed among pastoralists, which means pov-3. 
erty is persistent;
The maximum number of animals (and therefore the maximum number of people) is lim-4. 
ited by the amount of livestock feed available;
The area of grazing land accessible for pastoral use is shrinking as a result of the expansion 5. 
of cultivation and wildlife conservation areas;
There are no known technologies for significantly increasing primary production on graz-6. 
ing lands;
Overall herd productivity cannot substantially improve unless the quantity and quality of 7. 
feed is improved;
The prospects for increasing the market value of livestock (thereby, decreasing the number 8. 
of livestock required per person) are limited;
The prospects for income diversification within the pastoral areas are unfavorable because 9. 
there is little local demand for the increased amounts of goods and services supplied;
Finally, in some parts of pastoral areas, there is greater potential for agricultural develop-10. 
ment than pastoral development.
Source: Moritz et al. (2009: 1115)7
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For Sandford, the pastoral population is growing and facing insufficient stocks which 
are inequitably distributed and even decreasing. Livestock feeds are qualitatively and 
quantitatively deficient and/or inaccessible and their availability is increasingly lim-
ited by the agricultural production schemes and resource conservation. The use of 
technology in pastoral societies is not increasing productivity on rangelands. Live-
stock has a limited market value with few prospects for its growth, and even if it had 
such prospects, marketing would further contribute to reducing the per capita avail-
ability of livestock. Diversification opportunities in pastoral areas are also limited, 
since there is little demand to meet the large range of available goods and services 
that could be offered. Facing all these issues, cultivation would be more rewarding 
in some areas which nevertheless struggle for a very problematic pastoral develop-
ment.
The substance of Sandford’s argument lies in the exaltation of threats to, and 
weaknesses of pastoral systems in the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA), which I be-
lieve underestimates the performance recorded in various pastoralist communities 
struggling more or less successfully against various risks that challenge their liveli-
hoods. His thesis generalizes the despair and the pitiful state of pastoralism in the 
Horn of Africa. However, the pastoral community should never be considered as a 
homogeneous group. Ahmed (2001: 189f.) reported that, in extremely challenging 
economic, social, political and ecological conditions, there were always some thriv-
ing agro-pastoral systems, contributors to the economies of countries in the con-
cerned region. Ahmed added that pastoralism has always prevailed over contempt 
from planners and decision-makers, who have always favored cultivation at the ex-
pense of pastoralism, and have constantly, marginalized and hindered the latter. The 
pessimist argument was also heavily criticized by a wave of researchers who opposed 
Sandford, claiming a more secure and even flourishing future for African pastoral-
ism. The skilled demonstration of Moritz et al. (2009) through case studies in West 
Africa is an example. The main arguments of the opponents of the pessimistic views 
described above are discussed in the next section.
Optimistic narratives on pastoralism
The Boserupian discourse perceives pastoralists as “Moving with the times” (Future 
Agricultures, 2015). Jeremy Swift, in an interview with African media on the future 
of pastoralism stressed: “I believe pastoralism not only has a future in Africa, but 
that their future will be rather more successful than many others, as climate change 
makes all drylands more risky with more extreme droughts and floods” (Jeremy Swift 
in Afronline, 2012).
The main argument of pastoralism optimists is linked not only to the diversifica-
tion possibilities available to pastoralists but also, and above all, their ability and ca-
pability to capture new opportunities, to innovate and stand against all odds. Pasto-
ral diversification consists of pursuing non-pastoral activities in both rural and urban 
areas, as an additional source of income (Little, 2001; Little et al. 2001: 403). The 
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reinterpretation of crisis conditions is also crucial in this viewpoint. Far from being 
in crisis or decline, the Fulani of Senegalese Ferlo, for example, interpreted changes 
in their livelihoods as a way to adapt and not to resign (Adriansen, 2006: 226; Moritz 
et al. 2009: 1130). Another important aspect of pastoral optimism is that it admits 
that herders are not fixed in their ways of coping with crises. They constantly revise 
their situation, assess the effectiveness and sustainability of adopted practices and 
take up new alternatives as necessary in connection with the new socio-economic, 
environmental and political conditions. Their coping strategies evolve continually 
over time (Campbell, 1984: 48; 1999: 378; Campbell et al. 1990; Waters-Bayer and 
Bayer, 1994a: 216). 
Swift and Hamilton (2001: 86) have divided the livelihood strategies of rural 
communities into four broad groups: intensification, extensification, diversification 
and migration. In the intensification strategy, labor, capital or technology are used 
to increase production per unit of land or livestock. But when a large expanse of 
land or a high number of cattle is being used for production with relatively low level 
of external inputs, this reflects rather an extensification dynamic. Actors may also 
diversify their income sources without holding steadfast to herding or cultivation 
as their traditional or main sources of livelihood. In this case, they combine several 
other economic activities to reduce their level of vulnerability. Migration, which is 
the last strategy, means leaving the area and/or their original livelihood to seek other 
lifestyles. As shown in several studies in recent years, the argument that pastoralism 
is declining is gradually losing ground, giving way to hope based on the resilience 
and adaptation of pastoral systems. The focus is increasingly placed on the diversity 
of mobility strategies, openness to change and innovation in production techniques 
and diversification of income sources (IRDR/SOS-Faim, 2012; Toutain et al. 2012; 
Catley et al. 2013a). In the following, I will review the literature on the different 
ways in which various pastoral groups in Africa adapt to risks and shocks.
Dynamics of dealing with uncertainty2.2 
Pastoralism and migration
Pastoral mobility, although increasingly difficult in many parts of Africa, is the his-
torical way through which pastoralists face up to various challenges and grasp various 
opportunities, e.g. of good-quality grazing in specific areas in specific times of the 
year or specific years. Pastoralism and migration have long been closely intertwined. 
Mobility has always allowed pastoralists to enjoy accessible spaces in the short, me-
dium or long term. The availability of grazing resources often determines the inten-
sity and frequency of the movements of pastoralists and their animals. By moving 
towards the southern sub-humid or various other areas, many pastoralist groups in 
Africa have, flexibly and strategically, dealt with ecological, epidemiological, socio-
economic or political issues (Boutrais, 1986; 1994a; 1999b; 2000: 164f.; Sutter, 
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1987; Bassett, 1988; Behnke and Scoones, 1992; Blench, 1994; Waters-Bayer, 1994; 
Diallo, 2001; Tonah, 2003; Marty et al. 2006; Wane et al. 2006; Bassett and Turner, 
2007; Moritz et al. 2009; De Jode, 2010; Zampaligré, 2012; Zampaligré et al. 2013). 
Pastoralists undertake seasonal as well as permanent migrations to enjoy areas less 
pressured by agriculture, to enter zones where they can easily trade animal products 
and also acquire drugs and remedies for maintaining their animals in risky environ-
ments (Blench, 1994: 207f.).
More than a simple adaptive struggle in the face of various challenges, other au-
thors suggested an “intelligent”, “proactive”, “rational” and “program-based” dimen-
sion of pastoral migrations. They claim that the movements of pastoralists and their 
herds are also geared towards improving productivity, in that the pastoralists give 
priority to obtaining fat healthy animals rather than getting out of an annual cycle 
of mobility with a severely emaciated herd. Accordingly, the migrations of Woɗaaɓe 
pastoralists in southeastern Niger were identified by Schareika and his collaborators 
as an effective strategy to improve livestock productivity. By challenging the com-
mon model of a passive adaptive struggle in an uncertain environment, the authors 
showed that the short and long-distance movements practiced by Woɗaaɓe herders 
are rather part of a coherent program of animal nutrition, implemented with strong 
ecological knowledge. This method of keeping cattle, described as “goal-oriented” 
and “site-specific”, greatly improves the production and reproduction parameters. 
Making judicious and technological use of the asymmetric distribution of nutrients 
in the uncertain environment offers great economic orientation and specialization 
(cf. Schareika et al. 2000; Schareika, 2001a; 2001b; Krätli and Schareika, 2010). 
Woɗaaɓe pastoralists shape their pastoral life around four types of migration. The 
perol migration is a permanent and irreversible relocation in the face of various un-
manageable ecological, socio-economic or political crises. The seasonal long-range 
baartol migration connects the place of affiliation to another ecologically different 
region in order to benefit annually from their complementary soil and vegetation 
types between dry and wet seasons. The medium-range goonsol migration takes place 
within the same ecological setting and involves simply a change of pasture. Finally, 
the short-range sottol migration is based on movements around the pastoralist dwell-
ing camp in order to effectively cope with pastoral degradation (Schareika et al. 
2000: 319f.).
Fulani pastoralists have been migrating to the south, coming from drought-prone 
areas and have become more numerous in some sub-humid areas of southern Mali 
such as Sikasso, where they were absent before the 1970s (Ramisch, 1998; 1999). 
Facing a population explosion, agricultural expansion and land insecurity, herders 
in southwestern Niger also undertook transhumance over large distances with the 
relocation of part of the family herd into southern sub-humid areas (Bassett and 
Turner, 2007). Fulani pastoralists of northern Nigeria facing aridity were moving 
farther south in the dry season. On the resumption of the wet season, they led the 
herds back to the northern semi-arid area to avoid the tsetse flies. With the decrease 
in inter-ethnic warfare, crop-farming groups from the south and north moved into 
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the Middle Belt of Nigeria, where they cleared many of the trees and shrubs and 
started extensive cropping. This led to a reduction in tsetse flies and lowered the 
disease pressure for ruminant livestock. Pastoralists also took advantage of the new 
environmental conditions to use areas of land that were previously inaccessible be-
cause of tsetse (Stenning, 1957: 60; 1959; Blench, 1994; Bourn and Wint, 1994; 
Waters-Bayer and Bayer, 1994a: 215). Settled pastoralists in the extreme northeast of 
Cameroon whose grazing areas were diminished by strong urbanization and agricul-
ture expansion entrusted their herds to mobile pastoralists or hired herders to move 
the herds over large distances of transhumance to exploit greener and accessible areas 
(Moritz, 2003). Chadian Mbororo pastoralists “like” mobility and can travel over 
one thousand kilometers, if necessary, for the welfare of their herds (cf. Oumarou-
Ibrahim, 2011). 
Senegalese Fulani responded to the population explosion, agricultural expan-
sion and environmental harshness by moving further south into regions with acces-
sible rangelands. Through endogenous innovations (donkey carts, inner tubes), they 
met the feed and water needs of their animals, while travelling very long distances 
(Santoir, 1994; Juul, 1996; 2005a; 2005b; Adriansen and Nielsen, 2002; Adriansen, 
2006). Emigration enabled Fulani of the lower Senegal valley to cope with the ef-
fects of successive droughts and to improve their livelihoods. However, a complete 
lack of pasture in the valley led them to return to temporary nomadism in addition 
to the regular transhumance, reshaping therefore a new mobility landscape (Santoir, 
1994: 252). Sometimes the pastoral household is divided into two units; one com-
pletely settled while the other remains mobile with the larger part of the herd. This 
settlement of one part of the household versus the seasonal migration of the other 
part attempts to secure rights on the small portion of land in the settlement area for 
growing food crops. This kind of relationship to land is common in many pastoral 
societies in West Africa, as was reported by Sutter (1987: 197) in northeast Senegal, 
Boutrais (1994b: 187) in the Adamawa area of Cameroon and Waters-Bayer and 
Bayer (1994a: 214f.) in subhumid central Nigeria.
Another important aspect of pastoral mobility is the combination of several ani-
mal species. Indeed, the mixture of different species in the same herd is a coping 
strategy for many pastoralists. This mixed livestock farming is practiced by many that 
combine, as appropriate, cattle, sheep, goats, camels, horses or donkeys with prior-
ity for specific sex, age or breed to take advantage of their dissimilar feeding habits 
and hardiness. The large herds can also be subdivided into smaller more manage-
able herds, grazed on diversified routes to take advantage of the adaptability of each 
animal species to reduce the risk of a total loss of livestock in case of crisis (Camp-
bell, 1984: 48ff.; 1999: 399ff.; Sutter, 1987: 201; Blench, 1994: 206; Santoir, 1994: 
249; Ayantunde et al. 2000; Djenontin et al. 2004; Adriansen, 2006: 222; Marty et 
al. 2006; Hesse and MacGregor, 2006: 7; Awuor, 2011; Oumarou-Ibrahim, 2011; 
IRDR/SOS-Faim, 2012: 3). 
In difficult environments, mobility is expected to persist and even increase among 
pastoralists who use smart ways to exploit various political and social networks to 
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adapt to new opportunities and constraints (Swift, 2006). Wane et al. (2006) assume 
that the flexibility and diversity of mobility solutions are among the factors that 
determine the viability of pastoral systems in the Senegalese Sahel. Mobility remains 
the best way for pastoralists to produce better, access market, avoid risks and generate 
all social and economic resources useful for their development.
Pastoralism and technological innovation
Technological innovations, both endogenous and exogenous, occupy an important 
place in the coping mechanisms of pastoralists in various crisis situations. The econo-
mies of risk-prone areas are perceived as highly innovative in terms of exploiting 
natural resources and livelihood opportunities (Mortimore, 2003: 62). Thus, the 
successful introduction of inner tubes and donkey carts was celebrated in papers and 
books by many authors (Santoir, 1994; Juul, 1996; 2005a; 2005b; Adriansen and 
Nielsen, 2002; Adriansen, 2006). In a context where high mobility is required to 
save the stock, these innovations of Fulani pastoralists in the Ferlo of Senegal have 
been instrumental in maintaining the produce from the herds and their reproduc-
tion. The kind of transport revolution locally initiated has been of great support in 
climatic crisis. Carts and donkeys, abundantly acquired by herders, were strongly 
integrated into their new form of mobility. A harness with plastic drums or truck in-
ner tubes of hundreds of litres volume allowed pastoralists to cover the animals’ water 
needs throughout the year, even when boreholes malfunction or break down.
Through livestock exchanges and crossbreeding, Fulani pastoralists in the Nige-
rian humid and sub-humid zones have adopted various cattle breeds more resistant 
to diseases, nutritional and water stresses and resource scarcity. Accordingly, the red 
zebu breeds such as Rahaji, Azawak and Wadara desirable for their good production 
performance and their symbolic value, were gradually replaced by the white breeds 
such as Bunaji (Blench, 1994: 207; 1999: 17ff.). Samburu pastoralists in Kenya, un-
der pressure due to the privatization of communal rangelands, adopted some exotic 
dairy breeds reported to be highly productive that were promoted and subsidized by 
the Kenyan Ministry of Rural Development (Lesorogol, 2005: 1969). Jeremy Swift 
noted that the adoption of new breeds and animal species (e.g. small ruminants, 
cattle, donkeys, camels and so forth) is an undeniable dimension of the opening of 
pastoralists to modernity, and this evidently allows them to meet the strong market 
demand for a greater diversity of animal products (cf. Afronline, 2012). 
Many pastoralists also strive to improve the productivity of local breeds through 
intensification practices. For example, they use cereal residues and agro-industrial 
concentrated feedstuffs (cottonseed cake, groundnut cake, etc.), available in many 
regions of Africa (Santoir, 1994; Van Driel, 1999; Ayantunde et al. 2000; Moritz, 
2003; Mortimore, 2003; 2005; Juul, 2005a; La Rovere et al. 2005; Moritz et al. 
2009). Some pastoralists buy fodder sold in bundles to feed their animals in periods 
of scarcity and will also willingly commit all funds necessary for the survival and the 
productivity of their animals (Santoir, 1994: 253; Djohy and Edja, 2014). Another 
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strategy is to combine nocturnal with diurnal grazing periods. Pastoralists have also 
become more frequent users of modern veterinary services that provide diverse phar-
maceutical products for the health of their herds (Ayantunde et al. 2000; Boutrais, 
2000: 170).
The use of information and communication technology (ICT) has brought an 
unpredicted revolution within pastoral societies in Africa. The improved access to 
information through ICT has allowed many pastoralist groups to achieve economic, 
socio-political and security goals, and thereby improve their livelihoods (Juul, 2005a; 
De Jode, 2010; Sangare, 2010; Sife et al. 2010; Crandall, 2012; Dieye and Roy, 2012; 
Stockton, 2012; Tafere and Teklu, 2013; Keita, 2015). The transformative power of 
mobile phones for pastoralists of the Douentza Region in Mali deeply impressed 
Keita (2015: 45), who calls them “Magic Tools”. Telephone facilities in various parts 
of Africa allow pastoralists to maintain and consolidate their social networks. They 
keep in touch with their relatives, friends, employers and other important people 
in their social network, especially in shock or stress situations (Devereux, 2006: 36; 
Sangare, 2010). Fulani and Woɗaaɓe pastoralists in Niger have gone beyond mobile 
phone communication to develop their own websites through which they can com-
municate to a wider audience not only nationally, but also internationally. This inter-
net platform allows them to defend pastoral mobility and therefore their livelihoods, 
while drawing a host of actors to support their cause (De Jode, 2010: 56).
Transport technologies have also revolutionized pastoralism in several parts of 
Africa. With inexpensive motorbikes made in China and exported to African coun-
tries, many pastoralists plan their mobility over large distances to take advantage of 
domestic and international market opportunities. Trucks and ships are sometimes 
used in transporting animals and resources to markets (De Jode, 2010; IRDR/SOS-
Faim, 2012). Jeremy Swift in Afronline, (2012) claims that the recent technological 
development among pastoralists confirms that pastoralism is not a backward way 
of life closed to modernity. He emphasizes that pastoralists intelligently extract the 
facets of modernity that seem convenient to their mode of production and make 
confident use of them. One example is how they use mobile phones to improve their 
business sensitivity, navigate towards good-quality resources and reduce information 
asymmetry in livestock marketing. Dieye and Roy (2012) also noted the expansion 
of GPS tools in some pastoral communities in northern Senegal and postulated a 
likely strong involvement of these remote sensing technologies in seeking livestock 
grazing and watering sites. 
Another innovation in pastoralism survival pathways in Africa involves process-
ing animal products – e.g. milk into by-products with added value. Self-managed 
and co-managed livestock markets were created in various West African countries 
where information asymmetries and cheating were reduced to a minimum, enabling 
pastoralists to enjoy livestock trade through better sale prices that they negotiate di-
rectly with the buyers of their goods. Mechanisms for bundling products for sale are 
also being developed, although several issues still limit their effectiveness (Guibert et 
al. 2009; IRDR/SOS-Faim, 2012). 
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Some pastoralist communities in Eastern Africa are becoming increasingly familiar 
with credit provision schemes and risk-transfer mechanisms proposed by various 
private operators and development partners. One such scheme is the index-based 
livestock insurance (IBLI) to deal with drought risk, which often affects productivity 
negatively and causes livestock losses (De Jode, 2010: 65). Pastoralists are report-
edly becoming increasingly open to these schemes and willing to subscribe to them 
(Chantarat et al. 2010; Wandera, 2011). Saving money in banks and storing food in 
food banks are also strategies used by the Maasai pastoralists to reduce their vulner-
ability to food insecurity in crisis conditions (Campbell, 1999: 405). Some of them 
take advantage of the development of transport technologies to enhance their mobil-
ity and increase their sources of non-farm income (ibid: 410). As demonstrated here, 
technological openness contributes greatly to the adaptation of various pastoralist 
groups in Africa under the pressures of external change.
Pastoralism and livelihood diversification
Diversification of income sources is central to the arguments about the future of 
pastoralism in Africa. Devereux and Scoones (2008) agreed with Sandford (2006) 
that there are many challenges that lay in the way of pastoralists gaining access to re-
sources, with negative implications for pastoral livelihoods. However, they disagreed 
with him in that they assert that the sustainability of pastoralism should no longer 
be seen through the natural forms of self-recovery or the ratio of animals to people. 
Their main idea is that “old-fashioned” pastoralism will certainly disappear, giving 
way to more sophisticated and dynamic forms based on diversification. African pas-
toralists will seek to broaden as much as possible their livelihood portfolio in order 
to withstand shocks. Three main options (“moving up”, “moving out” and “moving 
away”) are expected within pastoral areas:
“Moving up” option: A herder not only stays in pastoralism but also strengthens 
his pastoral economy by maintaining or increasing his herd. Integration into the 
market is quite strong, since these pastoralists play an important role in supplying 
livestock markets and finding good paths in livestock marketing. Good performance 
can be recorded even for exports. However, this form of pastoralism is often ham-
pered by policies and institutional measures at national or regional level, such as 
restrictions on mobility, tax grabs, cross-border barriers, etc. (Devereux and Scoones, 
2008; Aklilu and Catley, 2010; Catley and Iyasu, 2010; Catley and Aklilu, 2013).
“Moving out” option: Some more vulnerable pastoralists keep a foot in pastoral-
ism, while seeking other alternative livelihoods to avoid poverty. Their diversification 
strategies may cover a wide range of agricultural as well as non-farm activities, which 
can greatly contribute to improving their living conditions (Devereux and Scoones, 
2008; Aklilu and Catley, 2010; Catley and Iyasu, 2010; Catley and Aklilu, 2013). 
Based on a catalogue of 54 activities recorded in the Somali region of Ethiopia (cf. 
Devereux, 2006), Devereux and Scoones (2008) argued that pastoralist households 
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with lower per capita value of livestock could be definitely viable if their economic 
portfolio were sufficiently diversified.
“Moving away” option: This consists of getting out of pastoralism and seeking oth-
er sources of income. In a context of difficult mobility, exiting pastoralism remains 
the option of many. When livestock have been lost and the chances of restocking 
are slim, pastoralists often become destitute. The most vulnerable people find refuge 
in IDP (Internally Displaced People) camps where they depend on social assistance 
and humanitarian support from governments and international relief agencies. These 
pastoralists, whose future is far from certain, find themselves more or less perfectly 
described by the pessimistic model of Sandford (2006). However, an orientation 
towards diversification (moving out) is still possible if they are backed up by ap-
propriate accompanying policies, in which case they might recover successfully and 
improve their life through multiple livelihood diversification activities (Rass, 2006: 
4; Devereux and Scoones, 2008). Since the various authors regard diversification as 
the key to the future of pastoral peoples, it is important to present in the following 
sections the main trajectories that could be taken in the various regions of Africa.
Agro-pastoral integration
Combining crop farming and livestock keeping is one of the most widely used strat-
egies in Africa (Toulmin, 1983; Boutrais, 2000). This involves scalable integration 
with mutual benefits for both activities and represents a well-established option for 
many pastoralists in different regions of West and Eastern Africa. It takes place in 
many different ways in different African regions, while also involving various forms 
of specialization and socio-economic adjustment. When successfully achieved, agro-
pastoralism plays an important role in ensuring food and cash for pastoralists. How-
ever, unsuccessful integration fuels conflicts between rural actors competing for the 
same natural resources (Landais and Lhoste, 1990; Ramisch, 1998: 282ff.; Diallo, 
2001; Tonah, 2003; Yembilah and Grant, 2014). Looking at livelihood trajectories 
in the Sahel, Bonfiglioli (1990: 256ff.) found that crop-livestock interactions could 
be simply opportunistic, transitory or a definitive strategy increasing food security, 
all of which require sacrifices and effort of self-transformation by the pastoral groups. 
These different forms of agro-pastoralism play a decisive role in the pastoralist adap-
tation to high-risk situations, as several fairly instructive examples across Africa have 
demonstrated.
Rain-fed and irrigated cropping has ensured Fulani pastoralists of the lower Sen-
egal valley a minimum of food self-sufficiency and monetary resources that sup-
port the pastoral economy within the households in the event of an ecological crisis 
(Santoir, 1994: 249). Fulani pastoralists in northern Nigeria also rely upon various 
integrative practices to improve the productivity and the sustainability of their lands 
(Mortimore and Adams, 1998; 1999; Mortimore, 2003; 2005). The integration of 
crops and livestock also allow Fulani herders in southwestern Niger to improve the 
productivity of their herds within a context of population growth and agricultural 
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expansion (Ayantunde et al. 2000; La Rovere et al. 2005). Borana pastoralists in 
southern Ethiopia have shifted from pure pastoralism to agro-pastoralism in re-
sponse to climate risks, rangeland degradation and population growth (Gemtessa 
et al. 2007; Little et al. 2010.). Production of grains, fruits and vegetables plays an 
important role in the adaptation of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the Somali 
region of Ethiopia (Devereux, 2006; Devereux and Scoones, 2008). Samburu pas-
toralist households in Kenya have earned significant income from cultivation as an 
additional revenue source while privatization of communal grazing land has been 
occurring (Lesorogol, 2005: 1968). Maasai pastoralists of Kenya also combine crop-
ping with livestock to cope with droughts that have increased the degree of resource 
depletion in a context of agricultural expansion, wildlife conservation and land ad-
judication (Campbell, 1984: 44f.). Crop farming in a pastoral society is believed to 
provide food security, while relieving the herd, part of which should be periodically 
sold to cover the households’ food expenses (Boutrais, 1994b: 188f.). Accordingly, 
the Fulani pastoralists of Hayre in central Mali resorted to cropping as insurance 
against risks and uncertainties in the face of droughts, land insecurity and politi-
cal power asymmetry induced by the rise of the Maasina Empire in the nineteenth 
century. Combining crops and livestock promotes a better integration of pastoralists 
into the market and cash economy (De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 1994: 99f.).
Pastoralism and market orientation
The market orientation of African pastoralism is an old story. Many pastoralist 
groups across the continent have taken advantage of various market conditions at lo-
cal, national, regional and international levels. Livestock trade remains an important 
means of diversification for pastoralists in many parts of Africa (cf. Campbell, 1984: 
48ff.; 1999: 399ff.; Blench, 1994; Bourn and Wint, 1994; Boutrais, 1994b: 191; 
Santoir, 1994: 249; Quarles van Ufford, 1999; Djedjebi, 2009; Little et al. 2010; 
Awuor, 2011; Ayantunde, 2011).
Amanor (1995) postulated against the very substantivist rationale that contemp-
tuously looks at pastoralism as a chronic social form of subsistence with little com-
mercial orientation. He stressed that pastoralists in West Africa are indeed well inte-
grated at regional level in an important trading network that contributes greatly to 
the meat supply for large urban centers. Moreover, he argued, this regional economy 
is very dynamic and flexible in dealing with opportunities. In this same vein, Djed-
jebi (2009: 236) showed that pastoralists involved in livestock marketing in Benin 
are making significant profits while enjoying great market opportunities available 
notably after cotton sales and during various Muslim and Christian celebrations. 
Ramisch (1998) also reported that Malian pastoralists had heavily taken advantage 
of market opportunities to reduce the fragility of their livelihoods in the face of land 
uncertainties in the south of their country. In the same way and with the same goals, 
many herds of pastoralists of Niger are cyclically found in the southern areas close to 
the capital city of Niamey (Bassett and Turner, 2007). Samburu pastoralists of Kenya 
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in the context of privatization of common rangelands have relied upon livestock sales 
as an important way of improving their income. Their market-oriented way of life is 
very prosperous in drier years, and contributes to reconfiguring the herd, especially 
through disposing of aged males and keeping dairy females for milk production and 
herd increase (Lesorogol, 2005: 1968f.).
Beyond simple livestock trading, the market can sometimes offer large special-
ization opportunities to pastoralists. This is the case of the Senegalese Ferlo herders 
who have positioned themselves in an important segment of the market: supplying 
highly demanded rams for the celebration of the biggest Islamic festival of id-al-
Adha9 (Adriansen, 2006). Other pastoralists involved in pastoral intensification also 
provide special care for dairy and breeding cows, and fatten beef cattle to fit into 
various segments of the local market (Blench, 1994; Amanor, 1995: 380ff.; Djedjebi, 
2009: 236).
In addition to livestock trade, engaging in small business activities plays an im-
portant role in the survival of diverse pastoral communities. Petty trade based on 
animal by-products (milk, cheese, butter oil, leather, hide, etc.), art objects (neck-
lace, basket, etc.), foodstuffs (coffee, tea, sugar, cake, rice, grain, cereal flour, etc.) and 
miscellaneous goods (kola nuts, local spirits, clothes, shoes, etc.) is widely practiced 
among pastoralists (cf. Waters-Bayer, 1986; 1994; Sperling and Galaty, 1990: 88; 
Little, 1992; 1994; Fratkin and Smith, 1995; Fratkin, 1997: 247; Hodgson, 2001; 
Little et al. 2001; 2010; Mortimore, 2003; Devereux, 2006; Djedjebi, 2009; Home-
wood et al. 2009; Awuor, 2011; Ayantunde, 2011; Hodgson, 2011). 
This petty trade, which is a source of diversification formerly controlled by wom-
en, can also become male-dominated under certain circumstances favoring better 
integration. It might also move from a strictly small-scale activity to take a quite 
remarkable dimension in some pastoral areas. Devereux (2006), who studied pasto-
ralists and agro-pastoralists in the Somali region of Ethiopia, reported that, in areas 
endowed with road infrastructure where transport facilities exist, large-scale formal 
and informal trade (import and export) involving home appliances and other mass-
market products has enabled pastoralists to sell their goods and so improve their 
cash income and their welfare. Similarly, several immigrant pastoralists who have 
prospered in livestock marketing in Benin now invest their profits in cotton and food 
cropping and in various forms of physical capital (livestock, plots, houses for rent, 
etc.). They also use their business mobility to seize other opportunities, such as trad-
ing motorcycles, used cars, electrical devices and manufactured goods. In this same 
context, Fulani small traders who have saved financial capital through their retail 
business reinvest in livestock or other income sources to improve their livelihoods 
(Djedjebi, 2009: 236ff.). If cultivation and trade have played an important role in 
9 The id-al-Adha (Arabic name), also called Tabaski in Wolof language in Senegal (and also in 
French), is the commemoration of Abraham’s sacrifice. On this occasion, the Muslims sacrifice rams, 
and this is an important market for pastoralists who specialize in young male sheep.
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the adaptation of pastoralists to adverse conditions, odd jobs as well as full-time posi-
tions are not regarded with contempt in their livelihood trajectories.
Casual and secure employment 
When a situation gets critical, seasonal jobs in both urban and rural areas, have al-
ways occupied an important place in the lives of African pastoralists. This correlates 
to their “moving out” and “moving away” options. They sometimes cross the borders 
of their home countries to seek work in neighboring countries or even go beyond the 
continent. This trend has already been well established in scientific literature. Some 
examples across Africa could be instructive. 
Many Fulani pastoralists are recruited by wealthy businessmen, politicians or offi-
cials to take care of their often large herds in urban and sub-urban areas of Cameroon 
and Central African Republic (Boutrais, 1990; 1994b). The same author drew up 
a list of insecure economic activities carried out by Fulani in Adamawa to diversify 
their pastoral livelihood. Some herders find happiness in odd jobs always related to 
pastoralism for example trade commissioners, brokers, walking livestock conveyors 
or butchers, etc. Others are, in contrast, engaged in precarious jobs with little or no 
connection with pastoralism. They are often found as independent retailers, roving 
merchants, shopkeepers, natural resources traffickers and petty smugglers (Boutrais, 
1994b: 192).
In a situation where common rangelands have been privatized, Samburu pasto-
ralists of Kenya use wage labor to further enhance their income already diversified 
with livestock marketing and petty trade. Their occupations are multiple and multi-
faceted. Those who have received some formal education are often recruited as civil 
and military servants (policemen, soldiers, teachers, etc.) and rely on their secure 
salary, which they reinvest in crop farming or livestock. However, others who do 
not have the minimum level of education required for civilian and military work10 
resort to lower-paid seasonal jobs, becoming casual laborers, farm workers, watch-
men, craftsmen etc. and it is this that hinders their ability to diversify (Lesorogol, 
2005: 1968f.).
Craftwork and various forms of casual labor or secure employment – guarding, 
teaching, modern or traditional healthcare, food selling, etc. – play an important 
role in the adaptation of pastoralists (Bonfiglioli, 1988: 97; 1990: 258; Hodgson, 
2001; Little et al. 2001; Devereux, 2006; Djedjebi, 2009; Homewood et al. 2009; 
Hodgson, 2011). Some pastoralists also work in brickmaking and housebuilding 
10 A military job is an important resource appropriated in various ways within pastoral societies (cf. 
Grémont, 2014: 31ff.). It provides a small fixed income (salaries) and good positions within the state 
apparatus useful for access to information, decision-making and economic and financial markets (ibid: 
36). But beyond national army warriors, there are also cases where pastoralists living in State margins 
(cases of Niger and Mali) engage in illegal weapon and drug traffics and armed conflicts by constitut-
ing rebel groups or by being recruited into various insurgent groups. This is also a strategy for seizing 
resources through taking part in the manna sharing including positions and markets, etc. (ibid: 37).
38 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
(De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 1994: 102; Awuor, 2011). Many pastoralists in arid re-
gions of Africa voluntarily or involuntarily move and settle in towns where there are 
casual labor opportunities for example in the construction business (housebuilding, 
roads and public works) and automotive trades (taxi driver, truck driver, passenger 
recruiters) [cf. Mohamed Salih, 1995; Fratkin, 1997: 247; Boutrais, 1994b: 193]. 
To deal with successive droughts, land degradation and other changes in the pastoral 
environment, pastoralists of the lower Senegal valley have relied upon handicrafts 
(mats, calabash covers, ropes, etc.), seasonal piecework in the Senegalese Sugar Com-
pany, wage labor in irrigated fields, entrusted-flock guarding, making charcoal and 
amulets, and so forth (Santoir, 1994: 249).
Fulani pastoralists also take advantage of their Muslim identity to develop vari-
ous religious activities locally or outside their region and even beyond their country. 
Some Fulani become Koranic school teachers, writers of prayer verses, marabouts, 
makers of endogenous veterinary potions, etc. – which then provides them with 
livestock gifts that allow them to build up their own herd capital (Boutrais 1994b: 
193f.; De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 1994: 101ff.).
Urban areas are also potential markets where Fulani women can carry out re-
sourceful trade or domestic work, becoming maids, cooks, etc. But the most ab-
horrent living conditions could prompt them into the street, where they engage in 
begging and more specifically in sex work that has significantly increased in various 
West African societies, and much more in countries of the Greater Horn of Africa 
(Hogg, 1983: 35; Dahl, 1987; Talle, 1987; 1988; 1999; White, 1990; De Bruijn and 
Van Dijk, 1994: 101; Fratkin, 1997: 247; 2001: 9; 2004: 34 & 122; Kassa, 2001a; 
Morton, 2006: 9; Kipuri and Ridgewell, 2008: 13; Homewood et al. 2009: 30 & 
401; Hodgson, 2011: 203). Prostitution practiced in cities and even beyond the 
national borders is often an option to get out of the misery inflicted by various situ-
ations (e.g. severe droughts) that destroy Fulani livelihoods, undermine efforts and 
hopes of economic recovery and challenges all cultural and ideological norms that 
prohibit its practice (Kassa, 2001a; Morton, 2006).
For jobs beyond country borders, Ramisch, (1998) reported that some Malian 
pastoralists seeking to overcome precariousness and insecurity look for jobs in the 
Ivory Coast. This remains a current phenomenon, since many young pastoralists in 
Hayre region were recently traced in several neighboring countries of Mali where 
they are engaged in trade or are employed as herders (Keita, 2015: 46). Djedjebi 
(2009) also thoroughly presented the livelihood trajectories of Fulani from Nigeria, 
Burkina Faso and Niger who immigrated to Benin, where they engage in various 
activities in small, medium and large cities. These pastoralists became salaried herd-
ers, livestock trade assistants, commercial intermediaries or cattle trekkers to local, 
regional or international markets. Even if they did not all succeed in the same way, 
some of them have ended up getting rich in their new activities, often with good 
prospects for reinvesting in livestock and other lucrative sectors (cf. Quarles van Uf-
ford, 1999; Djedjebi, 2009). 
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The crisis and vulnerability situations in pastoral areas may sometimes induce a re-
turn to gathering wild resources and is one of the most common strategies in Afri-
can pastoral areas. Many pastoralists live directly or indirectly from wild resources. 
They opportunistically collect wild plants (grains, fruits, grasses, firewood, wooden 
poles, charcoal, etc.), wild animals (bees and honey, bush meat, etc.) and extractive 
resources (stones, incense, Arabic gum, etc.), which they may use themselves or sell 
for cash income (Hogg, 1983: 35; Campbell, 1984: 48ff.; 1999: 399ff.; Sutter, 1987: 
204; Bonfiglioli, 1988: 97; 1990: 258; De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 1994: 101f.; San-
toir, 1994: 249; Kassa, 2001b: 151; Lesorogol, 2005: 1969; Devereux, 2006; Awuor, 
2011; Ayantunde, 2011).
Social networks and social arrangements
Social networks definitely influence how pastoralists adapt to change. This is very 
remarkable in the Greater Horn of Africa. Many pastoralists in the Somali region in 
Ethiopia rely upon support from members of their social networks involving rela-
tives, friends or allies (Devereux, 2006). In crisis conditions, mutual support and 
various social arrangements are often made between family members for livestock 
management and survival strategies. Exchanges or animal loans often occur between 
close relatives, friends or needy neighbors. For example, individual animals can be 
given to far away family members or friends as part of the haɓɓanaaye or haɓɓana’e, 
an institution characteristic of solidarity between Fulani (Dupire, 1970: 32; Guich-
ard, 2000: 119; Djohy, 2010: 103). This heifer loan occurs between relatives or 
peers/friends so allowing the recipients the usufruct of milk (and some of the calves 
born) to establish their own farm or increase their herd. This helps them to enjoy the 
animals’ products to meet their personal needs. It also promotes recovery, after heavy 
losses, enabling the recipient to reconstitute a herd and is also a way of “obtaining” 
new blood. This moral economy can go beyond livestock trade and loans to involve 
food and cash gifts or loans, and other forms of institutions among people with fairly 
strong social ties. This is an important factor of social cohesion and security (Camp-
bell, 1984: 48ff.; 1999: 399ff.; Hesse and MacGregor, 2006: 19; IRDR/SOS-Faim, 
2012: 3). 
Many households of pastoralists in Niger send their members to seek jobs in 
urban centers and neighboring countries like Nigeria and Benin. The remittances 
from these migrants relieve those who stayed behind. Some herders also rely heavily 
on support from relatives or richer people with whom they have close relationships 
in the same community or who live farther away in urban centers (Ayantunde, 2011; 
IRDR/SOS-Faim, 2012: 3).
In areas where pastoralists have access to land such as in the Siambu region of 
Kenya, privatization of common rangelands enabled them to develop usufruct by 
leasing out their land to non-resident commercial wheat farmers. However, the es-
tablished social norms have increased the symbolic value of land while discouraging 
its sale to third parties. Any pastoralist who aspires to sell part of his property must 
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defend the motivating reasons before the local chieftaincy. In addition, a floor price 
is collectively defined and imposed on all the pastoral community to avoid any sell-
ing off (Lesorogol, 2005: 1972f.).
In a context of State withdrawal of services, several pastoralist groups make joint 
decisions and cooperate to ensure their socio-economic wellbeing. Accordingly, some 
Fulani pastoralists in northern Senegal collectively supplied diesel oil for sustainable 
operation of the boreholes through which they usually water their animals. A limited 
veterinary service due to lack or remoteness of vaccination posts and lack of veteri-
nary inputs has prompted them to access informal markets to buy drugs and to then 
treat the animals themselves, as a complement to the long-standing traditional rem-
edies. They also help each other through reciprocal loans of agricultural equipment 
(Santoir, 1994: 252ff.).
One can also encounter various systems of solidarity between pastoralists with 
different social backgrounds. A pastoralist who becomes a poor shopkeeper may en-
trust cash to a cattle trader for profit-sharing transactions. Similarly, a wealthy cattle 
trader could sometimes install a shop next to his most frequented livestock market; 
offering a job opportunity to a poorer pastoralist (Boutrais, 1994b: 192). In Benin, 
the immigrant Fulani pastoralists engaged in petty trade entrust their financial capi-
tal to wholesalers who insert them in their networks of grocery distribution in many 
urban and rural areas. By contributing to widening the commercial reach of the 
wholesalers, the pastoralists enjoy in return an ease of supply with practical advice 
for their business prosperity (Djedjebi, 2009: 237).
Many pastoralist households are able to impose a number of disciplinary dietary 
measures, by rationing food consumption within the household, which is a common 
practice in different pastoral and agro-pastoral communities of the Somali region 
in Ethiopia. The portions served are often reduced while household members also 
receive fewer meals per day. The quantity of meat or self-consumed milk is also sub-
ject to this austerity diet (Devereux, 2006). This kind of action is not only oriented 
towards food consumption. Various social spending could also be subject to simi-
lar forms of discipline. Ayantunde (2011) reported that pastoralists in Niger, while 
avoiding lavish expenditures, carry forward some large expenses related, for example, 
to weddings or children’s education in the post-crisis period (e.g. after droughts). 
Many pastoralists from West Africa are increasingly involved in inter-ethnic mar-
riages as a strategy to secure their access to pastoral resources. Others rely on friend-
ships to access pasture to which they otherwise have no access. This is the case of 
Toubou and Arab pastoralists in Niger and Chad who pay their Fulani and Tuareg 
fellows to take care of their herds to take advantage of the relatively good availability 
of resources in their territories (De Jode, 2010: 56).
The use of a host or local mediator called jatigi11 (De Bruijn, 2000: 23ff., Diallo, 
2000: 70ff.; Diallo et al. 2000: 230ff.; Juul, 2005b: 122 & 184; Gonin and Tallet, 
11 The concept is variously written by the authors based on Fulfulde dialects used by the Fulani pasto-
ralist groups that they have studied. But all the writings refer to the same social actor.
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2012: 98 & 106; Gonin, 2014), is also one of the ways by which many pastoralist 
groups in West Africa have improved their access to resources (grazing, crop residue, 
water points) and their socio-economic conditions, including employment, market 
access, social integration, conflict management, etc.
Another shock adaptation strategy is much more ideological. Some Maasai pas-
toralists rely on prayers as an important means to eradicate evil and to implore the 
mercy of God for the return of better rainfall conditions. Local priests and rainmak-
ers endowed with various gifts in kind or cash are intercessors for pastoralists (Camp-
bell, 1984: 48ff.; 1999: 399ff.). When all these measures listed above fail to maintain 
pastoralist households, the most vulnerable become dependent on social assistance, 
as I will present in the next section.
Pastoralism and social assistance
The food aid and other forms of assistance from relief organizations and charitable, 
church and government structures also contribute to covering the needs of poor pasto-
ralists (Hogg, 1983; Devereux, 2006). Pastoralists in the Somali region, whose hopes 
have totally collapsed with the loss of their herds in an infernal cycle of droughts, 
survive on food aid and essential supplies provided by the Ethiopian Government 
and relief agencies to IDPs and refugees (Devereux, 2006). Helland (2001: 70ff.) 
argued that famine relief became part and parcel of pastoral societies in Ethiopia 
and many other countries of the GHA. The Borana pastoralists, for example, have 
benefited tremendously from this aid, to the point of developing various songs per-
formed in honor of persons or events related thereto. The operations related to food 
aid distribution also provide wage employment opportunities and careers that are 
of great interest to many. Access to emergency food aid has also positive impacts on 
pastoralism. First, it reduces the self-consumption of milk within pastoralist house-
holds and increases its availability to the calves. Second, animals that would have 
been sold or slaughtered during the crisis are kept with a high prospect of calving. 
All this improves the production and reproduction performance of the herd; proving 
the rationale behind the pastoralist aforementioned songs which aim at commending 
the positive effects of humanitarian aid on pastoralism. While individual pastoralist 
households resort to various strategies to improve their livelihoods, food aid action 
has also increasingly contributed to strengthening them in their different adaptive 
options. The next section will be devoted to the pastoralist organizations and their 
support to the viability of pastoral livelihoods.
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Pastoralism and civil society organizations
Are African pastoralists associative?
Pastoralists in Africa, until recently, were considered by many outside observers as 
incapable of collective action. Even though they have always known various forms of 
traditional or informal institutions and organizations, some authors (Swift and Ma-
liki, 1984: 4f.; Sylla, 1989) reported large mobilizations and formal associations were 
not really that common. Waters-Bayer and Bayer (1994b: 7), who were concerned 
with development planning within local communities, noticed in the mid-twentieth 
century that “the formation of pastoralist organizations to plan, implement and mon-
itor action is relatively difficult”, even in cases where the minimum rights to resource 
use or animal mobility were flagrantly abused. They justified this state of affairs by 
seasonal movements, fragmentation within households and social heterogeneity that 
prevails within structured groups; and concluded that “pastoralists will be willing to 
devote time to this, only where they can expect considerable benefits”. Bierschenk 
(1995: 462), who studied the Fulani in Benin in almost the same periods as the pre-
vious authors, justified the inaction of pastoralists by the marginalization they suffer 
from other competing groups and the self-marginalization they inflict on themselves, 
since they have moral and socio-cultural virtues to defend and assert. In all cases, get-
ting together to plan their development or claim rights, in a political sense, was not 
an intrinsic value known to the African pastoralist groups. They carry a stereotype 
of being permanent strangers without land affiliation, and their dissatisfaction with 
any attempt to political claim regarding marginalizing treatments imposed on them 
could be the beginning of greater tribulation (cf. Hagberg, 2000: 176; 2011: 148). 
Even when things go wrong, they prefer to suffer vagaries from competing groups 
to avoid confrontations, agreeing to be disclaimed or abused, paying large amounts 
of fines, rather than using all possible means to defend their rights (Hagberg, 2011: 
158). The lack of skills to convince, with an accessible language, the external actors 
of the logic behind their lifestyle, and their low level of organization, were among the 
major weaknesses that contributed to further prejudice against them, since outside 
actors perceive their pastoralism as backward and guilty of ecological disequilibrium 
(Hesse and Odhiambo, 2002: 2). These are indeed some reasons why Scoones and 
Graham (1994: 193f.) proposed that, in a context of overlapping and politicized 
rights, where tenure, access and use are highly correlated with political leverage, 
pastoralists as disadvantaged groups should be empowered into associations to give 
them more lobbying power.
When and why pastoralist associations?
The creation of development institutions in Africa was gradual and took place in 
three phases (cf. Fowler et al. 1992). First, the wave of struggles for independence 
in the 1960s strengthened the existing institutions in African countries, with the 
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emergence of new ones nationwide. During this period, the development issue was 
essentially assigned to the governments, which became their prerogative. Later in 
the 1970s, authoritarian approaches to community-based or cooperative develop-
ment and exploitation of non-governmental organizations’ potential were powerfully 
echoed in public policies. Finally, in the 1980s, the institutional framework was 
improved in most countries, thereby promoting a proliferation of civil society orga-
nizations. This occurred precisely at a crossroads in the evolution of African countries 
when establishing a strong pastoral civil society became a key element in debates on 
pastoral development.
Marty (1990: 121) stressed that this change within a two-decade interval is due 
to the economic crisis and its corollaries of disciplinary measures imposed by inter-
national donors, as well as the failure of many costly government projects that re-
duced rural actors to mere implementers of external experts’ instructions. Therefore, 
the economic liberalism that intervened forced governments to transfer some of their 
powers to farmer organizations. Other authors added that participatory approaches 
and political pluralism efforts in countries in governance crisis were also of great 
influence on the development of the institutional landscape in which pastoralist as-
sociations as well as other forms of citizen mobilization have emerged (Fowler et al. 
1992; Sylla, 1999: 236). 
Some authors have also perceived a certain inevitability in the development of 
pastoralist associations. This is the case with Swift and Maliki (1984: 3) who argued 
that pastoralism would always be in trouble if there were no communication channel 
between decision makers and pastoralists. The situation will not improve, as pastoral-
ists will seek to deal individually with the government bureaucratic apparatus, which 
is more powerful and led by a different rationale. Collective action is then required 
to bridge this gap. The advent of pastoralist associations is also understood as a good 
economic option for reducing the enormous costs related to crises and relief inter-
ventions in pastoral areas (Sihm, 1989 quoted in Sylla, 1999: 236). All actions for 
empowering pastoralist associations in recent years aim not only to help them bet-
ter defend the logic behind their lifestyle, but especially to gain stronger positions 
enabling them to apply necessary pressure on decision-making processes, as ignored 
and marginalized groups. Advocacy and lobbying concepts have become the daily re-
frain in all pastoral areas of Africa where pastoralist associations operating at various 
levels – from local to international – take action with support from various partners 
(cf. Hesse and Odhiambo, 2002: 5).
Forms of associative struggles among pastoralists
Pastoralist associations in Africa are multiple and multifaceted. Sylla (1999) in a 
comparative approach presented a wide range of associations across the continent 
that I will not repeat in this document. However, I would like to mention through a 
few examples the increasingly remarkable presence of pastoral civil society organiza-
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tions within both Eastern and West Africa: to deduce subsequently the link with the 
sustainability of pastoralism.
Pastoralist associations in Eastern Africa
There are two types of pastoral civil society organizations in Eastern Africa. Some 
emerged from an endogenous process of self-determination, while others are pure 
products of development projects funded by external donors. Whatever the format, 
three main reasons support the creation of pastoralist associations in this part of Af-
rica. Some were to face the issue of land confiscation by governments and their busi-
ness allies. Others were to take responsibility in filling the gap created by the with-
drawal of some States under socio-economic and political crises and alike. Finally, 
democratization and decentralization processes were also favorable to the emergence 
of many pastoralist associations (Hesse and Odhiambo, 2002: 5). Although they 
are not all well equipped to influence the policymaking machinery that undermines 
their pastoral livelihoods, many pastoralist associations in Eastern Africa have posi-
tively contributed to the welfare of pastoralists. This is the case in Kenya of several 
village and district-level pastoralist associations within Wajir region in the northeast. 
The Loita Maasai groups in Narok as well as Dupoto-e-Maa association within Ka-
jiado County are also pro-active in the southwest (Birch and Shuria, 2002; Hesse 
and Odhiambo, 2002). 
The National Association of Nomadic Livestock Keepers in Kenya was also ac-
tively involved in designing various strategies for poverty reduction. Its intensive 
lobbying resulted in a consideration of specific needs of poor pastoral communi-
ties, with better reorientation of the World Bank financial credit by the Kenyan 
Government which ended up giving priority to certain infrastructure more useful 
to pastoralists (World Bank, 2005: 156; Leloup, 2006: 8). In the United Republic 
of Tanzania, there are also some defense associations of Maasai pastoralists such as 
Inyuat-e-Maa covering the entire north of the country with its individual members 
and more than five other affiliated local associations (MAA, 2015).12 In Karamoja 
Province in north-eastern Uganda, organizations such as Action for Poverty Reduc-
tion and Livestock Modernization in Karamoja (ARELIMOK), Karamoja Women 
Umbrella Organization (KAWUO), Matheniko Development Forum (MADEFO), 
Karamoja Peace and Environmental Protection Services (KAPEPS), have become 
experts in providing literacy, vocational and business skills to pastoralists, while be-
ing brokers for various development partners (cf. Hesse and Odhiambo, 2002: 5; 
Concern Worldwide, 2013). The Afar Pastoralist Development Association (APDA) 
also has helped to carry the voice of Ethiopian pastoralists beyond local and regional 
boundaries (Rass, 2006: 61). A broader list of pastoral civil society organizations in 
Tanzania can be found from other authors (Igoe, 2003; 2006; Igoe and Kelsall, 2005; 
Hodgson, 2011) who have also widely discussed their various inclusion politics.
12 http://e-maa.org (accessed 10/12/17).
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The Eastern African pastoral civil society was further strengthened during the past 
decades with the advent of Pastoral Parliamentary Groups (PPG)13 in countries such 
as Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The formation of these entities was to 
“open new avenues of pushing the pastoralist agenda in national policy and legisla-
tive making process and to front pastoral interests in national development strate-
gies” (Olenasha, 2004). The fruitful interactions between MPs, pastoralist defenders 
and pastoralist civil society leaders gave a new configuration to the advocacy, with 
positive effects on political and legislative decision-making for the benefit of live-
stock farmers. In Tanzania, for example, the PPG has significantly contributed to 
the active participation of pastoral civil society in consultations on reforms regarding 
wildlife conservation acts as well as poverty reduction strategies documents for better 
inclusion of pastoralists (Olenasha, 2004; Rass, 2006: 61). 
Pastoralist associations in West Africa
The advent of pastoralist associations in West Africa started in recent past decades 
when elites from various pastoralist communities established various forms of mo-
bilization to pursue inclusion, legitimacy and other interests for their people. Both 
spontaneous and externally prompted organizations were quickly established at vari-
ous levels, offering social services oriented towards literacy, staple foods and relief 
distribution, etc. Other economic activities such as livestock product trading, credit 
issuance, management and accounting training, input supply, veterinary and health 
care and various development activities were also offered to their members (Marty, 
1990; Sylla, 1999). 
Local and regional associations became widespread in West Africa (Benin, Burki-
na Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, etc.). Umbrella organizations were 
also established at national level. In Chad, for example, there is a national federa-
tion of pastoralist organizations (CONORET) gathering eighteen regional federa-
tions and various other pastoralist associations. All these pastoralist associations were 
recently integrated into a national platform of pastoral development stakeholders, 
which, together with the government and development partners, try to improve the 
living conditions of pastoralists. In this consultation framework, pastoralist leaders 
participate in exchanges, dialogues and prospective thinking on public policies and 
pastoral development (Saleh, 2011: 44; Republic of Chad, 2013). This structural ap-
proach is also echoed in many other countries. The Fulani Association of northwest 
Niger and the Fulani Association in Nigeria have undoubtedly contributed to the 
consideration of pastoralists’ needs at regional and national level (Rass, 2006: 61).
13 The name may differ from one country to another. Therefore, we have the Pastoral Parliamentary 
Association (PPA) in Uganda, the Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee (PASC) in Ethiopia, and the 
Pastoral Parliamentary Group (PPG) in Kenya and Tanzania (Olenasha, 2004). See also Rass (2006: 
61) for the influence of PPGs in policymaking within each concerned Eastern African country.
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In Burkina Faso, Fulani elites have founded various types of associations such as 
trade unions, cultural groups and NGOs in order to defend the rights and inter-
ests of pastoralists. By mobilizing concepts such as “democracy”, “development”, 
“cultural diversity” and “civil society”, they have tried to articulate the challenges of 
pastoralism while organizing the ethnicity of its practitioners. Despite the associative 
diversity in place, there are common marks of a recognition policy and a quest for 
legitimacy at the local, national and international levels, feeding ambiguities in some 
cases (cf. Hagberg, 2011). This author identified three strategies used by pastoralist 
associations in Burkina Faso in order to gain the socio-economic and political inte-
gration of pastoralists. First, while being all civil society organizations, they mobilize 
elites and higher-standing human resources that can be of useful support in a context 
of marginalization. Second, they involve both cultural activities and development 
actions, knowing which lever to push in order to free their members from various 
challenges weighing on them. Third, they engage in a trade union struggle that also 
involves their members as key financial partners (Hagberg, 2011: 159).
Beyond the visibility at country level, the West African pastoralist organizations 
have become more structured in recent years with the creation of various sub-region-
al networks and more influential as pastoral issues become transboundary. Organiza-
tions such as the Association for the Promotion of Livestock in Sahel and Savannah 
(APESS) and the Billital Marooɓe Network (RBM) are pro-actively involved in mak-
ing pastoralists more “professional” and “modern”. While fighting for better resource 
access, they are also engaged in activities aimed at behavior change. Some even offer 
alternative pastoral vocational training targeting the psychology of pastoralists in 
order to motivate them for learning and for change to their traditional livelihoods.
The APESS, the oldest network created in 1989 in Burkina Faso, mobilizes up to 
30,000 herders in thirteen countries in West Africa, including Benin. Locally consti-
tuted, it became an international Swiss association with headquarters in Lucerne and 
General Secretariat in Ouagadougou. Its vision: “For a living modern family farm”14 
is to transform livestock production practices and livestock farmers in a changing 
context (APESS, 2011; Grandval, 2012). APESS is well known for its logic of set-
tling pastoralists. Some concepts were very dear to its promoters and marked all its 
interventions. Through the concept: “A herder, a hay shed”15 developed from 1989 to 
1994, the association taught pastoralists to settle down in response to the difficulties 
of feeding and watering animals during the dry seasons. Hay production and straw 
conservation initiatives were successfully developed (Suttie, 2000). The concept: 
“The slate and the horn”16 guided the training and literacy provided to the members 
over the same period to avoid the conflicts related to the lack of formal education 
of Fulani herders. From 1994 to 2000, the actions of APESS were oriented towards 
the sub-regional integration through livestock production. This motivated its ex-
14 “Pour un élevage familial moderne de vie”.
15 “Un éleveur, un hangar à foin”.
16 “L’ardoise et la corne”.
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pansion into several other African countries. After spending the period 2000–2010 
consolidating its achievements, the association entered from 2011 into a new per-
spective formulated around “The transformation of livestock farming, cooperation 
within family and society, advocacy at sub-regional level and youth literacy”17. The 
association celebrated its 25th anniversary around the topic: “The family farm at the 
heart of West and Central African issues”18 aiming at “reconciling food sovereignty, 
regional integration and sustainable development”19 (Faye, 2014). All these abun-
dant development and modernity-oriented concepts are backed up by an ethno-
philosophical rationale which causes most interventions of APESS to be rooted in 
the “dream” (or the vision) of the pastoralists, in order to stimulate a sustainable 
appropriation of knowledge and technical expertise that may impact their future. 
Thus, the transnational and open-membership association reconnects the technical 
acquisitions to a certain spiritual and psychic dimension of being Fulani to develop 
awareness of pastoralists for change (Ly, 1998; Pesche and Barbedette, 2004: 12ff.; 
Hagberg, 2011).
The Billital Marooɓe Network (RBM) was established in 2002 in Niamey from 
three pastoralists associations working in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. The basic 
idea was to have a framework to influence public policies in order to defend the 
interests of transhumant pastoralists. It was then opened to other countries in the 
ECOWAS space (Economic Community of West African States). The RBM works 
for safeguarding pastoralism with the strong belief that the spatial and seasonal mo-
bility is an essential form of production by generating economic, social, cultural and 
ecological support to arid and semi-arid areas where other forms of production are 
very uncertain or sometimes impossible. The RBM involves more than 400,000 pas-
toralists from nine countries in West Africa, including Benin (cf. Boureima, 2010: 
116). It works for ensuring better inclusion of pastoralists in decision-making, secur-
ing access to natural resources and improving market integration. Its main objective 
is articulated around two main axes: first, promoting advocacy at a regional level in 
order to contribute to the improvement of policies at national and regional levels; 
and second, building capacity of both organizations and leaders regarding advocacy 
(De Bruijn et al. 2011; RBM, 2015). Through quarterly newsletters, it attracts poli-
cymakers, development partners and other civil society players. It promotes preven-
tive and peaceful management of conflict, and stimulates the translation of various 
acts available on pastoralism and mobility into local languages, for greater appropria-
tion by pastoralists. Therefore, it strengthens the capacity of member associations to 
achieve a better defense of pastoralist rights and interests in their respective countries 
(Boureima, 2010: 118).
17 “La transformation de l’élevage, la coopération au sein de la famille et de la société, le plaidoyer au 
plan sous régional et l’alphabétisation des jeunes”.
18 “L’élevage familial au cœur des enjeux ouest et centre africains”.
19 “Réconcilier souveraineté alimentaire, intégration régionale et développement durable”.
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These pastoralist networks presented above are crucial settings where different na-
tional livestock associations are formed for a stronger presence in their respective 
countries. They bring important support to their members and are highly visible 
internationally with the support of various development partners. They make fan-
tastic use of communication technologies and handle the editing process for some 
information bulletins and periodic newsletters. In light of the structuring, the obvi-
ousness of actions, the involvement in consultation arenas and the reputation gained 
by these networks, some international organizations assume that APESS and RMB 
have become unavoidable for both politicians and development partners within the 
ECOWAS group (IRDR/SOS-Faim, 2012: 6). 
Advocacy and lobbying have become leitmotivs of pastoralist network interven-
tions which target and put pressure on decision-makers to better take into account 
the pastoralist voice in policies determining the sustainability of their lifestyle. They 
strongly fight for a favorable regional institutional framework through the harmo-
nization of numerous laws and bilateral or multilateral agreements between coun-
tries on livestock mobility and cross-border transhumance. They also give priority to 
strengthening infrastructure in pastoral areas, through construction and equipment 
regarding water resources and animal routes. Improving veterinary and commercial 
infrastructure and services, as well as access to various technologies, are also impor-
tant occupations of pastoralist networks. Huge efforts are being made to provide ba-
sic social services such as education and health care (Boureima, 2010: 116ff.; IRDR/
SOS Faim, 2012: 4f.). 
Governments and development agencies increasingly recognize the role of pasto-
ral civil society organizations strengthened by a genuine political will at continental 
level. To address implementing sustainable pastoral development and equitable ac-
cess to resources for pastoralists, the “African Union Pastoralism Policy Framework” 
was developed, giving prominence to pastoral civil society organizations. Particular 
emphasis was put on receiving additional input, checks and counterbalances from 
pastoralist associations and networks that had to be actively involved in all pasto-
ral development processes (African Union, 2010: 34f.). The development of global 
networks such as the World Alliance of Mobile Indigenous People (WAMIP), the 
World Herders Council (WHC) and the World Initiative for Sustainable Pastoral-
ism (WISP) has also been a great support for pastoralist associations and networks 
in Africa (Rass, 2006).
Pastoralist associations and pastoral sustainability
The consideration of the pastoralist voice is perceived as being able to better cover the 
real needs of African livestock farmers. Therefore, pastoralists must be represented 
in decision-making and policy implementation bodies through their various civil 
society organizations (Leloup, 2006: 8; Rass, 2006: 61). Since most of the problems 
faced by pastoralists are linked to political issues at the national or global level, sev-
eral authors have advocated a wider organizational support. Pastoralist associations 
Once robust and vigorous: Does African pastoralism have a future?  49
with supra-local legitimacy are then seen as best suited to solve pastoralist problems. 
They can then take advantage of practical knowledge on the ground to assert pres-
sure on political decision-makers for changes (Hogg, 1992; Sylla, 1999: 251f.). To 
achieve a legitimacy that transcends national boundaries, pastoralist associations use 
various strategies and take advantage of ICT. As shown above, APESS, which was a 
local association created in Dori (Burkina Faso), has become a Swiss NGO recog-
nized and approved by various West African governments (cf. Hagberg, 2011: 151). 
In a similar way, the collective platform of nomadic pastoralist associations in Niger 
“DJINGO” uses its website20 to defend the rights of pastoralist peoples. Through 
its good international reputation built online, it mobilizes international partners to 
share socio-cultural values and get political visibility (De Jode, 2010: 56; IRDR/
SOS Faim, 2012: 4). Strategies of this kind based on the use of media and internet 
technologies are found among many other African pastoral civil society associations 
which have become increasingly internet-savvy.
Despite their important role, the actual configuration of pastoralist associa-
tions can determine their influence on pastoralism. Based on a typology by Rouillé 
d’Orfeuil (1984: 25) cited in Marty (1990: 124ff.), two categories of pastoralist 
associations can be distinguished: First, some are designed mainly for rent-seeking 
through a variety of creative and appealing micro-projects. Thus, they take advantage 
of the “projetose”21 which is one of the chronic diseases of development approaches 
in African pastoral zones. These are often “proxy” or “nominee” associations owned 
by influential individuals of pastoral communities who resort to “alibi-projects” to 
attract for their self-fulfillment technical and financial resources offered by interna-
tional partners. The gatekeepers among Eastern African pastoralists, as revealed by 
Igoe (2003; 2006; Igoe and Kelsall, 2005), could be part of this category. Second, 
other associations as part of socio-economic struggles are more sincerely involved in 
solving local problems, valuing pastoral potential and creating added value. Depend-
ing on the group to which each pastoralist association belongs, their impacts on 
pastoralism trends can be totally different. 
Collective action for better access to resources, markets and conditions for diver-
sification of income sources is an important aspect in the sustainability of pastoral-
ism. Marty et al. (2006) emphasized that the economic and institutional viability 
of pastoralism requires appropriate and recognized professional organizations to be 
more involved at various levels in decision-making and policy implementation pro-
cesses. Pastoralist associations contribute, as the case may be, to the adaptation of 
pastoralists to various shocks or threats in their living and production environment. 
They represent forms of delegated power that take strong action to improve resources 
20 http://www.djingo.net/fr/index.htm (accessed 26/07/15). The Pastoral Forum Ethiopia (PFE) also 
uses the same web-based strategy to better defend the rights of the pastoralists in Ethiopia (cf. http://
www.pfe-ethiopia.org/, accessed 13/10/15).
21 It is a concept used by Marty (1990: 126) to call a disease that is to maliciously seek rent through 
projects to which international development partners rush to give their support.
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and market access, which are two important factors cited in the literature that greatly 
influence the future of African pastoralism. Thébaud (1988: 122) argued that pasto-
ralist associations will definitely be the “cornerstone” of maintaining and preserving 
pastoral production and a pastoralist lifestyle. After showing that each pastoralist 
relies on a wide range of strategies to cope with threats and shocks, and that collective 
action through various associations increasingly includes them in decision-making 
processes favoring the viability of their livelihoods, I will now summarize the main 
pathways conjectured by scholars for the future of African pastoralism.
Synthesis: future scenarios for pastoralism
The discourses on the future of pastoralism are twofold, as discussed above. Pessi-
mists predict the disappearance of this livelihood on account of worsening environ-
mental, socio-economic and political conditions. Optimists root their argument in 
the resilience and adaptability of pastoralists, and foresee sustainability for this way 
of life. Some authors hold this viewpoint very strongly, arguing that pastoralists in 
their adaptation approach often adopt nested strategies without relying on a single 
source of income (cf. Devereux, 2006). While pursuing extensification or intensifica-
tion or even migration, pastoralists often remain open to market and job opportuni-
ties. Some specialize in the production of specific livestock species to take hold of 
a given market segment (cf. Adriansen, 2006). Others are even willing to defy the 
shame or what Boutrais (1994b: 175) calls the “pastoral ideology”, and reshape their 
cultural practices and attitudes (Hodgson, 2011: 208) to engage in other forms of 
activities and jobs formerly very despised within pastoralist communities. Therefore, 
the sustainability of pastoralism is seen as lying in economic diversification. Sand-
ford (2011: 6), even in his pessimistic position, stated that “Diversification holds the 
key to successful pastoralism...”, and still holds fast to that, as evident in his recent 
statement that “…[T]he decline in pastoral welfare will not be halted or reversed by 
focusing on livestock-based livelihoods but requires major diversification of liveli-
hoods” (Sandford, 2015)22.
However, Peter Little and his collaborators call for vigilance in this kind of analy-
sis, assuming that diversification should not be seen as a panacea, as some coping 
strategies are also quite risky. Livestock mobility and diversification of livestock re-
main the best sustainability options for pastoral systems. Education, by opening up 
opportunities for secure and high-paid jobs, also appears to be a promising pattern 
for pastoralism in Africa (Little, 2001; Little et al. 2001; 2010). The same author 
indicates that African pastoralism must certainly withstand shocks to be viable, but 
the pastoralism of the future will be completely different from today’s (Little, 2013). 
Devereux and Scoones (2008: 3) also support this argument, stressing that pastoral-
ists will adapt to their different ecological and socio-political threats, innovate and 
seize various opportunities available to them. However, they will evolve from the 
22 Personal communication with the author, 14/05/15.
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“old-fashioned” pastoralism, which will probably disappear, towards new forms of 
livestock farming. The “moving up” will certainly coexist with the “moving out” and 
the “moving away”, since not all actors will be affected in the same way, as their re-
sponses to the crisis will not be the same. Access to market and pastoral resources will 
be decisive for the future trend of pastoralism in various parts of Africa (UNOCHA-
PCI, 2007: 19ff.; Catley et al. 2013b: 15).
Conclusion2.3 
Livestock remains crucial for the resilience of pastoralist communities in Africa. 
However, the ecological, economic and socio-political conditions induce a trend 
towards diversification, which is perceived as the path to sustainability. Pastoralist 
civil society organizations also play a key role in favoring access to resources and 
markets and better conditions for diversification. Greater integration and diversifica-
tion are the expected directions of transformation. Chapter 3 will now highlight the 
analytical framework that will allow me to thoroughly analyze the ongoing pastoral 
pathways in Benin.

Conceptual framework of socio-technological 3 
change study in pastoral settings
In addition to the overall theoretical debate discussed in Chapter 2, this third chapter 
clarifies the various concepts I have used to account for various phenomena stud-
ied. The concept of political ecology is discussed, as it allows scrutiny of the power 
relations between rural actors in their daily dynamics of accessing and controlling 
natural resources. This is followed by a discussion of the concepts of access, property, 
territorialization, belonging and citizenship. This is done in such a way as to bring 
out the connection between them. Moreover, the various meanings of the concept 
of technology are presented and possible forms of interaction between technology 
and society are also reviewed. The development brokerage, as well as positioning and 
repositioning in identity politics are also briefly summarized. The chapter ends with 
a brief presentation of the analytical framework of the study.
Commons and political ecology of land use3.1 
Looking for causes of environmental problems facing humankind, the British econo-
mist Thomas Malthus advanced an argument of a geometric population growth fac-
ing an arithmetic reduction of resources (Malthus, 1798). This analysis was taken 
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over by Hardin’s thesis on human-nature relationship. In his famous “Tragedy of the 
Commons”, Hardin argued that the achievement of individual interests over limited 
commons will inevitably lead to extinction. In an open pasture, each herder will try 
to maximize his own profits by grazing the largest possible number of livestock. As 
all herders will pursue this same opportunistic strategy in face of limited resources, 
“therein is the tragedy” (Hardin, 1968: 1244); as overexploitation will occur, and will 
be detrimental to all.
The solution proposed by Hardin, to prevent this disaster is to have social ar-
rangements with coercive power, capable of producing responsibility amongst stake-
holders. The Malthusian or neo-Malthusian approach admits that this reform, even 
if it is imperfect and prone to injustice, is better than the status quo or “nothing” 
leading to harm or ruin (ibid: 1247f.). This political solution, proposed to solve an 
ecological crisis, is based on the Hobbsian or neo-Hobbsian model, offering a su-
preme moral authority – The Great Leviathan – for social regulation. Thomas Hob-
bes (1968) assumes that a society without Civitas23 would be anarchic and fall victim 
to individual interests. This necessarily requires a central government to ensure the 
sustainability of common resources (Heilbroner, 1974; Hardin and Baden, 1977). 
The State then has the function of protecting common resources through a coercive 
control of individual impulses likely to exhaust resources and cause conflicts between 
co-users (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 16). The game theories through the prisoner’s 
dilemma and the free-ridership have also contributed to the debate on centralized 
management of natural resources. What are they really about?
The prisoner’s dilemma: Supposing two anonymous herders, Djemo and Djega, 
presumed guilty of illegal intrusion into “Trois-Rivières” classified forest of Gogounou 
District in Benin; are subjected to police questioning, separately in two different jail 
cells. Two options are open, with differentiated penalties. The “cooperate strategy” is 
to not testify against his cellmate so that collective sentence is not severe; and “defect 
strategy” is to testify against his neighbor, resulting in both of them receiving capital 
punishment. In this situation, each herder in his rationality will in all likelihood seek 
to reduce his own sanction by making the “wrong” choice that will result in both of 
them worse off. 
The free-rider: Consider a group of ten Fulani herders who should contribute 
100 CFA francs per day for the maintenance of a common pasture in Wara village 
of Gogounou District. This pasture is likely to disappear since every herder, accord-
ing to his rationality, will try to graze his animals without making any contribution 
to the collective goal. Free-riding is the behavior of social actors who try to take 
advantage of common goods without being willing to invest the necessary resources 
collectively defined as necessary for its maintenance and perpetuation.
The main argument of these theoretical strands recalled above is that rational and 
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve common goals. Their participation 
in collective action occurs when there is a threat of exclusion, or else when there is a 
23 Latin term for “State” or “Commonwealth”.
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coercive power or incentives that lead them to act in the group’s interest (Olson 1978: 
42ff.; Johnston, 1989: 114; Ostrom 1990: 5f.; Ostrom et al. 2002; Tuck, 2008). This 
“rational egotism” is a source of unfairness (Tuck, 1979: 148) that would be the 
basis for an ecological crisis in the context of free access to common resources. This 
tragedy-oriented explanation of human-nature relationship was rejected by common 
property theorists who empirically demonstrated that common pool resources can 
indeed be managed sustainably. Some authors argued, based on cases of collective 
stewardship that failure occurs in sustainable common property management only 
when there are defects in internal governance rules and regulations (Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom et al. 2002; Robbins, 2012).
Institutional and political solutions to deal with environmental issues have great-
ly influenced the birth and development of political ecology approach24, which I will 
discuss further in the next sections.
Political ecology has been a guideline widely exploited in several scientific disci-
plines during recent decades. The concept was coined by the American plant physi-
ologist and ecologist Frank Thone. He wrote in 1935, “Nature rambling: we fight 
for grass”, one of his syndicated issues wherein he described his passion for the pres-
ervation of the plant wealth of nature. The concept was furthered by Eric Wolf, an 
Austrian-born American anthropologist considered the forefather of using political 
ecology in Anthropology. In his article “Ownership and Political Ecology” the author 
argued that: 
The property connexion in complex societies is not merely an outcome of lo-
cal or regional ecological processes, but a battleground of contending forces 
which utilize jural patterns to maintain or restructure the economic, social 
and political relations of society. (Wolf, 1972: 201f.)
Political ecology in its early days focused on property rights showing how they are 
economically and socio-politically shaped. It proved that property and inheritance 
rules do not merely intend to generate rights and obligations within a local commu-
nity but rather they are tools mediating between external pressures from society, at 
large, and local ecosystem requirements. This is actually why some inheritance rules, 
for example, can be made and unmade regularly to feed the interests of some given 
elites having no roots locally (ibid: 202). 
After this Weberian starting point, political ecology has greatly evolved from 
some works by authors like Watts (1983), Blaikie (1985) and many others. Sci-
entists from a large range of disciplines have appropriated and used the concept 
more broadly, and sometimes, with unclear and loose parameters. Political ecology is 
not so far a coherent theory built upon common assumptions, concepts or research 
methods. There is no consensus upon its content; only multidisciplinary trends pre-
24 See Bryant and Bailey (1997: 10ff.) for details on the evolution of the neo-Malthusian school and 
the related political ecology.
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vail among scholars and scientific discussion forums concerned with deciphering 
power and politics that shape the ecological milieu while being inversely affected 
(Blaikie, 2008: 767; Minch, 2011: 864).
Political Ecology is considered a subfield which “emphasizes how power relations 
and politics shape the dynamics of economic development, environmental transfor-
mation, and social change across geographic scales of analysis from the local to the 
global” (Jarosz, 2001: 5472). It criticizes the neo-Malthusian motives of environ-
mental dynamics which completely ignore the social and power relations which, 
when historically and geographically decrypted, could help better understand the 
current environmental and population interactions. This is the reason why it “com-
bines a broadly defined political economy of resource development and change cen-
tering upon the role of social relations and processes to environmental change and 
degradation, resource distribution, access, and control and the social constructions 
of nature” (ibid: 5474). 
Considering natural resources exploitation as being also a political act (Peluso, 
1992; Peluso and Watts, 2001), the behavior of users and managers of these resourc-
es are neither a matter of subitus nor a result of an ab irato factum: instead they have 
roots in historical, political and economic landscapes (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987: 
239). Therefore, in this “politicized environment”, it is necessary to trace the power 
relations between actors, since: 
Unequal relations between actors are a key factor in understanding patterns of 
human-environment interaction and the associated environmental problems 
[…]. [And] those unequal relations need to be related, in turn, to the power 
that each actor possesses in greater or lesser amounts, and which influences 
the outcome of environmental conflicts. (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 37)
The issue of power has been extensively explored by several authors. The political, 
economic and cultural dimensions of power are developed by Foucault (1977), Esco-
bar (1995), etc. I will not venture to go into the complexities of what power means, 
but I would rather give power a most simplistic definition for me to understand how 
some rural actors reinforce and use their power to deny others access to resources. 
Therefore, I perceive power as “the control that one party has over the environment 
of another party” (Bunker, 1985: 14). The control, itself, could be understood as 
“complete authority to make decisions on the use of resources” (Ribot and Peluso, 
2003: 158; Purnomo, 2011: 15). However, power is not to be seen as someone’s 
property, but is a fabric built from a range of human and non-human forces in an 
integrated chain (Latour, 1990: 110). My ethnographic material on how farmers use, 
for instance, herbicides and chainsaws to increase their control over land will clear up 
this position in Chapter 6.
Ecological problems at local level are often the result of political and economic 
processes, often with local as well as regional or international roots (Blaikie, 1985; 
Bryant and Bailey, 1997). In developing countries, ecological phenomena observed 
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locally, can find explanations in distant colonial and post-colonial capitalist dynam-
ics. Political ecologists often return back to the colonial and even pre-colonial times 
if necessary to trace how capitalist approaches have conditioned the relations that 
local people have with these environment and natural resources now. Accordingly, 
the policies of post-colonial states are blamed for creating winners and losers in their 
implementation. For instance, integrating farming communities into the market 
economy, generally forces them to move or to settle on restricted space. In many 
cases, labor shortage also occurs facing a growing demand. Therefore, promoting 
cash crops may cause food insecurity and emergence of environmentally degrad-
ing agricultural practices (Blaikie, 1985: 22ff.). In such situations, taxation policies 
contribute in adding to the “surplus extraction”25, forcing local actors to also take 
surplus, by overexploiting local resources over which they hold some parcel of power 
(ibid: 124f.).
Everyday ecological changes reinforce the economic and social inequalities be-
tween stakeholders, and reduce the resources and powers of the weak actors at the 
expense of the stronger ones; making marginalization an important social factor as-
sociated thereto (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987: 23ff.; Robbins, 2012: 21). That is 
why after helping to trace the social forces involved in ecological struggles, political 
ecology also offers the opportunity to find out about adaptive social arrangements 
including alternative livelihoods, protests or various forms of resistance in the face 
of changes (Peet and Watts, 1996; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Robbins, 2012). As ac-
tors are bound by power relations within and between themselves (Stonich, 1993; 
Peet and Watts, 1996), some authors argue that the scale of analysis and conclusions 
should not be considered a panacea. They consider human-environment dynamics 
as being constantly shaped and reshaped; and scale-based analysis does not enable 
us to capture how various actors interact with one another and co-construct on a 
daily basis (Escobar, 1998; 1999; Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). This postmodern 
or poststructuralist perspective, with roots in science and technology studies (STS) 
argues for an interactional and inter-relational co-construction of realities as facts or 
artifacts. There is no division a priori between mankind and nature, human and non-
human, material and immaterial, animate and inanimate things, social and technol-
ogy; as well as local/micro and global/macro scales, etc. All these factors interact and 
influence each other in a complex network (“seamless web”) whose articulations need 
simply to be followed up and documented (cf. Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; 1990; 
2005: 128; Vinck, 2012: 138).
25 The “surplus transfer” by farmers or “surplus extraction” by the State or other actors refers to the 
imbalance between the social relations of production and exchange spheres. It follows taxation and 
price setting mechanisms, unfavorable to farmers, added to the failure of setting aside capital reserves, 
the instability of production and others, which are correlated with the indebtedness of resource users. 
To break this vicious circle, farmers are forced to extract also the “surplus” by overexploiting natural 
resources – land, pasture, forest resources, labor/energy, etc – in order to provide some room for ma-
neuver. This is a major cause of resource depletion in the Third World (cf. Blaikie, 1985: 7, 118 & 
124).
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The use of political ecology in this study aims to better understand the way Fulani 
pastoralists loose access or manage to (re)gain access to pastoral resources, and the 
influence of this on their livelihoods. This is in line with Watts (2000: 257), who 
stated that “political ecology seeks to understand the complex relations between na-
ture and society by considering the nature of access and control over resources and 
their implication for sustainable livelihoods”. This means that the complexity of use 
and control of local resources (land, pasture etc.) will be better understood when 
local dynamics within a rural community are investigated without prioritizing any 
presupposed limits for a context or scale-based analysis. Without delving into the 
many controversies surrounding political ecology, I tried to apply it in a simplistic 
way, sharing the common premise that “environmental change and ecological condi-
tions are the product of political process” (Robbins, 2012: 19f.). 
From this point of view, it became possible for me to scrutinize how some seem-
ingly unrelated realities like pesticide manufacturing and the woodworking industry 
in the People’s Republic of China could be linked to land control practices and 
rangeland reduction in Gogounou District in northern Benin. Although Asia is geo-
graphically and even culturally distant from Africa (cf. Fouda Ongodo, 2006), it is 
an open secret that Asian countries especially China are currently among the closer 
economic partners26 of Africa. I do not want to analyze the position of China in the 
international geopolitical and economic debates. I am also not going to make any 
value judgments over China’s partnership with Africa. I will avoid, purposely, using 
the issue of land control and natural resources degradation in northern Benin as a 
basis to add to the wide-ranging polemic of the world system against China’s eco-
nomic position in Africa. I just propose, looking at political and economic decisions 
and facts underway in Benin that could be related to its cooperation with China, to 
address a multifaceted land use dynamics involving pastoralism in my research site. 
I am not motivated by attributing a causal significance to the political and economic 
forces operating from outside of the local level. I will highlight how some practices 
(widespread use of herbicides in cropping, large-scale deforestation with chainsaws) 
have developed in my research site and how they have contributed to the expulsion 
of Fulani pastoralists from lands. The causes and consequences of these events will 
not be used as sticks to beat a targeted actor or to defuse a given power. My concern 
is to put forward how land exclusion has occurred upon Fulani pastoralists in my re-
26 In Benin, the word “partner” when referring to China is outdated. Political discourses often use the 
term “ami” meaning “friend”. It is very common to hear political leaders say “nos amis les Chinois” or 
“nos amis chinois” (cf. Goutchili, 2008; Awassi, 2015). The Ambassadors of China in Benin often use 
in their speeches “nos amis Béninois” or “nos deux pays frères et amis” (cf. Shengli, 2012; China-Embas-
sy, 2009; China-Embassy, 2014). On social media the partnership between Benin Government and 
China is perceived as disparaged complicity. It is portrayed that in the future one could have more Be-
nin citizens of Chinese origin through a kind of invasion or tactful conquest (cf. Couao-zotti, 2014). 
Some politicians and trade union actors also talk about “new colonization” by China (Slate Afrique, 
2012). In any case, the Chinese presence is increasingly strong in socio-economic and political arenas 
in Benin (cf. Dupré and Shi, 2008).
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search site and how this is related to the overall socio-technological transformations 
underway in Benin Republic.
Access, property, territorialization, belonging  3.2 
and citizenship
With technological, socio-economic and political dynamics in the 21st century, land 
issue has become more crucial than ever; and this is even stronger in African coun-
tries and other countries of the Global South (cf. Lund, 2011a; 2011b). Therefore, 
transformation in pastoral settings cannot be discussed without referring to how 
natural resources are obtained and used by various groups of stakeholders. In the 
socio-anthropological literature, access to land or natural resources is not considered 
synonymous with land ownership or resources that have become properties. These 
two concepts are often confused and need to be clarified to give my readers a clear 
understanding of what I mean when I use one or other of the two concepts in this 
document. I will refer mainly to Ribot and Peluso who “theorized access”.
Access is defined as a “bundle of powers” or “the ability to derive benefits from 
things”; with things being persons, institutions, material objects and symbols (Ribot 
and Peluso, 2003). Talking about access to land or other natural resources, consists 
of somehow to establishing the profiles (who does and who does not), the condi-
tions, the possibilities or the countless ways in which individuals or institutions can 
provide, benefit from or enjoy these resources. The authors have made appeals to 
the notion of “ability”, equated with power, which allows social actors to use various 
socio-economic and technological strategies, structural or relational, legal or illegal, 
legitimate or illegitimate, to afford the rights of use to given resources at a given time 
and in a given geographical area (Ribot, 1998: 310; Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 154). 
The property as a “bundle of rights” or “the right to benefit from things” rather 
refers to “some kind of socially acknowledged and supported claim or right – wheth-
er that acknowledgment is by law, custom, or convention” (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 
156). In other words, the property returns to the legal – or illegal but collectively le-
gitimized – rights of use and enjoyment, granted to social actors, to natural resourc-
es. As a result, the property is like a component or included within the access (Ribot, 
1998: 312). This distinction will help better understand how Fulani pastoralists can 
settle, live and graze on land for decades without ever owning the property, and can 
therefore be expelled one day by those who claim to hold the property rights.
When power games reach a level where access to resources is no longer open to 
everybody, but restricted to a given social fringe, the concept of territorialization is 
best placed to better reflect these dynamics. Territorialization simply means terri-
tory making as a result of land pressure and power plays involving competing actors 
struggling for access and use of natural resources. It encompasses all the means by 
which some can be included and others excluded from given geographical boundar-
ies through the assertion of an authority that implicitly or explicitly allocate rights 
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and control access (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Peluso, 2005; Pourtier, 2005: 39). 
More specifically, it represents:
A spatial strategy deployed by actors (individuals, institutions, government) 
involved in power games to control access and use of a resource through a 
geographical area over which these actors seek recognition of their author-
ity. [Accordingly], previously abundant resources with relatively easy access 
(land, pasture, timber and non-timber forest products etc.) become subjected 
to control and appropriation attempts. (Gonin, 2014: 436)
Territorialization can be from above with strong intentional intervention by the 
State, or from the bottom as a result of deliberate or unintentional practices of local 
actors. In both cases the State through its policies and various development interven-
tions still seems to be directly or indirectly involved in territorialization processes by 
supporting somehow the unequal power relation among rural actors (Vandergeest 
and Peluso, 1995; Bassett and Gautier, 2014; Gonin, 2014).
In a context where social actors competitively try as much as they can to secure 
their rights to use and enjoy the natural resources contestations and conflicts often 
arise (Sikor and Lund, 2009; Peluso and Lund, 2011). The social tensions, as the 
authors pointed out, are not necessarily related to access or use per se. It is rather the 
dynamics of access legitimization, supported by some logistics of control, security or 
exclusion, which are often the basis for the land troubles frequently found in con-
temporary African societies. In some cases of land competition, belonging becomes 
important. Some actors guided by their own subjectivities and agendas, put forward 
the argument of belonging, making therefore more complex the existing set of rules 
around which the many existing institutions exercise their authority over the alloca-
tion of rights (Lund, 2011b). The belonging issue has occupied an increasingly grow-
ing place in land claims, as it also allows for citizenship to sometimes be instrumen-
talized, both nationally and locally, for exclusionary purposes (ibid). Jacob and Le 
Meur (2010) conceptualized that one may well be a citizen at national level with all 
the rights associated thereto (national citizenship) without being a local citizen (local 
citizenship), and therefore devoid of access rights to resources, if one is not recognized 
in the given socio-political setting as being an autochthon (first settler). These con-
cepts are important in helping to demonstrate how denying local citizenship is one 
of the strongest weapons brandished against the Fulani pastoralists of my research 
site by local farmer groups, as a way to exclude them from land and resources that the 
former increasingly need to fulfill socio-economic and political purposes.
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Science and Technology Studies (STS)3.3 
Technology definitions
There is in the literature a plurality of definitions of what can be called technology. 
In this part of my work, I have selected some definitions that allow me to qualify 
this or that “thing”, a technology. This is what I will present now before elaborating 
much more on how scientists perceive the relationships between technology and hu-
man society.
MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985: 3f.) distinguished three different ways to define 
technology: First, technology refers to sets of physical objects. Thus, a computer, a 
mobile phone, a hoe, a tractor, a cart, a chainsaw and the like are all technologies. This 
definition considers only “hardware”, but does not take into account the processes 
through which a conglomerate of physical materials that were previously useless, 
suddenly become useful and fully integrated into the daily lives of human beings. 
This led the authors to the second definition of technology that combines human 
activities with the artifacts or technological objects. Accordingly, “hoe-making” for 
instance by the Seko27 people in northern Benin, may be perceived as a technology, 
involving both foundry equipment that is the stove, and the work of the blacksmiths 
themselves. Since the work of a blacksmith requires a certain amount of know-how 
emanating from the society in which he lives, therefore technology appears also to be 
equated with knowledge. From this third definition, one might infer that the way to 
use pesticides in crop farming as well as how rural actors plant a particular tree spe-
cies all come from a technological know-how. This position is inspired by Ferguson’s 
argument (1977) that technological “things” – such as, for instance in my study area, 
agricultural chemicals and seedlings of given crop varieties or plant species – would 
have no meaning without a minimum of societal expertise that puts them into use or 
reshapes them so that they are really useful. 
To be even more encompassing, one could rely on a definition by Spier (1970: 
2) reported in Pfaffenberger (1992: 497). For the author, all means used by hu-
man beings to control or induce changes in their natural environment can be called 
technologies. From this point of view, I am right to call the following technologies: 
tractors, pesticides, land certificates, plant seedlings, and many other things to be 
discovered throughout this book. This way I position myself in aligning with science 
and technology studies, for which technology includes a broader set of elements, in-
volving physical artifacts, technological principles, features, procedures and manuals, 
the knowledge and skills that accompany them, etc (Vinck, 2012: 126). Now that 
I have briefly defined what can be understood by technology in this work, I am going 
to explain how technology and society interact.
27 The Seko are blacksmiths in Batonu language. They correspond to Agbede and Flenon respectively in 
Yoruba and Fon communities of Benin.
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Technology and society interactions
There are considerable differences in how the relationship between technology and 
society is explained. Three main groups of approaches exist to determine how the 
social is articulated with the technological: 1) technological determinism; 2) social 
constructivism; and 3) co-construction theories. I would like to summarize these 
debates before stating how STS is used in this study.
Technological determinism sees technology as an external factor, an intruder in-
troduced into society, having positive or negative impacts on the latter. In this regard, 
technology carries social change and shapes significantly the nature and the overall 
development of society, without being mutually influenced (Mackay and Gillespie, 
1992: 686; Brinkman et al. 2009: 70). This is somehow the alignment of the society 
with the technological system to achieve convergence (Vinck, 2012: 126). This quite 
influential theoretical stance was widely criticized and deemed insufficient on its own 
to explain the different relationships between technology and society. MacKenzie 
and Wajcman (1985) pointed out that many technologies that have been designed, 
and their impacts, have followed unpredicted trajectories dictated by a variety of 
factors, which may be politico-institutional, socio-economic and so forth. These au-
thors as well as many others thus rejected the argument of exogeneity and autonomy 
of technology in relation to society, and postulated a Social Shaping of Technology 
(SST).
This SST approach as “an antidote to naïve technological determinism” (Winner, 
2009: 251), allowed scientists to think in other ways about technology-society inter-
actions by scrutinizing the processes through which technologies embody and reflect 
various social interests in both their forms and contents (Mackay and Gillespie, 1992: 
686; Russell and Williams, 2002: 38). Inspired by the constructivist principle of 
the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), Pinch and Bijker pioneered the Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) through which they showed that technological 
artifacts are socially constructed just as social facts are also built technologically. They 
observed that there are many ways for any technology to emerge and develop; and 
therefore subject to an “interpretative flexibility”. A given form of the technology 
eventually comes into being as a result of choices and negotiations involving “rel-
evant social groups” who have interests in that technology (Pinch and Bijker, 1984; 
1986; Bijker, 1995; 2012; Bijker et al. 2012). The finally “stable” version of the tech-
nology is then seen as product of a “closure”, which refers to the streamlining of all 
the possibilities of interpretation, leading to gradual mastering of the controversies 
surrounding the technology (Bruun and Hukkinen, 2003: 101). 
The SCOT perspective emphasizes the open character of an innovative process, 
making the trajectory of a technology depend to a large extent on social meanings 
and uses constructed and negotiated locally by various stakeholders (Vinck, 2012: 
130). One of the main weaknesses of this approach is postulating the existence of a 
stable set of social and economic forces that determine the direction of technological 
development (ibid: 131). It also fails in providing explanations on how controver-
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sies and competing interpretations among social actors are resolved to give rise to 
some closure-based technological objects (Bruun and Hukkinen, 2003: 103). These 
criticisms are found in works by some authors who have shown that there is neither 
stability nor convergence in technological development. Socio-economic, and other 
forces present, attempt to influence this development tending to make the so-called 
stable format of a technology evolve towards a specific version, depending on the 
conditions of use (Vinck et al. 2004). 
Science and technology studies have finally evolved towards theories defend-
ing the co-construction of society and technology. Thomas Hughes was inspired 
by the scientific adventure of Thomas Edison to demonstrate that the success of 
electrical power has been the result of a “seamless web” involving a plurality of local 
and national forces; scientific, economic, social, technological and even political, 
etc (Hughes, 1983; 1985; 1986; 1991; 2012; Mackay and Gillespie, 1992: 686; 
Akrich, 1994:17; Pfaffenberger, 1992: 498; Law, 2012). To demonstrate that tech-
nology and society cannot be considered as separate entities simply influencing each 
other, Hughes used the concept of a socio-technological system through which he 
highlighted that technology is always a product of several spheres namely scientific, 
engineering, financial and political for example.
The Actor Network Theory (ANT) has been developed by authors such as Bruno 
Latour, John Law, Madeleine Akrich, Michel Callon (cf. Callon, 1981; 1986; Callon 
and Law, 1982; Callon and Latour, 2006; Latour, 1986; 1988; 1990; Akrich, 1989; 
1992; 1994; 1998; Akrich et al. 2006; Law, 1991; 1992; 2012; Sismondo, 2010: 
81), who rejected any a priori distinction between technology and society, assuming 
that technological innovation is the result of forces of various kinds, working togeth-
er and achieving networks in which their identities are renegotiated, redefined and 
reconfigured continuously. Absolutely heterogeneous components encompassed in 
the language of “actants” – human and non-human, social and non-social, animate 
and inanimate, economic and non-economic, political and apolitical, physical and 
non-physical, chemical and non-chemical, material and immaterial – can come to-
gether and ally with each other through a “heterogeneous engineering” (Law, 2012), 
to give a specific configuration of a technological system. The network thus formed 
then becomes an assemblage of heterogeneous elements, more or less dense and sta-
ble or, alternatively, weakly bound and fragile (Vinck, 2012: 136). Accordingly, the 
emergence of a new technology is evidence of destabilization of the old order and the 
rise in power of a new socio-technological order, enshrining new arrangements, new 
connections and gradual stabilization of a new network of actants (ibid). Any new 
socio-technological constellation of human and non-human players is assumed to be 
the result of a translation, an important concept as I am going to clarify.
“Translation” highlights the process through which some social or technological 
forces are dissociated from the network to which they belong, to be recruited and 
integrated into a new network, for the establishment of a new socio-technological 
order. For Callon and Latour (2006: 12f.), translation refers to: 
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All negotiations, intrigues, acts of persuasion, calculations, violence, thanks to 
which an actor or force takes, or causes to be conferred on itself, authority to 
speak or act on behalf of another actor or force”. By saying “we” for example, 
an actor “thereby translates other actors into a single aspiration of which he 
becomes the master or the spokesperson. He gains power. He develops […]. 
Callon (1986) identified four steps for translation to happen. The first step of “Prob-
lematization” is when some actors raise socio-technological issues, while identifying 
and targeting the human and non-human entities to be removed, and those to be 
recruited and associated to move forward. The actors define the issues so as to be es-
sential and unavoidable to their resolution, becoming therefore “Obligatory Passage 
Points” (OPP). The “Interessement” is the second step and consists in the gradual 
dissolution of pre-existing links and their replacement by new links acting for a 
new network to come into being and succeed. Therefore, actors mobilize speeches, 
objects and devices intended to seduce, attract and bind different players to the new 
network. The third step in the translation process is the “Enrolment”. It includes a 
process of defining and stabilizing the roles prescribed for each actor through the 
problematization. At this level, each actor is fixed on what to do for collective suc-
cess to be achieved. This paves the way for “Alignment”, the last step, referring to the 
adjustment of the human and non-human entities mobilized for the consolidation 
and stabilization of the new network put in place (Vinck, 2012: 136). 
With ANT, the researcher starts with the perspective that everything is moving. 
Everything can change, everything is negotiable and everything is possible as long as 
one can never have absolute mastery of all the forces that might emerge and modify 
the course of technological developments. This is also why Latour (1986: 267) ar-
gued that:
The spread in time and space of anything – claims, orders, artifacts, goods – is 
in the hands of people; each of these people may act in many different ways, 
letting the token drop, or modifying it, or deflecting it, or betraying it, or add-
ing to it, or appropriating it.
In the same vein, Wajcman (2000: 451) added that: 
The user interacts with the pre-inscribed artefact, and can challenge and rene-
gotiate the meanings and uses of the artefacts.
This reinterpretation or renegotiation of technology is so important that Mackay and 
Gillespie (1992) castigated that it is sometimes ignored or overlooked in the rich and 
abundant debates on the interactions between technology and society. Beyond the 
forces involved in designing, producing and marketing technologies, it is also im-
portant to understand how technologies transferred from outside, are appropriated 
locally by their users. The authors posited that:
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People are not merely malleable subjects who submit to the dictates of a tech-
nology: in their consumption they are not the passive dupes suggested by 
crude theorists of ideology, but active, creative and expressive – albeit socially 
situated – subjects. People may reject technologies, redefine their functional 
purpose, customize or even invest idiosyncratic symbolic meanings in them. 
[…]. They may redefine a technology in a way that defies its original, designed 
and intended purpose […]. The user may bring to bear on a technology an 
intention which was not foreseen by the technology’s designer. (Mackay and 
Gillespie, 1992: 698ff.)
This statement calls for paying special attention to how rural actors interact with 
various technologies that are made available to them through various rural develop-
ment policies. By doing so myself, I also seemed to be in perfect connection with the 
evolutionary thoughts developed by some authors on human society and technologi-
cal progress. I would like to refer to Pfaffenberger who summed up that: 
The recipient appropriating culture can reinterpret the transferred artifact as 
it sees fit […]. Every human society is a world in the process of becoming, in 
which people are engaged in the active technological elaboration, appropria-
tion, and modification of artifacts as the means of coming to know themselves 
and of coordinating labor to sustain their lives. (Pfaffenberger, 1992: 511) 
Looking at the technology appropriation culture (cf. also De Bruijn et al. 2009: 12) 
of rural actors enables us to see how they manage to perpetuate their livelihoods in a 
competing context of natural resources access. Several other concepts can be found 
in the literature and convey virtually the same reality of the transformation of the 
meanings or the uses of technologies in everyday life. They will not be very opera-
tional in this document, but should be mentioned; with examples such as “domes-
tication” (Lie and Sørensen, 1996), “contextualization” (Rip and Schot, 2002; De 
Bruijn et al. 2009: 12), or “re-purposing” (Nilsson and Salazar, 2015), etc.
As shown in these sections, STS should in no way be taken as a homogeneous 
approach. Sismondo (2010: 57) pointed out that there are several social construc-
tions in STS with each approach inducing its own implications for research. To avoid 
confusions and amalgams, I want to specify where and how STS has been useful in 
my work. The science and technology studies are used in this book to show how as-
semblages of various socio-economic, technological and political factors have led to 
pastoral resources dwindling and the eviction of Fulani pastoralists from land they 
have been using for decades. In presenting how power relations between farmers and 
pastoralists have become more imbalanced through the approach of political ecology, 
I made use of the concept of reinterpretation or renegotiation of technology. This 
enabled me to better account for the different meanings and uses acquired by various 
technologies used by rural farmers to lay claims or increase their power over land. I 
have finally called on the notion of “translation” to explain the socio-technological 
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process that led to the creation of autonomous livestock markets that the Fulani 
leaders showcase to attract external donors as part of their extroversion strategies in 
their “development brokerage”. In the perspective adopted in this study, I have pre-
supposed no difference between context, local stakeholders and technologies. I have 
considered all of them as actants influencing and building each other continuously, 
to determine how pastoral practices are shaped and reshaped every day in northern 
Benin where I carried out my ethnographic research.
Development brokerage and brokers3.4 
The relationship between macro and micro spheres almost always leaves room for 
mediation spaces. This results in the emergence of actors who try, through multiple 
strategies, to ensure the connection between levels using available resources such as 
information, financial capital or patron-client networks etc., to control the uncer-
tainties at the juncture/interface of these two worlds (Long and Villarreal, 1993; 
Long, 1994). This role is similar to that of “gatekeepers”, who maintain somehow a 
double identity as being both “outsider” and “insider”, gaining therefore some mar-
gins of maneuver (cf. Mendras, 1976; Igoe, 2003; 2006; Igoe and Kelsall, 2005).
Development brokerage is a recently developed theoretical perspective in An-
thropology of Social Change and Development, but the concept of broker itself 
was borrowed from Political Anthropology where scientists have tried to understand 
the doings of political brokers. Several studies have focused on political brokers in a 
dichotomous approach considering an inclusive society holding power over a sub-
sumed society. The concept has evolved with some authors who argued that more 
varied and unstable configurations of power relations in postmodern contexts exist 
(cf. Boissevain, 1974; Cohen and Comaroff, 1976). More recent works by Olivier 
de Sardan and Bierschenk (1993), Blundo (1995), Le Meur (1996), as well as the 
case studies compiled in the volume by Bierschenk et al. (2000) Brokers in develop-
ment: The African villages in search of projects28 have shared the latter perspective and 
offered significant theoretical advances on how to design research and analyze the 
position of development brokers and other median-level players in African countries. 
My ethnographic study among the Fulani pastoralist associations in northern Benin 
has drawn more particularly on this approach of which I will now try to summarize 
some key lines.
Bierschenk et al. (2000: 7), define the development brokers as:
The social actors established in a local arena [...] serving as intermediaries to 
drain towards the social space corresponding to this arena, external resources 
within the scope of development aid. [...]. The brokers include the local so-
cial project promoters; they provide the interface between the recipients of 
28 “Courtiers en développement : Les villages africains en quête de projets”.
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the project and the development institutions; they are supposed to represent 
the local population, or express the “needs” vis-à-vis the external support and 
funding structures. [...]. Far from being passive operators in logic of assistant-
ship, development brokers are the key figures in the irresistible projects’ seek-
ing in African villages and around them.
From this definition, the authors perceive development brokers as being genuine 
social entrepreneurs and not simply social agents passively facing dilemmas. They 
are active and enterprising in mobilizing development rent to implement local de-
velopment activities. Therefore, they mobilize a wide range of skills that can be rhe-
torical, organizational, scenic and relational. Beyond these credentials, which can be 
found with the “small brokers” or “barefoot brokers”, there are also “large brokers” 
or “professional brokers” who hold two additional abilities. They are able to design, 
by themselves or through support from experts in their relational network, a variety 
of development projects to get funding. Further, they have the competence in get-
ting directly into contact with policymakers without intermediaries (Bierschenk et 
al. 2000: 26ff.).
The median-level actors transform the meaning of “things” and “deeds” giving 
them different connotations that can enable them to meet effectively the needs of 
the players between which they mediate. In this political strategy of “management 
of meaning” (Cohen and Comaroff, 1976), they raise, using “dressed-window” or 
“showcase”, development funds provided by external donors, and drain them after-
wards into their favorite area for implementing development initiatives in favor of 
their constituencies. Showcases to attract development funds may be of several kinds. 
Using spectacularly prepared songs, creeds, slogans, theater and rhythms, Mongbo 
(2000) as a representative of a non-governmental organization, was enrolled in the 
anonymous village of Gliten in Benin, by a group of women assembled and sup-
ported by some local brokers. Similarly, a market garden was the showcase of a group 
from Malem-Hodar in Senegal (Coll, 2000: 117). These successful achievements 
(cultural, socio-economic, technological, etc.) are often the means by which brokers 
hold a positive image, credibility and trust with foreign donors.
In this vein of “showcasing” their successes or “making” the concerns of their 
communities known to external partners, development brokers can use three possible 
strategies (Neubert, 2000: 255f.): They can present the situation as it exists locally: 
this is the “true reality”. They can ignore the major needs of the local populations and 
embrace other less significant issues, such as to fit well into the agenda of the external 
partners: this is the “distorted reality”. Finally, the brokers, in compliance with the 
agenda of donors can willingly present a picture totally out of touch with the local 
realities, using therefore a “phantom reality”. Blundo (2000: 93), conceptualized 
these practices as being the “art of make-believe”. 
The strategy of brokers is not only oriented towards external actors. It also seeks 
to increase and improve their local clientage networks to fulfil their own economic 
and socio-political agenda. Accordingly, by masquerading themselves as people very 
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much concerned with the development of their communities, they transform the 
presence of external actors (foreign donors, government officials and others) into 
valuable capital to mobilize the grassroots (cf. Blundo, 2000; Coll, 2000; Kossi, 
2000). 
Development brokerage and politics straddle each other so often. Blundo (1995) 
argued that the brokerage is a springboard for political commitment. This strad-
dling generally leaves room for power struggles and the search for new compromises 
among power holders (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 33). Since the brokerage takes place 
in a local context where several political forces pre-exist (traditional, administrative 
and decentralized political authorities, etc.), the brokers may induce some political 
reshuffling, strengthening or weakening, as the case may be, of certain powers in 
their own favor (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 31ff.). They adopt local or regional “anchor-
ing strategies”, as appropriate, to improve their patron-clientage, or “neutralizing 
strategies” to challenge and overthrow if possible the existing powers. These political 
strategies could lead to the achievement of a peaceful coexistence between the local 
development brokers and those who hold the local political power (ibid: 32).
Though they become generally “people of networks” (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 20) 
development brokers do not necessarily choose deliberately this brokerage career. 
Nobody is born a development broker, and local development brokering is not an 
intended or planned career in African countries. Many people have become develop-
ment brokers “reluctantly” (Geschiere, 1982; Lavigne Delville, 2000: 166; Tidjani 
Alou, 2000). Bierschenk et al. (2000) assumed that becoming involved in develop-
ment brokerage is rather the result of “logic of discovery”, arguing that:
Becoming a broker is not necessarily the result of a planned acquisition of 
skills such as that of a trainee wishing to become a craftsman. [Some brokers] 
have gradually shifted from humanitarian and political activism (in the broad-
est sense) to development activism, without any clear or deliberate strategy. 
The “career” of development broker is not a matter of stubborn and patient 
implementation of a purposive plan; it is much more a sense of “discovery” 
that can also be described as “procedural” in the course of the action itself. The 
intentionality is not totally absent – for example, activist intent or associative 
engagement – but it is usually not focused at first on brokerage activities as 
such. Other conditions, the future broker has no control of, are essential to 
lead him in that way. (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 23f.; emphasis added)
Exploring associative struggles of the pastoral sector in Benin, I would assume that 
this process of discovery could be seen as the result of multiple “positionings” and 
“repositionings” operated by Fulani activists in the face of various opportunities and 
challenges. What I am putting forward as being concrete in the concepts of position-
ings and repositionings?
“Positionings” (in plural form) is a concept proposed and developed by Hodgson 
(2011), to analyze the “dynamic contours and content of the post-colonial political 
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struggle in a neoliberal world”. The concept was used by the author to explore, from 
a “nodal ethnography”, how Maasai activists and organizations in Tanzania have 
politically positioned and repositioned themselves in the face of local, national and 
transnational opportunities and constraints. She clearly states that: 
The concept of positionings encompasses and signals the interlocking strug-
gles over representation, recognition, resources, and rights that are central to 
any form of political action. […]. Positionnings, therefore, incorporate and 
index agency, structure, meaning, and power; they demonstrate the articu-
lation of political economy and cultural domains of meaning, signification, 
and representation. […]. Positionings are thus, by definition, inherently re-
lational. Individuals and groups position themselves for and against certain 
ideas, issues, institutions, and identities. As a result, any one positioning has 
consequences for other relationships, for other positionings, often at distinct 
political scales. (Hodgson, 2011: 8f.) 
In dealing with rights of access to land and natural resources, self-determination and 
socio-economic and political inclusion of Fulani in Benin, these concepts seem very 
useful in explaining how the pastoralist organizations came into being, proliferated 
and asserted themselves at local, national and transnational levels. Through analyzing 
the passage from a single cultural association in the 1980s to a variety of so-called 
professional associations, my ethnographic study reveals the socio-political agenda 
shaping and reshaping the fight for pastoralist representation and inclusion in a neo-
liberal context.
By mobilizing development brokerage, positionnings and repositionnings con-
cepts to analyze the civil society struggle of pastoralist organizations in Benin, I would 
like to divest myself of all possible negative or positive prejudices. I have given to 
these concepts no pejorative connotations. I have used them in the most neutral 
sense to try to understand the dynamics of mobilizing development funds from the 
highest levels, and how it drains down the lower levels, as a strategy of defense among 
marginalized groups like Fulani pastoralists in northern Benin. I intend to show how 
Fulani herders in northern Benin have shifted from an originally cultural identity 
struggle to a primarily economic-oriented activism promoting autonomous livestock 
markets, to finally take root in a struggle of professionalization and grassroots devel-
opment. The purpose of the analysis is to elucidate the actual impacts of Fulani elites’ 
activism on the local Fulani herders, with regard to their long-standing claims of land 
rights, natural resources access, livelihood improvement and political inclusion. Af-
ter clarifying all concepts and theoretical positions to which I have resorted, I would 
like now to schematize the analytical framework that governed the organization of 
my findings and analysis.
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Analytical framework3.5 
As this study aims to scrutinize the socio-technological changes in Fulani communi-
ties of northern Benin, it must answer three main questions ubiquitous in recent 
debates on the future of pastoralism. The first question is whether pastoralism in 
Benin and more specifically in northern Benin is threatened or not. If it is then what 
are the major threats? The second question is whether or not pastoralists individually 
or collectively adapt to any crisis. The third is whether, in the light of the answers to 
the first two questions, pastoralism carries some mark of sustainability or not. To an-
swer these questions, I will use an analytical framework with two main components 
(Figure 3.1). The first component will focus on shocks and factors that could help to 
scrutinize the crisis of pastoralism in Benin. The second component will address the 
adaptive strategies developed by pastoralists. I will present on one hand the responses 
of individual households; and on the other, the collective action through the pasto-
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Figure 3.1: Synthetic analytical framework of socio-technological change among pastoralists
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Conclusion3.6 
This chapter provides the necessary clarifications for understanding the various con-
cepts that allowed me to do my analysis in this document. This led to a synthetic ana-
lytical framework. Political ecology will allow me to analyze the context of access to 
pastoral resources for herders by focusing more on technologies and power relations 
between local actors. This will also open the way to looking at the alternative ways of 
adaptation, since political ecology after identifying the forces at work in the ecologi-
cal struggles tries also to figure out how actors deal with changes by relying upon 
various alternative means (Robbins, 2012). Beyond individual strategies observed 
at the household level, I will attach particular importance to collective action in the 
face of change. For this, I will use the development brokerage and positionings/repo-
sitionings in civil society organization struggles to better account for the associative 
dynamics underway within Fulani communities in northern Benin. But before going 
to the empirical chapters where this analysis will be performed, I will first present my 
study area and my methodological approach. The next chapter (Chapter 4) is entirely 
devoted to my research setting.

From battlefield to showcase  4 
in livestock production
Gogounou District in northern Benin
This chapter puts my research site in perspective. It focuses on the geographical, 
ecological, socio-economic and political features that help to better put the study 
area in context. I will first present the profile of Benin Republic before taking a closer 
look at the specific patterns of Gogounou District where the research took place. 
The data used in this chapter come mainly from secondary sources. They are largely 
drawn from national policy documents, previous studies of and development plans 
for Gogounou District. However, some of them are from databases accessed during 
my fieldwork and this is the case for the climate series (1970–2010), from which 
I have drawn a chart to provide useful information about the evolution of rainfall 
in Gogounou over forty years. This is contrasted with empirical data on how local 
populations perceive the evolution of rainfall in their area. Climate change issues 
became less relevant in the local context of livestock production and did not form 
a major part of my fieldwork (cf. Chapter 5). However I was able to capture, in my 
daily conversations with people, the overall perception of the local populations. All 
information herein is selected so as to highlight some changes in connection with 
pastoralism, which is my main focus.
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National context of livestock production4.1 
Geographic and demographic characteristics
Located in the West African bight of Guinea, Benin Republic covers a total area of 
114,763 square km. The country is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean (on 121 km) 
in the south, Niger (on 266 km) and Burkina-Faso (on 306 km) in the north, Ni-
geria (on 773 km) in the east and Togo (on 644 km) in the west (Heldmann et al. 
2009: 5f.). Benin is divided into twelve provinces and the provinces are split up into 
seventy-seven districts (DGDGL, 2010: 9ff.).29 Porto-Novo is the political capital of 
the country, but Cotonou is not just the largest city, but also the economic center 
and hosts many important administrative services. The population of Benin was 
estimated at 9,983,884 inhabitants in 2013 of whom 51.2% are females (INSAE, 
2013a: 2). The country is a multicultural sphere, with fifty-nine ethnic groups and 
diverse religions. According to the national census of 2002, the population is 27% 
Roman Catholic, 24% Muslim, 17% Vodun, 5% Celestial Christian and 6% prac-
titioners of indigenous religions. Many other Christian groups and religious sects, 
each accounting for less than 5% are widespread, and 7% of the population claims 
no religious affiliation (USCIRF, 2013: 1). The religious context is also characterized 
by a clear predominance of Christians in the south and of Muslims in the north.30 
However, religious syncretism is a common practice in Benin. Many individuals who 
nominally belong to the aforementioned major religions are also well engaged in dif-
ferent forms of traditional beliefs and practices (ibid). 
French is the official language, but the fifty-nine ethnic groups speak different 
dialects grouped into ten community languages. The most spoken languages are: Fon 
and related dialects (39.2%), Adja and related dialects (15.2%), Yoruba and related 
dialects (12.3%), Bariba and related dialects (9.2%), Fulfulde and related dialects 
(7%), etc. (INSAE, 2003: 19; Heldmann, 2009; Gnacadja et al. 2011: 2). The Ful-
fulde is the mother tongue of the Fulani pastoralists to be found almost everywhere 
in the country. According to the mapping of ethnic groups, the Fulani pastoral-
ists are concentrated in the northern provinces of Alibori (22.1%), Borgou (20%), 
Donga (11.5%) and Atacora (9.8%). According to the 2002 census, they represented 
26% of all ethnic groups in northern Benin (INSAE, 2003: 19ff.). Now, where did 
the Benin Fulani really come from?
29 A district (“Commune” in French language) is a decentralized local authority administered by an 
elected council called Municipal Council. A “Commune” is divided into “Arrondissement”; and each 
“Arrondissement” might have several cities and villages (cf. DGDGL, 2010: 9ff.). Throughout this 
document I will use “District” for “Commune”, “Province” for “Département” and “Region” for  
“Arrondissement”.
30 This religious mapping is perceived as the third big difference that feeds the North-South divide in 
Benin: see France Volontaires (2010).
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Fulani origin, migration and settlement in Benin
The origin of Fulani in Africa is always associated with myths and stereotypes as 
noted by Bierschenk (1999: 195f.). But beyond the contradictions in the literature 
and the unknowns to be discovered, there are some parallels which, however, allow 
the understanding of where Fulani come from. The expansion of Fulani pastoralists 
in West Africa is often explained by both peaceful and warlike migrations (Fage, 
1995: 14). Seeking water, pasture, political peace or non-infested areas, several Fu-
lani groups between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries moved from the southwest 
of the Sahara to settle in various, more favorable regions of West Africa. Their origin 
would be between Senegal and Lake Chad (Stenning, 1957; 1959; Dupire, 1970; 
UNESCO, 2008: 1042; Homewood, 2008: 22).
Lombard (1957) was the first ethnologist to talk about the origins of Benin Fu-
lani. In a four-page article entitled “Quelques notes sur les Peuls du Dahomey” pub-
lished in “Notes Africaines”, the author noted the difficulties in being able to date 
with certainty the arrival of Fulani in Benin. However, he made it clear that Fulani 
groups settled in northern Benin in the early eighteenth century from peaceful mi-
grations essentially from Gurma-land in Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso) 
and partly from the northern Gold Coast, current Ghana.31 Other groups would 
have come later from Niger, claiming a distant origin: the Futa Toro, which lies to 
the north of Senegal (Lombard, 1965: 95). The ravages of trypanosomiasis and the 
strong politico-military regime of Bariba groups pointed to the likelihood that Benin 
would have been among the last peaceful destinations of Fulani, since the prolifera-
tion of Fulani in Mossi and Gurma-lands, and then Katsina and Gobir lands dates 
back to the seventeenth century (Labouret, 1955: 29 cited by Lombard, 1965: 95).32 
To add to this diversity, Van Driel (2002: 54) also noted other Fulani who came 
from Nigeria and settled in the Niger valley in northern Benin. There does not seem 
to be a collective, abundant and definitive migration of Fulani in Benin. Fulani are 
spread across the country from north to south and from east to west. However, they 
are more concentrated in Borgou region (current Borgou and Alibori Provinces). 
31 There are many contradictions on the installation period of the Fulani in northern Benin. In older 
literature, Marty (1926: 174 quoted in Lombard, 1965: 96) reported that the first migratory west-east 
flow of pastoralists to Batoumbu country dates back to the eighteenth century. Brégand (1998: 18) 
rather indicated that the first waves of Fulani arrived in the Borgou in the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies. They lived in the bush, taking care of the herds of Wasangari. Blench (1994: 201) talked about 
a more recent presence of Fulani pastoralists in Borgou region, assuming that their settlement between 
Ilorin (Nigeria) and Nikki and Kandi (Benin) dated only from the nineteenth century. This argument 
of newest settlement in the nineteenth century was also footnoted by Guichard (2000: 114).
32 According to Débourou (2013: 58), the Fulani Jihad of early nineteenth century failed in penetrat-
ing Borgou region because of the power of the Bariba kingdom. Boutrais (1994a: 141) also confirmed 
that Fulani were welcomed in Borgou by Bariba leaders who also kept them out of political affairs, 
making them perpetually marginalized people. Bierschenk referring to Stenning (1957; 1959: 207 & 
221) has also shown that the immigration of Fulani in Borgou was not a great migration, but rather a 
“migratory drift” (Bierschenk, 1997: 32).
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The Sahelian droughts of the 1970s and 1980s would have pushed important waves 
of Fulani pastoralists lacking herds or seeking areas of relative productive resources 
availability to settle down in the northern Benin (Tonah, 2003; Ciavolella, 2013). 
Bassett and Turner (2007) argued that these southward livestock movements should 
not be seen as a “sudden shift”. It is rather a process having much to do with both 
factors of contingent (drought, livestock disease and political fragility), structural 
and adaptive (social network building, herding contract and cross-breeding) order. 
The pastoralist presence in northern Benin finds its very essence in the kind of ra-
tionality or legitimacy argument that often prevails upon pastoralists and livestock 
mobility in African arid and semi-arid environments (cf. Adriansen, 1999; Niamir-
Fuller, 1999; Adriansen and Nielsen, 2002).
Pastoral practices and evolution in northern Benin
Pastoralism in northern Benin meets the sedentary and semi-sedentary logics found 
in many parts of West Africa. Pastoralists live in stable settlements where their fami-
lies are installed with a small part of the herd for milk supply. They undertake sea-
sonal movements, with a lot of the herd, looking for water and pasture. Travelled 
distances often depend on the availability of resources which in turn, is determined 
by the harshness of the dry season. At the beginning of the rainy season, the animals 
return back to the dwelling camp for grazing on offshoots in uncultivated areas. 
When crop fields are being installed, they are isolated away from the local tie. This 
is the “small transhumance”. They return back during the harvest period to take 
advantage of crop residues and provide manure. When water availability becomes 
critical and there is also less stubble to feed on, they undertake the “great transhu-
mance” and only return on the resumption of rainfall (De Haan, 1995: 133; 1997: 
10; Bierschenk, 1996: 104; 1999: 204). This livestock-keeping model is shaped on 
ecological and socio-economic realities. Permanent readjustments may be involved 
in the pastoral calendar to enable herders to maximize the opportunities of accessing 
good quality pastoral resources. This ensures more secure management of the herds 
(Djenontin et al. 2012; Djohy et al. 2014a). Seeking areas abundant in water and 
pasture, escaping conflict spaces and exploring market opportunities may also influ-
ence the spatio-temporal options of the pastoralists in northern Benin (Djohy et al. 
2014b).
As shown by Bierschenk and Le Meur (1997) throughout their edited volume 
“Trajectoires peules au Benin: six études anthropologiques” and noted by De Bruijn 
(1999: 187) in her comment on the book, the livelihood of Fulani in northern Be-
nin is strongly related to that of their neighboring farmers and depends also on the 
relationships they establish with them despite their diversity. The pastoral system 
was characterized by a symbiotic relationship between herders and farmers, which 
has degenerated over time to make room for a kind of conflicting polarization (De 
Haan et al. 1990; De Haan, 1995: 137; 1998). The complementarity and reciprocity 
between Fulani herders and farming communities take many forms and is subject to 
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an evolutionary dynamic whose future is not predictable. Now, let me explain how 
farmer-herder coexistence has indeed evolved in northern Benin.
In northeastern Benin, predominated by Bariba ethnic groups, a kind of mutual 
influence created cattle herders among farming groups and farmers among Fulani 
pastoralists. This transformation was gradually induced by neighborhood relations, 
livestock guarding and manure contracts, which predominate as agro-pastoral sys-
tems in this region. In some cases a complete conversion of herders to sedentary ag-
riculture, or farmers who change to a type of transhumant herding occurs (De Haan, 
1997: 131; Djenontin et al. 2004; Djedjebi, 2009: 34; Djenontin, 2010: 3). In the 
northernmost of the country Dendi and Gourmantché farmers who dominate the 
Niger valley and are also involved in fishing activities, animal caretaking contracts 
have always maintained the links between the two groups until the 1980–90s. But 
resource scarcity, market orientation and draft animal promotion have contributed 
to a declining trust in existing relationships (De Haan et al. 1990; Van Driel, 1997; 
2002). In the northwest, Fulani herders have largely abandoned their pastoral life 
to get involved in cultivation, like their neighbors. The animals entrusted by local 
farmers represented an important part of the Fulani’s migrant livelihood in their 
early days in the area. The crisis of confidence over the years among actors almost 
completely dwindled these opportunities, which are now restricted to a small fringe 
(cf. Ciavolella, 2013; Droy and Bidou, 2015: 78).
Some modern livestock farms have also appeared over the years in urban and 
peri-urban areas, with greater or lesser involvement of Fulani herders. For example, 
in the vicinity of some towns in northwestern Benin, there are small-scale livestock 
farms belonging to businessmen (Alkoiret et al. 2011; Droy and Bidou, 2015: 78). 
Around Parakou, the metropolis of northern Benin, some private actors are also 
involved in breeding exotic cattle species known for good milk performance. These 
types of cattle-based, small-scale, individual enterprises can be encountered in Co-
tonou, Benin’s largest city and in many other secondary cities (cf. Assogba-Miguel, 
1999; Aboh et al. 2003; Floquet and Nansi, 2005; Djedjebi, 2009; Mama Sambo, 
2013: 5).
Despite this evolution of livestock systems, cattle-keeping remains technically, 
economically and socially strongly attached to the Fulani ethnic group. The loss 
of pastoral life by the Fulani is perceived as an identity crisis and a loss of their 
intrinsic cultural values. The authentic Fulani, who are thereby granted ethnic and 
cultural prestige, must possess cattle and, like their ancestors, have a bush life away 
from urban life and a non-sedentary lifestyle (Ciavolella, 2013). The socio-technical 
evolution of pastoralism, as I have begun by showing here, took place in a political 
landscape, which itself has evolved considerably over time, as I will present in more 
detail in Chapter 8. 
78 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
Ecological background of Benin Republic
The climate of Benin is subhumid tropical, influenced by the West African southwest 
Monsoon and the dusty northeast Harmattan (Ermert and Brücher, 2009: 17f.). An-
nual rainfall is about 900 to 1,300 millimeters. The average temperatures remain be-
tween 22° and 34°C with April and May being the hottest months. However, many 
nuances are recorded both seasonally and geographically within the climate patterns 
(Adam and Boko, 1993: 15f.). The southern part of the country is characterized by 
a sub-equatorial climate with four seasons; while the northern part registers two dis-
tinct seasons. Benin Republic is part of a fragmentation within the Guinea rain forest 
block, known as “Dahomey gap”. This is a forest relic causing climate anomaly with 
a decline in annual rainfall, a reduction of the sea level and air surface temperatures 
(Booth, 1958; Salzmann and Hoelzmann, 2005). During the period 1971–2000, 
the number of rainy days averaged 140 in the south and 80 in the extreme north of 
the country (Boko et al. 2012: 3). This has steadily declined by 11 to 28% over the 
period 1951–2010. The temperatures have increased by 1°C since 1995. The climate 
trend is more critical in the north, which is the main pastoral zone. By 2050, the 
probabilistic models on Benin climate predict a rise in average temperature of 0.9°C 
to 3°C (cf. Boko et al. 2012: 4; Lawin et al. 2013: 54). It is pointed out that the 
north is going to suffer from increased periodic rains of between 3.3 and 3.8%. On a 
seasonal scale, the length of the dry season will also increase with a decrease in rain-
fall from March to May (Boko et al. 2012: loc. cit.). These recorded climate patterns 
are blamed for the increase in the vulnerability of crop and livestock productions 
and might further compromise the development of the agricultural sector (PSRSA/
MAEP, 2011: 1; Lawin et al. 2013).
The Republic of Benin is characterized by an agro-ecological diversity and is 
split up into eight agro-ecological zones involving the districts undergoing the same 
physical, biological and social challenges, and in which populations develop specific 
coping strategies (PANA-Benin, 2008: 15ff.). The forest and tree cover was estimated 
at 7.67 million hectares (ha), representing 68% of the total area in 2007. The perma-
nent forest domains cover about 2.7 million hectares distributed between national 
parks (843,000 ha), wildlife reserves (420,000 ha) and 58 classified forests and refor-
estation spaces (1,436,500 ha) [FAO, 2010a: 5]. An overview of land use shows that 
the Benin vegetation is dominated respectively by closed-open shrub cover, broad-
leaved tree cover and cropland mosaics (Bartholomé and Belward, 2005; Lawin et al. 
2013: 58ff.). The vegetation was termed to have gradually undergone severe degrada-
tion because of agricultural expansion, pastoralist practices, uncontrolled logging ac-
tivities and bush fires. About 70,000 hectares of forest was cleared annually between 
1990 and 2000 (FAO, 2010a: 1). The gallery forests in the Sudano-Sahelian savan-
nahs of northern Benin were rich in noble species such as Khaya senegalensis, Khaya 
grandifoliola, Milicia excelsa, Afzelia africana, Isoberlinia spp. Some of these plants are 
very important for Fulani pastoralists who rely on them as browsing species to feed 
their animals during the period of forage shortage. Regrettably, most of these species 
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are currently over-exploited, and some of them are even endangered because of abuse 
and illegal logging (CES, 2011: 17).
Political and socio-economic patterns of Benin Republic
The Republic of Benin is making positive steps with democratic pluralism. This has 
been possible since the sovereign national conference in February 1990. From the 
adoption of the Constitution of 11 December 1990 up to 2016, Benin has peace-
fully organized six presidential elections, seven legislative elections and three local 
and municipal elections. The relative peace and freedom of expression that exist in 
Benin are not, however, enough to claim there is good political governance. The 
country regularly faces political and social crises that are being gradually overcome 
through constitutional and legal means (MAEP/REP, 2008: 8; MTFP-OIT, 2010: 
1; Badet, 2012). 
There is no overt government motivated discrimination towards specific ethnic 
groups or minorities. The Fulani, as well as all other ethnic groups in the country, can 
participate freely in the country’s political life. They are free to run and campaign for 
positions during local, parliamentary and presidential elections as full citizens pro-
tected by the constitutional provisions (cf. Government of Benin, 1990). Similarly, 
there is no repressive action exclusively oriented toward Fulani pastoralists. How-
ever, certain political decisions to control transhumance seem to have been designed 
principally to control the movement of Fulani pastoralists. This appears to be the 
case with “Operation Guépard”33. Launched in February 2013 by the Ministry of 
Interior and Public Security of Benin it mobilized a hundred gendarmes and soldiers 
and tasked them to track down and punish so-called “outlaws” such as pastoralists 
(mostly the immigrants from neighboring countries) as well as local farmers who do 
not respect the laws of transhumance. The main objective was to secure the popula-
tions and limit conflicts between local crop farmers and foreign Fulani pastoralists, 
33 This is one of the most controversial measures on transhumance control in Benin. “Opération Gué-
pard” meaning “Cheetah Operation” was to fight against the warlike and murderous transhumance 
practiced in southern and central Benin in recent years. Benoît Degla, the former Minister of Interior 
and Public Security portraying the new form of transhumance in Benin stated “But in the practice [of 
transhumance], some deviances are deplored such as crop fields destruction, bloody and deadly clash-
es, rapes and arsons”. This government policy did not target specifically the Fulani pastoralists, but 
all the culprits of transhumance laws as the Minister put it: “In practice, the rules of transhumance 
are violated daily by transhumant herders as well as farmers and complicit persons”. About the name 
given to this operation, he made it clear saying: “Like the cheetah, our security and defense forces are 
called to hunt down these outlaws to their last retrenchment” (Government of Benin, 2013). I could 
emphasize that the management of information by the media and the various local interpretations 
have probably made of it a vector of contempt for the Fulani pastoralists in the country. For example, 
“La Presse du Jour” a daily newspaper in Benin published in its issue of 7 March 2013: “Since some 
weeks, people in some areas of Benin [Zè, Ouinhi, Zangnanado, Covè etc.] do not know where to 
turn. They are the prey of transhumant Fulani. With their herds, they vandalize, steal, rape, kill and 
pass. Unfortunately, at the nose and the beard of the Government that has resigned” (Anonrin, 2013). 
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which had become increasingly violent and bloody in parts of Benin such as Zou 
and Collines Provinces. However, this operation was manipulated very early on by 
the media and fueled stigma and discrimination towards the Fulani ethnic group. 
The Fulani pastoralists felt targeted with popular vindictiveness and with numerous 
stereotypes (robbers, rapists, murderers, outlaws, etc.) built and exacerbated daily by 
the media (cf. Government of Benin, 2013; Constitutional Court of Benin, 2014).
The socioeconomic context is characterized by a very weak human development. 
With a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.476, Benin ranked 165th in 2013 
out of 187 countries worldwide (UNDP, 2014: 159ff.). The GDP per capita was 
407,258 CFA francs34 in 2013 (INSAE, 2015). Its growth of 5.6% during this year 
was heavily dependent on cotton production and the port sector. The tertiary and 
primary sectors are the two main pillars of the economy, contributing respectively 
for 2.6 and 1.7 percentage points to the GDP growth (BCEAO, 2014: 22). The 
agricultural sector (livestock production included) involves more than 60% of active 
male and 35.9% of female assets. Its contribution to the GDP declined from 34.3% 
in 1995–2005 to 30.5% over the period 2005–2008. Crop production is promi-
nent and contributes 24.1% to the GDP, while animal production contributes about 
5.9% (PSRSA/MAEP, 2011: 8). 
The government policy on crop and livestock production is included in the 
Strategic Plan for Agricultural Sector Development (PSRSA35) implemented since 
2008. This document carries an ambitious vision, which plans to “make of Benin 
a dynamic agricultural power, competitive, environmentally-friendly and wealth-
creating meeting the needs for economic and social development of the population” 
(PSRSA/MAEP, 2011: 25). The overall objective of the PSRSA was “to improve the 
performance of Benin’s agriculture, to make it capable of ensuring sustainable food 
and nutritional sovereignty, contributing to economic and social development of 
Benin, and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and poverty 
reduction” (PSRSA/MAEP, 2011: 25). 
Several projects and programs were included in the policy agenda in order to 
ensure food and nutritional security in animal proteins for rural and urban popu-
lations and to run surpluses for export. The most recent of these is the Livestock 
Development Program (PDE36) that ended on 30 June 2006 after a total run time 
of eight years; and followed by the Program of Support to Milk and Meat Sectors 
(PAFILAV37) started in 2009 for a period of six years (CAADP, 2007; Hestin, 2012). 
Still there is a plan for several billion CFA francs to be spent in the coming years in 
the livestock sector for the rapid transformation of traditional systems into more ef-
ficient, modern and professional livestock farming.
34 The franc of the African Financial Community (FCFA) or XOF is the currency of Benin. It has a 
fixed parity with the Euro (1€ = 655.957 XOF). In this book, 1 US dollar (US$) corresponds to 500 
CFA francs.
35 Plan Stratégique de Relance du Secteur Agricole.
36 Programme de Développement de l’Elevage.
37 Programme d’Appui aux Filières Lait et Viande.
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It appears, therefore, that rural development policies devote a great attention to live-
stock production and considers it as one of the priority areas for increasing the wel-
fare of communities as well as for improving the national economy. However, as I 
will show later in the next chapters, pastoralism is more a victim of the crop farming 
policies. Some sectors such as cotton and cereal crops that provide “faster” and more 
“tangible” results on the national economy seem to be privileged as compared to pas-
toralism which requires more time and resources for it to be modernized and respond 
more quickly to the expectations of the Government. After this brief description of 
Benin, its resources and agricultural development policy, I will now turn to the pro-
file of Gogounou District.
Local context of livestock production4.2 
Boundaries and demography of Gogounou District
My research site was Gogounou District in northern Benin. Gogounou is considered 
the “showcase” of pastoralism in Benin. This perception is neither related to the local 
livestock size, nor the amount of resident Fulani pastoralists. Gogounou is ranked 
after other districts such as Kandi, Banikoara, etc. when considering the aforemen-
tioned factors. The perception of Gogounou as the main site of pastoralism in Benin 
is simply because of socio-technological order. Indeed, it was in this district that the 
Fulani pastoralists initiated the first “autonomous” livestock market. This innovation 
was subsequently adopted in other parts of the country and led eventually to the 
establishment of many pastoralist professional associations. Gogounou was also the 
first district in which the Fulani cooperative mini-dairy was installed in 2006. This 
is therefore the hometown of those pastoral innovations from which different Fulani 
leaders have emerged. For a study that attaches great importance to technologies and 
associations among Fulani, it became almost unavoidable, even necessary to carry 
out my research in Gogounou. This option was made after an exploratory visit on 
which I will give more details in Chapter 5.
Gogounou is located in the southern part of Alibori Province between 10°33’ 
and 10°57’ north latitude and 15°2’ and 3°15’ east longitude. Its total area is esti-
mated at 4,910 square km and framed by Ségbana and Kalalé in the east, Banikoara 
in the northwest, Sinendé and Kérou in the southwest, Bembéréké in the south and 
Kandi in the northeast (Figure 4.1). It is about 615 km from the economic capital 
of Benin (Cotonou). It is crossed by the Benin-Niger interstate lane for a distance of 
about 45 km. The district of Kandi, which is the capital of the province, is about 35 
km from Gogounou. A road of about 180 km connects Gogounou to Parakou, the 
metropolis of northern Benin. The Niger border is about 140 km from Gogounou 
(PDC2 Gogounou, 2010: 22). 
Gogounou was established three centuries ago by Batoumbou princes called 
Wasangari, who came from the princely city of Nikki (Adégbidi, 2003: 33). The 
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name it bears is diversely interpreted (PDC2 Gogounou, 2010: 25). The first mean-
ing is linked to the fact that it was a “battlefield” where Bariba warriors clashed with 
various enemies. The main purpose of Wasangari was to condemn to death (go) all 
their enemies who would dare cross the local hills (guuru), and were found taking 
refuge in caves across the region. This is why the area would have gradually been 
called in Batonu language go n’guuru meaning “The Hill of Death”. The second in-
terpretation is related to the presence in the caves of a fetish boa called gobani in local 
language. This is then gobani n’guuru meaning “The Hill of Boa” that would have 
become Gogounou through French speaking.38 Regardless of how Gogounou got 
its name, it appears that the first settlers are from Batoumbu or Bariba ethnic group 
who thereby hold the oldest land rights. Gogounou is seen as one of the oldest geo-
graphic locations and area of concentration of Fulani pastoralists (Guichard, 2000: 
97). Different migratory drifts from Burkina Faso and Niger led Fulani to Bagou, 
which is located in the present-day Gogounou District. It was then from Bagou that 
Fulani pastoralists scattered in different directions in the old Borgou Province (Mai-
farth, 1989: 27 cited by Guichard, 1990: 34 ff.).
38 The hills and rugged and wooded landscapes played an important role in the war strategy of Ba-
toumbu/Bariba against the French colonizers. They enabled camouflage and provided valuable shelter 
to the local warrior troops (Débourou, 2013: 76).
Figure 4.1: Study area location
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The population of Gogounou was 117,793 inhabitants (58,126 men and 59,667 
women) in 2013 (INSAE, 2013a). The two predominant ethnic groups are Bari-
ba (54%) and Fulani (42%). The human population density is 24 inhabitants per 
square km, including about 10 Fulani herders. Immigrants account for 4% of the 
whole population. They are from other parts of the country and other neighboring 
countries such as Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Togo. Several types of beliefs 
co-exist in Gogounou. However, Islam is the dominant religion with 67.1% of the 
local population. The majority of the Fulani pastoralists are Muslims. Catholicism 
and Protestantism account for respectively 7.8 and 0.9%, and traditional religions 
represent about 11.1% (PDC2 Gogounou, 2010: 25). Crop farming is the main 
economic activity involving 67.5% of the population. It is the main activity of Bari-
ba ethnic group, even if the farmers also own cattle, usually integrated into their 
cropping activities. Livestock production is the second largest activity of the local 
population and simultaneously represents the main economic and professional oc-
cupation of the Fulani herders (PDC1 Gogounou, 2004: 19; Bani, 2006: 19; PDC2 
Gogounou, 2010: 47). The local livestock in 2013 was estimated at 139,000 head of 
cattle, 37,460 head of sheep and 30,000 head of goat (FAOSTAT, 2014).39 
Alkoiret and his staff distinguished three livestock systems in Gogounou (cf. 
Awohouedji, 2008; Alkoiret et al. 2009; 2010).40 The first group: “Fulani small-scale 
livestock system”, is mainly made of Fulani pastoralists responsible for modest cattle 
herds (30 ± 15 head), inherited or accessed through caretaking contracts (40% of cas-
es). The transhumance is practiced by 62% of the herders in this group, against 38% 
for sedentary herders. Apart from crop residues used for strengthening animal feed in 
the unfavorable season, endogenous treatments are always prominent in this system 
(93% of cases). The second group: “Fulani large-scale livestock system” consists of 
Fulani herders owning large herds (158 ± 68 head) mainly inherited or acquired by 
purchase; and all practicing transhumance. The herds are also entrusted in 20% of 
cases. Crop residues and minerals (e.g. cooking salt) are used as supplements, and an-
imals are supplied with veterinary care in 85% of cases. They are treated against ticks 
and parasites at least once a year. The third group: “Integrated agro-pastoral system” 
is composed of agro-pastoralists from Fulani (45.5%) and Gando41 (54.5%) ethnic 
39 These statistics generated on the basis of old herd growth indices are very far from the reality on the 
ground. The massive outmigration of Fulani from the region justifies the fallacies in these estimated 
figures. Instead of continuous increases in animal stocks as reflected in FAO statistics and those of the 
livestock department of Benin, Gogounou has lost in the last five years much of its livestock. I will 
later discuss the reasons why.
40 The studies of Alkoiret and his collaborators on the livestock systems in Gogounou took place 
in 2007 and were part of the NPT/BEN/183/FA-UP/WU project implemented by the Faculty of 
Agronomy (University of Parakou, Benin). Their typology was based on a sample of 102 herds mobi-
lizing 7,769 head of cattle, estimated at 9.7% of the municipal cattle population.
41 These are the former slaves of Fulani pastoralists, locally known as black Fulani or Maccuɓe (sing. 
Maccuɗo). They are generally considered in official statistics as Fulani, but distinctions exist within 
them. Details are provided about them in Chapter 8.
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groups, holding 52 ± 48 head of cattle. These herds have been generally accessed by 
heritage or entrusted (7% of cases), are sedentary in cases of Gando herders, and 
transhumant when owned by Fulani pastoralists. Supplementary animal feedstuffs 
are used: crop residues, fodder reserves and cottonseed cakes. Most of the herders 
in this group (96%) rely on veterinary health care in maintaining their livestock 
holdings. The integrated agro-pastoral system is assumed the most efficient when 
considering production (especially milk) and reproduction patterns (Awohouedji, 
2008; Alkoiret et al. 2010).42 Every year Gogounou also receives immigrant herds, 
coming from the hinterland countries, transiting through the northernmost Benin 
districts (Malanville and Karimama) and Kandi (Kperou Gado, 2006: 68; Djohy et 
al. 2014b).
Ecological and economic features of Gogounou District
The district of Gogounou has a Sudano-Guinean climate with a rainy season from 
May to October and a dry season from November to April. The average annual 
rainfall is estimated at 1,100 millimeters. The months of August and September are 
supposedly the wettest. The local temperature varies between 18°C and 38°C. There 
are about 26 main water resources (Table 4.1), available to the pastoralists in the 
six regions of Gogounou. There are twenty dams, four large over-diggings and two 
rivers, respectively Sota in the East and Alibori in the West. The tributaries of these 
rivers are part of the Niger River Basin. Additional boreholes also exist in the regions, 
even if there is no updated statistics. A census in 2009 by development agencies in-
volved in the water sector revealed that 2,352 water points were equipped in Alibori 
Province with 1,738 water points being functional, covering the needs of 65% of 
the population of the whole area (UNICEF, 2010: 14). The functional hydraulic 
structures in Gogounou in 2009 included 242 boreholes fitted with hand-pumps 
(FPM43), three village water supply systems (AEV44) and 22 standpipes (BF45). These 
represented 348 Equivalent Point Water covering the drinking water needs of 65% 
of the locals (PDC2 Gogounou, 2010: 33). It appears, therefore, that boreholes and 
different types of wells are significant in the pastoral environment of Gogounou and 
play an important role in access to water for Fulani pastoralists and their livestock 
holdings.
The district of Gogounou is made of plains and plateaus overcome in some places 
by hills with maximum heights of approximately 300 meters. The soil is ferruginous, 
42 This productivity analysis was performed on 3,022 cows from thirty herds within the 102 cattle 
herds used by the authors for their aforementioned typology of livestock systems in Gogounou. 
These results may not capture the true picture of Gogounou herds taken all together. Moreover, the 
resources access trend has evolved, inducing also other dynamics in livestock keeping. However, these 
data provide an idea of pastoralism in Gogounou before some transformations discussed in this book.
43 Forage de Pompes Modernes/Pompes à motricité humaine.
44 Adduction d’Eau Villageoise.
45 Borne Fontaine.
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with predominance in the plains of alluvial soil, suitable for agriculture. The total 
area of the district is composed of 35% of arable land (1,705 square km). The two 
classified forests (“Trois-Rivières” in the East and “Alibori Supérieur” in the West) oc-
cupy about 36% of the area (1,772 square km). Part of the local land (1,235 square 
km), representing 25% of the total area, is normally devoted to livestock grazing. 
Thus, a theoretical 0.89 hectare and 2.51 hectares of land are respectively available 
for a head of cattle, and per capita (i.e. per Fulani herder).47 There is 3.6 square km of 
46 Source: SCDA/Gogounou, October 2014 (Legend: *Dams, **Over-diggings; ***Rivers).
47 The first figure (0.89 hectare) is obtained by distributing 1,235 square km on the 139,000 head of 
Table 4.1: Main water sources in Gogounou District46















































































86 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
lowland in the district and 42% of it is used for crop farming. Gogounou lies within 
the second agro-ecological zone of Benin called “cotton zone of northern Benin”48. 
Cotton (Gossypium sp) is the main crop in the region, but maize (Zea mays), sorghum 
(Sorghum bicolor), millet (Pennisetum glaucum) and yam (Dioscorea spp) are the most 
important food crops (PANA-Benin, 2008: 17). 
Three major forage species groups are locally exploited to feed animals: the group 
of Loxodera ledermannii and Hyparrhenia involucrata, the group of Andropogon 
gayanus and Isoberlinia tomentosa and the group of Hyparrhenia involucrata and Pen-
nisetum pedicellatum (Bouraïma, 2006; Degbohouet, 2010: 74ff.). The average carry-
ing capacity of natural pastures is 0.62 TLU/ha/year corresponding to an equivalent 
land demand of 1.61 ha/TLU (Degbohouet, 2010: 51). Thus, an area of 2237.9 
square km is needed to feed the municipal cattle stock in 2013. This demand, given 
the official rangeland availability in the district (1,235 square km), seems insuffi-
cient to meet the needs of the whole local livestock. When added to this the burden 
of immigrant herds invading the local rangelands each year during the dry season 
then mobility and other strategies help address this shortfall. The pastoralists em-
ploy some browsed species: the most important being Afzelia africana, Pterocarpus 
erinaceus and Khaya senegalensis (Houéhanou, 2006; Degbohouet, 2010: 47). I will 
provide more details on the strategies of pastoralists to cope with this lack of feed 
resources in Chapter 7. 
Marketing of agricultural products has an important place in the economy of 
Gogounou District. Trade takes place in seventeen ordinary markets and also three 
livestock markets: Petit-Paris, Gogounou-center and the small stock market of Boro-
darou village (PDC2 Gogounou, 2010: 50). Livestock marketing is prominent in 
Gogounou, and this is the reason why the municipal authorities headlined the dis-
trict development plan: “Gogounou: subregional pole of livestock trade”.
Rainfall trend in Gogounou and perceptions of local populations
The trend of the annual rainfall over forty years (1970–2010) indicates a large fluc-
tuation (Figure 4.2). The straight line seems to show a prima facie stability (at 1,000 
millimeters) of the average annual rainfall for the period. However, the slightly posi-
tive slope (0.01) shows that the annual rainfall trend in Gogounou is relatively up-
ward. Further, the low value of the coefficient of determination (R-square = 0.016) 
reveals that the horizontal line cannot explain the real progressions of the annual 
cattle that would be in Gogounou if the estimation of FAOSTAT in 2013 was fulfilled. One can also 
estimate the per capita rangeland availability by dividing 1,235 square km of grazing area acknowl-
edged by Gogounou Municipal Authority by the number of Fulani in the district (41.6% of 117,793 
residents). This gives 2.51 ha per Fulani herder. This is not, however, the reality since there are also 
small stock (goat and sheep), and Fulani are not the sole owners of livestock. Farmers are also involved 
in livestock keeping. The current amount of grazing area is also not accurately known. 
48 “Zone Agro-Ecologique 2” (ZAE 2) or “Zone Cotonnière du Nord-Bénin”.
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rainfall. One may not conclude there is an absolute stability of the annual rainfall 
over the period 1970–2010, but rather a slight upward trend.
The trend of the average curves, run on five year periods, reveals that the yearly 
rainfall has changed over the years. During the period 1970–1985, the annual rain-
fall increased relatively except for the year 1975 when the average rainfall fell prob-
ably due to the severe drought that affected all sub-Saharan Africa. This first period 
was wetter. From 1985 to 2000, the annual rainfall has decreased leading to a dry 
period. The trend was reversed in the last decade 2000–2010 where rainfall increased 
relatively, giving rise to a more humid period. Only the year 2005 was an exception 
with a rainfall equating to the average over the forty years (1,000 millimeters). The 
current rainfall trend is slightly upward. This progression of the rainfall (if the data 
provided by ASECNA are effectively correct)50 contrasts with the perception of the 
local actors (both crop farmers and pastoralists) who often claim a decrease in rainfall. 
However, I did not investigate deeply to seek the real determinants of this contradic-
tory perception of people on the rainfall. Other recent studies in the region of Alibori 
could better inform us about climate change and the perceptions of the population. 
These studies show that climate change is a reality in Alibori. The most important 
factors of Alibori’s climate change would be the late rains, the abnormal distribution 
of rainfall, the stunted rainfall, the dry breaks, the violent winds and the warming 
(Adégbidi, 2003; Dedjan, 2010; Nouatin et al. 2014a; Katé et al. 2014). The farm-
ers who are said to have perceived these changes develop in turn different strategies 
to cope with their new conditions of production (Gnanglè et al. 2012; Tidjani and 
49 Source: From ASECNA rainfall database.































Figure 4.2: Trend of annual rainfall in Gogounou from 1970 to 201049
88 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
Akponikpè, 2012; Nouatin et al. 2014b; Yegbemey et al. 2014). These same factors 
were also often cited by pastoralists of the region to explain the climate change and 
the vulnerability of their livelihoods (cf. Lesse, 2009; 2011; Djohy, 2010; Djohy et 
al. 2014a; Zakari et al. 2015). Climatic disturbances seem not to be new facts in the 
northern Benin. Débourou (2013: 52) reported that agricultural production has 
always been subject to the vagaries of the weather, and this was already conspicuous 
in colonial times when Borgou people were forcibly involved in cash cropping by 
targeting cotton, tobacco, shea tree, etc. In the specific case of Gogounou District, 
Adégbidi (2003: 137) who carried out his doctoral research in the village of Bagou 
a decade ago came to the conclusion that climate constraints are real and strongly 
determine the farmers’ production strategies.
During my interviews, it emerged that the crop farmers often talked about the 
rainfall that has become scarce and insufficient, with consequences for crop produc-
tion. Rainfall is seldom mentioned immediately by Fulani pastoralists as a major 
constraint for their activity; anyway less so than other issues such as herbicide use, 
logging or land expropriation, that I will discuss later. One can understand from 
this that the influence of these factors on their pastoral activity is so strong and so 
unbearable that pastoralists are not primarily concerned about climate change which 
has nevertheless become omnipresent in common discourses. In any case, none of 
my informants has spoken positively about the trend of the rainfall. They all perceive 
that the climate is not the same as before, and try to blame other actors. 
Fulani pastoralists tend mainly to incriminate the crop farmers they think re-
sponsible for the climate disruptions through their destructive crop farming practic-
es. Similarly, farmers also believe that the loggers are responsible for the disruptions 
in rainfall patterns due to their excessive wood cutting in the forests and village lands. 
This is why in some villages, for example Zougou-Pantrossi, crop farmers sometimes 
organize uprisings to drive the loggers out of the forests and snatch their chainsaws 
during the rainy season, when breaks are registered. The objective of this kind of 
mobilization against the loggers was, as I have been told by my informants, to ensure 
a good agricultural season with regular rainfall without dry spells. But this struggle, 
which often occurs in the rainy season, does not prevent those same farmers from 
being the best sellers of wood to the woodcutters in the dry seasons. I will talk more 
about this phenomenon in Chapter 6. What appears important here is how each ac-
tor thinks his counterpart or other land user is responsible for the changes recorded 
in weather conditions, through their specific actions, which are not environmen-
tally friendly. These reciprocal accusations fit well into the ongoing controversial 
discourses on anthropogenic climate change (Paavola and Adger, 2006; Kaufmann 
et al. 2011; Poortinga et al. 2011). Thus, local people perceive climate change as a 
general curse driven by human beings.
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Gogounou at the heart of pastoral development policies
Gogounou is one of the first places targeted for the implementation of government 
policies oriented towards the transformation of pastoralism in Benin. The Fulani 
community has been a trial field for technologies oriented toward local cow milk pro-
cessing through cooperative mini-dairies. Through support from the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Government of Benin implemented 
two mini-dairy pilot projects, respectively TCP/BEN/3003 and TCP/BEN/3204, 
aimed at: “improving the collect, the processing and the marketing of milk, wagashi-
cheese and other dairy products” (cf. Awohouedji, 2008; FAO, 2010b; Mama Sam-
bo, 2013: 9). These mini-dairy projects were implemented over forty-one months 
(from June 2005 to December 2009) for a total amount of US$ 405,000, and led to 
the creation of the Dairy Cooperative Society of Gogounou (SOCOLAIG51) man-
aged by the Fulani associations. The promotion of mini-dairy products in Gogounou 
is assumed to have allowed consumers to enjoy nutritious, healthy and quality prod-
ucts with fresh milk from local herds (FAO, 2010b). The mini-dairy of Gogounou 
worked notably well from 2006, but unfortunately closed down in 2010 without 
achieving the development goal assigned through the policy documents.
Among the various development programs oriented towards livestock produc-
tion, I would like to mention the Program of Support to Milk and Meat Sectors 
(PAFILAV), which is one of the more recent. PAFILAV intervenes in Gogounou 
with activities oriented towards building animal keeping capacity of pastoralists and 
promoting milk productivity enhancing technologies (cf. Hestin, 2012: 57ff.; Mama 
Sambo, 2013: 10). This program with 21 billion CFA francs budget, co-funded 
by African Development Bank (AfDB) and public funds was to ensure food secu-
rity through diversification of animal production sectors. Located in milk sheds in 
twenty-seven districts, PAFILAV was designed more specifically to (i) increase milk 
and meat production, (ii) improve the competitiveness in the milk and meat sectors 
and (iii) improve actors’ incomes through organizational and institutional support. 
PAFILAV was still operating in Gogounou during my study, even if its closure was 
scheduled for late 2015.
Gogounou is also the target of academic and research institutions, which under-
take various projects for transforming pastoral systems and training pastoral profes-
sional staff. The University of Parakou (UP52) through its various entities collaborates 
a lot with the municipal authorities and other stakeholders of the livestock sector in 
implementing action-research projects oriented towards productivity of pastoral sys-
tems, climate change, food security, etc. The NPT/BEN/183/FA-UP/WU53 projects 
51 Société Coopérative Laitière de Gogounou.
52 Université de Parakou.
53 NPT is the Netherlands Program for Institutional Strengthening of Post-Secondary Education 
and Training Capacity, aiming at strengthening the institutional capacity of secondary education and 
vocational training in developing countries.
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implemented by the Faculty of Agronomy (FA54) between 2006 and 2010 helped 
map the livestock systems in place and monitor their productivity in order to effec-
tively contribute to the improvement of their performance. The studies of Alkoiret 
and his team were very successful in that sense (cf. Awohouedji, 2008; Alkoiret 
et al. 2009; 2010; University of Wageningen, 2010: 32). The ongoing NICHE/
BEN/19655 project by the FA, in partnership with the Faculty of Literature, Arts and 
Humanities (FLASH56), is designed to improve the farming systems in achieving 
food security under climate change conditions in northern Benin. The livestock sec-
tor in Gogounou is one of the most important targets and one which has undergone 
a profound diagnosis made with great involvement of local herders, pastoralist as-
sociations and municipal authorities (NICHE-Benin, 2014).
The University of Abomey-Calavi (UAC57), which is the largest university in 
Benin, is also very active in Gogounou through its Faculty of Agricultural Sciences 
(FSA58). With SIMPROMEAT59-Benin program, for instance, academics and ex-
perts implement training and technologies in improving livestock productivity and 
the meat value chain (SIMPROMEAT-Benin, 2014). Several other projects directly 
included in the annual action plans of pastoralist associations have support from 
international development agencies and regional livestock farmer networks. All 
these efforts resulted in the recent creation of the National Agro-pastoral School of 
Gogounou (ENSAP)60 by Benin Government. Gogounou has thus become, as con-
veyed in common discourses, the showcase of pastoral development in Benin; and 
therefore appears to be the primary pastoral district of the country.
54 Faculté d’Agronomie.
55 NICHE is the Netherlands Initiative for Capacity development in Higher Education, an improved 
version of NPT (cf. University of Wageningen, 2010).
56 Faculté des Lettres, Arts et Sciences Humaines.
57 Université d’Abomey-Calavi.
58 Faculté des Sciences Agronomiques.
59 Sustainable Improvement of the Productivity of Meat value chain for food security in West Africa.
60 The Ecole Nationale Supérieure Agro-Pastorale de Gogounou (ENSAP) is an academic center 
managed by the University of Parakou and officially launched on Monday, 23 March 2015 after a 
pre-launch on 14 July 2014. The center’s mission is to ensure, for the benefit of Benin society and 
the Gogounou population in particular, training on livestock systems, nutrition, reproduction, health 
and the genetic improvement of domestic farm animals; and the production of livestock feeds. It 
will cover a total area of thirty-seven hectares offered by the municipal council. A first generation of 
twenty-five students began courses for the academic year 2014–2015 (cf. Plagbeto, 2015).
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Conclusion4.3 
The natural, socio-economic and political patterns presented in this chapter are im-
portant assets for the predominant ways of life of my study area. Pastoralism is an 
important activity in Benin generally, and in Gogounou especially. The ecological 
and climatic conditions in the past have been favorable to crop and livestock produc-
tion, which constitute the main livelihood of the local communities. However, those 
factors are currently highly disturbed or perceived as such. For example, the vegeta-
tion has markedly deteriorated in recent years. As for the climate, it is perceived by 
local actors as unreliable and changing in an adverse way which impacts on agricul-
tural production. The Fulani pastoralists face locally greater challenges than climate. 
They are fully included in Benin society, and considered as citizens both nationally 
and locally. However, their late arrival in Gogounou places them in a position of 
subordination compared to the Bariba farmers who are first settlers and therefore 
landlords. The pastoralists and their livestock depend on the leeway granted to them 
by their farmer neighbors in terms of land access. A noticeable fact is how State 
policies consider livestock farming as important for achieving food security and eco-
nomic growth. The commitment for pastoral development is reflected in national 
rural development policy documents as well as local development plans (cf. PDC2 
Gogounou, 2010). But what is the actual effect on local pastoralism? Forthcoming 
chapters will inform about this, but first, I will recount my ethnographic experience 
in Chapter 5.

An itinerant ethnography of socio-technological 5 
changes among Fulani pastoralists  
in northern Benin
In this chapter, I present my field approach and the various methods and techniques 
that I drew upon in collecting and analyzing data. My study actually began on 1 
April 2013. The first quarter of this study at the University of Göttingen was devoted 
to broadening my knowledge of pastoralism in Benin and Africa. The importance of 
a literature review was not overlooked, as emphasized by Bernard (2006: 96): 
The first thing to do after you get an idea for a piece of research is to find 
out what has already been done on it. Don’t neglect this very important part 
of the research process. You need to make a heroic effort to uncover sources. 
People will know it if you don’t, and without that effort you risk wasting a lot 
of time going over already-covered ground. Even worse, you risk having your 
colleagues ignore your work because you didn’t do your homework.
I looked through the documentation while counting also on some colleagues and 
experts in pastoralism studies in Africa. I read a lot on Fulani migration, marginaliza-
tion and their association politics in Benin. Another batch of literature, which I had 
“devoured”, was mostly on how pastoralists in different parts of Africa deal with 
changes. I read about various transformations and technological innovations among 
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the Fulani. Finally, I read the literature on ethnographic methods in order to deepen 
my knowledge of participant observation, biographical narratives, interviews and so 
forth. Thus, I was better equipped to move forward with my research and to draft 
my first research project.
The first version of my project and my study schedule were presented at the doc-
toral seminar of the Institute for Social and Cultural Anthropology in Göttingen on 
3 May 2013. The discussions made during this session brought out some theoretical 
and methodological gaps that took some time to fill in. Meanwhile, a lecture that 
I started to follow in April 2013 with my supervisor on Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) improved my understanding of how technology and society could be 
studied. By the end of the seminar in July, I was excited and eager to apply this new 
knowledge to my research on pastoralism in Benin. I then left Germany on 15 July 
2013 for my exploratory visit that I give more details about below.
Exploratory field visit5.1 
My preliminary research lasted two months, from 15 July to 15 September 2013. 
I was seeking the social and technological drivers of change related to pastoralism 
in northern Benin. I first met on the morning of 16 July 2013, Prof. Dr. Marcel 
Houinato at the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, University of Abomey-Calavi. The 
latter is a specialist in livestock production who has long worked on pastoralism in 
northern Benin. I got from him diverse information on pastoral practices, Fulani 
associations, livestock markets and various technologies emerging in Fulani com-
munities. He also provided me with some mobile phone numbers to ensure easier 
contact with Fulani leaders. 
After this promising start in Cotonou, I headed to the north of the country that 
I was looking forward to visiting and exploring. My first landing point in the up-
per Benin was Parakou, my hometown, my home University and also where I met 
my second supervisor, Prof. Dr. Honorat Edja. We talked about broad issues of my 
research and my exploratory visit. He also gave me literature and practical guidance 
for improving my way of carrying out participant observation and interviews with 
pastoralists and their leaders. Once I had completed the institutional steps required 
to begin my research in Benin, I then undertook the most active phase of data col-
lection. 
I visited and conducted interviews with several organizations based in Parak-
ou supporting Fulani pastoralists and their grassroots associations. Two groups of 
partner organizations were targeted. The first group consisted of the local partners 
(local NGOs, advisory services) including APIC-NGO (Action for the Promotion 
of Community Initiatives), APIDEV-NGO (Association for the Promotion of Sus-
tainable Development Initiatives) and CARDER Borgou/Alibori (Regional Action 
Center for Rural Development). Second, the international donors such as SNV 
(Netherlands Development Organization), GIZ/ZFD (Civil Peace Service of Ger-
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man Development Cooperation) and DDC/UGP (Partnerships’ Management Unit 
of the Swiss Agency of Development and Cooperation) were also involved. I con-
ducted interviews with and received documents from various specialists in charge 
of pastoralism. The organizations to which these specialists belonged enabled me 
to understand that Borgou-Alibori Region was better suited to my research topic. 
Particular emphasis was placed on Gogounou District, the cradle of pastoralism in 
Benin, which accounted for all of my interlocutors. Several technologies related to 
livestock marketing and dairying (cf. Chapter 4), were regularly cited as well as many 
well-developed grassroots associations.
After gaining a clearer view of a promising area for my field research, I traveled 
by motorbike to Gogounou, about 180 km from Parakou. On the way, I stopped 
in the Petit-Paris village for two hours to observe transactions at a livestock market 
in south Gogounou. I reached Gogounou later in the afternoon and went directly 
to the headquarters of ANOPER61 (National Association of Professional Organiza-
tions of Ruminant Herders) where I had my first discussion with the coordinator 
of the association. I was then introduced to the president who agreed on my re-
search being carried out with ANOPER and its local branches. I spent some time 
in Gogounou visiting the regional and local branches of ANOPER (UDOPER62 
B/A, UCOPER63 Gogounou), the livestock market, the veterinary pharmacy, the 
store of agro-industrial feed concentrates, the mini-dairy and the small plant where 
animal nutritional supplements were manufactured. Having been even hosted in a 
hostel run and built by the pastoralist associations, I was completely amazed at how 
pastoralism had evolved in my home country and how organized and rich in tech-
nological innovations and infrastructures the Fulani herders were. After conducting 
open-ended discussions with Fulani leaders and technicians involved in the manage-
ment of the various elements mentioned above, I decided to go into the bush to see 
firsthand how pastoralism is carried out in the countryside. I landed in Fana-Peulh, 
a village about 20 km from Gogounou center where I spent two weeks in a Fulani 
household.
During my time in Fana-Peulh, I directly observed the local realities of livestock 
management and conducted informal discussions with the heads of households, their 
spouses and the youth responsible for moving with the herds. Our discussion topics 
were many, including pasture access in open ranges as well as in state forests. The 
availability of watering sources and other pastoral infrastructures (vaccination cor-
rals, animal passageways, herder resting areas, etc.) were also assessed with the herd-
ers. Some technologies, such as fodder cultivation, straw conservation and industrial 
concentrate use, were also discussed and debated. After gaining access to general 
data on the feeding, watering and movement of livestock, I sought to improve my 
understanding of production and market issues. I asked about where, why, when 
61 Association Nationale des Organisations Professionnelles des Eleveurs de Ruminants.
62 Union Départementale des Organisations Professionnelles des Eleveurs de Ruminants.
63 Union Communale des Organisations Professionnelles des Eleveurs de Ruminants.
96 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
and how animals are sold in a Fulani household, as well as, who is responsible for 
such decisions. The transport and communication technologies used by the Fulani 
were discussed as well as their linkage with pasture and market access. With Fulani 
females, I had more discussions on milking, conserving, processing and marketing 
raw milk or wagashi cheese. Here, the modern mini-dairy installed in Gogounou was 
mentioned as having induced negative changes in the management of milk within 
the Fulani households. But since the factory had stopped working, the situation 
seemed to return to normal. 
I finally tried to understand how Fulani herders perceive the pastoralist associa-
tions. During very open discussions, I asked questions about membership, gover-
nance, achievements and satisfaction of Fulani herders, vis-à-vis ANOPER and its 
local branches. Alongside these conversations with my Fulani interlocutors, I ob-
served how farming activities were performed. I frequently asked questions to the 
Bariba farmers about their farming practices. My aim was to link cultivation prac-
tices to pastoralism and investigate some of the complaints that I often received from 
herders. I took advantage of my stay in Fana-Peulh to travel further inland into the 
Zougou-Pantrossi Region where I visited the technical unit of forest management 
(CTAF64) and discussed with two foresters and one tracker. With the support of a 
Fulani assistant, I traveled 20 km through the “Trois-Rivières” forest from Zougou-
Pantrossi up to Dougoulaye village. This visit enabled me to observe herds’ move-
ments and have a word with some herders on grazing animals in the forest. 
I did not only observe and question people in camps and on farms, but was also 
involved in fun-filled activities of everyday life. I witnessed a musical evening in 
Fana-Peulh where young Fulani males showed their expertise in playing modern mu-
sical instruments and performing various modern dances. It was also an occasion for 
teens and youth to exercise their ability to court young girls who were nicely dressed 
and well-groomed for the occasion. I could clearly see another form of modernity 
evolving in Fulani areas. Back in the Gogounou center, I was able to attend a meeting 
held by the staff of UDOPER B/A with a delegation of Swiss partners (UGP Para-
kou), where successes and failures in implementing the association’s annual action 
plan were raised.
After I had gained this somewhat more detailed view on pastoralism in Gogounou, 
I decided to go to the extreme north of Benin and see what was happening there. 
I was led by a passionate logic of comparison to obtain a different story. I wanted to 
know how other associations, apart from those of the ANOPER family, operate and 
how various technologies were also used in other parts of Alibori by Fulani herders. 
I extended my trip by motorbike to the extreme north of Benin, precisely in Malan-
ville District. There, I met the leaders of the most famous local Fulani association, 
being ASPEB65 (Association for the Safeguard and Promotion of Livestock in Benin). 
With the president, the secretary and the organizer, respectively, we discussed pas-
64 Cellule Technique d’Aménagement Forestier.
65 Association pour la Sauvegarde et la Promotion de l’Elevage au Bénin.
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toralism in Malanville. The objectives of ASPEB, its activities and its achievements 
were discussed and various documents were also collected. Finally, I made a short vis-
it to the president of UCOPER-Malanville. I talked with him informally about his 
association and the relationships between both local associations. I realized that the 
very root of Fulani professional associations was the livestock marketing and the two 
systems were competing locally. For the leaders of ANOPER and its components, 
the ASPEB is in an opaque management of the cattle market in Guéné (Malanville). 
This so-called traditional market system was seen as unfavorable to herders and must 
be fought. Conversely, the leaders of ASPEB were fighting against the plan of ANO-
PER promoters to impose the self-managed marketing system in Guéné as they did 
in Gogounou and many other districts. This strategy was seen as an internal form of 
colonization by the Gogounou Fulani and a way for them to control all the livestock 
markets across the country and therefore all the Fulani herders and their herds. I de-
cided to take a ride to the livestock market of Guéné, where I spent about four hours 
observing the transactions and the actors involved. This enabled me to make some 
comparisons with what I had already seen in the livestock markets of Petit-Paris and 
Gogounou. 
From Malanville returning back to Gogounou, I stayed four days in Kandi Dis-
trict where I met Ruga, the paramount chief of Fulani in northern Benin, with whom 
I conducted an interview in his palace. He was very interested in my study and asked 
me to visit again. During my second visit, he mobilized fifteen Fulani herders with 
whom I had a group discussion. The special feature of this meeting was that all of 
the herders shared with me a precise problem that they were facing in their daily 
lives. Some herders, who were driven off the land they had occupied for more than 
fifty years, gave me written documents that showed their unsuccessful advocacy at-
tempts with local authorities. Those involved in other forms of conflict told me how 
they tried to manage with or without the support from Fulani association leaders. 
One common theme raised by the herders during this discussion was about how 
traditional leaders more experienced in managing pastoralists’ problems were ruled 
out by the new generation of associations, such as ANOPER and its allies. For my 
informants, these associations are oriented towards “travelling the world on behalf 
of pastoralists” and “getting money from international donors”, and did not provide 
any concrete solutions for the most important land issues affecting the Fulani. Some 
herders provided evidence that the existence of such associations did not prevent the 
expulsion of the Fulani from land they had occupied for a long time. 
With Habibou66, a nephew of Ruga, I spent an evening in a local refreshment bar 
in Kandi where we discussed the management of conflicts involving Fulani herders 
and other stakeholders (for example, farmers and foresters). He detailed his duties, 
66 Habibou is a son of the former Ruga Osséni, well known in Benin and beyond. During my explor-
atory visit to Benin, he was the representative of ASPEB in Kandi. It is important to note that Ruga 
is the paramount ruler among Fulani in northern Benin. But Ruga is also a surname ascribed to the 
people of the chief lineage. This is the reason why the full name of Habibou is “Habibou Ruga”.
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which were similar to the ones of a “conflict manager”. He was involved in all con-
flicts of the Fulani pastoralists and defended their interests. Further in Kandi, I was 
able to visit the CENAGREF67 (National Center for Wildlife Reserves Management) 
and the Forestry quarters in Kandi, where I had informal talks with their heads and 
other forest officers who briefly gave me insight into pastoralism around W Park and 
other local state forests. I completed my stay in Kandi with a visit to the president 
of Jam Naati association, which is one of the associations that has emerged from the 
cleavage that occurred between Fulani herders and their former Gando slaves, with 
whom we talked about the marginalization of Fulani altogether, the history of Fulani 
cultural association (Laawol Fulfulde) and the causes of the scission that took place 
between Fulani and Gando. He also gave me his perspective on the related current 
struggle in northern Benin and its impacts on pastoralism. I left him holding a large 
range of files on Gando associations and their consortium called Faaba Men. I finally 
returned to Gogounou to prepare for my return trip to Germany on 15 September 
2013. 
In short, my exploratory visit was very successful in getting me in touch with 
valuable contacts namely; the Fulani herders, the Bariba farmers, the local authori-
ties, the Fulani association leaders, the extension workers, the forest officers, the local 
NGOs and the international development agencies. It enabled me to capture a kind 
of pastoralism in northern Benin that I had never known before. I was able to collect 
extensive data on technological progress and the controversies about the nature and 
the impacts of pastoralist associations on Fulani herders. The overall picture of the 
place was both rewarding and confusing but I found some clarity when writing down 
a field report where my preliminary trip was well detailed. This report helped me to 
target relevant phenomena, technologies and associations for in-depth investigation 
in the future. My revised research proposal was presented at the doctoral seminar of 
the Institute for Social and Cultural Anthropology of Göttingen on 13 December 
2013. I spent the period from December 2013 to February 2014 in Göttingen, 
documenting further my research and refining my data collection methods. I also 
took time to acquire various materials for the long-term fieldwork that I present in 
the paragraphs that follow. 
Long term fieldwork 5.2 
I carried out my fieldwork from 23 February 2014 to 25 October 2014. For logisti-
cal reasons that I will mention later, I gave up the comparison between Gogounou 
and Malanville, a decision I made after my exploratory visit. The long-term data 
collection phase was finally carried out only in Gogounou. During this period of 
investigation, a number of stakeholders were involved and different ethnographic 
tools were drawn upon. I gave priority to participant observation and conversations 
67 Centre National de Gestion des Réserves de Faune.
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with herders, farmers and their respective leaders. I was involved in farm work and 
various practices related to the daily management of cattle herds (e.g. grazing, water-
ing, milking, marketing, veterinary care). I was often a prominent participant dur-
ing various meetings organized by pastoralist associations, their members and their 
partners. Only once I was in the field did I realise the need for a small ethnobotanical 
study and geospatial mapping to better illuminate certain phenomena (e.g. livestock 
feeding with unusual fodder plants, land cover change) that I had studied. Photogra-
phy and videography were very helpful throughout the data collection process. These 
visual methods helped to support my arguments by capturing the realities as they 
were unfolding. The scope of each technique in my “fieldwork policy”68 is detailed 
below.
Participant observation
The extended immersion of the ethnographer in his study setting offers him the 
opportunity to better understand the social and cultural realities through good rela-
tions and intensive interactions with his informants (Bernard, 2006: 342ff.; Bryman, 
2012: 430ff.). When I entered my field site for the second time, I started taking 
advantage of the contacts I had already established to enable me to multiply my 
visits to various stakeholders. With the support of my trilingual research assistant,69 
I quickly developed closer relationships with some Fulani herders and Bariba farm-
ers. My regular presence at the head offices of pastoralist associations (ANOPER 
Benin, UDOPER B/A and UCOPER Gogounou) also enabled me to progressively 
widen my network. 
I got to know some workers in the cattle market of Gogounou, the employees 
of SOCOLAIG mini-dairy and other specialists in the local agricultural extension 
service (SCDA70 Gogounou) that I visited often. I started with routine observations 
that enabled me to get a precise picture of what Fulani herders were really con-
cerned about. I observed some lean cattle within some “pitiful” small herds grazing 
everywhere and watering on some dams which were about to dry up. In the very 
dry month of March, agricultural chemicals were already displayed along urban and 
rural tracks. Every Friday, various means of transport, escorted animals from Fulani 
camps to the cattle market in downtown. 
When I overheard some conversations within small groups of Fulani herders, 
the main focus were often land, logging, herbicide, conflict, foreigner, emigration, 
68 I borrowed this concept of fieldwork policy from Olivier de Sardan (1995; 2003; 2008; 2015). The 
author often uses this concept to describe the rigorous ethnographic strategy that leads to the produc-
tion of scientific knowledge. It includes several techniques (participant observation, interviews, case 
studies, unobtrusive measures, written sources, etc.) to be used to mobilize reliable data.
69 My research assistant speaks fluent French, Batonu (the language of crop farmers) and Fulfulde 
(the language of Fulani pastoralists), which is his mother tongue. I personally speak Fon, a language 
of south Benin. 
70 Secteur Communal de Développement Agricole.
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etc. When I sat down in the head office of ANOPER, everyone complained about 
massive emigration of Fulani. I often heard the Fulani leaders complain about the 
guilty silence of the authorities with regard to the mistreatments inflicted on Fulani 
pastoralists. The coordinator of ANOPER at one time nervously said: “All the herds 
have already left. There is no milk to run the mini-dairy. The cattle market’s earnings 
have collapsed. The time all the Fulani will leave with their animals, is when our rul-
ers will see that the Fulani also contribute a lot to the development of this country”.71 
Many other individual and group complaints were often on land expropriation from 
Fulani and various acts of depredation against the local cattle herds and their owners. 
I then decided to go beyond this apparently “naïve” and “careless” observation to sys-
tematize and better organize my observations to feed specific aspects of my research, 
as recommended by Olivier de Sardan (2008: 66).
My ethnographic field research was an intense period during which I could dedi-
cate a lot of time to observe farming and logging practices as well as pastoralism, 
which was my main focus. One ethnographic technique that I used was to describe 
the unspoken or silent dimension of the social and to put into my own words things 
that were not obvious (cf. Hirschauer, 2006). This is the reason why I regularly wrote 
down short notes in my notebook and relied on mental notes in situations where 
handwriting was not possible. I made it a point at the end of each day to know in 
which direction my data were evolving and targeted some topics for a deeper un-
derstanding. My observations were carried out in six major sites (crop farms, Fulani 
camps, forest reserves, local markets, association headquarters and Fulani leaders’ 
houses). A brief summary of my observations at each site is found below.
Observing pastoralism through crop farming: I participated in different cropping 
activities at several farms to better understand the changes in farming practices. The 
significant operations were: clearing and soil preparation, plowing, sowing, weeding, 
insecticide treatment and chemical fertilization. Only the harvest of crops had not 
begun before my return to Germany. My presence on the farms and my involvement 
in these activities enabled me to capture the logics and practices of farmers and to 
understand the complaints of pastoralists. Particular focus was given to the villages 
like Ouèrè, Bagou, Boro, Borodarou, Gounarou and Zougou-Pantrossi, where more 
in-depth case studies of farming practices were conducted. This allowed me to fol-
low the use of certain technologies (e.g. tractors and pesticides) and to understand 
the logic behind them and their implications for pastoralism. I visited several areas 
formerly known as livestock corridors or rangelands, which were occupied by annual 
crops or perennial plantations. I personally witnessed a case of land expropriation 
from Fulani herders in the village of Boro. 
Observing pastoralism in a Fulani camp: I spent time in several Fulani camps (es-
pecially Fana-Peulh, Wesseke and Dadaare) observing what the daily life of herders 
consisted of. I observed how the herds were managed and how herders coped with 
pasture access issues. With “Sidi” in Fana-Peulh and “Sanda” in Wesseke, I explored 
71 I recorded this discourse in my notebook on 6 March 2014.
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how Fulani herders shared their life between the bush, the rural village and urban 
areas. My observations often included: the different forms of housing, internal orga-
nization of households, herd management, alternative livelihoods and the education 
of children. I also observed food customs and various innovations related to pastoral-
ism (veterinary care, use of concentrates, forage cultivation, etc.).
Observing pastoralism within forest: I visited a group of Fulani herders gathered 
around the forest of “Alibori Supérieur”, in the village of Lougou, shortly before the 
next rainy season. I observed how the herds from the various regions of Gogounou 
lived in a meeting site and grazed in the forest during the dry season. I then orga-
nized a personal visit from Diadia village to the forest to capture the extent to which 
crop farming, pastoralism and logging were practiced. After I travelled over 25 km 
into the forest with a Fulani herder, I was able to capture the true nature of a state 
forest in Gogounou. On another occasion, I spent a whole day with a Fulani herder 
grazing his cattle from Diadia village to Fuka village. I witnessed how pasture was 
found and how technologies, like cell phones, were involved in daily mobility. A visit 
to Dougoulaye village allowed me to observe the isolation of some Fulani in areas 
bordering “Trois Rivières” forest, far away from Gogounou center. It was an isolated 
area because of limited road access. The only track was often washed out by the many 
rivers, which regularly caused the drowning of herders and members of their house-
hold. The area also had limited telephone network coverage and robberies regularly 
occurred on Fulani. I experienced firsthand how Fulani pastoralists managed to live 
and produce in this marginalized area.
Observing pastoralism through Fulani associations: The headquarters of ANOPER 
in Gogounou was a good site of observation. Almost every day was made up of ac-
tivities involving Fulani leaders (commonly called élus meaning “elected representa-
tives”), Fulani herders and women. I was unable to attend all of these meetings and 
therefore only took part in those that seemed more important for my research. These 
included: two general annual congresses (ANOPER and UDOPER), a roundtable 
(ANOPER), two workshops (ANOPER and SIMPROMEAT-Benin; UCOPER), 
and a training session (ANOPER and SIMPROMEAT-Benin). I also attended two 
other special meetings on reporting, participatory diagnosis and decision-making 
with partners (ANOPER and DDC/UGP, ANOPER and NICHE-Benin). These 
meetings listed above mobilized a wide range of actors whose actions and interven-
tions were very useful for understanding pastoralism, its environment and its evolu-
tion. These were also occasions when Fulani leaders performed, with the vision of 
modernizing and professionalizing pastoralism. During my stay, the pastoralist as-
sociations were involved in designing a strategic guidance document (DOS72), with 
more diversified activities aimed at documenting the past of Fulani herders and plan-
ning for their future. I jumped at the chance to deepen my knowledge of the history 
of Fulani and to grasp the new directions of pastoralism in Benin.
72 Document d’Orientation Stratégique.
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Observing pastoralism through Fulani leaders: An important aspect of pastoralism, 
namely, social networking and conflict resolution, was concealed in the everyday 
lives of Fulani leaders and could only be detected once I became more involved in 
their daily interactions. I regularly spent time with UCOPER leaders, as well as, 
some local representatives of GPERs, especially those of Fana-Peulh, Wara, Bagou 
and Wesseke. With the latter, I was able to see how Fulani herders complained about 
crop farmers and how conflicts were amicably settled at the local level. But when 
conflict resolution failed at the village level, or when the protagonist did not want to 
handle the problem with local leaders, the situation was transferred directly to the 
ANOPER president. The latter is called the “supreme commander” of the Fulani 
and his residence could be likened to a “Court”. I spent some of my afternoon in 
the courtyard of the president playing with some of his children and nephews. I first 
made friends with his eldest son, Seydou, who was one of the program facilitators 
of his father-led association. Through my regular visits with Seydou, I became closer 
to his father, with whom I spent several occasions talking informally about Fulani 
problems. I had the opportunity to interview his visitors and understand their dis-
cussion points. I also got to see how Fulani herders regularly filed their complaints 
and the responses they received from the president. I sometimes witnessed the many 
phone calls he received from Fulani pastoralists and other stakeholders on specific 
issues and actively followed the different arrangements that were made. Certain types 
of calls made him angry and my presence was an opportune moment for discussion 
between the two of us, with him seeking someone to confide in and me hungry for 
data for my analysis.73 I witnessed firsthand the mediation of two “small conflicts”, 
one was between a herder and a farmer on crop damage and the other was between 
two Fulani families on embezzlement.74 Other conflicts involving bloodshed were 
directly transferred to the police and taken over by the Legal Adviser of ANOPER. 
Without ever having had the opportunity to follow them, I sometimes came upon 
Fulani leaders who had been quickly mobilized to visit conflict hotbeds in other dis-
tricts and provinces of the country. I often found myself in their wake to follow up 
the various comments and access the reports.
Observing pastoralism in markets: I observed the pastoralism of Gogounou in two 
kinds of markets: the weekly miscellaneous product market and the self-managed 
livestock market (MBA). On three occasions, I made short visits of one to two hours, 
to the regular market of Gogounou, and visited the markets in the villages of, for 
73 Thus, the annoying phone calls received by the Fulani leader provided me with unexpected data 
such as the people with whom he communicated in Fulfulde and the topics of their talks. This al-
lowed me to have new informants, new investigative sites and new themes/sub-themes of discussion. 
The “irritating intrusion” of mobile phones in interpersonal communicative relationships (Pelckmans, 
2009: 32), became advantageous in my ethnographic study. The mobile phone served, at times, as a 
“digital research assistant” (ibid).
74 It was a marriage situation in which a young Fulani had paid the bride price for a Fulani girl who 
was later secretly given in marriage to someone else. The victim and his parents had taken action 
before the president of ANOPER.
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example, Boro, Gounarou, Diadia, Sori, Bagou and Wara twice. I intended to see 
what the Fulani did in these markets. I saw the Fulani talk with kinsmen and friends. 
Some paraded into kiosks to charge the batteries of their mobile phones, buy recharge 
cards, mobile device accessories, electrical appliances or special music files. Others 
were eager to acquire agricultural implements, pesticides, motorbikes and accesso-
ries. Fulani pastoralists were also among buyers of drinks (coffee, alcoholic beverages, 
soft drinks), electronic equipment (video CD, DVD player, TV sets and alike) and 
building materials (corrugated roof iron, cement, paint, to name but a few). I often 
saw women strolling around the market stalls that displayed cooking utensils, beauty 
accessories or sometimes goods for sale (milk, cheese, craft products, etc.). I was able 
to get an in-depth picture of what the Fulani society in northern Benin had become 
and a clear understanding of the openness of the Fulani to “modernity”. In addition 
to my explorations of public markets, I also spent many long days (six to nine hours) 
observing the autonomous cattle market (MBA75) of Gogounou. I focused mainly 
on the market organization, the origins of animals, the trading practices and other 
aspects, which I will not be detailing in this document.76 While observing the pro-
cesses through which an animal is sold and the behavior of different actors involved, 
I also took note of the immediate use made by some Fulani herders of their income 
after the sale of an animal. Some bought, for instance, motorbikes, cell phones, small 
ruminants, veterinary supplies or animal feed from vendors already available in the 
marketplace. Agricultural implements and pesticides, often exhibited at the livestock 
market, were also part of the products that attracted the Fulani pastoralists. I realised 
the importance of the market for Fulani herders with the overall transformation of 
pastoralism in the region. Participant observation was at the core of my field ap-
proach and it went hand-in-hand with interviews with various informants involved 
in my study. I will now give my readers an overview of the interviews.
Individual interviews
The second technique for collecting ethnographic data were the interviews I carried 
out alongside my observations. Both were complementary in terms of providing 
access to further information while avoiding misinterpretations. I focused a lot on 
biographical narratives about crop farming and pastoral practices and their inter-
related dynamics in Gogounou. My objective was to allow local actors to spontane-
ously relate how they have experienced certain life processes and their own life (cf. 
Apitzsch and Siouti, 2007: 7ff.). I prompted Fulani pastoralists to describe how their 
life and activity had evolved over time. From their life histories, which were digitally 
recorded, I noted specific factors or benchmark moments that had marked their lives 
75 Marché à Bétail Autogéré (MBA)
76 Some details on the self-managed cattle market and the mini-dairy in Gogounou are not detailed 
in this document. I analyzed these as case studies in separate papers or a specific book addressing the 
technological innovations among Fulani in northern Benin.
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and which required coping strategies. This same approach was also used with crop 
farmers who were asked to provide a clear picture of how their farming activities had 
evolved over time. This resulted in tracing production patterns, technological prog-
ress, land tenure trends and labor issues. All of the conversations were performed in 
the mother tongues of my interlocutors, and translated into French by my research 
assistant. 
Another group of actors, with whom I could speak directly in French about 
specific issues, were Fulani leaders, extension workers and local and international 
partners. With Fulani leaders I had open-ended discussions on all of the pastoralists’ 
problems, as well as, the management approach of the grassroots associations. I inter-
viewed the leaders of the self-managed livestock market about the extent of pastoral-
ist involvement in animal marketing. I asked extension workers questions on land 
use practices. I tried to gain a deeper view of the changes in land access, pasture and 
water availability and animal health care. The local foresters and the heads of the for-
est administration at the regional level provided me with extensive date that enabled 
me to grasp the economic and political dimensions of logging and grazing within 
forest and village lands in Gogounou. I addressed the farmer-herder conflicts with 
the Gogounou brigade commissioner, with the intention of understanding their evo-
lution and their management. I conducted semi-structured interviews with agents 
of local NGOs and international donors listed above, to better understand their 
guiding logic, their support to pastoralist associations and their expectations. The 
real impacts of their interventions on herders were also assessed during these con-
versations. I also enjoyed having discussions with local government members about 
the extent of pastoralism in Gogounou as well as other issues regarding the political 
stances and the local development agenda. I ended up with a total of 164 individual 
interviews recorded during my fieldwork. The information received from individuals 
was reinforced by those from group discussions, as I will now present. 
Focus group discussions
Twenty-one focus group discussions consisting of five to seventeen participants were 
organized, mainly with Fulani herders and Bariba farmers. The discussions with 
farmers in smaller groups of five to seven participants focussed mostly on specific 
technologies that somehow “revolutionized” farming practices. In the sessions on 
technologies, we addressed topics such as plow, draft ox, tractor, weed, herbicide, 
fertilizer, soil fertility and labor. Other sessions were devoted to local citizenship (au-
tochthonous versus aliens), land tenure, logging and the sale of wood. 
My group discussions in the cattle camps of Fulani herders were often more dif-
ficult to manage. There I preferred to carry out conversations in smaller groups, but 
this was often not possible because of the strong and rapid mobilization of Fulani. 
Even when I started with only four or five informants, the group often became larger 
with the addition of curious passers-by and visitors. Whenever I announced that I 
would hold a group discussion in the camps, it was often like a big ceremony where 
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I was received as an authority on pastoralist issues and given a variety of meals. 
With great expectations, Fulani herders looked at me as a project officer who could 
potentially solve some of their worries. The advent of mobile communication tech-
nologies, especially mobile phones, played a great role in making Fulani mobilization 
easier. Further details on this technological change are provided in Chapter 7. The 
downside of discussions in large groups was that they often became less interactive, 
particulary when some elders and leaders came to dominate the discussions. I later 
tried to avoid this by not announcing group discussions.77
Despite the enthusiasm of the majority of herders to participate in such discus-
sions, I also faced the disappointment of some who were tired of always being in-
vestigated by a myriad of researchers without any immediate impact on their living 
conditions. However, my meetings with the Fulani herders generally favored inter-
actions that enabled access to in-depth information on different items. We deeply 
examined some topics such as lekki fuɗɗo (herbicide), kiisoowel (chainsaw), teetere 
leydi (land grabbing), buditol leɗɗe (woodcutting), banjibanji (logging), guyka na’i 
(livestock rustling), potabu (cell phone), luumo (market).
Finally, I organised two group discussions with the members of the technical unit 
of forest management in Zougou-Pantrossi. Two foresters, a tracker and two mem-
bers of the local forest management committee (CTAF) were involved. In French, we 
discussed the “Trois-Rivières” forest, giving emphasis to its current state and the con-
ditions for accessing it by socio-professional groups (crop farmers, pastoralists, etc.). 
The issues of logging and conflict were also covered. The information on logging 
practices was further deepened during a discussion with a group of three woodcutters 
I had the opportunity to meet resting under a neem tree in Zougou-Pantrossi village. 
While studying pastoralism through the practices of actors, I also realized that major 
changes had occurred in terms of the use of various forage species. It was then neces-
sary to conduct a short ethnobotanical study to be presented in the next section.
Ethnobotanical investigation
The interest of anthropologists in plant biology is well established. This is in fact why 
Cotton (1997) in his edited volume Ethnobotany: principles and applications targeted 
them in a bid to shift them to modern ethnobotany. He also showed that the suc-
cess of an ethnobotanical study has to do with its multidisciplinary approach where 
ethnographer and plant taxonomist complement each other (Cotton, 1997: 126). 
I tried to follow this principle, even though I was not directly supported by a plant 
specialist during data collection. My study had initially no botanical aim. However, 
it became important during my fieldwork to collect and identify some plant species 
useful in pastoralism as currently practiced in Gogounou. My ethnobotanical study 
aimed at knowing the ancient and newly-used species by the Fulani pastoralists, and 
77 All this could be seen as one of the shaping influences of mobile phone on anthropological re-
search. Other aspects are found in Pelckmans (2009).
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some endangered, extinct or invasive species. This ethnobotanical investigation was 
fully integrated into my field approach and was not carried out separately. It was not 
really a botanical “collection” as proposed by Martin (1995: 29f.), but a study based 
on anthropological methods as described below. 
During individual and group interviews, Fulani herders regularly referred to the 
degradation or the loss of plant and fodder species that were typically used by ani-
mals. Similarly, they complained that some invasive species were more frequently 
found in poorer local rangelands and negatively impacted livestock. It was also com-
mon to hear some herders rejoicing that their cattle herds increasingly fed on plant 
species that had no use for them in the past. When various ligneous or herbaceous 
plant species were named during the interviews, they were systematically recorded 
and their Fulfulde names written down. Other questions like the location of such 
species, the link with pastoralism, the state of availability, the impact on animals, 
the alternative feedstuffs, etc., were also asked to the interviewees. More than an 
open-ended investigation, this “freelisting” (Quinlan, 2005; Bernard, 2006: 301ff.) 
allowed me to understand how the availability of certain plant species was strongly 
linked to being Fulani. The list proposed here is not to catalog the richness of the 
biological diversity of Gogounou, or exaggerate the loss. It is to simply show how the 
Fulani herders have found innovative ways to train their animals to get used to some 
species that are now more available than those they once depended on, but which 
have become less available. 
When the Fulfulde names of plants were recorded with Fulani herders and sam-
ples collected, I personally looked for the scientific names. The Flora of Benin (De 
Souza, 2008) was used to identify the majority of the species. However, some species 
of which Fulfulde names were confusing and, those without scientific names avail-
able in the flora book, were identified by a Fulani botanist, Yacoubou Boni, also a 
program officer at APIDEV-NGO in Parakou. This taxonomist also confirmed and 
corrected the names of some plant species initially identified in De Souza’s flora book. 
Once the plants were identified and their scientific names known, I cross-checked 
the Fulfulde names with those I had received from my research assistants in order 
to replace any improvised Fulfulde names with authentic ones. This cross-checking 
of Fulfulde plant names was carried out with the support of Hibirou Souagou, a 
Gogounou native and Fulfulde literacy teacher at DERANA-NGO in Parakou.
Some plant species that are subject to human pressure (cultivation, logging and 
pastoralism) were listed by forest specialists. My key informants were the foresters of 
the technical unit of forest management (CTAF) of Zougou-Pantrossi, the Head of 
the regional forest office of Kandi and the Deputy-Head of the departmental forest 
administration of Parakou. Their information was also cross-checked with those in 
the forest management plans of the two state forests of Gogounou (MEPN, 2010a; 
2010b). When studying humans and plants, I also took advantage of the remote 
sensing technologies and applied them to my research, as it appears hereinafter. 
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GIS and spatial data analysis
The use of geographic information systems (GIS) and spatial data analysis (SDA) 
has grown in social science research in recent decades. From a critical social theory 
perspective, some scholars have assumed that mapping and spatial analysis will trans-
form social sciences, as did the statistical modeling approaches decades earlier (Har-
ris and Weiner, 1996; Goodchild and Janelle, 2004). Anthropologists, like other 
social scientists, who have an unbridled passion for understanding the social and 
even physical environment in order to analyze the link with the behavior of social ac-
tors, have no more qualms about using GIS and related technologies (Okabe, 2006; 
Parker and Asencio, 2009). 
Throughout an edited volume by Aldenderfer and Maschner (1996), Anthropol-
ogy, Space, and Geographic Information Systems, several studies in America, Europe 
and Africa demonstrate the utility of GIS in analyzing complex interactions involv-
ing various ecological, political-economic and socio-cultural forces. In the article by 
Stonich (1996: 78ff.), for example, it appears that the use of informant interviews 
in anthropological inquiry and mapping through remotely sensed images can better 
educate on issues of land ownership and shifts in agricultural systems. Thus, recon-
ciling small-scale and individual information and large-scale phenomena becomes 
important to explain a locally based problem. Without using sophisticated and com-
plex manipulations of SDA and GIS tools, I used these methods in my research at 
three levels: 
First, remotely sensed images were used for land use and land cover analysis. This 
consisted of inventories of ecological entities over time in order to value the changes. 
It was done using Landsat satellite imagery and aerial photographs acquired from the 
Center for National Remote Sensing and Forest Cover Monitoring (CENATEL78) in 
Cotonou. Three years were considered (1982, 2002 and 2012) to compare the land 
cover dynamics over thirty years divided into two periods. The first period runs from 
1982 to 2002 and the second one from 2002 to 2012. The purpose of this temporal 
subdivision was to better understand when the changes in land use and land cover 
were more significant. This enabled deduction of its influence on local pastoralism. 
I was supported by a specialist of CENATEL, Abou Adam, for processing and ana-
lyzing the spatial data on Gogounou. ArcGIS software was used and statistics on 
stable, regressing and progressing spatial units were generated.
Second, GIS was used for mapping the investigation sites (Figure 5.1). My goal 
was to cover a large part of Gogounou to understand the diversity in perceptions and 
strategies of Fulani herders. That is why all the camps and places where interviews 
were conducted were systematically geo-referenced with a handheld GPS (GPSMAP 
62s). I personally extracted the points with MapSource software and constituted a 
database in Excel. This database was then transferred to a specialist cartographer, 
Rufin Aïssan, who supported me in drawing up my location maps. This was made 
78 Centre National de Télédétection et de Suivi Ecologique.
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possible by placing the collected points on the topographic map background of the 
National Geographic Institute (IGN79) of Benin through ArcGIS. 
Third, GIS results were drawn upon for the presentation of the main destinations 
of Fulani emigrants. A list of various new destinations of the Fulani pastoralists of 
Gogounou was established from the individual and group interviews. A migration 
map was drawn up (cf. Chapter 7). I first designed a model as a Word file and the 
genuine map was made later in ArcGIS with support from the cartographer, Abou 
Adam.
Photography and videography
I had taken plenty of photos (about 3,800 items) and short videos (about 20 items) 
to show different real-life settings. These materials provide interesting views on 
farming activities, such as, land preparation, plowing, sowing, use of herbicide, resi-
due burning and fire putting options. They also demonstrate livestock feeding and 
watering activities, involving daily mobility, long-range transhumance, and herds’ 
grouping camps during dry season. Some technologies (forage cultivation, forage 
storage, ligneous forage conservation) were also captured in photo. Pictures were 
taken of the relics of homesteads of some Fulani herders who had permanently left 
79 Institut Géographique National.
Figure 5.1: Investigation sites in Gogounou District
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Gogounou. The diversity of transport technologies is also shown through images. 
The self-managed livestock-marketing model is also covered, including images of the 
actors involved, market settings and selling dynamics. Finally, there are illustrations 
of pastoralist association meetings, etc.
Documentary research
The literature was collected and analyzed throughout my research stay in Benin. My 
research material dealt mainly with ecology, pastoralism, farming, market, Fulani as-
sociations, conflicts and technologies. The quantitative databases obtained were used 
to design diagrams inserted in the document to justify various trends (education, 
rainfall, crop production, livestock marketing, etc.). The qualitative data were inte-
grated directly into my argument through content analysis. The sources of literature 
found in my bibliography were many.
Pastoralist associations: I collected many reports on specific activity, study and 
conflict with the three Fulani associations based in Gogounou (ANOPER, UDOP-
ER B/A and UCOPER Gogounou). Some communication slides and videos were 
also accessed. The livestock market managing committee (ALGMB80) provided me 
with a database on livestock marketing from 2003 to 2013. This provided the differ-
ent trends in livestock sales and the market’s contribution to the Fulani association 
budget, as well as, to that of the Gogounou authorities.
Local partners: I accessed databases from the extension services (CARDER 
Borgou/Alibori and SCDA Gogounou) on cultivated areas, production volumes and 
annual crop yields from 1996 to 2013. The SCDA Gogounou also provided me 
with a database of water resources in Gogounou used by pastoralists. I was able to 
access sequenced data on rainfall in parts of the district, but these data were replaced 
in my analysis by more complete data I got from the regional station of ASECNA 
in Kandi. The local NGOs (APIDEV and APIC) also contributed to my literature 
search. I was able to collect some reports on pastoralism. The Gogounou Municipal-
ity through its service of economic and trading affairs gave me an additional database 
on the contribution of livestock markets in the municipal budget. The local office 
of environment and nature protection (SCEPN81) granted me with copies of the 
participatory management plans of the two state forests of Gogounou. I obtained a 
database on the evolution of children’s schooling from 2004 to 2014 from the local 
school board of Gogounou. The University programs like SIMPROMEAT-Benin 
(Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, University of Abomey-Calavi) and NICHE-Benin 
(Faculty of Agronomy, University of Parakou) gave me access to diagnostic reports 
on pastoralism in Gogounou.
International partners: The technical and financial partners such as SNV Parakou, 
DDC/UGP Parakou, GIZ/ZFD Parakou and FAO Cotonou, supplied me with vari-
80 Association Locale de Gestion du Marché à Bétail Autogéré de Gogounou.
81 Section Communale de l’Environnement et de la Protection de la Nature.
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ous documents. These are typically activity reports, study reports, partnership agree-
ments, in connection with the promotion of the pastoral sector.
Other sources of documentation: During my fieldwork, I made documentary search-
es in three other documentation centers. I was able to access the INSAE82 (National 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis) recent data on Gogounou population 
and specific statistics on Fulani herders in the region. I visited the documentation 
center of Kandi Municipality, as well as those of CARDER B/A in Parakou and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MAEP83) in Cotonou. I was able 
to access general reports on pastoralism, agriculture, pesticides and livestock market-
ing. The livestock department of the MAEP in Cotonou provided me with annual 
reports from 2002 to 2012, and livestock statistical yearbooks from 2007 to 2011. 
I was able to access the private documentation of some students and specialists who 
worked on pastoralism in northern Benin in general and Gogounou in particular.
Summary on data collection and analysis5.3 
During my long ethnographic stay of ten months, I collected a vast amount of re-
search material to address the socio-technological changes among Fulani pastoral-
ists in Gogounou. My strongly flexible multi-sited and multi-method approach, as 
detailed above, could also be seen as an “itinerant ethnography” as conceptualized 
and used by Schein (2000: 26), who captured the politics of ethnicity, gender and 
nationalism among Miao minority in China, through a roving approach. As in the 
case of the author, there were many things that I had not planned at the beginning, 
but which had become inescapable in the good understanding of pastoralism in Be-
nin. I seized every available opportunity to collect useful data.
By drawing on multiple data sources, including informants, I could cross-check 
the data and avoid any one individual as becoming the single holder of all the knowl-
edge about the Fulani community or Gogounou society in general. Similarly, no 
single technique was enough in itself to access an unquestionably “true” version of 
the information I had gathered. The cross-checking of sources and, to some extent 
methods, indeed, falls under what Olivier de Sardan (2008: 79f.) refers to as “com-
mon sense” in ethnography. This common sense approach liberated me from being a 
prisoner of single informants or sources since it allowed for me to seek out contrast-
ing discourses, rather than inflexibly and unthinkingly search for “truthful” informa-
tion. All of my recorded interviews and group discussions were transcribed with “F4 
software” (version 3.1.0), codified and saved as Word files. I benefited from the sup-
port of my younger brother, Gildas Louis Djohy, an undergraduate in Geography, to 
do this tedious task. But having abundant material does not mean that the analysis is 
complete, for field data do not “speak for themselves” (Bernard, 2006: 503f.). They 
82 Institut National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique.
83 Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et de la Pêche.
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must be given a meaning by the ethnographer himself, who is responsible for pro-
cessing them, poring over them, sorting them out and producing an analysis (ibid). 
This is what I have tried to do. The generated texts were supported by the personal 
field notes and grouped under themes and sub-themes. This corpus of data was ana-
lyzed and used to feed my arguments throughout the document. Discourses, short 
descriptions, tables and charts were used for the production of scientific knowledge 
of an ethnographic kind. Despite these efforts, imperfections remain. I admit that 
some constraints stood in my path, and would have certainly influenced my research. 
The main limits of my field approach are presented below. 
Constraints and limits of the research5.4 
It would be very presumptuous of me to claim to have covered all aspects of pasto-
ralism in Gogounou and in northern Benin. The analyses included throughout this 
document are based on information that I was able to gather from different sources 
available during my fieldwork. Some constraints of ethnic, linguistic and financial 
order may have induced some biases.
Identity constraint: My belonging to an ethnic group from southern Benin espe-
cially “Fon” may have unknowingly played against me to some extent. It was con-
spicuous that a real friendship was established between Fulani pastoralists and me. 
I spent time talking with many of them, who often told me that they had missed me 
during the days that I was away and could not visit them. I had daily encounters in 
which people begged me to visit and talk to them. I was even nicknamed danirawo 
Fulɓe or pasijo Fulɓe.84 Similarly, an utmost trust was established between Fulani 
leaders and me. Leaders were often stunned by the way in which I moved back and 
forth between farms, camps and forests studying pastoralism. They saw me different-
ly from many students and consultants with whom they had worked in the past, and 
who preferred documenting data in the city. At some meetings to which many herd-
ers were invited, the ANOPER president commended my efforts. During a training 
workshop organized by SIMPROMEAT-Benin on forage cultivation, the ANOPER 
president, while showing me around, told the participants alternatively in Fulfulde 
and then in French: “O wai like Pullo, o wai like horejo Fulɓe”85. 
If I was considered “Fulani”, “Fulani friend” or “Fulani patron” by Fulani pasto-
ralists and leaders, I was also as much for local farmers. I was very surprised one day 
when a Bariba opinion leader embraced me from afar, shouting “Batonu, sunon bi 
gogu non” 86. This image that the two opposing groups in the area had made of me, 
84 “Friend of Fulani” or pasijo is synonymously used with danirawo, which means friend.
85 “He has become Fulani, he has even become the patron of the Fulani” (horejo, which means “au-
thority”, was sometimes use synonymously with mawɗo and nyinijo, which refer all to the Head of the 
Fulani).
86 “Bariba, son of the King of Gogounou”, meaning “Bariba, prince of Gogounou”.
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each pulling me to his side, was a great factor in the collection of field data. How-
ever, this did not prevent some interlocutors from considering my true identity of 
dakumejo or dahumegi.87 respectively, in Fulfulde and Batonu languages. Two kinds 
of stereotypes have followed me throughout my stay in Gogounou. For some, I was 
considered as an intelligent young man to be doing doctoral studies, especially in the 
country of “white people”. The visit of my “white supervisor”88 in Gogounou was 
tangible proof of my powerful network. Thus, I confirmed the intelligence and the 
capability known for a dakumejo. My friendship with some of my interlocutors and 
my presence in their homesteads were regularly imputed to them as improving and 
internationalizing their own network. 
For other people from my research site, I was nothing other than a crafty and 
wicked guy to have travelled through all of southern Benin to arrive at Gogounou 
for research. For them, my research could have had a hidden agenda. I would be 
remiss not to provide a glimpse of the kind of experiences that I had in the field. 
For example, during the middle of an interview that I was having with the King of 
Gogounou on Gogounou’s history and Fulani settlement, he suddenly turned to my 
assistant and asked him in Batonu: “Madi wuninm boro wi una?” 89 The latter replied: 
“Dahume tem dina owee.” 90 And the King added: “N’bam bosira dahume wi u ka sun 
na mini, ma u wim tem deri ma?” 91 And my assistant replied again: “Si wi kasu mon 
87 These words, which refer broadly to the people of Dahomey (now Benin Republic), refer more par-
ticularly to the “Fon” people from Abomey (former capital of Dahomey kingdom); where I originally 
come from. For the boundary between “Dahomey” and “Fon”, see Law (1986). Dahomey (or Dax-
ome in Fon language) was one of the most powerful kingdoms in Africa between the seventeenth and 
the late nineteenth centuries. Its prominence was related to Abomey kings who had conquered several 
neighboring territories along the coast and in the farther interior (Heywood and Thornton, 2009: 88). 
Dahomey was a “scene of organized struggles for power, of political alliances and deals, of dynasties 
and successions, and of political manipulation of trade, especially the slave trade” and an “absolutist 
warrior state devoted to ancestor worship, was endlessly engaged in aggressive warfare” (Bailyn, 2009: 
12). The stereotypes built on the natives of Dahomey for a long time, equate them with “trickery” 
and “wickedness”, feeding a kind of hatred from other ethnic groups in the country. This legacy well 
used in political manipulations in the recent decades, makes it difficult for a Fon to be accepted by the 
other ethnic groups. For people of certain ethnic groups, the man of Abomey is simply a devil, an evil 
genius and should not be considered a human being (Agossou, 2001). These kinds of ethno-region-
alist and tribalist stereotypes that exist in both North and South of Benin somehow feed the ethnic 
solidarity which is the preferred means of mobilizing the electorate in the struggle for power conquest 
and ruling (ibid). 
88 My main German supervisor (Prof. Dr. Nikolaus Schareika) visited me during my fieldwork in 
Gogounou on 19–24 March 2014.
89 “Where does your friend come from?” This question, which meant, “What is the origin of your 
friend?” showed that the King was looking for more details about my true identity. Although I had 
already briefly presented myself to the King before the interview, I did not go into details about my 
origin. The answer of my assistant also confirms my interpretation.
90 “He comes from Dahomey” or, more literally, “Dahomey is his homeland”.
91 “What is an Abomey native doing here leaving behind his own land?”
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naa yera so.” 92 When I realized that I was temporarily excluded from the discussion, 
I subtly asked my assistant to explain to me what was being said. When I understood 
that the discussion was about my ethnic background, I decided not to turn a deaf 
ear, but to talk about it and make the atmosphere more relaxed. I then explained to 
His Majesty that I was no longer just a “southerner”, but my marriage with a Bariba 
woman had already made me a full member of this ethnic group. Very surprised that 
I was married to a Bariba woman, he smiled, and jokingly said: “Nin bi wa ama su 
e mi! wi a ko kpin u behe dema ho kpo kpin onu gari dera sia.” 93 We all laughed and 
I was able to revive the interview. This dialogue, which seemed playful, finds its very 
sense in the Benin democratic context of ethnic cleavages and regionalist differences 
often sharpened in political manipulations (cf. Agossou, 2001). Like His Majesty, 
the Bariba King of Gogounou, other people from my field sites might have also 
stereotyped me in one way or another. This might not have completely nullified the 
difference that I had seriously tried to avoid between my informants and myself. 
The fact that I was completing my study in Germany was also variously interpret-
ed by the development agencies that were already supporting pastoralists in Benin. 
As I was told once by a worker of an international development agency in Parakou, 
the German development cooperation had invested very little in pastoralism in Be-
nin in recent decades. Therefore, I might be, for the other international partners, a 
German spy assigned to explore the pastoralist sector in order to offer my funders 
ideas for future development projects. I felt as though I was sometimes mistaken 
as a competitor, even if the Fulani association leaders liked very much this form of 
competition between donors, through which they expand their financing networks, 
as I examine later on in Chapter 8.
Linguistic constraint: My inability to speak Fulfulde and Batonu languages hin-
dered direct conversation with some interlocutors, especially pastoralists and crop 
farmers. I had used a trilingual research assistant, Aboubakar Amadou, who was 
more accustomed to censuses and more rapid consultations. The ethnographic study 
that I was doing was the first in his life. Everything seemed boring and redundant 
to him in the very beginning, despite our time agreeing on preparations. I felt his 
fatigue and impatience. Sometimes he wanted me to avoid repeating questions, to 
which we already had answers, and to move on to new issues that we had not yet 
discussed. Abou, as he was commonly called, preferred that I shorten our discussions 
so I could release him earlier. He wanted to pursue other economic and political 
opportunities. As a young independent undergraduate, he was faced with many self-
supporting issues. He even got married during my stay in Gogounou and his marital 
as well as financial charges increased. While the compensation94 that I gave him was 
92 “He is seeking information related to animals”.
93 “You even married my daughter! It is she who will betray our tradition (or our secrets)”.
94 I was paying Abou, 80,000 CFA francs (US$ 160) per month. This monthly pay corresponded 
to slightly less than twice the monthly salary of a worker in Benin (all categories combined). The 
minimum wage rate per month gross is 31,652 CFA francs (US$ 63). The median net hourly wage of 
114 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
sufficient for this kind of work, it did not make up for his other responsibilities. I was 
forced to give him time to farm or attend political meetings for which he had at least 
received a per diem. 
Despite the Abou’s absences and the regular readjustments induced in my work 
schedule, the strong friendship that developed between us over time made it easy to 
catch up on lost time. Abou and I cooked and ate together, and we shared the same 
bed in a flat that I had rented in Gogounou. This was possible since his wife worked 
in Kandi and returned to Gogounou only on the weekends. We reached the point 
of also sharing confidential matters with each other. This helped limit the manipu-
lations he was often susceptible to vis-à-vis his “friend researcher”. My trustworthy 
relationship with Abou was much inspired by the experience of Sascha Kesseler (a 
German doctoral researcher) and Lucien Tentaga (a Beninese research assistant), who 
used their commonalities and differences as opportunities to approach the field (Kes-
seler and Tentaga, 2013). The behavior of some actors and the manipulation of my 
research assistant by some players were important clues that helped me to understand 
many issues related to the situation of pastoralism in Gogounou. Therefore, we were 
able to reduce the biases on the data and their interpretation.
Another challenge in using young Fulani as research assistants was to be able to 
minimise their politically motivated actions during the period of fieldwork. Fulani 
youth were prepared to take advantage of my status as well as my materials in order 
to feed their local political clientage. The situation was worse during my time in 
the field when several elections (local, municipal and legislative) were imminent in 
Benin. The young educated Fulani are often courted by many politicians who seek 
to use them to win the electorate of Fulani pastoralists, or position them on lists of 
political parties in some areas to weaken their political enemies. I have had different 
experiences during my two data collection phases. With Sanda Aboubakar, whom 
I used as interpreter during my exploratory research, my status as a doctoral student, 
my coming from Germany and my field materials (recorder, camera, GPS) were all 
useful to him. He claimed that he wanted to solve the problems of the Fulani and de-
velop his region. His ambition to run in the local elections in the region of Zougou-
Pantrossi and his desire to meet my requirements often placed him in ambiguous and 
uncomfortable positions. 
This socio-political positioning of research auxiliaries between two worlds (soci-
ety and researcher) is often seen in anthropology as important for data collection and 
analysis. The research assistants are active rather than passive, having their agency 
and pursuing their own agenda (Powdermaker, 1966; Lather, 1988; Tomaselli et 
al. 2008; Kesseler and Tentaga, 2013). After my experience with Sanda, I sought 
to limit the biases by seeking an assistant outside Gogounou, but my efforts in this 
a worker in Benin (all categories combined) is 214 CFA francs; and the usual average working week is 
57 hours in 5.8 days (cf. Besamusca et al. 2013).
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regard were unsuccessful.95 I ended up recruiting Abou for the long-term fieldwork, 
but my experience with him had revealed other forms of positioning of the research 
assistant towards his employer-researcher and his own society.
Abou, who is one of the school-educated young Fulani of his village (Boro), had a 
great influence locally. He knew exactly how to mobilize supporters and was the kind 
of henchman liked by politicians. My research assistant was often courted by many 
politicians and would perform other plans during our investigation time. Some Fu-
lani leaders, who also had ambitions to run in the municipal and parliamentary 
elections, often asked him to make contacts in the camps in order to make the up-
coming campaigns more successful. He would regularly list Fulani camps and make 
key contacts to help improve the campaign strategies of some politicians (including 
some Fulani leaders) to win the elections. 
Six months after my return to Germany, Abou was positioned on the list of the 
ruling political alliance in Benin to enter the Gogounou Municipal Council, but he 
did not succeed. This overview of young educated Fulani in Gogounou, who were 
not only political brokers in the making, but research assistants, precedes my analy-
sis on development brokerage in which Fulani intellectuals were involved in trans-
forming and modernizing pastoralism and pastoralists. Researchers must care about 
providing fair remuneration and developing flexible field approach, when using the 
services of these young Fulani that also offer another face of the transformation un-
derway in pastoral areas in northern Benin. 
Financial constraint: My fieldwork benefited from limited funding, but also re-
stricted my analysis to several local cases. A larger sample and more quantitative data 
for statistical purposes would have been useful for studying certain phenomena (e.g. 
tree cutting, involvement of youth in the informal marketing of pesticides, involve-
ment of officials in farming, herbicide use for land control, etc.). However, this was 
not possible for logistical reasons and prevented the extension of the study to the 
district of Malanville as originally planned. To do this, I would have required more 
research assistants and thus more financial means to complete the investigation. This 
constraint may have induced some methodological bias and thus influenced the in-
terpretation of some data. It can sometimes seem a bit exaggerated in my analysis to 
generalize certain observed phenomena. However, I was able to limit this weakness 
in two ways. First, I visited other districts like Kandi, Bembéréké, N’Dali and Nikki 
where I was able to carry out some direct observations and converse with some lo-
cal people on what was happening in those regions about the pastoralism. Second, 
I launched a debate on the online discussion forum “AgriProFocus Benin”96 about 
informal marketing and the abundant use of herbicides in northern Benin and their 
95 Sir Amadou Bani Yero from Bembéréké District, with whom I had agreed to work several months 
prior to my arrival, finally withdrew to find a job in southern Benin. 
96 AgriProFocus is an online platform where farmer organizations, NGOs workers, researchers and 
agricultural entrepreneurs in thirteen countries meet and debate on all issues related to agro-pastoral 
family farms. I used the section on Benin (AgriProFocus Benin) to launch the discussion on herbicide 
use in connection with pastoralism in northern Benin. I launched the discussion on 20 March 2015 
116 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
implications for pastoralism. The comments and cases raised by the participants on 
this internet-based consultation97 corroborated my arguments in this document. In 
sum, the three aforementioned constraints have influenced my study. However, my 
knowledge of the area since 2008 and my strong integration into the local communi-
ties enabled me to develop strategies to avoid or mitigate any negative effects on my 
data and analysis.
Conclusion5.5 
Throughout this chapter, I have presented my itinerant field approach and the dif-
ferent techniques used to collect and analyze my data. I have also outlined several 
constraints that could be linked to potential biases in the arguments made in this 
document. Finally, I have explained the strategies that I used to reduce those biases. 
In the chapters that follow, I will present the main findings of my ethnographic 
experience. I begin by showing the “crisis” of pastoralism through the land control 
and the dwindling of livestock feed resources in Gogounou (Chapter 6). I will then 
present how individual pastoralists address the shortage of resources (Chapter 7) and 
I will finalize my arguments by examining the strategies used by the pastoralist as-
sociations and their leaders to find solutions to the problems of pastoralists (Chap-
ter 8).
and closed it on 29 March 2015, after successful interventions from five participants. For details, see: 
http://agriprofocus.com/search?keyword=Georges+Djohy (last accessed 10/12/17).
97 The internet (and other communication technologies) is one of the many opportunities available to 
anthropologists nowadays. For other possibilities, see Bernard (2006: 254ff.). 
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Technological revolution, land use change  
and social exclusion in Gogounou
This chapter presents and analyzes the land use situation in Gogounou District over 
the past three decades. The different pathways for economic development, food se-
curity and sustainable natural resource management by the Government have some 
negative influences on pastoralism, especially in terms of land and access to resourc-
es. The state development policies supported by various other local, national and 
international actors have ultimately enabled crop farmers to consolidate their power 
over land at the expense of Fulani pastoralists. Cash cropping, logging, tree planting 
and land individualization are all powerful weapons in the hands of crop farming 
communities, which use them to better control land. There was a form of rangeland 
acquisition through various forms of territorialization detrimental to Fulani pastoral-
ists who face huge difficulties in accessing pasture. Here, I argue that technologies 
promoted within the framework of rural development policies create imbalances in 
power relations between actors, and fuel multidimensional processes of territorializa-
tion, resulting in rangeland reduction. In the next section, I begin by mapping the 
land cover and land use in Gogounou during the last three decades. I will then pres-
ent the socio-economic and political dynamics that explain the dwindling of pastoral 
resources through the use of remote sensing technologies.
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Land use and land cover change in Gogounou  6.1 
from 1982 to 2012
The GIS-based spatial diachronic analysis of land use and land cover change in 
Gogounou (Figure 6.1) shows a subtle regression of open forests and wooded sa-
vannahs. From 85,060 ha in 1982, they have deteriorated by 0.53% and 1.11%, 
and were respectively, 82,430 ha in 2002 and 76,994 ha 2012. Trees and shrubs 
savannahs have decreased from 337,827 ha in 1982 to 236,392 ha in 2002 and to 
197,893 ha in 2012. The mosaics of croplands and fallow lands have increased al-
together from 58,754 ha in 1982 to 160,188 ha in 2002 (20.54%) and to 199,364 
ha in 2012 (7.94%). The built-up area, which was 297 ha in 1982, also increased 
over time. It became 1012 ha in 2002 and then 4472 ha in 2012 with, respectively, 
0.14% and 0.71% as growth rates. The plantations covered a total area of 405 ha 
in 1982; but they increased respectively by 0.39% and 0.27% during the two sub-
periods. Their area became 2345 ha in 2002 and increased to 3672 ha in 2012. In 
summary, the overall pattern of change in Gogounou has been the expansion of the 
various spatial units. Residential spaces, crop areas, grasslands and plantation areas 
have undergone significant change over the period concerned (Table 6.1).
Figure 6.1: Land use and land cover changes in Gogounou (1982–2012) / part 1
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Figure 6.1: Land use and land cover changes in Gogounou (1982–2012) / part 2
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Table 6.1: Area change through land use in Gogounou (1982–2012)
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of land cover patterns in Gogounou (1982–2012)
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The area of Gogounou has experienced growth in agricultural settlement. There was 
a dramatic increase in the amount of land used for cropping and fallowing. This 
expansion occurred through a continuous clearance of the savannah, which has de-
creased almost in the same proportion. Part of the destroyed trees and shrubs savan-
nah was reverted into plantations, as it appears more conspicuously in Figure 6.2.
The hidden political ecology of rangeland reduction  6.2 
in Gogounou
After a technical or geospatial understanding of land use and land cover changes 
in Gogounou in recent decades, it is now important to link people to the pixels.98 
I will begin by presenting the demographic changes in Gogounou. The government 
policies and their implications at the local level will then be discussed, as well as the 
reinterpretations made by local actors who have access to various technologies.
Local population growth in Gogounou
Population growth is among one of the leading factors often indexed in most analyses 
of ecological dynamics in relation to pastoralism (cf. Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990). 
When looking at the local trend, the population of Gogounou District has more 
than quadrupled in thirty years (Table 6.2). The total number of inhabitants, which 
was 27,830 during the first general population census of 1979 (RGPH991), increased 
to 117,793 according to preliminary results from the fourth census in 2013 (INSAE, 
2013a: 4). The most recent growth rate of the local population was 3.50%, practi-
cally equivalent to that of the whole country over the same period (2002–2013). 
The Gogounou population has, however, increased to a lesser extent than in other 
districts in the same region, since the growth rate of Alibori Province was 4.64% 
between 2002 and 2013. This demographic explosion implies an increasing land 
demand for both settlement and farming. It is an undoubted reality, but not enough 
to explain alone the whole observed spatial occupation trend. The disappearance of 
rangelands in Gogounou District is more easily understood when looking closely at 
the various rural economies in place: the cotton economy, the grain economy, the 
wood economy and, finally, the growing plantation economy. I will now turn to the 
government agricultural policies, the local crop economies and the power relations 
that undermine the pastoral practices in Gogounou.
98 “People and pixels” is the main heading of a book by Liverman et al. (1998) to link remote sensing 
and social science. “People” refers to the socio-political landscape and “pixels” to the image-based geo-
spatial technologies. I am referring here to the idea of merging remote sensing and socio-anthropolog-
ical analysis. As McCusker and Weiner (2003) put it, the remotely sensed images are representations 
not only of nature but also of hidden socio-political realities (hidden political ecologies), and more 
social analysis is needed to better explain the uncovered underlying social processes.
99 Recensement Général de la Population et de l’Habitation.
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Agricultural mechanization and territorialization by farm extensification
As stated by Bryant and Bailey (1997: 57) regarding other Third World countries, 
the Republic of Benin is also part of the smaller and economically vulnerable coun-
tries due to its heavy dependence on export of few products. The cotton sector re-
mains the biggest contributor to the national economy, which fluctuates according 
to the rhythm of production during the annual agricultural campaign. It is the basis 
of the agro-industry, accounting for about 60% of local industry. In 2009, the cotton 
sector contributed 13% to the GDP in terms of value added. The cotton produc-
tion also contributed 45% to the domestic income (taxes and treasury) and was the 
primary source of income for Benin (MEF, 2010). Given its importance, priority is 
always given to the cotton sector. Nothing prevents cotton production and nobody 
can afford to destroy a cotton field because of a land dispute, animal grazing or for-
est conservation. In the political discourse, cotton farmers deserve special attention 
from the Government, since their commodity is source of foreign currency for the 
country and contributes to the growth of the national economy. The President of 
the Republic himself and various Ministers of his Government campaign each year 
across the country, moving from one district to another within the northern cotton 
basin to motivate farmers to increase their cotton acreages. 
In addition to cotton, which occupies this privileged place in economic growth 
and development efforts, recent upsurges in agricultural diversification and food sov-
ereignty of African nations have also fueled the promotion of grains and perennial 
crops, which have become very important in Benin’s agricultural policy (cf. PSRSA/
MAEP, 2011). 
100 Source: Adapted from INSAE (2013a: 4).


















27,830 4.28% 50,045 4.80% 80,013 3.50% 117,793
Alibori 
Province
213,078 3.73% 355,950 3.88% 521,093 4.64% 868,046
Benin 
Republic
3,331,210 2.82% 4,915,555 3.25% 6,769,914 3.51% 9,983,884
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Farm machinery appropriation and land issues
The Government of Benin began to actively promote the mechanization of agricul-
ture in 2006. The National Council for Agricultural Mechanization (CNMA101) and 
the Agency for Agricultural Mechanization Development (ADMA102) were created 
for this purpose (PSRSA/MAEP, 2011: 31). Individual farmers who could not af-
ford farm machinery grouped themselves into Cooperatives for Farm Machinery Use 
(CUMAs103). The CUMA model was designed to promote a shared mechanization 
by a group of farmers who could access farm machinery with greatly reduced indi-
vidual usage costs and by sharing the maintenance charges. This also reduces their 
reliance on costly imported tractor services, improves their access to knowledge and 
information and increases their bargaining power with market actors and decision-
makers (CTA, 2011; Balse et al. 2015a; 2015b). More practically, accessing farm 
machineries through a CUMA enables a farmer to plow one hectare of land in only 
four hours rather than four days, as required by draft power, or eight to ten days by 
hoeing (CUMA-Benin, 2010).
The CUMAs were initiated in 1995 in Borgou-Alibori region by the French Farm-
ers and International Development (AFDI104) and the Departmental Federation of 
CUMA Dordogne in France105. It was part of a North-South transfer of technology 
intended to improve the performance of small family farms. The first experience was 
made in Bembéréké District (about 65 km from Gogounou) through the Program 
for Professionalization of Agriculture in Benin (PPAB106) endowed with funding 
from the French Development Agency (AFD107). A CUMA is composed of about 
10 members; and equipped with a 30–60/70hp tractor, a plow and a 3-ton trailer 
(Balse et al. 2015a: 6; Balse et al. 2015b: 6), requiring a total budget of 10 million 
CFA francs. Benin Government chose the CUMA model as key element to make the 
country an “agricultural power”. This vision was clearly defined in different policy 
documents such as the Document of National Strategy for Agricultural Mechaniza-
tion (DSNMA108) in 2005 and the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Sector Develop-
ment (PSRSA109) in 2006 (PSRSA/MAEP, 2011). This led in 2007 to the setting up 
of the Program for the Promotion of Agricultural Mechanization (PPMA110). About 
300 tractors were distributed throughout the country as part of this program. The 
beneficiaries were individual farmers, farmer groups, agricultural education centers 
101 Conseil National de Mécanisation Agricole.
102 Agence de Développement de la Mécanisation Agricole.
103 Coopérative d’Utilisation de Matériels Agricoles.
104 Agriculteurs Français et Développement International.
105 Fédération Départementale des CUMA Dordogne (France).
106 Programme de Professionnalisation de l’Agriculture Béninoise.
107 Agence Française de Développement.
108 Document de la Stratégie Nationale de Mécanisation Agricole.
109 Plan Stratégique de Relance du Secteur Agricole.
110 Programme de Promotion de la Mécanisation Agricole.
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and various youth groups enrolled through the Special Program for Youth Integra-
tion in Agriculture (PSIJA111) (Saizonou, 2009). The tractors are subsidized by 50% 
of the real price and the payment is spread over four years. A 60hp tractor is sold to 
the CUMAs for 6 million CFA francs and a 30hp tractor for 4.5 million CFA francs. 
The first portion of 20% is payable when collecting the machines, 30% in each of the 
second and third years, and, finally, 20% in the fourth year (ibid). 
The number of CUMAs has increased considerably over time across the country. 
There were about 109 active CUMAs in the Borgou-Alibori Region in 2010, being 
referred to as the Regional Union of CUMAs in Borgou and Alibori Provinces (UR-
CUMA B/A112). The URCUMA Borgou-Alibori mobilized about 953 farmers who 
cultivated altogether 10,112 ha in 2010 (CUMA-Benin, 2015). The other regions of 
the country also made progress in this way and the rate of agricultural mechanization 
was estimated at 17% in 2010, compared to 1% in 2006 (Agro-Benin, 2011). The 
process of machine exchange between CUMAs, the individual tractor acquisition 
and the availability of tractor service delivery promoted the integration of tractors in 
agricultural practices in various parts of Benin. This enabled an increase in the culti-
vated areas in some regions (Saizonou, 2009; Gibigaye et al. 2010, Balse et al. 2015a; 
2015b). Balse et al. (2015b) found that the members of CUMAs in Benin increased 
111 Programme Spécial d’Insertion des Jeunes dans l’Agriculture.
112 Union Régionale des CUMAs du Borgou-Alibori.
Photo 6.1: Tractor use in crop farming in Gogounou
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their crop areas 3.5 fold on average, 1.2 fold minimum and 6.4 fold maximum. In 
an information sheet disseminated in 2014 by the network of CUMAs in Benin, the 
agricultural performance of the CUMAs and their members was well explained: 
The CUMA: a tool for sustainable development of Benin agriculture 
The CUMAs enabled: 
An increase in area cultivated by their members 
An increase in yields through better-quality plowing 
An increase in farmers’ incomes 
An increase in school enrolment of children 
Investments within agricultural holdings 
An overall improvement of the living conditions of the CUMA member 
farmers and their families. (CUMA-Benin, 2014)113
The district of Gogounou did not remain on the sidelines of such agricultural “mod-
ernization” (Photo 6.1). Aside from the individually acquired tractors, and those of 
farmer cooperatives, the local authority invested in three tractors for service deliv-
ery. By 7 April 2014, fifteen CUMAs had been created in Gogounou and nine of 
them were equipped by the PPMA114. These local machines were supplemented by 
other tractors from neighboring districts and countries offering plow services within 
Borgou and Alibori Provinces, and, more specifically, in Gogounou. Another im-
portant aspect of this agricultural modernization policy is the Program for Youth 
Integration in Agriculture, which recruits and installs youth groups in different up-
land and lowland areas granted by the district authorities. In Gogounou, two groups 
involving about 115 young farmers occupy about 170 ha of land for agriculture.115 
Their holdings are dedicated to maize and rice production. This kind of free installa-
tion of young people on lands they do not own, inevitably leads to strong dynamics 
around arable and pastoral areas (cf. Amoussou and Sagbohan, 2010: 11f.).116
113 I have translated it from its original French version.
114 At least 19 farms in Gogounou received machinery through the PPMA (cf. Ligan-Topanou et al. 
2015).
115 There is a group of 100 youths in Bagou village for rice production on 160 hectares, and a group 
of fifteen youths who produce maize in Dougoulaye village on ten hectares of land (TSAGRN, 
SCDA-Gogounou, 19/08/15).
116 The authors have shown that the granting of land by the State through these kinds of programs, 
in collaboration with decentralized authorities, to anyone with the ability and willingness to farm, 
has led to unprecedented territorial dynamics over land. In the Niger valley in Malanville District, for 
example, more than 9,000 youths (30% women) benefited from this agricultural integration initiative 
(Amoussou and Sagbohan, 2010: 12).
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Labor shortage and territorialization by tractor
The adoption of agricultural machinery has been accompanied by serious labor chal-
lenges. It has the merit of reducing child labor, which was commonly involved in te-
dious operations such as plowing with hoes and draft animals. However, it generates 
a large labor deficit due to the extensive rather than intensive strategy that governs 
its use by local farmers (Balse et al. 2015a; 2015b). The savings in time and labor 
through tractor plowing – plowing being almost the only farm activity performed by 
a tractor – are constantly reinvested by farmers who continually increase their crop 
areas. Additional manpower is then necessary to cover other farm operations and 
achieve the objective of good agricultural performance. For CUMA members, for 
example, the average person would have farmed 1.7 ha in the past, but must now 
take care of 4.2 ha, despite the external labor often sought to fill the gap (cf. Balse et 
al. 2015b: 12). This labor issue has become even greater, since it was also aggravated 
by the higher school enrolment of children, the result of significant education policy 
efforts by the Government, with support from international development agencies.
Based on various regional and international commitments, the Government of 
Benin adopted a policy paper for education in 2005. This policy document was 
strengthened later by the Growth Strategy for Poverty Reduction (SCRP117), which 
issued the political will of improving the human capital of the country by giving 
special priority to the “promotion of an education system for development” (SCRP, 
2010: 112ff.). This led to the adoption of the Decennial Plan for Education Sec-
tor Development (PDDSE118), supported by international partners. Since 2006, the 
“Education for All” policy also promotes free primary education for all children and 
free secondary education for girls, followed by various sensitization, advocacy and 
support measures. This has resulted in increased numbers of students at these two 
education levels (Zerah and Fontaine, 2012). 
This education trend at the national level is also visible in Gogounou, where 
child enrolment in primary schools has increased by more than 147% between 2000 
and 2014 (Figure 6.3). The total number of schoolchildren increased from 5,718 
in 2000–2001 (46% female), to 14,132 (53% female) in 2013–2014. Several local 
NGOs and international organizations, e.g. DANIDA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP/
FAO,119 contributed by providing support to families in the form of food, uniforms, 
school supplies, etc. This improvement in the child education rate also impacted the 
availability of labor within rural households, where mechanization is an undeniable 
reality related to the increase in crop areas. Another labor-saving technology that has 
become accessible to many farmers is the use of chemical herbicides that are infor-
117 Stratégie de Croissance pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté.
118 Plan Décennal de Développement du Secteur de l’Education.
119 Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA); United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP); United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); World Food Program (WFP) of the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
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mally supplied by local operators. Now, I will present how agricultural input supply 
has become an informal business in Benin, and how the adoption of herbicides has 
become a threat to pastoralism in Gogounou District.
Agricultural reforms, de-liberalization and territorialization through herbicide use
In the 1980s, the Government of Benin had a monopoly on the cotton sector, sup-
plying seeds and inputs, providing training and advisory services, buying the pro-
duction, ginning and exporting the cotton fiber, etc. As a result of the liberalization 
process started during the 1992–93 agricultural campaign, the input supply market 
was gradually granted to private actors (private importers-distributors) working in 
partnership with the Government through the public agricultural promotion and ex-
tension services (CTA, 2008: 3). The Inter-professional Cotton Association (AIC121) 
created in 1999 was in charge of critical functions in the cotton sector: cotton re-
search, seed production, input supply, training and supervision of producers, quality 
control of cotton seed, fiber grading and road maintenance (ibid: 5). The inputs (fer-
tilizers and pesticides) were provided by the businesses at a single price arranged with 
the Government, which strictly controlled the sector. This input policy was made 
up of three different components. First, the cotton inputs benefited from an import 
duty-free regime, while those of other crops were automatically charged import tax-
es. Second, cotton inputs were sold to farmers at highly subsidized prices.122 Finally, 
cotton inputs were supplied on credit to farmers according to their holdings and the 
120 Source: From Gogounou School Board’s database.
121 Association Interprofessionnelle du Coton (AIC).
122 The input subsidy could reach 75% in 1970, but the implementation of structural adjustment 





























Figure 6.3: The changing numbers of schoolchildren in Gogounou from 2000 to 2014120
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costs systematically deducted from their income after commercialization (Kherallah 
et al. 2001: 8). Through this process, the sector was relatively well controlled by the 
Government, which hindered inroads from unlawful traders and unapproved private 
firms (ibid: 12f.).
The conflicts of interest between ginners, the regular protests of input suppli-
ers against the procurement process and the cleavage within the single grassroots 
farmer organization in 2003 resulted in parallel input supply channels going out of 
control (Gbeffo, 2012: 22). The Government in 2006 intervened to resolve these dif-
ficulties through the establishment of national councils for each professional group 
involved in the cotton sector (farmers, inputs suppliers and ginners). The informal 
input flows were relatively controlled until 2007, when the Government initiated a 
series of reforms to improve the contribution of cotton to the economy. The Decree 
No. 2007-238 of 31 May 2007 on the definition and organization of the transitional 
management framework for the cotton sector repealed all the earlier acts, including 
the Decree No. 99-537 of 17 November 1999 on the transfer to the private sector 
of the responsibility of organizing consultations for the supply of agricultural inputs, 
and the Decree No. 2005-41 of 2 February 2005, which laid down the Framework 
Agreement between the Government and the inter-branch organization of the cot-
ton sector. These reforms were perceived by private-sector actors as Government 
interference in a liberalized sector, and this led to a major conflict between the two 
groups. As a result, the liberalization acts were unilaterally cancelled by the Govern-
ment (CTA, 2008; Meenink, 2013a).
This complete breakdown in the public-private partnership meant that the Gov-
ernment took over the cotton sector again. The powerful economic operators who 
were controlling the sector confronted the Government, making it difficult to supply 
inputs to farmers (cf. Dossoumou, 2012). The slow formal market – managed by the 
public agricultural promotion and extension services (CAIA, CARDER, SONAPRA, 
etc.)123 – was overtaken by informal flows of inputs out of Government control, rap-
idly developed by private businesses (cf. Meenink, 2013b:67). Farmers were supplied 
more quickly with pesticides for all types of crops and at very cheap prices. These 
chemicals, generally branded “Made in China”, are illegally imported from Nigeria 
and Ghana and directly dumped without any environmental controls onto the cot-
ton basin of northern Benin through its various border routes. Alongside the roads, 
in villages and marketplaces, such products have become highly accessible, especially 
given the possibility of credit arrangements. With 2,000–4,000 CFA francs, farm-
ers can access one liter of herbicide, almost the same product offered through the 
formal market at 5,000–8,000 CFA francs. The Government, which wants, at all 
costs, cotton as well as grains to be abundantly produced to ensure economic growth 
and food security, was unable to control the input supply and banish the informal 
market as was previously the case prior to the reforms and their related conflicts. This 
123 Centrale d’Achat des Intrants Agricoles (CAIA), Centre Agricole Régional pour le Développement 
Rural (CARDER), Société Nationale de Promotion Agricole (SONAPRA).
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ubiquitous availability of agricultural pesticides has completely changed local farm 
practices, as I explain below.
Weeding technology and change in farm practices
For farmers in Gogounou, herbicide is one of the most important innovations that 
have revolutionized farming practices over the last decades. This is not to say that 
herbicides did not exist in the region before, but they had never been as accessible to 
farmers. Chemicals for weeding were introduced into Benin agriculture in the early 
1980s. The first pre-extension tests dated back to 1979, when different products with 
weed-killing effects on cotton, maize, sorghum and peanut production were experi-
enced across the country (cf. Atachi, 1979). This initial step in promoting herbicides 
was jointly made with other tropical countries of francophone sub-Saharan Africa 
in order to face the labor shortages challenging hand-weeding, creating a bottleneck 
in the cropping calendar (Gaborel and Fadoegnon, 1991; Marnotte, 1994). Since 
then, the use of herbicides increased mostly in cotton production due not only to 
the aforementioned input policy which targets cotton farmers, but also to the higher 
costs that non-cotton farmers could not afford to pay in cash. It is a fact that many 
cotton farmers diverted those products for use in their own food crops areas, or sold 
them off to their peers – which affected cotton yields (Kherallah et al. 2001: 16). 
However, the recent propagation of herbicides and the designed purchase facilities by 
sellers provide greater flexibility to farmers, who acquire these products in abundance 
not only for production purposes, but also to take control over the land.
According to the farmers, draft animals and tractors were the most remarkable 
innovations that preceded herbicides in Gogounou District. The advent of herbi-
cides is therefore portrayed as the third milestone in local crop farming that brought 
it to a turning point in its history. The policy of the Government, oriented toward in-
creasing the volume and price of cotton and the growth of the maize sector, justifies 
the choice of the farmers. On the one hand, they are increasingly involved in cotton 
production to meet the will of the Government. On the other hand, they have also 
increased maize production volumes to satisfy not only the expanding local market, 
but also the flourishing recent export market that makes the sector more attractive. 
Zato, a farmer in his eighties with the largest farmland in Zougou-Pantrossi Region, 
presented the agricultural trends from the 1960s onwards (Table 6.3), and Yarou, a 
farmer in his forties with the largest farmland in Boro village, shared his agricultural 
profile, showing the influence of herbicides on land occupation and farming activi-
ties (Table 6.4).
Closer monitoring of farm work reveals significant changes in the technical itin-
eraries of the main crops grown in Gogounou District. I present here only the case of 
maize to show how the adoption of herbicides has changed the agricultural practices 
and the relations of rural actors to the land (Photo 6.2). I consider only the main 
cultivation operations from soil preparation up to the packaging of the grains to be 
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Table 6.3: Agricultural trends in Gogounou from the 1960s to date 
Periods Benchmarks Main features
1960s Before and  
during the term  
of President  
Hubert Maga
Agriculture with rudimentary tools –
Agriculture for subsistence   –
(no craze for money, no commercial exchange) 
Farming activities carried out by family   –
(domestic agricultural assets, family labor)
Land available and fertile, but low acreages   –
(less than 3ha) per family
Food crops essentially   –
(millet, sorghum, maize, beans, groundnuts, sesame, yam) 
with predominance of intercropping 
No use of chemical fertilizers, but good returns  –
Lush vegetation and a lot of rain during the rainy season  –
Water bodies abundant and permanent  –
No land troubles –
1970s–
1980
During the term  
of President  
Mathieu Kérékou 1  
(Revolution times)
Introduction of animal traction in agriculture –
Introduction of cotton production  –
Small-scale adoption of fertilizers and insecticides –
Increase in family crop acreage up to 10 ha –
Limitation of intercropping and early practice   –
of monoculture 
Massive destruction of trees for agricultural purposes  –
Start of disruption and disorganization of rainfall   –
and rainy season 





term to the two 
terms of President 
Mathieu Kérékou 2
Introduction of agricultural mechanization   –
(promotion of tractors, cultivators, etc.) 
Increase of family and individual acreages up to 30 ha  –
Remarkable population growth –
Emergence then decline of cotton sector due to   –
input quality, debts to the farmers and conflicts within farmer 
organizations
Proliferation of land disputes and violent land conflicts –
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sold on the market, without going into detail about possible differences at the indi-
vidual level.
The former way of cropping maize included land preparation, plowing, sow-
ing, hand-weeding (with weeding hoe) and/or ridge-weeding (with draft animals), 
fertilization, harvesting, shelling, packaging and handling/transportation. By con-
trast, the “modern,” technical route of maize production, chemicals are used for all 
weed-related activities. The use of herbicides has significantly relieved the manual 
soil-preparation activities, which currently involve spraying non-selective products 
on grassy plots to be plowed directly thereafter. The tedious time-consuming and 
labor-demanding hand-weeding is mostly replaced by easier herbicide-based weed-
ing. Some farmers also adopt no-till farming, which is becoming common practice 
and offers great potential for labor saving and area expansion. Depending on their ef-
fects on grasses, crops and soils, farmers distinguish between three types of herbicides 
called Kpake, Tangi/Yangatime and Dame in Batonu language.124 
124 Some of these names are in Batonu language (Kpake, Tangi, Yangatime); and others, like Dame, are 
adapted from the French language.
Table 6.3: Agricultural trends in Gogounou from the 1960s to date / continued
Periods Benchmarks Main features
2006–
2014
During the terms  
of President  
Boni Yayi
Facilitation of tractor access for all farmers   –
through the agricultural mechanization program
Upturn in cotton sector first, then decline due to   –
input quality, conflicts between the Government  
and the private operators holding the sector 
Increase afterward in cotton price by the Government,   –
but difficulty in accessing agricultural inputs
Emergence of maize sector and increase in prices   –
due to exports
Development of informal inputs (especially herbicides)   –
supply sector 
Huge increase in individual maize and cotton acreages   –
up to 50–100 ha 
Illegal tree felling within state forests and on village lands  –
More remarkable variations in rainfall and rainy seasons –
Movement of Fulani herders to the south and to the neigh- –
boring countries
Resurgence of violent land conflicts –
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Table 6.4: Agricultural profile of Yarou, a farmer in Gogounou




20 years  
old)
Participation in family farming activities  –
Use of hoes for farming activities –
Manual weeding –
Low fertilizer and pesticide use –
Family labor predominance  –
Land availability with good fertility  –
First family plow oxen purchase –





First years of independence, with cotton production option
1989 
(For 5 years)
Empowerment and self decision-making and manage- –
ment 
Land availability and relatively good soil fertility  –
Buying of the first own pair of plow oxen –
First experience with cotton selective herbicides –
Cotton 7 ha
Maize 3.5 ha 
1994
(For 10 years) 
Purchase of other pairs of draft animals, plows and a  –
modern seeder 
Pleasure with cotton sector (quality inputs supply,  –
rapid payout, kickback motivation, non-existence of 
conflicts)
First time using of tractor service –
Further experiences with cotton selective herbicides –
Cotton 15 ha
Maize 3 ha 
Period of cotton and maize balancing
2004
(For 4 years)
Emergence of problems within cotton sector (poor- –
quality inputs, debts to the farmers, conflicts between 
actors)
Use of conventional cotton fertilizers and pesticides  –
(insecticides and herbicides) 
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Kpake (meaning burning product): These are non-selective field-clearing herbi-
cides used to prepare land by weeding out all types of vegetation. Their role is to 
“burn” everything as stated in the name that is given to them. They include different 
glyphosate-based herbicides having industrial names of Kalach, Sharp, Herbextra, 
etc.
Yangatime or Tangi (meaning selecting product): These are selective pre-emer-
gence weed-killers used to control specific crop weeds (in maize, cotton, rice, yam, 
etc.) or particular types of weeds. For maize, farmers used to use herbicides with the 
names Amino-force, Atraforce (also called Bogoumbo in Batonu), Bic (also called 
Somboure in Batonu), Hervextra, Heabesta, etc. They are thought to have dual weed-
killing and soil-fertilizing functions. This conceptualization is due to two main fac-
tors. Firstly, cropland treated only with herbicide, but without any application of 
fertilizers is supposed to have almost the same yield than a cropland weeded with 
a hoe or draft animals and sprayed with fertilizers. The application of fertilizers is 
sometimes considered unnecessary after the use of certain types of selective herbi-
cides. Secondly, some herbicides are in the form of flour and farmers interpret them 
Table 6.4: Agricultural profile of Yarou, a farmer in Gogounou / continued
Periods Main features Crops and acreages
 Period of maize production option
2008
(For 5 years)
Schooling of children  –
Emergence and good pricing of maize sector  –
Development of informal market for pesticides (espe- –
cially herbicides)





Taking back land that the parents had granted to  –
friends 







Credit taking with savings and loans institutions  –
Purchase of agricultural lands in N’Dali District (cost- –
ing 200,000 CFA francs/ha)
Purchase of own tractor and other modern agricul- –
tural equipment
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as having the same role as fertilizers.125 By using such herbicides, they believed they 
could solve the problem of weed competition and improve their overall crop perfor-
mance. 
Dame (meaning soil-compacting product): These are usually systemic herbicides 
used for their anti-germinative effects on weeds. They are applied just after sowing 
to prevent the sown fields from early weedy species at the expense of the main crop. 
Some post-emergence selective herbicides are sometimes placed in this category. The 
most important factor here is their action on the soil, which becomes unsuitable for 
the rapid emergence of weeds to compete with the crops. They are thought to have 
a compacting effect on soil over an average of 40 days, thus facilitating crop growth 
in the early weeks. This category includes mainly Atraz50FW, known by farmers as 
also having fertilizing effects.
These perceptions about chemical weed killers govern various farm practices that 
may vary from one farmer to another. Modern farmers in Gogounou are those who 
use not only the tractor for plowing, but also strongly incorporate herbicides in their 
farming practices. And when one is a good user of herbicides, three key factors can 
influence the agricultural performance: the type of crop (maize, cotton and so on), 
the type of soil (new or old land) and the type of plowing (hoe, draft animals or 
tractor-based plowing or no-till sowing). 
Type of crop: Cotton for example requires more care than maize. Additional hand-
weeding or herbicide spraying could be done by farmers to increase yields. The cot-
ton field needs more care in terms of cleaning activities, and some operations such as 
harvesting are more expensive than in the case of maize. Farmers rarely practice no-
till cotton because they perceive it as risky for cotton productivity. Furthermore, it is 
not allowed by the extension services, which can prevent them from receiving input 
credit if they do this. As the attention is lower in the maize sector, the no-till practice 
is fairly common in maize cropping. Maize crops are not subject to insecticide treat-
ments for controlling pests and parasites, as is usually the case with cotton. 
Type of land: Two types of land are distinguished: Tem kpa (new land) and Tem 
toko (old land). The new farmlands are fallow lands used for farming purposes for less 
than three years. They are characterized essentially by relatively high fertility and low 
susceptibility to weeds, but require more physical, material and financial effort for 
soil preparation (tree cutting, stump clearing, etc). The old farmland soils are those 
that are cultivated for more than three years, are relatively poor and where the weed 
attack is fast, heavy and oppressive to the main crop. Plowing, especially with trac-
tors, as well as no-till seeding technique are easier on old farmland because the land 
is cleaner and does not need the removal of tree stumps.
Type of plowing: Tractor-based plowing is deeper, relatively more expensive, but 
more productive with the same level of care. Hoe-plowing is in essence equal to the 
draft-animal plowing in terms of cost and seeding easiness. Seeding in tractor plow-
125 I have not checked whether herbicides are actually fertilizers at the same time. The perceptions and 
practices of actors were more important to me during my fieldwork.
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ing is more demanding in terms of time and skills. Seeding on no-tilled lands is the 
most expensive. For each crop, yields may depend on which combination is used 
(tilling method and land type), without including the effects of weeding methods.
Short-term profitability of herbicide-based agriculture
From a comparative perspective, I present here the short-term profitability of herbi-
cide use as seen by farmers themselves in maize production in both former and new 
farming systems (Tables 6.5. and 6.6). The costs of farming tasks are estimated in 
terms of the technical process through which the crop is managed. Only the most 
important farming tasks are considered: land preparation, plowing, seeding, weed-
ing, fertilization, harvesting, shelling, packaging and handling/transportation. 
In light of the assessments presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, herbicides have the 
advantage, at least in the short term, of partly addressing the problem of labor short-
age. Weeding, which is one of the most important farming activities, is achieved with 
less difficulty. In the end, the farmer who uses these chemicals earns at least 35,000 
CFA francs (US$ 70)126 more per hectare of cultivated land than the farmer who 
has not used them. This is a short-term advantage sought by all farmers and justifies 
126 1 US$ = 500 CFA francs.
Photo 6.2: Herbicide application for land preparation in Gogounou
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Table 6.5: Maize farming without weeding chemicals 





15,000 This is an essentially domestic operation. Cutting trees and shrubs, stump clear-
ing and burning crop residues and brush are done by the farmer and his family 
members. However, some may hire wage labor. The cost of preparing a new 
fallow land is estimated at 20,000 CFA francs/ha while an old field takes about 
10,000 CFA francs/ha to be prepared.
Plowing 27,500 Plowing costs 25,000–30,000 CFA francs/ha regardless of the agricultural tools 
used (hoe, draft animals or tractor).
Seeding 10,000 Seeding costs 8,000 CFA francs, 10,000 CFA francs and 12,000 CFA francs/ha 
when the plowing is done by hoe, plow or tractor, respectively.
First hand-
weeding
11,000 The first hand-weeding costs 10,000–12,000 CFA francs/ha.
Mineral  
fertilization
32,000 Farmers use an average of two bags of fertilizer (NPK and urea) for fertilizing one 
hectare of maize. The bag costs 10,000 CFA francs. Fertilizer application labor 
costs 12,000 CFA francs/ha.
Second hand-
weeding




11,000 The third hand-weeding costs as much as each of the previous two: about 
10,000–12,000 CFA francs/ha.
Harvesting 12,000 Harvesting maize costs 12,000FCFA francs/ha.
Shelling 11,250 Simple maize shelling costs about 400 CFA francs per bag of 100 kg, but shelling 
coupled with husking demands 500 CFA francs. 25 bags of 100kg are harvested 
on average per hectare.
Packaging 8,000 Packaging costs 300 CFA francs per bag of 100kg. For 25 bags obtained per 





30,000 Loading and unloading a 100kg bag of maize cost 200 CFA francs, so 5,000 CFA 
francs for 25 bags. Conveying from farm to storage or trading place requires an 
average of 1,000 CFA francs per bag, so 25,000 CFA francs for 25 bags. 
Marketing 412,500 The 100kg bag of maize is sold at 8,000 CFA francs minimum and 25,000 CFA 
francs maximum, so an average of 16,500 CFA francs per bag. 
Profit 233,750 One hectare of hand-weeded maize cropping demands 178,750 CFA 
francs and the product is sold for 412,500 CFA francs.
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Table 6.6: Maize farming with weeding chemicals







7,750 One liter of non-selective herbicide costing 2,500–3,000FCFA is used for one 
hectare. Additional 5,000 CFA francs per hectare are committed for arranging 
trees and stumps before plowing.
Plowing 27,500 Plowing costs 25,000–30,000 CFA francs per hectare regardless of the agricul-
tural machinery used (hoe, draft animals or tractor).
Seeding 10,000 Seeding costs 8,000 CFA francs, 10,000 CFA francs and 12,000 CFA francs per 





2,750 One liter per hectare of selective herbicide or a half-liter of selective herbicide 





2,750 Selective herbicide spraying is done at an interval of 15–45 days depending on 
the farmer, the type of soil, the main crop’s growth and the weed attack. This 
step can be replaced or not by ridging-weeding with draft animals.
Mineral fertil-
ization
32,000 Farmers use an average of two bags of fertilizer (NPK and urea) for fertilizing one 
hectare of maize. The bag costs 10,000 CFA francs. Fertilizer application labor 
costs 12,000 CFA francs/ha.
Harvesting 12,000 Harvesting maize costs 12,000 CFA francs/ha.
Shelling 11,250 Simple maize shelling costs about 400 CFA francs per bag of 100kg, but shelling 
coupled with husking demands 500 CFA francs. 25 bags of 100kg are harvested 
on average per hectare.
Packaging 8,000 Packaging costs 300 CFA francs per bag of 100kg. For 25 bags obtained per 




30,000 Loading and unloading a 100kg bag of maize cost 200 CFA francs, so 5,000 CFA 
francs for 25 bags. Conveying from farm to storage or trading place requires an 
average of 1,000 CFA francs per bag viz. 25,000 CFA francs for 25 bags. 
Marketing 412,500 The 100kg bag of maize is sold at 8,000 CFA francs minimum and 25,000 CFA 
francs maximum, so an average of 16,500 CFA francs per bag. 
Profit 268,500 One hectare of herbicide-weeded maize cropping demands 144,000 CFA 
francs and the product is sold for 412,500 CFA francs.
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the expansion of these products across Gogounou. The farmers regard herbicides as 
having helped to facilitate the education of children, since they alleviate the need for 
labor. This positive correlation between technological change and children’s school-
ing in northern Benin was also established by Baco (2008: 11).
As cotton and maize receive special attention from the state agricultural policy 
– the former is for export and the latter is for food security – most farmers increase 
their acreages and the production of both. With successive crises in the cotton sector, 
priority is given however to maize cropping. This interest in maize production also 
increased with the growing exports to neighboring countries, which raises specula-
tion on prices during certain periods of the year. Through improved varieties (white 
and mostly yellow) and higher production across northern regions, the maize locally 
produced in Benin has become highly profitable and competitive within the West 
African sub-region (cf. Baco et al. 2009; Diallo et al. 2012). Figure 6.4 shows the 
changes in areas of major crops in Gogounou District from 1996 to 2013.
Cotton (Gossypium sp) was by far the first cash crop in Gogounou. Its acreage has 
changed significantly from 1996 until the 2008–09 agricultural campaign, when the 
situation was reversed by a craze for grain production. The area covered by cotton, 
while still large, records an unsteady trend thereafter.
Cereal production has skyrocketed in recent decades. The cultivated area of 
cereals quadrupled between 1996 and 2013, rising from 7,258 ha to 28,525 ha. 
The main cereals planted are maize (Zea mays), sorghum (Sorghum bicolor), mil-
let (Pennisetum glaucum) and rice (Oryza sativa). Maize is the top-priority cereal 
in Gogounou. Its area has increased fivefold from 4,454 ha in 1996 to 22,686 ha 
in 2013. Maize is followed by rice, which quadrupled in area from 338 ha in 1996 



















































































































Figure 6.4: Evolution of crop areas in Gogounou from 1996 to 2013127
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to 1,258 ha in 2013. This implies a high exploitation of wetlands for agricultural 
purposes. Sorghum doubled in area with an annual average of 3,541 ha. The area of 
millet remained almost constant over the period, with an annual average of 123 ha. 
Maize and rice are two crops that contributed to the enormous increase in cereal area 
in Gogounou District.
The roots and tubers, being cassava (Manihot esculenta), yam (Dioscorea spp) and 
sweet potato (Ipomœa batatas), covered almost constantly an average of 2,664 ha per 
year over the period. This is also the trend in leguminous crops, being cowpea (Vigna 
unguiculata), groundnut (Arachis hypogaea), voandzou (Vigna subterianea) and soy-
bean (Glycine max), whose cultivated area averaged 2,358 ha from 1996 to 2013. The 
main vegetables produced in Gogounou are okra (Abelmoschus esculentus), pepper 
(Capsicum annuum ssp), tomato (Solanum lycopersicum), sesame (Sesamum indicum) 
and squash (Cucurbita spp). Their annual area averages 457 ha and remains almost 
stable over the period under consideration. 
In summary, there has been an expansion of cotton cultivation and much more 
in grain production during the last decades in Gogounou. The other crops have 
relatively stable areas or have experienced a less remarkable increase over the period. 
In all cases, no crop in Gogounou District has significantly decreased in area. This 
partly explains the intense pressure on land and the impact on grassland availability 
observed. The increasing trend taking place is even more evident in the evolution of 
production per unit of land (Figure 6.5). 
Figure 6.5 shows a continued increase in the total cultivated area from 1996 to 
2013. The total annual crop area has practically doubled in seventeen years from 
24,783 ha to 50,475 ha. The total production (all crops together) has also evolved 










































Figure 6.5: Evolution of total crop areas, products and yields from 1996 to 2013128
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from 37,842 tons in 1996 to 98,375 tons in 2013. Despite this increase in both 
total cultivated area and total production, the yield has not significantly improved. 
The average annual yield is invariably equal to two tons per hectare over the whole 
period. This observable land-use trend, in which the value of product per land unit 
does not significantly improve despite a doubling of the total cultivated area over 
time, could be referred to as agricultural extensification. This was possible thanks to 
the access of farmers to the different technologies presented above, especially tractors 
and pesticides. The use of non-selective and selective herbicides has become alarming 
with regard to high pollution pressure and challenge to the agro-ecological sustain-
ability of family farms (cf. Ligan-Topanou et al. 2015: 134). I will show in the next 
section the informal system through which farmers gain access to herbicides and the 
main trajectories of its appropriation by them.
Contraband trade and chemical flows in Gogounou
The informal herbicide market has become very dynamic in recent years in Gogounou 
District, as in other cotton-growing areas of northern Benin. The import is done by 
traders or economic operators who cross borders with their products to be locally 
retailed. The large scale of this contraband could raise doubt as to the unawareness of 
border authorities and government officials. In all cases, there are currently no wor-
ries for those who are engaged in such cross-border trade. As my informants often 
repeated, they are experts in legally crossing borders with illegal products. 
The largest wholesalers located in neighboring districts of Gogounou (N’Dali, 
Kandi or Bembéréké) supply and control the retail trade sector. Some importers 
with smaller capital also live locally in Gogounou. When the products from Ni-
geria or Ghana eventually make their way to Gogounou, they are sold on credit to 
semi-wholesalers or retailers who are responsible for distribution to farmers. Many 
schoolchildren and undergraduate students were also involved. They were mostly 
semi-wholesalers or retailers in local marketplaces, along the streets, across villages 
and hamlets and even at home. This was the case of Idrissou, a young undergradu-
ate in Geography who took advantage of the herbicide marketing opportunity to 
develop his own business. He is supplied by another young, unemployed Bachelor 
in Marketing and Management student from the University of Parakou. The latter 
is a semi-wholesaler coached by his uncle, a trader and importer of pesticides from 
Ghana, living in N’Dali District. Hundreds of herbicide boxes received on credit 
are sold for cash or distributed on credit to loyal customers like Idrissou, who goes 
through several local marketplaces and villages to sell his products in order to be in 
good standing with his supplier at the end of the week. 
The herbicide distribution chain is a flourishing business to all actors involved. 
Mr. “3212” is an importer from Ghana and Nigeria with a financial capital of about 
three million CFA francs. He delivers his products on credit to semi-wholesalers 
for 22,000–25,000 CFA francs per box keeping twelve containers of one liter. The 
semi-wholesalers supply retailers at 25,000–29,000 CFA francs per box and earn 
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about 4,000 CFA francs per box sold. A container of herbicide costs 2,500–3,000 
CFA francs from the retailers who recover 30,000–36,000 CFA francs per box. This 
activity procures finally 5,000–6,500 CFA francs to every retailer per box. The fairly 
dynamic young retailers like Idrissou sell an average of five boxes each week, yielding 
25,000 CFA francs per week and therefore 100,000 CFA francs per month. 
Within the context of growing youth unemployment, this business makes pow-
erful actors on the ground.129 The youth unemployment rate in Benin increased to 
14% in 2012 from only 1% in 2001, while the youth underemployment rate ran to 
70% in 2013 from about 50% in 2011. More than 150,000 young people join the 
labor market each year and 20% of them do not hold qualifications (INSAE, 2013b). 
The flourishing informal business of pesticide supply seems to be one of the most 
successful jobs for some of the youth who leave the cities to return to their villages. 
But the weeding chemicals distributed to farmers are appropriated, reinterpreted and 
used for land control and also to contest the land occupied by Fulani pastoralists, as 
will become evident in the following section.
New farmers, land dynamics and pastoralism in Gogounou
The ease of farming with various adopted technologies and the perceived profitability 
cause the intrusion of new actors in agriculture. Some unusual actors have come to 
increasingly make a place for themselves in the “modern” agriculture of Gogounou.
“Agriculture is now very easy and profitable. Anyone can have a farm and easily 
cultivate land”. This remark was made by an official working in the local authority 
of Gogounou. The adoption of herbicides has led to a kind of agricultural revolu-
tion. Not everyone has land, but seemingly everyone is trying to have a farm. Public 
servants, including agricultural extension officers, foresters, primary and secondary 
schools teachers, health officers and various employees of the municipal authority, 
are all engaged in cropping. This is the case of Dramane, who coincides his annual 
leave with the period of farming activities to personally supervise the work entrusted 
to laborers. Others, living far away from Gogounou, regularly use phone calls to get 
informed of the progress of their agricultural works and spend some weekends for 
visits. It is also common to meet some state officials, originally from Gogounou, but 
who work and live in the southern capitals, and who rely on chemical products to 
secure their land ownership locally. Herbicides have therefore enabled land control 
in Gogounou as I will detail later on. 
“Banning herbicides is killing women”. This statement comes from a woman 
farmer of Boro village, who claims that herbicides have played a major role in em-
129 This is to compare the young traders of pesticides to the former secretaries of cotton farmer groups 
in northern Benin. The annual rebates “ristournes” in the cotton sector had made the latter into im-
portant local powers (cf. Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1998). I have found that the large income 
from illegal pesticide trading is promoting economically capable youth in many parts of northern 
Benin.
142 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
powering women in agricultural society in Gogounou. Moving from a marginalized 
position with respect to land access, women are now strongly competing with men 
in terms of grain and cotton acreages and production volumes. With access to herbi-
cides, Fatouma, a woman from Gounarou village, has doubled her cultivation area in 
the past six years. She could now afford ten hectares of various crops (two hectares of 
cotton, seven hectares of maize and one hectare of rice), instead of half to one hectare 
some years ago. Fatouma has the largest land holding of any woman in Gounarou 
village. She shared her profile, which is summarized in Table 6.7.
“I was refusing to work on the farm, but now I am cultivating my own field 
myself without anybody asking me to do that”. This is the new option for Yaya, a 
young scholar ending his fourth year at secondary school. At 16 years of age, thanks 
to herbicides, he was able to cultivate maize during the 2013–14 farming season 
on two hectares of his father’s land. Other schoolboys and students go further to 
access land. This is the case of Aboubakar, who relied on his maternal grandparents 
in Béroubouay Region (Bembéréké District) to access two hectares, where he has 
harvested 6,000 kg of maize sold for 150 CFA francs per kg. With his farm income 
slightly less than a million CFA francs, the student-farmer has renovated his room 
and settled his recent wedding expenses. 
The increase in cultivated area by the old farmers and the zeal of new farmers 
led to new land dynamics. Land tenure has evolved greatly over the last few years. 
Land is accessed in Gogounou by inheritance, donation, purchase, lease, loan or 
confiscation. Inheritance was the dominant land access mode. As described by Zato, 
“land conflicts are mainly caused by those whose grandparents had been lazy in 
the past and have not left them a great land legacy, but now they want to cultivate 
land in the same way as those who inherited enough land from their grandparents” 
(Zato, Zougou-Pantrossi, 10/07/14). The gift of land is declining in Gogounou. It 
has become almost impossible to find people who were granted land by donation. 
Buying and leasing are two modes of land access that are becoming more common. 
They enable autochthonous people to expand their agricultural land. Purchase is the 
route most associated with conflict, giving rise to the appearance of new landowners 
in formerly common properties. Land is sold by third persons to foreigners from 
neighboring districts and urban centers for 150,000 CFA – 250,000 CFA francs per 
hectare, and leased out for 5,000 CFA – 20,000 CFA francs per hectare and year. It 
is also possible to encounter cases of interest-free loans of small plots to women or 
foreigners working on-site (forest officers, teachers, medical practitioners and other 
state employees), enabling them to crop maize. 
The Fulani pastoralists, who are still considered as strangers or immigrants, gen-
erally lose out in land-access transactions in which Bariba farmers can confiscate 
their small plots by force to be cultivated, leased out or even sold to non-natives. 
This has enabled some youth to access land that their parents or grandparents had 
previously given to friends, kinsmen or immigrants on a freehold basis. The use of 
herbicides feeds various forms of abuse and enables farmers, who are keen to increase 
their holdings, to take hold of land that does not belong to them. It also allows those 
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Table 6.7: Farm technologies and a woman’s agricultural profile in Gounarou




Farming activities in family (but agriculture predominantly  –
male)
Agriculture with hoes (no plow, no tractors, no pesticides) –
Plowing and weeding very difficult and dedicated to  –
men; only seeding, fertilizing and harvesting were female 
operations
Land availability, fertility, but essentially male property –





First years of marriage
For 6 years Common farming activities with her husband –
Farming activities with plow and draft animals –
Land available, but less fertile –
Small plot access by her husband to meet the   –
needs of the household




First personal farming experience
For 10 years Husband older and unwilling to care for the family   –
(after her third child)
Inability to meet the needs of the family as she had no job –
First farming experience possible with her husband’s plow  –
and oxen, but with great difficulty for hand-weeding and 
animal-driven weeding
Use of chemical fertilizers and herbicides for cotton –
Cotton 2 ha
Maize 3 ha
Agricultural acreage and production increase
Since 6 years More land access from parents –
Use of tractor services for plowing –
Schooling of children –
Maize acreage increase –
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who have land and could not cultivate it to keep ownership by spraying seasonally 
non-selective herbicides. Three examples of such situations are provided hereafter:
It is thanks to kpake that I could take back 10 hectares to increase my maize 
acreage. This plot was occupied by people who said they have received it as gift 
from my late father. Luckily for me, they were not able to cultivate all of it. 
There were unused plots each year. The first year I applied kpake, but I did not 
cultivate. It was as if I was struggling against the infestation of my bordering 
cotton fields by insects that could come from these unoccupied plots. They 
thought I was joking. The second year, I spread again kpake but this time I 
cultivated a portion of it. This is where the uprising began. But I took the 
opportunity from my local councilor position to confine the whole plot with 
landmarks. They could no longer hold it. Only kpake enabled me to achieve 
this, because I cannot myself cultivate all this land if these products were not 
accessible. (Chabi130, Boro, 02/07/14)
Chabi’s strategy was to take possession of uncultivated areas surrounding his field. 
On a plot close to his own cotton field, my interlocutor applied non-selective her-
bicides, giving the impression of protecting his crops against pests. Following the 
same practice for two years, he then took possession of the plot that he demarcated 
and claimed ownership. This unspoken strategy was successful, since it has become 
common in the region to control the crop pests by weeding out the uncultivated 
lands bordering the farmers’ fields. The fact that this plot had belonged to his father 
in the past was an important, but not a sufficient reason to justify his attitude. He 
was seeking, at any cost, to broaden his area of cultivation and, therefore, would have 
likely behaved in the same way even if the concerned field had not been linked to his 
late father. His local councilor position gave him the additional power to do so. Like 
Chabi, many farmers are engaged in such abuses, as herbicides enable them to culti-
vate more than they could in the past. They surreptitiously used herbicides to claim 
ownership of lands surrounding their crop fields. The herbicide is here a technology 
for land conquest, favoring the territorialization by crop farmers. But people, who 
see through the “evil doings” of land confiscation, have begun to design some of their 
own counter-strategies to defeat them. This is the case of Adamu131: 
The only way to keep the land now is to cultivate. If you cannot cultivate it, so 
you have to find a way to preserve it, otherwise people will quickly tear you. It 
is not to be victim of these things that every year I send money to my cousins 
who buy herbicides and spray all over my field. Then, people will not think of 
it as a virgin land without owner and will not try to take it. I always tell them 
 
130 The informant has been anonymized.
131 The informant has been anonymized.
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if they can cultivate, it may be good, but if they cannot, the most important 
for me is that the herbicide is sprayed. (Adamu, native of Gogounou, Kandi, 
07/07/14)
Adamu is a Gogounou native, state official and permanently settled further north in 
Benin away from his home village. Since he cannot cultivate the land he inherited 
from his father, and does not want to become a victim of the land pressure that is 
occurring in Gogounou, every year my informant sends a certain amount of money 
to his relatives, who buy herbicides and spray them on the plot. Adamu’s objective 
is to show that his plot has, indeed, an owner; and that not being cultivated is not 
synonymous with abandonment or ownerless. The herbicide became a property right 
preserver for absentee landowners. But, preserving ownership by using herbicides is 
not an exclusive attribute of absentee landowners. Even large landlords on site also 
draw their tenure security from such practices. This is the case of Issifou132:
There is a return of intellectuals to agriculture. Everybody wants to cultivate 
land. People are looking to gain some plots from me. I have enough land, but 
I do not want to distribute it to people; otherwise, my children will not have 
enough later. [...]. Therefore, every season I buy kpake that I dilute enough of 
and I spray it on the fields. As people know that it is land to be cultivated, no-
body disturbs me again to give him land and I am quiet. (Issifou, Gogounou, 
27/06/14)
The case presented above is that of Issifou, a large landowner in Gogounou. Not to 
have to lease out his plots to demanders and deprive his offspring later, one of his 
strategies was to buy herbicides and spray them on the land. While this strategy is 
questionable and may not last over time because of the related costs, it allows him 
not to be forced to rent his land to someone; and thus to avoid the problems and 
abuses associated with leasing. The herbicide is again a tool for confirmation and 
preservation of property rights for large landowners. 
Here are some practices for controlling land, securing land rights and making 
territories. Like in the case of Chabi, Adamu and Issifou, land-control practices have 
spread across Gogounou. As reflected in the three case studies, access to land is no 
easy thing among Bariba farmers who have customary property rights to land. One 
could already imagine how difficult it could be for Fulani pastoralists, who are still 
considered strangers with no land ownership. These chemicals are regularly used to 
challenge and contest them. I personally witnessed, on 10 May 2014, a case of land 
expropriation in a Fulani camp in Boro village. I was conducting an interview within 
a Fulani household when their expropriator came onto the expropriated land that 
he had already prepared to be cultivated. The Fulani herders, who were looking at 
me as a genuine missus dominicus, tried to take advantage of my presence to confront 
132 The informant has been anonymized.
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their malefactor. This quickly turned into verbal confrontation. Although I could 
not make any concrete solution to this issue at this particular time, my presence 
at least deterred the antagonists and helped to avoid physical confrontation, which 
would have been detrimental to my hosts and myself. My research assistant was even 
intimidated sometimes by some opinion leaders who thought he brought a stranger 
to defend the interests of Fulani against Bariba. I have mentioned these incidents to 
demonstrate how the land issue has become so sensitive that everyone in my study 
area was on high alert.
“Herbicide has changed everything. Everybody has become lazy; nobody wants 
to make some effort”. This statement made by a farmer of Bagou village shows that 
herbicides have impacted more than only farming activities. This became most evi-
dent when I observed the courtyards of houses being cleared with herbicides. The 
weeding technology is increasingly used to clean the dwelling places. It is common to 
see people spraying non-selective weeding products inside and outside of their resi-
dences. It is the new way of cleaning homes and hindering reptiles and insects from 
invading. The trend is similar in both city and villages. Within villages, herbicides are 
used to clean up the pathways leading to the farms. Here, the weeding technology 
serves to maintain the rural tracks and footpaths. 
The consequences of herbicide use on livestock production in Gogounou are 
twofold. The direct impact of herbicides is the poisoning of animals on sprayed 
farmlands, while the indirect consequences concern the general shortage of pasture-
land throughout the district. Old pastureland has been overgrown by crop fields. 
The regrowth of grasses in the new rainy season and animal corridors are also af-
fected by herbicides. Pastoralism is significantly affected by this increase in cultivated 
area, reducing the availability of grasslands for feeding animals. Moreover, water 
resources are sometimes polluted with herbicides causing health problems for water-
ing animals. The corridors leading to water resources are blocked by crop fields. All 
68 corridors (making up a total length of 461 km) recently marked by pastoralist 
associations, consensually with representatives of all stakeholders, are almost fully 
occupied by crop fields (Boukari Bata, 2012: 11). A Fulani herder shared his experi-
ence of herbicides:
If people did not stand in solidarity in my neighborhood, I would be today 
without a herd. The herbicide lives in all of Gogounou. One day, my cattle 
went off to graze. But the fifty animals came back home with various symp-
toms. Some were crying, others were madly jumping and yet others were dis-
tending their tongues, salivating abundantly. In three days, I lost 10 of them. 
On my friends’ advice, I sent three to Gogounou livestock market that I sold 
for 350,000 CFA francs. With this money I paid 100 liters of palm oil for 
about 300,000 CFA francs that I started serving as drink to the cattle. Some 
friends also proposed serving millet or sorghum porridge as a drink for my 
animals in order to urinate, which helps remove much of the herbicide they 
have swallowed while grazing. In this situation, I really experienced Fulani 
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solidarity; everyone brought porridge to my animals. Women offered my herd 
porridge in cans or bowls all day long. This support that I received, the grain-
based porridge mixed with palm oil, helped me salvage my thirty cattle, even 
if they have not yet fully recovered. That I continue to be an animal owner, 
like the Fulani, is only because of the support I received from my relatives 
and my friends; otherwise, herbicides would have already completely changed 
my story. The herbicide-based agriculture in modern Gogounou society is the 
worst Fulani-experienced tragedy. Obviously, many have already left. (Ouma-
rou, Wesseke, 01/08/14)133
Oumarou suffered the atrocities of the use of herbicides as a trap against wandering 
animals. A farmer who was tired of the destruction of his maize fields by unknown 
cattle found the solution to his problem through herbicides. Amadou’s herd, which 
was not directly targeted in this chemical ambush, ended up paying the price of the 
tense neighborhood relations between Bariba farmers and Fulani pastoralists. He 
finally lost ten animals and was able to get out of this situation only through his 
social network involving relatives and friends who offered him advice and recipes for 
preventing the worst. Herbicide is one of the most sophisticated weapons that farm-
ing communities have ever had to deal with their Fulani neighbors.
In summary, the weeding products enable farmers to expand crop cultivation in 
labor-constrained situations.134 Land transactions, abuses and conflicts are increasing 
as new actors are also increasingly getting involved in the new-found ease of agri-
cultural production. Some farmers use weeding products to lay claim to the seem-
ingly ownerless lands surrounding their fields as a territorialization strategy. Oth-
ers, mainly absentee landholders and large landlords, apply chemicals to maintain 
their ownership. However, such herbicide use has reduced the extent of rangelands 
and poisoned cattle grazing on sprayed lands or drinking polluted water, increasing 
farmer-herder conflicts. As argued by science and technology scholars about the re-
interpretation and renegotiation of technology in use (Latour, 1986; Pfaffenberger, 
1992; Wajcman, 2000), it appears that the herbicide is being reinterpreted as that of 
a simple weeding chemical, labor-saving and agricultural intensification technology, 
to that of a extensification chemical and weapon used to take advantage of land and 
social conflicts.
133 The informant has been anonymized.
134 Although this was not an area I focused on during the study, it is worth mentioning that crop 
expansion is supported by the unfortunate increase in doping practices. A single farmer, with a small 
family, and thus only a few laborers, can have over fifty hectares of maize. He must, therefore, perform 
most of the farm activities himself. To cope with the harsh workload, he might engage in various 
forms of doping, using various drugs, analgesics and mixtures. The most famous pain relief drug used 
is Tramadol, which is linked to overdosing. Pharmaceutical drugs are supplemented with alcohol, 
coffee, chewing tobacco, and traditional doping powders and the like to enable the farmer to exceed 
his normal daily capacity of work. This “Tramadol-based crop farming” has greatly contributed to the 
current land configuration.
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Enclosure, logging and tree-based territorialization in Gogounou
The previous section has demonstrated how access to land and rangeland has become 
difficult for Fulani pastoralists. This section is a step forward to focus on forest re-
source governance and the influence of growing wood exports on pastoralism. I start 
by summarizing the institutional framework in which informal logging has devel-
oped. I will then present the local actors involved, the forms of legitimization of the 
activity, the mechanisms developed to raise awareness of decision-makers, and the 
influence of wood-selling practices on neighboring farmers and herders.
From enclosure to liberalized forest resource market
The enclosure of forest resources was initiated in Benin by the colonial adminis-
tration in the early twentieth century. Two key policy documents characterize the 
context in which forests were classified. First, the legal basis, which was the Forest 
Decree of 4 July 1935, established forests within French West Africa and, second, a 
report of a diagnostic study in 1936 by Aubreville on forest resources in Dahomey 
(Aubreville, 1937; Houndagba et al. 2007). The Inspection of Nature Protection 
and Hunting (IPNC135) was created in 1964 to protect nature and conserve wildlife, 
but did not operate well for various reasons (cf. Takpara and Moudachirou, 2012: 
27). It was more successfully engaged in monitoring and struggling against poaching 
and transhumance within the forests (Tiomoko, 2014: 35). The limited use rights 
granted to the traditional users of forest resources during this period gave way to 
abuse, causing severe damage to forest resources (Hounkpodote, 2002a: 13). From 
the 1980s onwards, there was the implementation of an integral protection policy, 
which made use of more coercive measures inspired by the Law No. 87-012 of 21 
September 1987 concerning Forest Code in Benin Republic and the Decree No. 
89-385 of 24 October 1989, and laid down the detailed rules for the application 
of the latter law. During this “fortress discourse” period, the State was the holder of 
resources and relied on repressive approaches to control the use of them (Akouehou, 
2004; Pochet, 2014).
The governance of natural resources has taken a new turn since the 1990s when 
processes of political democratization and economic liberalization were initiated in 
the country. Major institutional and technical progress has been made during this 
period. The forest policy has moved towards a participatory approach to reconcile 
the socio-economic needs of local communities with the environmental preservation 
and biodiversity conservation goals. This was made possible by the adoption of the 
Law No. 93-009 on 2 July 1993 dealing with forest management in Benin Republic 
and the enforcing of Decree No. 96-271 on 2 July 1996. A forest development policy 
was adopted in 1994 for the sustainable management of natural resources, consider-
ing participation from grassroots populations and knowledge from various players 
135 Inspection de la Protection de la Nature et de la Chasse.
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involved in the sector. A forest action plan was established thereafter. Some classified 
forests and state plantations benefited from participatory management plans. The 
National Center for Wildlife Reserves Management (CENAGREF136), responsible 
for wildlife conservation, was also created by Decree No. 96-73 on 2 April 1996 
(DGFRN, 2012: 13).
The State monopolization of forest resources has given way to various forms of 
collective ownership and participatory management (Akouehou, 2004). The classi-
fied areas were separated from protected areas. The protected areas involved reserves 
controlled by the State that were not subject to any legal act of registration (cf. Art. 
4, Law No. 93-009). While efforts are being made to make participatory manage-
ment plans for classified forests, the protected areas are under free usage rights, but 
subject to compliance with established rules (Hounkpodote, 2002a: 15). This lib-
eral trend has been reinforced by the implementation of the decentralization policy, 
which began in 2003 with the election and the establishment of local and municipal 
councils.
This liberal policy of forest governance has been marked by several changes: (i) 
the creation of a capital market for the exchange and consumption of natural re-
sources, with the involvement of Beninese banks in granting investment and operat-
ing credit to the private actors involved in the timber industry; (ii) the privatization 
of control over forest resources, characterized by concessions to private actors being 
individuals, communities, local authorities; (iii) the withdrawal of the State from 
direct intervention in market transactions of forest products, resulting in an almost 
exclusive occupation of the export sector by private operators, etc (Edja, 2012). Re-
garding power and disciplinary sanctions, there was also a shift, since the Govern-
ment began sharing some of its prerogatives with other stakeholders: local popula-
tions, grassroots organizations, local authorities, consumer trade unions and other 
market forces. Thus, the democratization progress and the decentralization efforts 
that subsequently followed have both resulted in power plays at the village level (cf. 
Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1998; 2003; Pochet, 2014: 8). Natural resource 
conservation has become a major issue at all levels.
In this context of liberal governance of forests and natural resources overlapped 
with “the back to the barriers” discourse (Pochet, 2014: 10), timber transactions 
have considerably expanded. Recent studies reported that forest products contribute 
6.64% of GDP, which does not account for the huge illegal flow of timber products 
excluded from national accounts (Bertrand et al. 2009; 2013). This sector has great 
potential, especially with the development of the Asian market, which offers new 
prospects for African economies. In Benin in recent years, illegal and abusive tree 
cutting has taken place, which, beyond its contribution to deforestation, has greatly 
affected pastoralism. A brief history of this phenomenon in my study area, its legiti-
mization at the national level and, finally, its contribution to the deterioration of 
Fulani pastoralist livelihoods are discussed below.
136 Centre National de Gestion des Réserves de Faunes.
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Browse vegetation and territorialization by chainsaws in Gogounou
The direct link between pastoralism and logging lies in the ability of Fulani herd-
ers to use browse from various woody plant species to supplement the diets of their 
animals under conditions of scarcity. The browse vegetation is a valuable animal 
fodder resource in different agro-ecological zones of sub-Saharan Africa, especially 
during dry periods and within the context of climate change (cf. Zampaligré, 2012; 
Zampaligré et al. 2013). The Fulani pastoralists in Benin are also experts in using 
certain browse species to maintain or improve the production and reproduction 
performance of their herds, when agro-ecological and pedo-climatic patterns lead 
to seasonal shortages in sufficient green pasture. Several authors have shown how 
significant plant species, such as, Afzelia africana, Pterocarpus erinaceus and Khaya 
senegalensis137 are in the annual cycle of livestock production and the mobility strate-
gies of Fulani pastoralists (Agbahungba et al. 2001: 12; Djenontin et al. 2004; 2012; 
Djenontin, 2010: 105ff.). Djenontin et al. (2004) gave details of the differential ap-
proach implemented by the Fulani to feed their animals. They reported that, during 
the dry season, draft animals, breeding bulls, dairy cows and calves are kept at the 
settlement, while the rest of the herd is sent to find pasture. The former are fed with 
crop residues collected by the herders in their own small farms, or negotiated with 
farmers who have larger fields. The lowland (fadama) grasses and tree forage species 
are then used as feed supplements to get through the unfavorable season. 
In the particular case of Gogounou, some rangeland ecologists and animal scien-
tists, who were interested in the local livestock production systems, reported that the 
tree forage mentioned above can improve milk productivity in the dry season. Their 
proven nutritional value and stimulating effect on milk production, helps herders 
face the major difficulties of accessing pasture during these periods (Bouraïma, 2006; 
Houéhanou, 2006; Awohouedji, 2008; Alkoiret et al. 2009; Degbohouet, 2010). 
Some tree forage species are also preserved by pastoralists for their medicinal values 
for which leaves, seeds and bark are involved in treating animal diseases and provid-
ing various forms of veterinary care (Alkoiret et al. 2009: 87). 
The above-mentioned trees are among the woody species most targeted by the 
flourishing trade of wood to Asian countries, especially China. This does not mean 
that forage plants had never been cut or exported in the past, but that the kind of 
export in question differs from the former by the extremely rapid growth of current 
logging practices in a short period of time (only since 2008). Another striking feature 
of this new form of logging is the systematic use of mechanical chainsaws, deliber-
ately against Article 53 of the Forestry Code, which prohibits the use of such ma-
chines. There is no region in Gogounou that is untouched by the phenomenon; and 
there are very few days when the chainsaw does not resound in the bush and forest 
reserves. These timber transactions are now carried out by the same local communi-
137 The Fulfulde names of these tree species are: Warnyanhi (Afzelia africana), Banuhi (Pterocarpus 
erinaceus) and Kahi (Khaya senegalensis).
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ties who initially opposed them. Bariba farmers and all those who have some power 
over land have suddenly become wood sellers. The situation has changed since the 
people understood that the political elites were totally involved in what was initially 
perceived as a simple short-term activity. Some of my informants revealed that the 
booming wood trade is in line with the government’s partnership with the Chinese, 
who have become very involved in providing aid for the country’s development. 
Before showing the complex network of local actors involved in the wood-cutting 
abuse, I will first present how it started in Gogounou by drawing on the narrative of 
an administrative officer of Zougou-Pantrossi Region:
Tree-cutting began here in 2008. One Thursday, the head of loggers operating 
in Alibori Province and the chief of the regional forest office of Kandi came to 
request my collaboration for some timber harvesting for a short period of time 
in my region. I firmly rejected by explaining that there is no more wood in my 
area. They besought me for a while and suggested that we go together to ask 
the local forest officer living in the village to inform us on the availability of 
timber within both the forest and the village land. Once we arrived, the local 
forest officer convinced me of the possibility of logging without damaging. 
We therefore arranged a program to move the next Sunday around “Trois-
Rivières” state forest and bordering villages to see where trees can be really 
harvested. Before leaving, our hosts gave me 100,000 CFA francs as motiva-
tion for my willingness to cooperate. 
Very early on Sunday, I went to the forest office of Zougou, but unfortu-
nately his wife informed me about his absence. I decided to move forward in 
meeting and informing local communities of Dougoulaye village. We agreed 
on 300 beams for 1,000 CFA francs per unit. The total amount 300,000 CFA 
francs this activity would generate was to be used to pay the salaries of teachers 
of the village school. For leaving, I gave 50,000 CFA francs from the 100,000 
CFA francs I have been previously given by the loggers to the village chief for 
their agreement. 
Surprisingly, none of these actors came back for further negotiations. 
Woodcutters were sent in the forest reserve and the surrounding areas to cut 
wood. In only few days, a lot of timber was already cut and conveyed to the 
village capital, and the end was not in sight. This situation was not under-
standable to me, and I found it was an abuse. I therefore angrily enlisted help 
from the municipal authority in punishing severely. The Mayor and the entire 
city council decided to pick up all the timber to be stored within the city office 
while waiting for the defendants. 
Disappointingly, the municipal authority was subjected to pressures and 
threats from above and the Mayor was having serious problems. We heard that 
Parliament Members, government officials and various elites were involved in 
this business with the Chinese. (An administrative officer of Zougou-Pantros-
si Region, 04/08/14)
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I have reported this story to show the extent of logging in Gogounou. Logging is as 
old as humanity, but what began in Gogounou from 2008 appears to be related to 
the partnership between Benin and Asian countries, especially China. The export 
of wood to Asia is an activity that targets particular species of which, like those 
mentioned above, are useful for pastoralists. The seeming involvement of high state 
officials and government members in this business makes local authorities and local 
forest administration powerless to fight against the practice. This is why there was 
finally a strong involvement of local communities; each seeking to take advantage 
of the situation. One might even think that the activity is legal in light of the ongo-
ing dynamics. The administrative officer of Zougou-Pantrossi, quoted above, further 
explained how the illegal logging was legitimized:
Everybody finally understood and realized the need to be careful and just take 
his share of the windfall. People were calling loggers to sell trees on farmlands. 
They also find good wood in Fulani camps because they are foreigners and do 
not normally own land. I decided myself as [an administrative officer] of the 
region to levy local development taxes on the activity. Therefore, I imposed 
that any logging shall be under an entry bond of 350,000 CFA francs and an 
exit tax of 200,000 CFA francs per loaded 10-ton truck. The front deposit 
belonged to me personally and was distributed as follows: 50,000 CFA francs 
for youth’s local security forces that I have deployed on all roads for securing 
persons and goods, 50,000 CFA francs for my counselors and 250,000 CFA 
francs for myself. The 200,000 CFA francs operating tax is fully accounted for 
public funds dedicated to local development initiatives. We mobilized millions 
who have enabled us to achieve many goals for the population’s wellbeing. For 
example, we invested 6.7 million CFA francs in building school residences for 
students coming from our area to provide them with enough housing condi-
tions for their secondary education in Gogounou city center. 
The City Authority also took substantial advantage of this trade. For a 
loaded 10-ton truck of timber, the municipality received an average of 600,000 
CFA francs. Other actors such as gendarmes, foresters and farmers have also 
considerably benefited from the windfall of illegal logging. Wood has really 
enriched people in a very short time. My nephew became wealthy in four 
years. He built two-storey houses in Parakou; he opened several well-equipped 
carpentry and joinery workshops, and also built a sumptuous fully tiled villa 
here in the village. He went from being a poor carpenter, to becoming a great 
entrepreneur and businessman. For my part, I really enjoyed building a beau-
tiful house in Gogounou city center. […]. The forest, while belonging to all, is 
for nobody. As an old saying goes, “Collective death is not difficult to endure”. 
Everybody is accountable for this crime. (Administrative Officer, Zougou-
Pantrossi Region, 04/08/14)
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The uncontrolled logging, as mentioned above, was profitable for several actors. The 
local people, especially farmers, sell wood and the local and municipal authorities 
levy taxes. Several local development initiatives were achieved with the money com-
ing from illegal logging. Many farmers and laborers were enriched locally. One can 
imagine how the business would be more profitable for the elites who invested in 
exporting the wood to China. Only Fulani herders could not afford to sell the wood 
that is also valuable to them. But their landless status plays against them. Since the 
target species are found in the Fulani settlements, farmers can go and sell those trees 
(Photo 6.3). This causes violent conflicts and the herders were sometimes about to 
commit homicide or suicide. This is the case of Gida138 in Bligobi camp: 
Only God has been able to save the one who cut down this tree on whose 
stump I stand. The history of logging is hard to tell; it is very sad. There is 
no more space to graze. These are the trees that are used to feed animals. Un-
fortunately, loggers have invaded the area to cut down all the trees. What I 
experienced here is very serious. 
When logging started in the area, I was informed by friends, and every 
day I hear the noise of the machines everywhere. I then took my bike to see 
our village authority in order to be enlightened on the situation. He reassured 
me that no one will come into my field without having contacted me and 
138 The informant has been anonymized.
Photo 6.3: Small truck loaded with wood in Pariki Fulani camp in Gogounou
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obtained my consent beforehand. But, much to my surprise, loggers arrived 
one nice day in my camp to cut the trees that I kept for my animals. On the 
first day that they arrived, I begged them to stop cutting the trees, but they 
did not listen. When they tried to cut down the first tree, I hugged the tree to 
prevent it from being cut, but they told me that if I did not leave, they would 
saw me and the tree. As they started cutting with the machine [chainsaw], I 
finally left. Then, I tried in a gentle voice to persuade them to stop, but they 
ignored my sorrow and continued. They went to the tree that I liked most in 
my field, as it was the biggest and allowed me to feed a large part of my herd. 
I said and did everything I could to save this tree, but all efforts were in vain 
as I helplessly witnessed them cut it down. And they did not stop there; they 
went on to further cut about thirty banuje [Pterocarpus erinaceus] that day. My 
hope had completely collapsed; I realized that I have to live with the horror 
and shame towards my children, who will not grant me with any excuses if 
I do not leave as an inheritance a herd in good condition. I decided to kill 
myself by taking the herbicide, but before taking the poison I resolved in my 
heart to kill with a gun the logger who made me feel this pain. For five days, I 
pondered this project and, in my anger, I shared with a friend. Since I realized 
that village and district authorities were all accomplices, I stopped going to 
them. I went straight to pay for a liter of fuel that I poured on the tree that I 
liked the most, and I burnt it. I then reloaded my gun and I started to stand 
guard in the field to finish with the logger once he returned to collect the 
planks. Unfortunately, my friend went to inform the local head of the Fulani 
association and they have discouraged the logger from returning to my camp, 
and my plan was therefore foiled as well. 
Over the past three years, if it was not God, there would already be a 
great war between Fulani herders and woodcutters. The machine [chainsaw] 
has finished the trees. Even now, when I hear its noise somewhere, it revolts 
me. I am not the only victim; you can go check elsewhere. (Gida, Bligobi, 
07/05/14)
Gida’s story about the removal of fodder trees on which he and his herds rely is 
not uncommon. He preferred to avenge his evildoer in the end, rather than admit 
to his family and community that he had anything to do with this shameful situa-
tion. Initially, however, he wanted to commit suicide in order to protect his Fulani 
identity, which is strongly attached to livestock. This kind of suicide option is com-
mon in Fulani communities whenever there are factors that attempt to undermine 
cultural values that are closely linked to their pastoral identity (cf. Guichard, 1990: 
31; Diallo, 2004: 55). Logging is one of the major factors threatening pastoralism in 
the district of Gogounou, since Masinije henyi leɗɗe139. The Bariba farmers use their 
autochthony discourse against Fulani herders to sell the trees that the latter rely on to 
139 “The machine finished the bush.”
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feed their animals. The main logic is that the Fulani have no land and, therefore, no 
trees. Thus, pastoralists are victims of forest conservation policy and timber export 
dynamics. 
The Government was often blamed by some of my informants, since it has not 
managed to stop the logging bonanza since 2008, despite warnings from various ac-
tors. Two complaints urging decision-makers to improve the conservation of forest 
resources come to mind. First, the natives of Gogounou District, in particular those 
from areas of wood overexploitation like Zougou-Pantrossi, addressed their com-
plaints in an open letter to the President of the Republic on 28 June 2011. An ex-
cerpt presented below helps to clarify the key message of the Diaspora of Gogounou 
District to the Head of the Government:
Excellency, Mr. President of the Republic, [...] 
Today, loggers stormed the two forests and systematically cut with chain-
saws valuable species that are conveyed in Cotonou using large-tonnage ve-
hicles called “titans”.
Thus, every week, four titan vehicles travel back and forth between 
Gogounou and Cotonou and woe to anyone who dares to lift his small finger 
to oppose not only the smuggling but also the massacre. For example, some 
youth of Zougou-Pantrossi, region capital, spent several nights at the brigade 
of gendarmerie of Gogounou for daring to stand against the evacuation of 
woody material collected in the classified forest of “Trois-Rivières”.
Excellency, Mr. President,
We know that the populations of all the municipalities bordering these 
classified forests silently complain of abuse that is made in the said forests for 
several years. But as the Diaspora of Gogounou District in southern Benin, we 
make it our duty to grab your attention by saying out loud what others have 
been quietly thinking of. We are pained to see this rich heritage, protected for 
more than sixty years, go up in smoke in such a short time. We also know that 
logging licences should not be granted for cutting trees in light of the current 
conditions of these forest reserves.
Keeping silent about this large-scale forest offense, which we equate with 
an unspeakable crime, will make us accomplices in the destruction of the na-
tional forest heritage […]. We would not be able to recall the role played by 
these two forests in our daily life and that of the whole of humanity. However, 
we should like to emphasize your High Authority that with the classified for-
est of Sota, located a little further north, and the cross-border National Parks 
Pendjari and W; they provide a natural shield against the advance of the desert 
that has struck the northern border of our country […]. (Gassi Bani, 2011 in 
“La Nation” 30/06/11)140
140 I have personally translated this excerpt which was originally in French.
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In his letter to the President of the Republic, the leader of Gogounou Diaspora has 
shown the scale of the logging activities and the extent of degradation that could 
result from this. Four titans (10-ton trucks) of wood were being conveyed weekly 
from Gogounou. In addition, he also mentioned how the opponents of this situa-
tion risked imprisonment. His message was mainly about the two classified forests 
“Trois-Rivières” and “Alibori Supérieur”, despite the fact that logging covers the en-
tire province of Alibori and beyond. 
Gassi Bani proposed a national struggle against logging in Gogounou. He sug-
gested the immediate eviction of illegal operators through the deployment of mili-
tary forces, if necessary. He recommended legal action against the promoters of this 
activity, and a better monitoring of the forest. The author of the letter also asked for 
greater accountability of the forest administration and local authorities involved in 
this struggle of forest resource conservation. These suggestions certainly would un-
dermine the newly developed timber export to China. The public elites did not favor 
the implementation of these measures. “Coincidentally”, Gassi Bani passed away six 
months after issuing these proposals, precisely on 5 January 2012. There was a lot 
of fear among the local population and suspicions spread over Gogounou that they 
needed to either accept the situation or oppose it and die. This has strengthened the 
involvement of farmers who are landlords, at the expense of Fulani pastoralists con-
sidered as immigrants and landless people.
The second complaint about the uncontrolled logging underway in Benin came 
from Parliament. A former Director of Water and Forests, an MP from Alibori Prov-
ince, had proposed a law during the same period in order to control the timber trade 
and the illegal practices that had developed over time. A summary of this proposed 
law is given below: 
Since July 2012, the MP Azizou El Hadj Issa, [...], filed a draft bill on the 
wood trade in Benin. The goal is to fill the legal gap in this sector, in order to 
fight against the widespread impunity, on the one hand, and control, on the 
other hand, the strong demand for forest products from Asian countries, espe-
cially China. The proposal also targets the abuse of specific species, primarily 
Pterocarpus erinaceus, commonly called kosso [...].
The MP proposed and sent to the President of the Parliament a law on 
marketing, industrial processing, export, re-export and import of forest prod-
ucts. The text is structured in nine chapters detailed in forty-eight articles. It 
aims to fill the legal gaps about the export of wood. This includes the inter-
ruption of: the massive export of Beninese wood [...], the systematic issuing 
of fake documents called “special import permit for forest products” which 
subjected these products cut in Benin to the customs clearance procedure, just 
to free them from the ban on chainsaw cutting [...]; the regularization of the 
situation of many illegal traffickers whose activities, in the past, could not help 
to keep good statistics on wood [...].
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The focus of the MP is to reverse: the inadequacy of existing laws in this re-
gard; the lack of a specific law on domestic and foreign trade of wood; the use 
of chainsaw to cut wood; the complicity of all categories of stakeholders and 
local elected officials to the non compliance with laws in force; the widespread 
impunity. Also, the law aims to master the strong demand for forest products 
from Asian countries mainly China [...]. (Ahlonsou, 2012 in “La Presse du 
Jour” 04/09/12)141
The MP Azizou El Hadj Issa, an expert in the forestry sector, proposed a total re-
form on timber trade. The most important measures in his drafted law were to fight 
against fraudulent timber trade, to preserve endangered species and to ban tree cut-
ting with chainsaws. There has not been any positive response from MPs so far. One 
might suspect the involvement of several MPs in this business as recounted to me by 
a forest officer of Zougou-Pantrossi Region: 
The loggers are not owners of chainsaws. These often belong to wood busi-
nessmen, MPs, Ministers and senior politicians. In 2012, I caught hold of six 
chainsaws with loggers who were illegally cutting trees in the forest. These 
saws belonged to an MP who called me later on. [...]. Other politicians often 
threaten us, and if we did not give up, we would have had problems with our 
superiors; for having enforced the forest law for which we have been recruited. 
(Forest Officer, Zougou-Pantrossi, 08/04/14) 
Several civil society organizations also rang the alarm bells by undertaking various 
movements and press conferences, but nothing has changed. The Government has 
maintained its silence. This led Agbodji (2011) to assert that Benin pays heavily for 
the philanthropy of China: 
[…] The People’s Republic of China supports Benin in several areas. Con-
struction of road interchanges, classrooms, arrangement of tracks, granting 
of scholarships. The generosity of China has increased significantly in recent 
years to such an extent as to make us ask questions about what the poor 
country of Benin in exchange gives to the great China. In light of the scandal 
engendered by wood cutting in our country, it would be justified to consider 
that the philanthropy of China is alternatively well paid by Benin. The proof 
of these claims lies in the fact that China is the sole destination where thou-
sands of wood containers are shipped. Consequently, the local craft industry 
suffers from the lack and therefore the high cost of this resource almost all 
of which is conveyed to China. The scope of the case and the increasingly 
displayed involvement of national authorities are not auspicious to consider 
141 I have personally translated this excerpt which was originally in French.
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improving the situation over the coming years […]. (Agbodji, 2011 in Ac-
tudubenin blog, 08/09/11)
Agbodji (2011) showed that Benin pays back somehow the generosity of China. The 
export of wood fueled by illegal logging could be one of the ways the country com-
pensates the Chinese supports in infrastructure, scholarships and training grants, etc. 
Some local newspapers even reported that, since 2009, the country has been ranked 
fourth among the world’s worst destroyers of forests. This position, assigned by a 
ranking from two international organizations, World Resources Institute and Green-
peace, was maintained until 2012 (Beninactu, 2012). The forests of Gogounou, 
though they were under a restrictive management system until 2011, were occupied 
by crops from 25 to 40% of their total areas. The result is the disappearance of several 
species: Milicia exelsa, Triplochiton scleroxylon, Afzelia africana, Pterocarpus erinaceus, 
Khaya senegalensis, etc (Tchiwanou, 2003: 3; CES, 2011: 17). The overharvesting of 
this ligneous vegetation with chainsaws has affected pastoralism in northern Benin, 
including Gogounou (ibid).142 
I have included these complaints and proposed solutions from citizens or groups 
of citizens in my analysis, in order to argue that the complicity of the State in the 
thriving timber trade has greatly influenced Fulani pastoralists. The impacts on them 
are of several kinds: First, the Fulani herders lack browse species to feed their animals. 
Second, since the right to enjoy trees is associated with land rights that the Fulani 
do not have, they lost trees in their camps, which they have long preserved. This 
way of laying claims on Fulani-used lands through trees, is a territorialization sup-
ported by the emergence of international wood market. Third, conflict and violence 
between actors have developed, including Fulani against farmers who are tree sellers, 
and the woodcutters. Fourth, Fulani pastoralists have developed some hatred against 
woodcutters and all wood sellers. They feel sorry every time the kiisoowel or regi-regi 
(chainsaw) makes noise. This allows developing arguments for psychosocial influ-
ence, in cases such as that of Gida, who is now prepared to kill anybody who would 
dare to cut trees in his camp. The illegal exploitation of wood, while encouraging 
farmers who have ultimately invested in the sector, has restricted the Fulani pastoral-
ists’ access to pastureland.
This is not to say that Fulani pastoralists are innocent in this situation (cf. pasto-
ralist incursion in local forests in Chapter 8). The current situation of forest resources 
in Gogounou is a result of the separate actions of all stakeholders. This involves a 
complex network of actors from the local to the national level. Some authorities in 
land administration also assume that the Fulani are not to be made blameless in this 
situation. Everyone is guilty of violating the established forest law: 
142 The methods that Fulani pastoralists use to collect tree forages are also often blamed for threaten-
ing the sustainability of these species (Tenté et al. 2013).
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All actors act against the law and nobody should accuse anybody. All are guilty. 
When I have heard that some farmers and herders were protesting against tree 
cutting by the loggers, it seemed to me like people were just joking. How can 
a guilty person tell others off? How can a thief catch another thief? Farmers, 
herders and loggers all break the law. None of them has the absolute power 
to dispose of the vegetal species on their own will. What is most important 
is what the forest laws provide. We cannot ask the loggers to cease cutting 
trees because the herders use them for their animals. The opposite is also not 
possible. Everyone has to look at the law and do what it is right. (Forest Com-
manding Officer, Parakou, 27/03/14) 
This discourse of a regional manager of the forest administration oversimplifies the 
situation by claiming that no one individual is responsible for the abuse of forest 
resources, but that all are equally guilty. This kind of statement, which is common 
among forest officers, reflects the failure of law enforcement in the preservation of 
natural resources. 
From tractors, weeding chemicals and chainsaws, to the landless and stranger 
status of Fulani pastoralists, as repeatedly recalled by local farmers, has strongly in-
fluenced the Fulani’s access to pastoral resources. The last element that influences 
the availability of pastoral resources is the plantation economy and the reforestation 
policy, which I will discuss in the last sections of this chapter.
Reforestation rationale and territorialization by tree planting in Gogounou 
The reduction of rangeland, besides being strongly linked to the extensive agricul-
ture-based use of herbicides and land claims through tree cutting, is compounded 
by the growing perennial plantation economy (especially based on cashew nuts) in 
Gogounou District as in other parts of the country. The link between plantation 
economy and ecological dynamics is established by Balac (1999), who showed that 
expansion in area with regards to cocoa and coffee plantations has strongly contrib-
uted, more than logging, to the reduction in primary forests in Ivory Coast. Benin’s 
agricultural policy, oriented towards intensification and crop diversification, has also 
allowed farmers in Gogounou to increase their plantation area, as shown earlier in 
Figure 6.2. Cashew (Anacardium occidentale)143 is also one of the crops promoted by 
the Government, with support from various outside partners. 
This Brazilian crop was introduced in Benin during the colonial period and is 
mainly grown for its nuts (Sedjro and Sanni-Agata, 2002; Lacroix, 2003; Singbo et 
al. 2004). The development of the cashew sector in Benin has grown in importance, 
particularly in the late 1990s with the rise of the purchase price of nuts in the inter-
national market, the need to diversify agricultural income due to the difficulties in 
 
143 The cashew tree is called akayuy (plur. akayuuje) in Fulfulde language in Gogounou.
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cotton sector and the impact of the CFA franc devaluation that made local cashew 
production more attractive (cf. Tandjiekpon, 2010). The production of cashew nuts 
from the parallel passing by Abomey District in the south (7°10’N), to that con-
necting Natitingou District to Gogounou in the north (10°25’N) has since brought 
significant economic benefits to the State as well as to the local farmers (Adégbola et 
al. 2005; Yabi et al. 2010). It represents officially the second export source of Benin 
Republic after cotton (Gagnon, 1998; PSRSA/MAEP, 2011: 69; Afouda et al. 2013). 
Exports of raw cashew nuts in Benin on the international market (China, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, European Union, etc.) increased from 19,174 tons in 1997 to 69,357 tons 
in 2006 and 116,398 tons in 2008 (PSRSA/MAEP, loc.cit.; PAC, 2009 quoted in 
Tandjiekpon, 2010: 20). Cashew has emerged as one of the promising economic 
sectors of the Government, which, with the support from outside partners, imple-
ments various programs for its development. It is of paramount importance the agri-
cultural and environmental policies of the State in recent years. The national cashew 
acreage in Benin has increased from 10,000 ha in the 1990s to 468,000 ha in 2012 
(FAOSTAT, 2015).144
The district of Gogounou did not remain on the sidelines of this evolution of 
the cashew sector (Photo 6.4). It enjoys the increased support recently provided by 
various donors who have long been reserved with regard to funding because of the 
144 These statistics should be taken with caution.
Photo 6.4: A cashew orchard encroaching on a Fulani camp in Pikoua village
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location of Gogounou in the boundary of the species’ range. The local area of cashew 
is increasing from year to year even if there are no long-term statistical data to prove 
it. However, the regional union of cashew farmers of Borgou and Alibori (URPA 
B/A145) recently reported that about 252 cashew farmers including 13 women (5%) 
own 402.44 ha in 2014 (URPA B/A, 2015).
Cashew farmers in Gogounou, who increasingly benefit from support from ex-
tension services and development agencies through various programs, take advan-
tage of this to increase their power over land. Indeed, planting cashew trees has 
always been a strategic way for men to assert their land power over women, since 
cashew plantations are mainly owned by men, due to the limited access of women to 
land. They are also means of land discrimination by local people over the foreigners, 
because there are more properties of local people who have customary rights. The 
strangers and immigrants are generally not allowed to install perennial crops such as 
cashew on land used by them for crop farming and related activities (Tandjiekpon, 
2010). More quantitatively, 90% of cashew farms in Benin belong to male farmers; 
and 93% belong to locals with some kind of land title (Balogoun et al. 2014). In the 
particular case of Gogounou, Bariba farmers take advantage of their power over land 
to increase their cashew acreage on livestock corridors, grazing areas and sometimes 
on small plots to which Fulani have access around their dwelling camps. It is a means 
of territorialization and a gradual encroachment on pastoral areas for the benefit of a 
plantation economy, as confessed by a cashew farmer in Gounarou village: 
I cultivate cashew to prepare for my retirement. And I cannot allow anybody 
to destroy it because of his animals. [He nodded to ask me if I can accept 
that]. The land belongs to us. We cannot prevent ourselves from planting ca-
shew because there are Fulani who need to move with their herds. If I did not 
prepare for my retirement, will the Fulani look after me when I am no longer 
able to farm crops? […] Planting cashew has too many advantages. We are 
even currently campaigning to urge small producers to increase their acreage. 
[…] We do not refuse herders to graze in the cashew fields. But when plants 
are still young, we cannot allow that, because the cattle eat and damage the 
seedlings. In the fruiting period, they eat cashew apples and damage the nuts. 
Therefore, they should not graze in the cashew fields during those periods. 
But after that, they can graze as they want. (President of cashew planters of 
Gogounou, Gounarou, 25/08/14)
Another contributing factor for this increase in plantations is the national refores-
tation program initiated by the Government and developed by the municipalities 
across the country. In 2013, the Government started the environmental program 
145 Union Régionale des Producteurs d’Anacarde du Borgou et de l’Alibori.
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called “10 Million Souls, 10 Million Trees” or “10MAA”146 inviting all Benin citizens 
to plant trees to ensure a green future for the country. This green program aims at 
making citizens more aware of the need to reforest the country in order to improve 
its vegetation cover. It also aims at improving accountability of forest rehabilitation 
and creating new maps of Benin forest cover that include reforestation (MEHU, 
2012: 32). This was the topic of an extensive reforestation and propaganda campaign 
launched by the President of the Republic himself in June 2013 (Photo 6.5). This is 
also one of the responses of the Benin Government to climate change, sustainable 
natural resource management, desert encroachment, environmental crises and disas-
ters threatening the whole of humanity (SNU-Benin, 2014: 28). 
This green initiative, supported by the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), the Kingdom of Morocco and other partners at the local and international 
level, has spread across the country. Politicians have taken action in their electoral 
strongholds to support their political leader, the President of the Republic. Plants 
of economic value, such as cashew trees, mango trees, eucalyptus and others have 
been generously given out free of charge to the local people enrolled in replanting 
demonstrations, which have become political and symbolic rituals widely reported 
through the media. 
Since the municipal authorities of Gogounou are members of the ruling political 
alliance, the Mayor and many local political elites have been involved in prepar-
ing the local communities to achieve good reforestation scores in Gogounou. The 
Gogounou local politicians did not hesitate to graciously supply citizens with vari-
ous seedlings in order to accomodate their Head of State’s vision, as is the common 
discourse around the 10MAA program. Several political events have been held in 
Gogounou to discuss seedling provisions and tree planting (cf. ABP, 2014). Some 
farmers in Gogounou have taken advantage of this sudden generosity and benevo-
lence of political players to access the various seedlings used to increase their planta-
tions and thereby improve their control over land to the detriment of Fulani pasto-
ralists.
There was a particular interest that developed locally for species of economic 
value, with especially cashew trees, followed by other species such as mango, teak, 
melina, eucalyptus.147 All of this has contributed to territory making by way of in-
creased orchards in Gogounou District and has negatively impacted pastoralism in 
terms of rangeland availability. Lafia Moura Moussa, the Chief of Gounarou Region, 
who had recently been promised seedlings free of charge by local officials to plant 
146 This government project was initially called “9 Million Souls, 9 Million Trees” before the fourth 
general census of the population in 2013, which revealed a population of approximately 10 million. 
The project title was therefore changed to “10MAA”: “10 Million Souls, 10 Million Trees”. 
147 Ligan-Topanou et al. (2015: 133), who has studied the agro-ecological sustainability of mecha-
nized farms in the district of Gogounou, also noted cashew ahead of perennial crops, followed by 
teak, mango and others.
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fifteen hectares of cashew trees, confirmed the prevalence of this crop dynamic in 
the region.
These trees are usually planted on poor soils or fallows that were formerly used 
for grazing livestock. The agro-ecological approaches conducive to the sustainability 
of perennial and annual crops are not met in many cases. The poor orchard mainte-
nance practices require the permanent mobility of farmers in search of new land for 
the development of annual crops. In this growing plantation economy, fields planted 
with cashew are being phased out in favor of new crops. Therefore, the more a farmer 
develops plantations, the greater the need for new pastureland after two or three 
years, for cotton, cereals and other crops. Some are forced to move their crop fields, 
encroaching on Fulani camps. This is the case of El Hadj Gnoma in Ouessene village, 
whose camp was largely encroached on by the cashew plantations of a Bariba farmer. 
Some plantations are established in areas commonly known as animal corridors, 
grazing areas or Fulani farms often located around their homesteads. Gnoma, who 
recently paid 50,000 CFA francs to a farmer as a penalty for damages caused by his 
animals to a young cashew orchard, a plantation that he condemned as having been 
set up on the livestock route, expressed his bitterness during our interview, or weari-
148 By courtesy of the public print media in Benin (La Nation): Benin President (Dr. Boni Yayi) is 
at right side dressed in white shirt with white hat, while the Minister of Environment and Climate 
Change (Mr. Raphael Edou) is dressed in dark green on the left side.
Photo 6.5: Launch of 10MAA program by the Benin Government147
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ness, tampiri149, which he translated as “I am tired enough” or “enough is enough”. 
Although cashew plantations that are left to become bush again can also sometimes 
serve as pasture for animals, the disappearance of animal corridors and mobility dif-
ficulties remain omnipresent.
 In short, the agricultural mechanization policy of the State has increased labor 
problems. To meet this challenge, farmers have taken advantage of the fragility of the 
input-supply policy to appropriate and even reinterpret herbicides to better control 
the land. The abundant wood export to China has involved the guilty silence of 
the Government since 2008 and has been to the detriment of all forest and natural 
resource conservation acts. The farmers, who cannot change this situation, have de-
cided to take advantage of the situation in order not to become the losers. Therefore, 
they are engaged in the timber trade in their own fields, even classified forests and 
in Fulani camps by brandishing the permanent discourse of the Fulani as foreigners 
or outsiders.
Farmers also took advantage of agricultural and environmental policies imple-
mented by the Government and supported by various partners to increase their 
plantations that enable them to encroach on pastoral lands and Fulani settlements. 
Reforestation initiatives targeting particular species, such as eucalyptus, have been 
perceived in the scientific literature as falling under the “green capitalism” of states 
and power struggles (Sargent and Bass, 1992 quoted in Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 60). 
In Gogounou, this has led to a new way of valuing poor land, with negative impacts 
on livestock keeping. In what follows, I detail the influences of agricultural and en-
vironmental policies on rangeland availability in Gogounou, before turning to the 
recent land reforms in Benin and their impacts on pastoralism.
Privatization of the commons and the land grabbing question
One factor that has influenced pastoralism in Gogounou is the rural land privatiza-
tion policy recently implemented in various regions across the country. Benin’s land 
policy has been evolving since the colonial period when the Decree of 26 July 1932 
reorganized the land tenure system.
The first land acts of Benin after independence were: the Law No. 60-20 of 13 
July 1960, establishing the system of housing permits in Dahomey, and the Law No. 
65-25 of 14 August 1965 on the land tenure system in Dahomey. Since the 1970s, 
the socialist Government of Benin complicated the land tenure system through the 
nationalization of land and the creation of several national agricultural cooperatives. 
With democratization and economic liberalization in the 1990s, the country ex-
perienced a de-monopolization of land from the hands of the Government. This 
149 This is a concept used sometimes by Fulani pastoralists to show their indignation and resignation 
over an afflicting phenomenon for which they have not yet succeed in finding solution. It is also used 
for a difficult situation that seems to have no foreseeable end, although efforts are made to overcome 
it. This seems to originate from the French adverb phrase “Tant pis”.
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transformation has also been linked to the growing sense of tenure insecurity pre-
vailing at that time (cf. Comby, 1998 quoted in Lavigne Delville, 2014). Various 
reforms were then made to secure land access across the country. Different projects 
supported by partners, including French and German development agencies, helped 
to experiment with the Rural Tenure Plan (PFR150) through a process of identifying 
consensual land rights at the local scale (Hounkpodote, 2002b; Edja and Le Meur, 
2004). The PFR151 is:
[…] a document which makes an inventory of rural lands. It refers to the 
rights attached to them and the identity of their holders. It also responds to 
individual and collective needs of land security, planning and investment. It 
allows each region to have a record, which specifies the property assets of the 
alleged landowners, the modes of land acquisition, and the characteristics of 
the held rights and the full identity of the holders of these rights. Achieving 
the PFR leads to the delivery of rural tenure certificates (CFR), equivalent to 
the land titles issued in urban areas. (MCA-Benin, 2011)
The land data gathered throughout the PFR projects led to the adoption on 16 
October 2007 of the Law No. 2007-03, establishing the rural land tenure in the Re-
public of Benin. Through this Act, the State approved the private ownership of land, 
which helped to clarify all of the existing misunderstandings of State ownership over 
customary land. This also enabled the Benin Government to benefit from American 
funding through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA-Benin)152. 
With its “Land Access” project, MCA-Benin implemented the PFR over five 
years in 300 villages and 40 municipalities across the country.153 The various studies 
conducted led to the drafting and the adoption of a State Land Policy154 on 14 July 
2010 (Noudegbessi, 2011). The finalization of all the efforts to implement the coun-
try’s “replacement”155 land policy is the adoption on 14 January 2013 of the Law No. 
150 Plan Foncier Rural.
151 For details on the history of the PFR in Benin, see Hounkpodote (2002b) and Edja and Le Meur 
(2004). 
152 The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA-Benin) is the program responsible for implementing 
various projects negotiated by the Benin Government and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a 
US fund for bilateral development. For details on MCA-Benin, see http://www.mcabenin.bj/r%C3% 
A9sum%C3%A9-du-programme (last accessed 02/08/15, still available via archive.org).
153 In total, 294 PFR were in fact completed by MCA-Benin and an additional 89 were previously 
made with German and French funding, that is, a total of 383 villages in 45 districts (Idrissou et al. 
2014: 63).
154 This document is also known as the White Book of Land Policy. It was developed as part of the 
“Land Access” project of MCA-Benin.
155 The land policy of “replacement” aims to replace existing land rights with private ownership. It 
was criticized in the 1980s and 1990s and the solution found was to shift to an “adaptation paradigm” 
(Bruce, 1992). According to Lavigne Delville (2014), Benin’s land tenure law of January 2010 was a 
step backwards to the replacement model.
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2013-01 regarding Domanial and Land Code in Benin. Thus, the Benin State en-
dorsed policies of privatization and the massive formalization of land rights, strongly 
supported by international institutions (Lavigne Delville, 2014). As shown above, 
any parcel of land mapped by the PFR receives a Tenure Plan Certificate (CFR156) 
issued by the concerned municipality to its given private owner. The CFR is a bet-
ter alternative to land registration and titling, often inaccessible, too expensive and 
unsuited to rural areas where property rights are mostly collective (Lavigne Delville, 
2014). This rural land “title” is irrevocable and unassailable, transferable and assign-
able, individual or collective, and easily convertible to cash (MCA-Benin, 2011). 
The new Land Tenure Code of Benin has caused many controversies since its 
adoption. It is contested by municipal authorities (Gandonou and Dossou-Yovo, 
2013), and challenged by many civil society organizations, which are “committed” 
to fight against land mafia (Idrissou et al. 2014)157. The main concern often raised 
by these players is the development of land markets and informal large-scale land 
grabbing. There are doubts about the effectiveness of the law to ensure land security. 
The scientists have not remained on the sidelines of the recent development of Benin 
land policy. Lavigne Delville, in his paper presented at the 2014 World Bank Land 
and Poverty Conference, argued that the promotion of private ownership of land 
without greater attention to local land relations may add to the marginalization of 
local communities: 
[P]romoting a single legal status of private ownership will require a massive 
restructuring of local land relations, which are mainly based on more or less 
extended family holdings, with de facto ownership largely confined to south-
ern Benin. It would mean breaking with this heritage aspect of land tenure, 
which constitutes a form of social security in the face of life’s perils. If it is 
effective, rapid privatisation is highly likely to marginalise a large part of the 
rural population within a short space of time. (Lavigne Delville, 2014: 6)
The district of Gogounou is among those districts wherein the Land Access project 
of MCA-Benin has been implemented (cf MCA-Benin, 2008: 8ff.). It has helped 
those in seven villages to fully complete PFR requirements, and some CFR were 
delivered to the beneficiaries in February 2011. The secured land tenure required 
for Gogounou, as in most other parts of the country, has led to new dynamics. The 
struggle for land procurement by some, and that of property preservation, by oth-
ers are often to the detriment of the Fulani. The PFR is locally received by Bariba 
farmers as a document confirming their landlord status and their local citizenship. 
Similarly, it lays bare the foreignness and landlessness of non-beneficiaries, including 
156 Certificat Foncier Rural.
157 The title of a book by Idrissou et al. (2014) is suggestive of this commitment: La gouvernance du 
foncier rural au Bénin: La société civile s’engage. Its translation could be “The governance of rural land 
in Benin: The commitment of civil society”.
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Fulani pastoralists. In villages where land certificates were received by Bariba farm-
ers, like Borodarou, where I conducted some interviews, the PFR and, consequently, 
the CFR, locally called tem bamsu tereru158 in the Bariba language, serves as a dis-
tinguishing factor between locals and immigrants, and therefore between those who 
own land and those who do not. An administrative officer of Gounarou Region, and 
member of the land individualization committee, confirms this analysis in his claim 
that: 
The PFR is a good thing. It has many advantages, but it has also created many 
problems here in our region. Many people use the PFR to grab ownerless 
land, and even land that belongs to others. All of this has given rise to tensions 
among some communities. There have already been two violent conflicts in 
the village of Borodarou. The problem of the Fulani is even greater, and I am 
sure it will be even worse in the future. People locally think that they are not 
landowners; they live on lands that belong to the farmers. Most of the time, 
people do not want to share the fields, which they acquired or which their 
parents had given to Fulani several years ago. Nobody thinks about grazing 
area and livestock corridors to protect them. All that interests people is to own 
land certificates. When the PFR covers all of Gogounou, I am a hundred per-
cent sure that many Fulani will be sent out and there will be a lot of clashes. 
(Administrative Officer of Gounarou Region, Gounarou, 03/07/14)
The local population takes advantage of the fact that no Fulani or group of Fulani 
has been granted a CFR as evidence to confirm that the Fulani herders are landless 
foreigners. Some Bariba farmers even told me that it is impossible and even unac-
ceptable to find such highly secure land property documents with Fulani. Giving 
Fulani access to CFR is to agree that they are Gogounois159 and, consequently, that 
they also have land. This seemed unacceptable to them, since land is said to be owned 
only by Bariba. These immutable property rights are related to their “first settlement” 
158 This concept can be literally translated as “paper of land right recognition”.
159 The words go-n’guuru temtombu are often referred to in French as Gogounois or himɓe gogunu in 
Fulfulde, which means “people of Gogounou”. This term was often used by some of my respondents 
to show that the original name go-n’guuru of the district is in the Bariba language showing the real 
identity of its founders and consequently the true owners of land. For them, being go-n’guuru tem-
tombu is first about being Bariba. If the name of the district was a Fulfulde name, they would admit 
that the first owners of land were Fulani, but it is not the case. This is therefore considered to be great 
proof of their autochthony. This is also the reason why the places where the Fulani have settled have 
often no meaning in Bariba language. They are often in Fulfulde language and are in accordance with 
Fulani place names. For example, Pariki, a local Fulani camp, means “pleasant pasture”. These dis-
criminatory discourses accord well with Hounkpodote (2002: 139) who argued that the PFR, while 
providing security to tenure in rural areas, does not solve every problem, particularly the conflictive 
coexistence between farmers and pastoralists. He concluded that the PFR would be more effective if 
it were accompanied by a complementary program that supports and advises on context-based land 
tenure issues.
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and are generally maintained by an inheritance system (Noudegbessi, 2011; Comlan 
Aguessy, 2014: 28f.). The Fulani pastoralists to whom they have granted land cannot 
become their equals in terms of access rights. This redefinition of local citizenship 
(Jacob and Le Meur, 2010; Lund, 2011b) around the PFR at the local level is also for 
commercial purposes. That is why, in some areas where the PFR was implemented, 
fallows and grazing areas are often confiscated and sold.
In the district of Djougou, further west of Gogounou, land grabbing by multi-
nationals is already a reality. Large amounts of land, up to 504 hectares, are being 
bought up by multinationals and politicians for, as they have claimed, modern agro-
pastoral investments (Idrissou, 2014: 21). The development of this phenomenon is 
in line with the concerns of Sylla (1999: 263), who stated some years ago that the 
State is not always able to prevent land grabbing or control all transactions when 
it implements a privatization policy. In recent years, talk about the foreignness of 
Fulani has continued. The Bariba farmers do not hesitate to resort to their history of 
settlement to explain to Fulani herders the conditions in which their grandparents 
were welcomed and accepted by Bariba landlords. I tried to better understand this 
issue by having individual interviews with different traditional authorities. A tra-
ditional leader of Gounarou, whom I interviewed, confirmed the “allochthony” of 
the Fulani with an argument based on their late arrival and their agreed settlement 
favored by the Bariba:
The Fulani came from Daburu, somewhere around Malanville [to be seen like 
Niger Republic]. At that time, animals and people were not many; and there 
was land [He raised his voice and snapped his fingers to show that the land was 
not a limiting factor]. That is why the Bariba gave them land to settle down. 
Nowadays, there are many people as well as animals. With modernity, one 
person can cultivate a large area. The Bariba need more land to farm. I do not 
find any problem if someone decides to hold back his land. [He looked at me, 
laughed and continued]. Fulani normally do not stay anywhere for long. They 
were here for a long time because the conditions were good for their animals. 
If the conditions are no longer good for them, they can leave and continue 
their lives elsewhere as they were doing before reaching here. This is not to say 
that we are enemies with Fulani. We have no problem with them if they do 
not bring their animals to destroy our fields. (Traditional leader, Gounarou, 
10/05/14)
The traditional leader in Gounarou showed in this statement that the Fulani are 
strangers and landless. The plots they have belong to Bariba who gave them land at 
a time when land was readily available. Consequently, if there is now less land than 
before, the owner should be able to easily get back his property. Another important 
factor in the traditional leader’s statement is that the stereotype of the Fulani that has 
been existed since the colonial era still prevails. They are considered nomadic people 
who do not stay anywhere permanently (cf. Bierschenk, 1996: 103). This also influ-
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ences their relationships with other groups who use this stereotype to expel them. I 
was also received by another customary authority in Gogounou, whom I interviewed 
about the foreignness of the Fulani. His statements suggest that the Fulani are useless 
neighbors:
[...]. They are not local people. They left Burkina and were established by the 
Wasangari. Each Wasangari had his Fulani who had given him various gifts. 
When my grandfather was [Chief ] here, he used to visit Fulani camps. When 
he arrived somewhere, Fulani automatically touched the tail of an animal 
and offered it to him. At that time, Fulani were more powerful than Bariba, 
because of their animals. But all has changed and the Fulani’s eyes are very open 
nowadays. They do not give anything to anyone. They are poorer [He paused 
and asked my assistant if he was lying]. In their camps, it is difficult to find 
chickens, even milk. Before, we were fed by Fulani; because they use our land. 
We were enjoying their being here. If it was like the past, I will not be even at 
home right now, but I will be collecting gifts across my Fulani camps. [He now 
breathed in deeply and asked my assistant if I wanted to talk only about Fulani]. 
(Customary authority, Gogounou, 12/05/14)
The customary authority in Gogounou confirmed the othering that prevails locally 
over Fulani pastoralists. He also showed that their settlement in Gogounou has been 
subject to patron-client power relations with the Wasangari. Fulani have nurtured 
this relationship with various gifts that have stopped over time (cf. Lombard, 1965; 
Bierschenk, 1996). For the customary leader of Gogounou, the Bariba do not gain 
anything by leaving Fulani on their land. The Fulani are now considered poor and 
useless, as indicated by my informant who became tired of talking too much about 
them.160 Like many Bariba, this man had once given the Fulani land because he had 
plenty of it and their cohabitation was fruitful then. Only now that land has become 
costly, does the Bariba man need more land to farm. He might even divide it up and 
sell it. In any case, he is no longer prepared to tolerate the Fulani, who are said to 
eventually become useless and even harmful, given the regular destruction of crops 
by Fulani animals. 
The congruence of both traditional leaders’ discourses shows how traditional 
leaders have helped to perpetuate the landless and foreign status of Fulani herders. 
This also has to do with the strong involvement of such customary authorities in 
the burgeoning development of land grabbing in northern Benin. They often use 
these kinds of exclusion strategies to decide or endorse various land transactions in 
160 His desire to change the discussion topic during our interview is my own interpretation of my 
informant’s behavior. He wanted to continue to discuss other topics, as he had enough talk about 
the Fulani who had given him nothing as chief; a situation that was different during his grandfather’s 
time.
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opaque conditions. This is where the concept of fils du pays161, as recently reported by 
Comlan Aguessy (2014: 30ff.), has become increasingly prevalent. Fulani pastoral-
ists generally suffer the consequences of this term, which further perpetuates their 
marginalized status.
Fulani cannot argue against a “reality” created by the Bariba community that 
undermines the Fulani. Even when efforts have been made to provide better access 
to resources for the Fulani, very few arguments demonstrate their autochthony. An 
influential leader of Fulani associations in Benin expressed his indignation during a 
friendly discussion in his courtyard in Gogounou: 
Bariba were lazy people in this Gogounou [of the past]. The Fulani162 were 
doing everything. The Fulani were even feeding them. Now they are chas-
ing us out. They say that Fulani do not have land; we are foreigners. Could 
somebody still be considered a foreigner after [living] fifty years somewhere? 
Some herders even lasted more than that; their grandparents were born, died 
and buried here. But one day they are sent out of this land they have used for 
a long time. This is an injustice and nobody cares. This situation cannot con-
tinue; otherwise, Fulani will stand up one day and it will be a disaster. (Fulani 
leader, field notes, 10/06/14)
As argued by Hagberg (2000: 176), the recent development of Fulani strangerhood 
in Gogounou reflects a boundary of exclusion, denying them access to pastoral re-
sources. The Fulani do not individually or publicly challenge the common discourse 
on their landlessness and foreignness. They almost never claim ownership on plots 
when required by Bariba farmers. It seems like they agree on the grievances made 
against them and sometimes call Bariba farmers their landlords. This way of mak-
ing themselves non-locals was seen as a positive strangerhood they admit, as part 
of their communication code, whenever it is to their advantage (Guichard, 2000: 
113ff.). They often rely on the strategy of considering Bariba farmers as above them 
in knowledge and power. However, they do not agree that their foreign status should 
be equated with land exclusion, as official discourse generally postulates, and places 
nomadism at the center of their identity (ibid: 115). All of the public discourse that 
recognizes the Fulani as subordinate in terms of land ownership, and Bariba as their 
dominant landlord, could be seen as, what Scott (1990: 14f.)163 terms “public tran-
script”. 
161 Fils du pays could be understood as “natives”, “locals”, “local citizens” or “son of the soil”. This has 
to do with “belonging” (Lund, 2011b). For a deeper understanding of all the complexities of “indige-
neity” and “autochthony” in Africa, see Pelican (2009).
162 He includes here the Gando group that is composed of former slaves of both Fulani and Bariba 
(cf. Guichard, 1990). Sometimes when he says Fulani, he does not associate them with the Gando, as 
I will show in Chapter 8.
163 For further arguments on “public transcript” and “hidden transcript” in relation to political ecol-
ogy, see Bryant and Bailey (1997: 62). Guichard (2000: 115) also talked about the hidden transcripts 
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But, conversely, the speeches of individual Fulani also resemble the one evoked by 
their leaders, as quoted above. They often whisper softly, pitying their fate as victims 
of the land competition. This is the “hidden transcript” that influences individual 
actions and relies on a kind of silent resistance to their conditions. These land access 
predicaments, as experienced daily by Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou, and probably 
in other regions of the country, makes the establishment of various pastoral infra-
structures and the implementation of local and regional rules on livestock mobility 
unfruitful. This was one of the concerns of the regional forum on cross-border trans-
humance organized in Gogounou on 14–16 April 2010. One of the most important 
resolutions was: “To pay more attention to the challenge of enforcing laws, in par-
ticular those relating to delimiting and securing animal corridors and transhumance, 
given the importance of land issues in certain countries, such as Benin” (RBM, 2010: 
7). However, at the time that I was conducting my research, the effects were not yet 
visible and there was still no easy solution to the marginalization of Fulani pastoral-
ists.
Conclusion6.3 
I have shown in this chapter that various state policies supported by national and 
international partners have led to the development of different economies predatory 
of land, forest habitats and natural pastures. The human population is increasing, 
but this is insufficient to justify the disappearance of rangelands. Family farms are 
expanding and encroaching on rangelands through new technologies, which have 
also favored a more beneficial growing plantation economy. The illicit exploitation of 
forest resources is legitimized, giving rise to various abuses. Herders have further lost 
access to tree forage, as trees are sold by farmers who take advantage of the flourish-
ing wood export to China. The establishment of the rural tenure plan became a fac-
tor in confirming the indigineity of farmers’ over the foreigness of pastoralists. The 
appropriation and reinterpretation of technologies also allowed Bariba farmers to 
consolidate their power over land to the detriment of Fulani pastoralists. All of these 
factors have fueled the disappearance of grazing resources through the multifaceted 
dynamics of territorialization.
The balance of local pastoralism has been upset by this very complex set of power 
plays similar to what Bryant and Bailey (1997: 62f.) termed “an amalgam of institu-
tional interests” that increase tensions between the roles of the State as both a devel-
oper of the country and a steward of its natural resources. The result of such tension 
has been the stiff competition and different conflicts between actors. The farmers, 
relying on their landlord status, maintain the strangerhood of the Fulani to further 
marginalize them. As power over local land becomes increasingly concentrated in the 
among the Fulani of northern Benin, as being statements relating to the rivalry for land control and 
the allocation of power during the first contact between Bariba farmers and Fulani pastoralists.
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hands of Bariba farmers, one can argue about a kind of “enclosure of the commons” 
that is taking place. The enclosure here, although, it is achieved by farmers in many 
different ways – e.g. by using herbicides, cutting pasture trees, planting cashew trees 
or exhibiting land tenure certificate, etc. – significantly decreases the availability of 
grazing resources for livestock, with huge consequences for the sustainability of lo-
cal pastoralism. The district of Gogounou, like many other regions of north-Benin, 
is already feeling a kind of “tragedy of the enclosure” as superbly used by political 
ecologists to portray rural land eviction as a destroyer of livelihoods and socio-cul-
tural patterns that maintain the common properties (The Ecologist, 1993; Fairlie 
et al. 1994). There is indeed a pastoral crisis in Gogounou; and the situation might 
be similar in other regions of northern Benin where livestock keeping has become a 
huge issue. Now that I have raised the land crisis in the pastoral sector, I will present 
the Fulani adaptive strategies in Chapter 7.
Staying Fulani or changing identity?7 
Mobility, socio-technological innovation  
and livelihood diversification  
among pastoralists in Gogounou
The previous chapter has shown that marginalization and exclusion are major ob-
stacles for resource access and that climate change is not ranked first in the laments 
of Fulani herders in Gogounou District. This chapter deals with the strategies devel-
oped by the herders to adapt to the risky conditions and to become self-sustaining. 
My main argument is that pastoralists respond differently to uncertainty due to the 
unequal access to resources, and that any generalization would be biased. Based on 
the rationale behind their practices, I have distinguished three categories of pastoral-
ists in the study area. The first group is made up of emigrant pastoralists who have 
permanently left the district of Gogounou to take refuge in other regions, mainly 
in the west and south of the country – or cross borders into other countries such as 
Togo and Ghana. Nomadism is again the option for these households, which had 
previously settled in Gogounou several decades ago. The second group is composed 
of fragmented pastoralist households with two or more units scattered across the 
country and abroad. The strategies implemented here are mostly aimed at economic 
complementarity to pastoralism and the protection of social ties. Often, one house-
hold unit is responsible for managing the herds that are far beyond the borders of 
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Gogounou, while another stays in the area for cultivation, alternative sources of live-
lihood and social assistance from peers. The third group includes the permanently 
settled Fulani pastoralists with a larger social network. They depend on growing both 
food and cash crops to diversify their income sources and they give high priority to 
the education of their children to ensure a better future for them. Whatever the cat-
egory is to which they belong, Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou have become active 
users of modern communication and transportation technologies that contribute 
greatly to how each lives with uncertainties. 
Peru7.1 ɓe pastoralists and the return to nomadism  
in Gogounou
Mobility remains the main strategy of securing pastoralist livelihoods in Africa, as 
shown in Chapter 2. But, for herders who have already settled over decades, like 
those in northeast Benin, their movements have been often limited to seasonal trans-
humance, enabling them to use efficiently pastoral resources for their livestock pro-
duction (De Haan et al. 1990; Bierschenk, 1996; Van Driel, 1997; 2002; Alkoiret et 
al. 2009; Djenontin, 2010; Djenontin et al. 2004; 2009; 2012). Calling the Fulani 
herders in Alibori region “nomads” was essentially stereotyping and marginalizing 
them (cf. Bierschenk, 1996: 103; 1999: 204). Their movements are part of a con-
crete pastoral calendar in which their return home is fully planned using sound eco-
logical knowledge, planning expertise and complete flexibility (cf. Djenontin, 2010; 
Djenontin et al. 2012; Djohy et al. 2014a). The return to a more mobile life, by mov-
ing part or all of the livestock and the household, is a recent mass social phenomenon 
induced by the poor access to land and pastoral resources. However, trends like this 
exist in the history of the Fulani in West Africa. This was revealed by Santoir (1994: 
252), who observed that pastoralists in the Senegalese Ferlo used this strategy to be 
self-sustaining in a context of total loss of access to grasslands. 
The perol, generally equated with ferol (sing. ferugo), was one of the words most 
frequently used by Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou during my research stay. Perol 
means a move where there is no particular intention of returning to a place. This ir-
reversible movement is closely related to the challenges facing the Fulani over which 
they have little influence. The only way to achieve a sense of normalcy is to con-
tinue moving with their herds (Stenning, 1959: 207; Schareika et al. 2000: 319f.)164. 
The word peruɓe (sing. peruɗo) or feruɓe (sing. feruɗo) refers to the land refugees, 
who are emigrant Fulani herders. For those who have permanently emigrated from 
Gogounou, there is little hope for livestock and herders in that place. The only way 
to preserve their Fulani identity is to move. In the Binga camp, I met a Fulani herder 
who had returned from northern Togo, where he had found refuge for nearly two 
164 Stenning (1959: 207) called it “migration proper”. This was undertaken by the Woɗaaɓe pastoral-
ists as a demonstration to challenge an absolute political domination in the Bornu (ibid: 222ff.).
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years. He had planned to remove and sell the metal sheets covering the houses on 
his farm, pick up the rest of his belongings and bid the camp farewell. When asked 
about the reasons for his move, he replied:
There is nothing for us here. Nothing will change here. The situation is dete-
riorating every day. The best way is to leave. The situation is better elsewhere. 
Gogounou is no longer liveable for Fulani and cattle. We cannot stay here. We 
are in danger. Being Fulani means that you have a herd. No herd; no Fulani. 
This is why we are all moving. We must save our animals and our own lives. 
As you are seeing, I am collecting right now all of my remaining property. We 
will not come back. We are leaving Gogounou forever [He started laughing]. 
(Abdoulaye Belko, Binga, 30/03/14)
Abdoulaye Belko came back from northern Togo to make some final arrangements 
and to move forever from Gogounou. He had already spent nearly two years abroad, 
waiting for the situation to change before returning home, but the information he 
receives daily through mobile phone calls confirmed that nothing will ever be as 
before. The periodic visits to his family had also dashed all hopes. He concluded that 
the future of Fulani herders is uncertain in Gogounou and that his pastoral identity 
will be lost if he stays there. This is why he chose to leave permanently – moving 
family members, herd and all of his belongings. His discourse suggests that in our 
ever-changing world that the passage from transhumance to emigration remains a 
core element in the culturally mobile Fulani system (Schmitz, 1999: 25). Emigration 
appears to be a way to preserve a pastoral identity. While this may not be possible 
in the future, the Fulani continue to move to save their livelihoods. This “security 
emigration” underway in Gogounou sees the use of a variety of transportation and 
communication technologies, as was the case with Abdoulaye. 
Abdoulaye sent his herd with part of the household (two young brothers and their 
small families) so that he could inspect the new area where they were to stay. When 
a new location was found and the living conditions were acceptable, he rejoined the 
first group with his third wife and two children. He used to come seasonally to visit 
other family members (his elderly father, and his first and second wives with their 
two and three children respectively) in Gogounou. He also regularly called them 
with his mobile phone to check on them. He finally came back to collect the whole 
family and all of their belongings. He later used a truck for this relocation, since the 
new settlement was far away from Gogounou. The small ruminants, the poultry and 
all the material goods were transported by truck to the new destination.
When the permanent decision to emigrate was made, all houses (suudu) within 
a household were systematically deconstructed and the metal sheets put up for sale. 
If some forage trees are still in the camp, they are also sold to tree cutters. It is often 
in these cases that Fulani pastoralists are also stereotyped as being sellers of wood in 
certain areas of Gogounou District. Those who still have cattle on site can seldom 
afford to take part in this wood transaction. The money mobilized contributes to the 
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moving expenses. When the funds are insufficient, small ruminants or poultry can be 
sold. For some herders, head of cattle can be sold earlier before the herd’s relocation 
in order to have enough money to deal with the moving expenses. The farm (wuro) 
is finally abandoned and the houses fall into ruin. A quick takeover by local farmers 
to increase their own farmlands (Photo 7.1) is common.
There is a second way of managing the farm when a Fulani household decides 
to leave Gogounou in search of safety elsewhere. In this case, the houses are simply 
emptied and the roofing preserved. The farm is secretly sold as it is to other Fulani 
herders – members of the emigrant’s social network (distant relatives, friends, neigh-
bors), who are willing to move in. This transaction does not include the land, since 
the Fulani do not have ownership of the land and are not allowed to sell it. Only the 
buildings and other infrastructure are involved. However, the new tenant inherits 
directly the small piece of land that the previous Fulani occupants were cultivating, 
that is, if it has not already been expropriated by the landlords. This is the case of 
Djodi, who bought a wuro for 200,000 CFA francs in Kagnan camp, where he has 
access to about 0.25 hectare of land for food cropping (Photo 7.2). If no Fulani herd-
er is interested in such an arrangement, the wuro is sold to a Gando agro-pastoralist, 
who agrees to the sale conditions. If there is no possibility to sell the wuro, the Fulani 
proceed to remove and sell all of the roofing sheets. The walls are left to go to ruin, as 
in the previous case, and farmers often reclaim ownership of the land.
The decision to emigrate is not always consensual among Fulani household mem-
bers. In some cases, young people reject the ideas of their parents and move with the 
Photo 7.1: Ruins of an abandoned house in a Borodarou Fulani camp
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family herd. While people of advanced age will often plead to staying in Gogounou, 
the youth usually take the initiative to move. It is common to see Fulani camps in 
Gogounou where only old people (men and/or women) are left behind. Some elderly 
pastoralists, whose children have been gone for more than two years, would beg 
me to help them to trace their family herd. Besides the loss of property rights, the 
disruption of social ties caused by emigrating is much more difficult to endure. This 
situation is similar to what De Bruijn and Van Dijk (1994: 100) encountered in cen-
tral Mali, where some old Jallouɓe women asked the researchers to send out through 
Mali Radio a wanted notice to get news about their missing children. Those who can 
still farm rely on food crops to meet their daily needs. For those of very advanced 
age, who can no longer cultivate land, their livelihood is provided by the kindness 
of some relatives and neighbors. Alms were sometimes collected from third persons 
or Muslim colleagues in the mosque. This is the case of many poor households in 
Boro, Kagnan and Wessarou that have been emptied of their able-bodied youth, and 
whose older inhabitants are incapable of farming and performing other economic 
activities, and must therefore rely on the benevolence of others and religious gifts 
(zakat, sadaqa, etc.).
The second type of migration also widespread in Gogounou is egirol or egiru 
(sing. egugo; vb. egi). It refers to a long-distance move from Gogounou to a new 
destination, with the possibility of return after two or three years. This seems to 
be what Stenning (1959: 207, with exemplification in 221f.) called “migratory 
drift”, which caused many Woɗaaɓe pastoralists in Bornu (Nigeria) to finally land 
Photo 7.2: House sold in Kagnan Fulani camp
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in Adamawa (Cameroon). The practitioners of egirol are called eguɓe (sing. egowo). 
In this case, part of the household – usually the elderly – stay put. They are often 
known as haccaɓe wuro (sing. haccaɗo wuro), which literally means “house guards” 
or “farm-keepers”. When there are some able-bodied youth, under-age children or 
handicapped persons, the term horiiɓe (sing. horiiɗo) is rather used, meaning the 
“remaining people”. Some herders move with all household members and entrust 
their residence to their Fulani neighbors within the same hamlet (gure) [Photo 7.3]. 
The contact is maintained through mobile phone with the latter regularly reporting 
to them on the livestock-keeping conditions in Gogounou. These are mostly people 
who still want to return back to Gogounou as soon as the situation has improved. 
But after a waiting period of two years on average, some of them come back to or-
ganize their final move (perol). When this decision is made, the wuro is finally sold 
when tenants are found or the corrugated iron roofs are removed and put up for sale, 
as is the case of the perol, presented above.
New destinations of Gogounou Fulani pastoralists
The new destinations of Gogounou Fulani emigrants are usually quite diverse. Both 
perol and egirol migrants can be found in different regions of the country and beyond 
the national borders. Three major groups can be distinguished: the southern group, 
the western group and the cross-border group (Figure 7.1).
Photo 7.3: A house entrusted to Salou in Wessarou Fulani camp
Staying Fulani or changing identity? 179
Figure 7.1: Fulani outmigration routes from Gogounou District
180 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
The southern group: These are herders who move southwardly. They gradually 
move from Gogounou towards some districts of the province of Borgou (Bem-
béréké – Sinendé – N’Dali – Tchaourou). Some of them move further to the north-
ern region of Collines Province (Ouèssè – Bantè – Glazoué). Others cross the south 
of Collines Province (Savè – Savalou – Dassa) to reach the province of Zou and the 
districts of Djidja, Bohicon and Zakpota, but recently even more towards the plateau 
of Agonlin composed of the districts of Covè, Zagnanado and Ouinhi. The district 
of Tchaourou however remains the most important destination of the herders in this 
group. 
The western group: The direction of this group is westward. The movements are 
oriented towards the districts located in Donga Province (Djougou – Copargo – Bassi-
la – Ouaké), and Atacora Province (Kérou – Kouandé – Toucountouna – Boukoum-
bé). Some Fulani pastoralists in this group sometimes move further to define the 
third group described below. The Djougou and Bassila areas remain the favorite of 
the herds whose herders do not intend to leave the country.
The cross-border group: This group includes those who are engaged in non-return 
movements. The preferred destination is the Republic of Togo, which can lead after-
wards to the Republic of Ghana. Their routes are varied. Some members of the two 
previous groups fall into this category when they decide definitively to leave Benin 
to run their pastoral activity beyond the national borders. The main exit areas are 
Boukoumbé, Ouaké and Bassila. From these three districts, they easily gain access to 
three major regions of the Republic of Togo: the savannah region (with Dapaong as 
capital), the Kara Region (with Kara as capital) and the Central region (with Sokode 
as capital). The region of Kara is the favorite area for the herders from Gogounou, 
but some transit through Dapaong Region to reach the northern part of the Repub-
lic of Ghana. Sometimes, there are attempts of outmigration to Nigeria, but the fear 
of Boko Haram165 and the related insecurity were often mentioned by Fulani herders 
as factors discouraging them from taking this risky adventure.
Due to the various constraints already mentioned in Chapter 5, I was not able to 
follow the movements of herds and herders in each group on their mobility routes. It 
may be of great interest to follow (for future studies) some pastoralists of these three 
categories, to understand more fully their adaptive strategies. The rest of this chapter 
will be essentially devoted to the pastoralists who are still on site in Gogounou, and 
with whom I have had the chance to undertake participant observations and inter-
views.
165 Boko Haram is a terrorist group operating in northern Nigeria and whose activities are well 
known among Fulani herders who reported being informed by their peers. Mobile phone is a privi-
leged means by which risk areas are shared between pastoralists.
Staying Fulani or changing identity? 181
Scope of livestock and Fulani emigration from Gogounou
The livestock population in Gogounou has officially recorded an upward trend be-
tween 2000 and 2013 (Figure 7.2). The average number of animals in Gogounou 
during this period is reported to be 112,953 head of cattle, 32,855 sheep and 23,687 
goats (FAOSTAT, 2014). These statistical data, available from the FAO database and 
various reports from the livestock department of Benin, contrast sharply with the 
reality on the ground. The growth rates often used to generate such data – with 1999 
as a reference year (MAEP, 2013: 8; Mama Sambo, 2013: 10f.) – are no longer con-
sistent with the local trends. The massive move of Fulani pastoralists with their ani-
mals (perol and egirol combined) challenges these official figures. It is just as difficult 
to find reliable statistics on both national and local herds, as it is to access accurate 
numbers of pastoralists and animals that have actually migrated out. 
There are also no sound data in the official documents of the pastoralist associa-
tions. It is difficult to show how the emigration has evolved over years. However, 
various figures are issued on different occasions such as political meetings, pastoralist 
general assemblies, livestock television broadcasts, meetings with international do-
nors, etc. These figures are often not consistent from one session to the next. Thus, 
they should be considered with caution, since they result from the communication 
strategy of Fulani associations, which is to draw gain attention from decision-makers 













































Figure 7.2: Gogounou estimated livestock population in 2000–2013166
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and external partners. The same data are often manipulated in different ways accord-
ing to the source of information. It is very common to hear different figures on the 
same issue being presented at different meetings. This seems to be done on purpose, 
and I give a few examples below.
A census conducted by ANOPER in 2011 revealed a stock of 64,815 head of 
cattle and 54,156 small ruminants that migrated out of Benin since the emigration 
began (Database, livestock census in Gogounou, ANOPER, 2014). During the vet-
erinary campaign in 2013, about 45,866 head of cattle were presented for vaccina-
tion against pasteurellosis and 47,310 head against contagious bovine pleuropneu-
monia in Gogounou. The local livestock has noticeably declined, as 77,970 head 
of cattle were counted in Gogounou during the national livestock census of 1999. 
And this livestock population is still declining each year (Boukari Bata, 2013: 32f.). 
According to the head officer of the agricultural extension service in Gogounou, the 
cattle stock ran from more than 80,000 head to less than 50,000 head in five years 
(Speech of RDR Gogounou, Interview 31/05/14). The UDOPER B/A reported that 
228 herds, comprising 11,085 head of cattle and 2,578 small ruminants (Boukari 
Bata, 2012: 11), left Gogounou in 2012. Another census by ANOPER reported that 
about fifty households of Fulani herders had permanently left Gogounou in 2013. 
The animal population is not mentioned in this last report, but it is estimated that 
several hundred cattle and small ruminant had also migrated. A more recent study 
by PAFILAV reported the disappearance of 223 Fulani camps in Gogounou, de-
creasing the cattle population from 85,000 head to 40,000 (PAFILAV, 2014: 135). 
During a meeting that I attended with a delegation of Swiss Development Coopera-
tion, ANOPER leaders mentioned that 88,016 Fulani pastoralists had left Benin to 
Togo and Ghana, with a total herd of more than 66,000 head (Speech of Dramane 
Guétido, Coordinator of ANOPER, 19/05/14). These figures are assumed to be the 
result of a national census, but there is no official document that confirms them.
In a memorandum submitted to the President of the Republic in 2013 by ANO-
PER Benin, provisional survey data based only on a few municipalities of northern 
Benin, including Malanville, Karimama, Gogounou, Kalalé, Sinendé and Tchaour-
ou, were used to portray how dramatic the emigration of Fulani pastoralists has been. 
It was reported, based on interim results of February 2013, that more than 72,000 
pastoralist households had emigrated to Nigeria, Togo and Ghana; with 88,191 head 
of cattle and more than 200,000 small ruminants (ANOPER, 2013a: 7). According 
to other figures presented at the media-covered roundtable of ANOPER on 4 April 
2013, more than a million head of cattle had left Benin (Arouna, 2013). In sum, 
there is no accurate number of Fulani emigrants from Benin in general and from 
Gogounou in particular. The “engineering of figures” is an important strategy of ad-
vocacy and lobbying heavily used by Fulani leaders, which I will provide more details 
about in Chapter 8. This is not to deny the ongoing reality. It is visible on the ground 
that the Fulani settlements are losing their stocks and their inhabitants, thereby re-
ducing local animal production. This collapse of the livestock production is already 
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remarkable in other parts of northern Benin as recently reported by Sounon et al. 
(2013: 297) regarding the Donga Basin.
Egirol7.2  mobility and seenuŋon wuro in Gogounou:  
Logics and strategies 
The logics of the egirol move
As previously demonstrated, the egirol move is a kind of mobility that is different 
from both transhumance ɓatiiru, including dummoɗi (sing. dummol ) in the rainy 
season, ceeɗoɗi (sing. ceeɗol ) in the dry season and absolute emigration (perol). 
Egirol is characterised by a sense of return, once the conditions have improved in 
Gogounou. This results in two social units, spatially distant, but interdependent in 
their livelihood practices. That is called seenuŋon wuro167, i.e. fragmented or broken 
household. The eguɓe (sing. egowo) is the household unit moving with the herd in 
search of good conditions for the livestock, while horiiɓe wuro (sing. horiiɗo wuro) or 
haccaɓe wuro (sing. haccaɗo wuro), depending on the case, is the sedentary household 
unit often emptied of its able-bodied youth, faced with the challenge of surviving 
far away from the livestock. This household-splitting decision is often made during 
a small family counseling session when the new destinations are decided and various 
prayers are said for the wellness of the herd and the accompanying household unit. 
Some herders use their religious leaders (Alfa or imams) for guidance and prayers 
before making the final decision to migrate. This social and spatial fragmentation 
helps secure the livestock through a partial nomadism, while avoiding a total loss 
of access to the small portions of land not yet expropriated by the local landlords 
back home. This shows a dynamic of control over land, also observed among other 
pastoralist communities of Western Africa (Sutter, 1987: 197; Boutrais, 1994b: 187; 
Waters-Bayer and Bayer, 1994a: 214f.).
In addition to the land security-seeking norms, which govern this practice, other 
more cultural and ideological factors play an important role in the way the egirol 
move is planned among pastoralists in Gogounou. Some Fulani pastoralists often 
complain about leaving the graves of their kin, who are generally buried on their 
farms. My informants often expressed a case of moral suffering if they lose this social 
bond or fail in their ethical responsibility of taking care of their parents after their 
deaths. The Barabaig pastoralists of Tanzania also preserved this kind of cultural value 
and believed that the expropriation of the land on which they had buried their ances-
tors causes a very painful cultural alienation. Accordingly, they were able to challenge 
both public authorities and international contracting forces before the Tanzanian 
167 This term usually refers to the breaking down into disparate units of the same household or the 
same extended family in order to have better accessibility to resources. It is also used to refer to the 
Fulani households which were divided due to dissent or various forms of internal conflicts.
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higher courts, and through international campaigns for successful recognition of 
their customary land rights (cf. Lane, 1994; 1996; Fratkin, 1997: 245). Therefore, 
being in Gogounou without a herd on site is a form of action of the horiiɓe/haccaɓe 
wuro for the recognition of their localness and their land rights. This fight is so im-
portant because they do not want to take the risk of totally emigrating – to lose their 
affiliation and become even more foreign than they were in Gogounou:
Keeping livestock has become impossible in Gogounou. There is no future 
for our animals here. They have all gone. Some of my children and my young 
brothers are following the herd. I am here by obligation. My parents are bur-
ied here. We can no more completely leave Gogounou. We will no longer 
allow ourselves to be new aliens somewhere else, because we will never be 
considered as natives, to access land. If where we are for over fifty years, we are 
still landless strangers, what will happen where we are really foreigners? People 
will squeeze us out at anytime they want and we could not come back here 
because the Bariba farmers would have already occupied the place. It is better 
to stay here, even if the space is reduced. (El Hadj Beissa, Ouessene village, 
23/04/14)
El Hadj Beissa was born in Gogounou, where he has lived for over fifty years. His 
father lived in Gogounou and was buried there after his death. Even if their land 
situation is still critical, Beissa thinks it is better for him to stay to keep control of the 
small piece of land that he has and to pass it on to his children. However, he is aware 
that it is always good to explore opportunities and continue enjoying the fodder and 
water resources still available elsewhere. The strategies developed by the herders who 
split up their households into two or sometimes more units, are based on reconcil-
ing crop faming with livestock-keeping and a strong use of various technologies that 
help to preserve and secure social ties. While the displaced household unit depends 
primarily on milk production and livestock, the settled unit meets the daily needs 
through crop production and other more insecure sources. In some cases, though 
rare these days, one can meet a few numbers of cows supplying milk to the horiiɓe 
wuro or haccaɓe wuro. This possibility is increasingly restricted because of the great 
difficulties they face locally in taking care of those animals.
Adaptive strategies of split Fulani households
Since the Fulani household is composed of two or sometimes several units scat-
tered throughout the country or across borders, the strategies implemented are often 
complementary, targeting the livelihood security of each unit as well as the preserva-
tion of social ties. The more mobile unit does not return to Gogounou and depends 
mainly on the sale of livestock and animal products (especially milk), while the sed-
entary unit relies mostly on cultivation and other alternative income sources.
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The livelihood practices of  horiiɓe/haccaɓe wuro
The settled household units are those that I have observed and interviewed the most 
during my fieldwork, since I could not follow the more mobile units. Most of these 
types of Fulani households seldom have cattle herds on site, as previously shown. 
They no longer have any open pastoral life, and can even be mistaken for farmers. 
Small-scale farming on an average of 0.25ha includes sorghum, millet and maize as 
the de facto main sources of income for these households. While the first two crops 
are for consumption, the last one is often sold for cash. The income from small 
livestock (sheep, goats, poultry) kept by both men and women (if they still have 
livestock) is used mainly for health care, food and other expenditures. Some Fulani 
women, individually or collectively, provide significant waged labor for harvesting 
cotton and maize in farmers’ fields. These practices are growing, as Bariba farm-
ers need a more external workforce to perform various tasks (especially sowing and 
harvesting) in their large and extended crop fields. Further, there may be significant 
changes in food habits, since milk is no longer as available as it was in the past. I was 
surprised to learn that many Fulani herders or members of their households consume 
millet porridge without milk, and had even been served this on occasion during my 
visits. In other households, cow’s milk is replaced with a yellow powder from the 
grain called Parkia biglobosa (Narehi in Fulfulde language), which is one of the most 
common milk replacement products in the study area. I was often mockingly invited 
by my interlocutors to drink the kossam nareri jam or “yellow milk”, in order to bet-
ter understand the suffering of the Fulani and to appreciate it.
As it is mostly the elderly people in the household who are left behind in 
Gogounou, they are the ones who often hold the power over the decisions on live-
stock, especially if the common herd is not yet shared among the offspring or indi-
vidual cattle owners. When resources are depleted and the household is faced with 
key challenges (lack of food, payment for health care, purchase of agricultural imple-
ments and inputs, etc.), the mobile household unit is often called upon to come to 
the rescue. Phone calls are made and instructions are remotely given for the sale of 
an animal. The cash is transferred back home in Gogounou by a representative us-
ing a motorbike or taxi. As the modern technologies offering cash transfer (such as 
MPESA in Kenya) do not yet exist in Gogounou, this process can take from one to 
several days, depending on the location of the mobile unit. This limits the ability of 
herders to send and receive money, and subjects them sometimes to very critical situ-
ations such as debt, hunger, and accident. Some messengers are sometimes robbed 
on the way by gangsters, or worse, killed by their assailants. Cases of this kind have 
been regularly reported in villages like Dougoulaye, Garikoro and Diadia. This justi-
fies the highly expressed willingness of those pastoralists to adopt fast money transfer 
technologies, for instance, through mobile phones, in order to relieve their pains and 
protect their people. 
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The livelihood practices of the eguɓe household unit
The more mobile part of the Fulani household generally consists of children, young 
single men and women, newlyweds and married adults. They are often brothers and/
or children of the household head. Early wedding ceremonies can be undertaken for 
teens, if necessary, in order to have enough people to take care of the herds further 
afield. This practice was reported in most regions, but especially in Gbeissa, Pikoua, 
Bikou and Garikoro. When the cattle owners no longer have able-bodied young men 
who can go with the livestock, hired herders are sometimes recruited. When the terms 
of the herding agreement are fulfilled and that the herd is productive and healthy, the 
herder is remunerated with a head of cattle a year. However, a growing mistrust has 
greatly reduced the use of hired herders in the district. Many pastoralists have seen 
their situation deteriorate by hiring Fulani herders who have mismanaged their ani-
mals or have disappeared altogether with the herd. Other pastoralists have also been 
victims of armed robberies, losing all or part of their entrusted herds. While this is 
not an absolute guarantee against certain forms of insecurity, most herders prefer to 
leave their herd under the control of a member of their own household: 
Our animals are not here. They are all in Djougou and Togo. Our brothers 
and children are taking care of them. There are also people who entrust their 
animals to herdsmen. They are paid a head of cattle per year. [...] When we 
do not have enough people to follow the animals, we try to manage it. For in-
stance, we can look for wives for our children or our brothers who are around 
16 or 17 years old. They will go with other herdsmen. But young men cannot 
go alone to Togo. Formerly, the Fulani did not get married at those ages; it is 
too early. But what can we do? All this is due to the problem of grass. (Focus 
group discussion, Pikoua camp, 30/04/14)
The migrant household unit lives mainly on milk produced by the cows, especially 
when the conditions at the new destination are favorable. But in cases where milk 
production remains uncertain due to insecure access to resources, some herd ani-
mals may be sold. Depending on who has the property rights over animals and who 
makes the decisions, destocking is often managed remotely by the sedentary unit in 
Gogounou through mobile phones. A livestock sale decision is made when necessary 
to deal with urgent household financial needs (for food, health care) and veterinary 
care for sick animals. When cash is needed to pay fines in case the herd has caused 
damage to the cropland of farmers, or when support is needed in a conflict situation, 
the information is sent back home through the same mobile phone channel. If the 
health status of an animal requires a rapid slaughtering to reduce the loss, the family 
back home is also systematically informed, if possible, through phone calls. 
When there are no impediments to the telephone connection between the mem-
bers of the fragmented household, their movements and difficulties are regularly re-
ported for advice and decision-making. Sometimes members of the mobile unit visit 
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their parents in Gogounou and return to their new camps or places of residence with 
foodstuffs. This limits the sales of animals to survive in a context where they do not 
have enough access to land for farming in their new settlements. Mobile telephony 
is the technology most used in this kind of complementary interaction between dis-
located units of the same social entity:
We are aware of their situation through mobile phone. We visit them from 
time to time, but they also come with their bike to see us at the camp. We take 
taxis to go down to the edge of the tar road closer to where they are, and we 
call them and they come to pick us up. We call each other regularly by phone. 
If the call is not successful, it is surely a network problem. In such cases, we 
can wait and retry later. If they have the network, they can call us. (Garba 
Alou, Dadaarè camp, 12/03/14)
This demonstrates, once again, the transformative power of the mobile phone as 
already observed among Fulani pastoralists in various parts of East and West Africa 
(Sangare, 2010; Kossoumna Liba’a, 2012; Stockton, 2012; Keita, 2015). Stockton 
(2012: 5f.) has observed that, in Kenya and Somalia in particular, mobile phones ef-
fectively contribute to building social cohesion between members of the same house-
holds whose adventures have scattered them across countries and borders in search 
of a better life. 
Beyond the mobile phone that plays an important role in preserving the links 
between Fulani household units, transport technologies also have an important func-
tion in the management of the relocated herds as it appears above. Periodic visits 
are sometimes organized on both sides. The followers of the herd may return to the 
camp by motorbike or taxi to see the people left behind. Similarly, representatives 
can be chosen in the settled household unit to visit and to inquire about the situation 
of those who are on the move with the animals. This is the case of Amadou, a Fulani 
herder in Diadia village, who goes twice a year to Togo to check on his herd that two 
of his children have been guarding over the past two years. Within Tilla Fulani camp, 
two representatives are chosen to make the trip once a year to visit about nine herds. 
These herds have already been in Togo for more than two and a half years. Each herd 
owner provides 5,000 CFA francs for the mission. When the cattle owners do not 
have enough money, the envoys are mandated to sell an animal to cover the costs. 
The herd from which the animal is sold is chosen by lot. This kind of draw brings 
together all camp members who have their herds in Togo and wish to have true 
information about their people. This strategy helps to reduce collectively the costs 
required to keep animals in Togo and to live in Benin:
It is only the day before yesterday that we collected 20,000 CFA francs to send 
someone to see how our animals are migrating. The whole camp delegates him 
to go and see the herds installed in Togo. Sometimes if the money to pay for 
his travel is not available, it is mandated to sell an animal from the herd of 
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someone in order to cover the expenses. He will take out an amount cover-
ing the travel costs and bring the rest back to the cattle owner. If there is no 
one who is available to go see them, we have to call by phone and explain the 
situation at home. In these cases, they can sell an animal and bring us money 
at home. Someone can take a motorbike to bring the money to us at home. 
(Focus group discussion, Tilla village, 13/03/14)
Receiving information by phone and visiting the herd are two complementary strate-
gies. No herder relies only on phone calls. Similarly, no one waits only for the visit to 
the mobile unit to inquire about the herd. For the herders, the mobile phone helps 
to have some idea about the status of the herd; but it is not always reassuring. There-
fore, it is important to see firsthand what is happening on the spot. These two factors 
help keep social ties while preserving the right of ownership over the livestock. This 
brings out how trustworthy relationships are built between social entities in the con-
text of the development of information and communication technologies in African 
countries. Trust remains an important issue in all social and business interactions 
involving the use of mobile phones. The direct personal contacts remain, however, 
very important in Africa, where many people do not rely too much on these infor-
mation and communication technologies that “always lie” (Molony, 2006; 2009) or 
“allow/encourage people to lie” (Brinkman et al. 2009: 78; De Bruijn et al. 2009: 
19). This is why transportation technologies (Chinese motorcycles, car taxis) greatly 
contribute to bridge any lack of trust between scattered pastoral units that follow a 
remote livestock management strategy. The loss of connection between both settled 
and mobile units for a long period of time is locally interpreted and felt as a commu-
nication tragedy, with negative implications on property rights and social identity. 
This is the case of Guidado, a Fulani herder in Wessarou camp who has had no news 
for two years from his two children on the move with the common herd. Since they 
left Gogounou for Togo, nobody has found them. He assumes that he is no longer a 
herder and is engaged in crop farming to survive. This situation is also taken as a loss 
of pastoral identity shamefully accepted by my interlocutor, who complained a lot 
about his new life as a farmer. 
When the herd is bigger, it is sometimes split up into two or three smaller herds. 
This is a strategy to use the resources available in different regions. This is the case 
of Djouldé in Alafiarou camp, who has had one of his herds in Bassila District and 
the second one in Togo (cf. Figure 7.1) for more than a year. He always uses phone 
calls and regular visits to manage them. To demonstrate the power of mobile phones 
in the management of the livestock, Belko, a Fulani herder in Pariki camp, whose 
herd is kept in Ouaké District, has tried to call Kouri, one of his migrant household 
members who has been following the herd in Donga Province, very close to northern 
Togo. During a conversation on a mobile phone put on loudspeaker, I was called 
upon for help to deliver Fulani herders from their “catastrophic” land access situa-
tion: 
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 El Hadj Belko: [He is calling with his own mobile phone]
 Kouri: Allo! Allo!
 El Hadj Belko: Assalamu alaykum [Greeting]
 Kouri: Wa alaykum assalam [Reply]
 El Hadj Belko: Some strangers came to visit us to inquire about the prob-
lems we face in livestock keeping. They are right now with 
me.
 Kouri: Hou! Hou! [He started laughing]
 El Hadj Belko: Tell them the problems you are facing over there.  
They are listening to you. 
 Kouri: [He laughs again and started talking] 
It is always the same problems. Farmers strike us all the time. 
Today Fulɓe have become a game to the farmers who run 
after them all the time. It is very hard to find where you can 
peacefully graze without being chased out. There are crops 
everywhere. There are no animal corridors. It is really difficult 
here. If you can help us, it would be good.
 El Hadj Belko: They have heard. I will call you later in the evening. 
[He cuts the call]
(Phone call on loudspeaker by El Hadj Belko, Pariki camp, 12/03/14)
The cell phone, while being a remote livestock managing technology, is also of prin-
cipal importance in the way Fulani herders seek solutions to the problems that un-
dermine their mobility. Through it, various outside actors are mobilized and par-
ticular versions of resource challenges are presented to them in order to engage their 
help. This also resembles a situation I experienced in Parakou during my explor-
atory visit. On 29 July 2013, I was interviewing Yacoubou Boni of APIDEV-NGO, 
when a Fulani herder from Kalalé District called him by phone, complaining about 
a farmer he accused of occupying one of the animal routes recently mapped out 
by his NGO in collaboration with Fulani leaders and all local land use stakehold-
ers. Having reassured the herder of his commitment to fight for the problem to be 
resolved, Yacoubou explained to me on the side afterwards that the mobile phone 
heavily contributes to addressing the injustices regularly committed against Fulani 
pastoralists. The Fulani now have telephone contacts of useful resource persons who 
can help address their daily challenges. This is also the strategy of the Fuutankoɓe 
pastoralists in northern Senegal, who can phone elites to take care of their concerns 
(Juul, 2005a: 126f.). 
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The 7.3 dariɓe gite pastoralists in Gogounou:  
Logic and strategies
Land right protection, belonging and differential strangerhood
Known as dariɓe gite, the Fulani in this category are called “awakened people”. The 
main external factor that distinguishes them is their further integration with the local 
communities – accepting new ways of life formerly uncommon among Fulani pasto-
ralists. They are often stereotyped among their peers as copying the lifestyle of Bariba 
farmers and even other people all ranked as haaɓe (sing. kaaɗo). Therefore, they are 
also considered as having lost the real Fulani identity, becoming more accustomed 
to urban life. Bush life and the nostalgic contact with cattle no longer hold first 
place in their lives. Those Fulani pastoralists who stayed in Gogounou, despite the 
many aforementioned land issues, believe that the situation is the same everywhere 
and there is no better condition for livestock in an ever-changing world. The days 
of abundant resources are gone, and pastoralists see the need to change their lives, 
widen their social networks, adopt new technologies and embrace new ways of mak-
ing money to improve their welfare. A saying that comes up often when I talk to the 
pastoralists in this category is “gaŋon anaɗo e hoy ɓuyri mo anaka” which means that 
a known enemy is easier to face than an unknown enemy whose ways are unpredict-
able. The speech of El Hadj Djodi shows the main logic of dariɓe gite pastoralists:
The problem is not in Gogounou only. It is the same thing everywhere. I will 
not leave here. This is where we will die. My children used to move with the 
herds, but there is nothing different in other regions. Where I am born and I 
have been for over fifty years, I am still alien. The Bariba farmers always want 
to take over our land at every turn. They always claim that here is their land. 
I do not think that I can get land where I will be completely a newcomer. (El 
Hadj Djodi, Pariki village, 12/03/14)
Djodi’s main point is that the difficulties of access to pastoral resources are not specif-
ic to Gogounou District. In all agricultural areas of Benin and its neighboring coun-
tries, the situation is the same. If some regions have not yet been fully occupied, it is 
simply because locally practiced modern agriculture has not yet reached those areas. 
But once these areas have extensive access to new agricultural technologies,168 sooner 
or later, livestock production will suffer in the same way. It is simply a matter of time. 
Therefore, it is better not to lose the small amount of land one currently has, even 
if it is not sufficient, than to have little, if any, access to land outside of Gogounou. 
I also met this kind of logic in Fana-Peulh village, where Fulani pastoralists actually 
identify themselves with their local settings – sharing a feeling of belonging:
168 He was referring mainly to tractors and herbicides used in farming.
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Where you are born is the place that belongs to you, and where you belong 
to. Even if we go somewhere else, we will be identified as recently settled 
foreigners and we will have no right of access to the land. And, in this case, 
if we come back, our old site will already be occupied and we will not have 
anywhere to stay. From here to Togo, we stayed in a different area to explore 
the possibilities to live there, but at the end we returned to Gogounou because 
there is no possibility for easy access to resources. The situation is the same ev-
erywhere. We do not want to leave here. (Focus group discussion, Fana-Peulh 
village, 13/03/14)
From the group discussion reported above, Fulani pastoralists of Fana-Peulh village 
demonstrate a sense of belonging that supports their choice to remain in Gogounou. 
Their ancestors came to Gogounou long ago. Their parents were also buried in 
Gogounou. Therefore, they consider that they belong to Gogounou, as Gogounou 
also belongs to them. Leaving Gogounou one day also means losing this “citizenship” 
or, more specifically, this “localness” and therefore becoming a foreigner. And this 
new “strangerhood” might be worse than the one they currently experience. This is 
what Orodji has also tried to clarify during an interview at Gbessa Fulani camp:
[…] Being an old stranger here is better than being a new stranger elsewhere. 
This pump and the school over there are the proof that we will never leave here 
again. Leaving is no more our goal. We will die and be buried here. When you 
go elsewhere you will encounter more problems than here. (Orodji Saïdou, 
Gbessa camp, 25/06/14)
Orodji prefers being an “old stranger” to being a “new stranger”.169 He considers that 
leaving Gogounou permanently might be seen as losing his citizenship and his true 
local identity. It is like having no rights and being subjected to all forms of contempt. 
Staying in Gogounou gives him the possibility to claim his citizenship, even if it is 
difficult. This is important for gaining access to different infrastructure (borehole and 
school) that will definitely play a decisive role in the future of their community.
From all these narrative accounts, it appears that the threats that undermine 
pastoralism are understood as not specific to Gogounou. Those who have this un-
derstanding of the situation, choose to completely settle down there. Their option 
of settlement is guided by the logic of “birth place”. Even if they are still marginal-
ized and do not have access to land and pastoral resources, they defend that an “old 
strangerhood” is preferable to a “new strangerhood”. Therefore, it is better for them 
169 Guichard (2000: 119) talked about a status of “étranger de l’intérieur” (inside foreigner) that the 
Bariba granted to the Fulani in order to stifle any attempts to become equals, and to maintain their 
domination over them. When Fulani herders in Gogounou talk about a status of “old stranger” vs. 
“new stranger”, one can see therein a resignation. They prefer to cope with the dominion of Bariba, 
with whom they have co-inhabited for decades, rather than putting themselves under the yoke of new 
and unknown masters by moving abroad into totally new contexts.
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to create their own conditions for living, and keep livestock as much as possible. Hav-
ing a borehole surely facilitates access to water (cf. Photo 7.4), as much as a school 
improves access to education. All of these factors are expected to have an impact on 
future livelihood trajectories, as I will show through their different strategies.
Range of adaptive strategies among dariɓe gite Fulani pastoralists
The dariɓe gite households are permanently settled in Gogounou. Livestock owner-
ship remains a reality for many of them, although animal farming is no longer the 
sole source of income. However, there are some who do not own livestock, and owe 
their pastoral identity to their activism within Fulani associations and their arrange-
ments with several alternative forms of subsistence, which may or may not be related 
to livestock rearing. One of the main characteristics of those who still have cattle is 
that the transhumance movements are no longer carried out as far as before, and are 
often oriented towards forest reserves for which they pay to graze. The herd goes for 
the great transhumance ceeɗoɗi (sing. ceeɗol ) after harvest and after feeding on crop 
residues, but returns at the resumption of the rainy season. The animals are directed 
afterwards to the small transhumance dummoɗi (sing. dummol ), after crops have 
been sown, in order to stay away from cultivated areas. Several innovations have 
increasingly been adopted by this group of herders. 
Photo 7.4: A borehole in a Fulani camp in Gogounou
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Crop residues, ox carts and manure contracts
Crop residues can be collected by the herders from their own fields. They can also 
be gleaned elsewhere from the farmers’ crop areas and transported to the camp to 
be stored. The residues are made of cereal straw (millet, sorghum, maize), and dry 
leaves of leguminous plants (groundnut, bean and cowpea). The fodder reserves play 
an increasingly important role in herd management: 
Nowadays, it is very difficult to access grasslands to feed the animals. There-
fore, it is very important to gather and conserve crop residues. This helps a 
bit to feed animals for a while. (Focus group discussion, Fana-Peulh village, 
21/03/14)
These settled pastoralists are also open to try hay and straw conservation technolo-
gies to cover part of the feeding needs of their herds. Fulani associations promote 
these innovations. A group of 276 pastoralists and agro-pastoralists was formed in 
2013 by UDOPER B/A, with support from Swiss and Dutch development agencies, 
to work on forage cultivation and conservation, and shed design. The beneficiaries 
of this training were from Borgou and Alibori Provinces. At least 24 herders in the 
group were from Gogounou (Boukari Bata, 2013: 39). Ox carts are used to gather 
and transport straw (Photo 7.5). Most settled pastoralists have great enthusiasm to 
own ox carts that increasingly play an important role in gaining access to harvest 
residues. Straw is collected on the farms of herders or farmer’s fields within a mean 
radius of 15 km, and rarely beyond 25 km. This dynamic was also observed in the 
Senegalese Ferlo, where the donkey cart was a major labor-saving technology in man-
aging transhumance by Fuutankoɓe herders. Those pastoralists use donkey carts to 
transport poultry, luggage, water, newborn lambs, sick animals and industrial feed 
concentrates in a context of great mobility (Juul, 2005a: 117). The emergence of this 
technology is still new among Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou, and the coming years 
might offer more innovative forms by way of using bullock carts. 
Manure contracts allow some pastoralists to access crop residues from the fields 
of farmers, while providing the latter with cow dung that improves soil fertility with 
positive effects on crop productivity. This kind of contract is an ancient practice, 
but would have disappeared in some areas due to the crisis of confidence between 
actors. However, Fulani pastoralists who still have a good relationship with some 
Bariba farmers continue to take advantage of such manure contracts. Fulani herders 
offer in exchange different gifts in kind such as chickens, guinea fowl, poultry eggs 
or cow milk, if possible. In other areas, Fulani women and youths offer labor power 
by helping farmers harvest their crops. I have personally witnessed such manure 
contracts during my fieldwork in some regions including Boro, Lougou and Wara. 
But the relationships between actors seem more tense in regions like Gounarou, 
Fanan-Peulh and Zougou-Pantrossi, where most farmers burn their fields after har-
vest. This practice has developed since farmers perceive that some herbicides they 
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use have fertilizing functions and therefore they no longer think they need manure 
from the Fulani livestock. This gravely affects the neighborly relationships between 
herders and farmers, leading to clashes but, in some cases, Fulani leaders can settle 
the disputes through agreements from both sides:
There was a farmer who had cultivated ten hectares of maize, but having fin-
ished harvesting, he prevented the herders from grazing their animals there. 
He set the residues on fire and it all burnt to ashes. This same farmer later 
asked the Fulani to keep their animals in his field, but the herders refused. 
He went to buy salt, which he distributed to the Fulani, but they still refused 
to tether their animals in his field. Someone cannot burn his crop residues 
and offer us salt in order to enjoy the dung of our animals. When we were 
informed about the situation, we Fulani leaders of Fana told him to make the 
commitment first to leave from now onwards his crop residues after harvest to 
us the Fulani – herders do not need his salt. It is on this basis that the Fulani 
could now tether their animals in his field. (Focus group discussion, Fana-
Peulh village, 21/03/14)
The practice of selling crop residues has also developed. Farmers with sufficient resi-
dues from their farms select and store the necessary part to cover the needs of their 
own draft animals or small stock, and then auction off the remaining residues left on 
the fields. Under these conditions, access is given to the herders who offer the highest 
bids. One hectare of maize straw costs on average 5,000 CFA francs, but this amount 
can double when conditions are harsher. Fulani pastoralists who pay for crop residues 
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graze their herds directly on the field. They can also collect the residues, which are 
then kept in the camp to maintain the dairy cows and other selected animals during 
the dry season. Some pastoralists who enter into such straw purchase contracts with 
many farmers use ox carts to transport the straw to their camp for conservation and 
usage. The straw stack (Photo 7.6) is locally known as danki fuɗɗo (fodder shelf ) or 
danki nyadu na’i (cattle feed shelf ). Those who are literate or well versed in the pas-
toralist association apparatus use the term “mirador”, borrowed from the livestock 
specialists who use this term when training them.
The manure contract can sometimes be collectively negotiated. I have observed 
this practice specifically in Lougou village where herds of over 20 Fulani pastoral-
ists across Wara region come every year to stay in a wide field belonging to a Bariba 
farmer, in order to have easier access to the nearby “Alibori-Supérieur” forest and to 
provide manure. This seasonal settlement, called kaɓorɗe171, that replaced the great 
171 The concept of kaɓorɗe (sing. haɓorde) is used to designate one or more herds as appropriate for 
the temporary meeting site of Fulani herds from the same region, usually installed near the local 
forest reserves. It is from this place that the herders, who have fulfilled the conditions imposed by the 
forestry laws, have access to the forests where they legally graze throughout the dry season. This is a 
very strategic place for Fulani pastoralists since they are banned from camping within the forest. How-
ever, as I will show later, several herders illegally install their kaɓorɗe deeper within the forest. And to 
outwit the vigilance of those who could understand the meaning of the word, a coded language was 
developed among Fulani pastoralists in which they use the word takkore (sing. takkiɗo) to call their 
kaɓorɗe that is in the forest. The word takkore literally refers to something/somebody who/which is 
in the vicinity of something (water reservoir, forest reserve, or anything else) or in the neighborhood 
of somebody. But kaɓorɗe and takkore are sometimes used interchangeably to deliver a coded message 
concerning the Fulani herders who have illegally gotten in or have settled in the classified forests; or 
anything contrary to the forestry laws. The herds camping near the forest are called kaɓorɗe takkore 
fore.
Photo 7.6: A straw stack in Bagou village
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annual transhumance to other areas, has no contractual commitment for the con-
cerned farmer. Rather, it allows pastoralists to overcome the dryness while grazing 
in the forest for which they have paid some annual user fees. However, this farmer 
supports his guests by offering them a few bags of salt for their animals, to preserve 
friendship and have their willingness to come back to his land the next year. This is to 
prevent them from being diverted by other farmers who can afford to be more gener-
ous. Negotiations with the farmer and the resolution of problems in the kaɓorɗe are 
made by a senior pastoralist who is the garso172 and remains in contact with his junior 
pastoralists through a collectively chosen camp leader. Mobile telephony is the main 
technology that allows connections between the different actors involved in this kind 
of mobilization and collective forest grazing arrangement:
We accepted to come and tether our animals here on this land. This field 
belongs to a Bariba farmer who asked us to come here every year to stay in 
his field. The manure from our animals helps him to improve his agricultural 
yield. As foresters prohibited us from settling in the forest, we stay here and 
it is closer to the forest. We go inside to graze animals and in the evening we 
come back here. That is kaɓorɗe. When the rainy season begins, we used to 
have a party to say goodbye to each other. The garso of Wara region is our 
leader who negotiates and arranges everything for us here. We keep in touch 
with him using mobile phones. When a problem arises, he is automatically 
informed, and comes to help us. (Focus group discussion, Lougou village, 
06/05/14)
This kind of organization also allows pastoralists who have not emigrated from 
Gogounou, to respond more efficiently to the needs of their herds. I have also met 
similar organizations of modest sizes in Diadia area (Seba, Illagi and Fuka sites) 
always around the classified forest of “Alibori-Supérieur”; and in Zougou-Pantrossi 
area (Berle, Dougoulaye and Zougou-Pantrossi sites) around the classified forest of 
“Trois-Rivières”.
Willingness to pay and graze in classified forests
There is increasing consent among Fulani herders who have not emigrated to pay a 
user charge to graze their animals in the classified forests of Gogounou District. As I 
have mentioned in the previous section, almost all transhumance movements are or-
ganized around or inside these forest reserves. The pastoralists take advantage of the 
provisions of the participatory management plans of these forests (MEPN, 2010a; 
2010b), which have planned uses for different local socio-professional groups that 
can access land and plant resources under defined conditions. The five conditions to 
172 The garso (plur. garsooɓe) is the head of transhumance mobility among Fulani pastoralists in a 
given region.
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be fulfilled for grazing livestock in the forests are summarized below (Table 7.1). The 
grazing fees amount yearly to 200 CFA francs per head of cattle and 100 CFA francs 
per head of small stock. However, the implementation of these rules often leaves 
room for clientage relationships that pastoralists must feed or confront.
The access strategies of pastoralists to the forests are not homogenous; they are 
multifaceted. Individual access is often accompanied by various negotiations, the 
results of which depend on the social network and the bargaining power of each 
herder. Collective arrangements are sometimes concluded with foresters and local 
forest managing committee members. This is the case, for example, with the Fulani 
herders in Wara region. Their leaders usually arrange a yearly payment of 20,000 
CFA francs per herd regardless of the number of animals. This enables them to graze 
in “Alibori-Supérieur” forest. Sometimes, many Fulani pastoralists can combine their 
herds to take advantage of these fixed payments: 
It is in the forest that we graze our animals. It is here that there is still some 
fodder during drought periods. We pay 20,000 CFA francs per herd annually. 
This is an amount negotiated by our leaders. If it was not the case, we have 
Table 7.1: Terms to graze livestock in the classified forests of Gogounou
Steps Check-in activities
Presentation The herder must present himself to the members of the village committee 
of forest management to obtain a grazing permit.
Registration The herder must be registered on arrival or at the entrance of the forest 
with the local forest managing structure.
Census The herder must let his herd be identified (herd size).
Payment The herder must pay the grazing fees.
Verification The herder should have vaccinated his animals against common dis- –
eases and should rigorously update the vaccination certificates.
The herder must be at least eighteen years old. –
The herder must hold his grazing permit. –
The herder must hold his receipt of payment. –
Caution The herder must participate in the maintenance of pastoral infrastruc- –
ture within the forest.
The herder must avoid cutting some species  – (Khaya senegalensis, Afzelia 
Africana and Pterocarpus erinaceus).
Source: Adapted from MEPN, 2010a: 57ff. and MEPN, 2010b: 64f.
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to pay 200 CFA francs per head of cattle per year. This arrangement does not 
depend on the size of the herd. Every cattle owner must pay this amount of 
money before getting into the forest. But when the herd of someone is smaller, 
we get together to pay the amount. The foresters also are not as severe as be-
fore. They were very hard on us because of the tree fodder that was abundant 
in the forest. But the woodcutters have finished them [tree fodder] with the 
tree-cutting machine. Also all the forest is full of crop fields due to the use of 
herbicides. As there are no more attractive resources in the forest for pastoral-
ists, the foresters also became so kind, and negotiating with them is easier than 
before. (Focus group discussion, Lougou village, 06/05/14)
Some herders, who formally access the forests, reduce sometimes the size of their 
herds in order to register smaller herds. Once the process is completed and the grazing 
permit obtained, they add afterwards the rest of the herd and graze the larger herd in 
the forest. This is the case of a pastoralist in Berle camp, who has an invoice for sixty 
head of cattle, which covers his entire herd of more than one hundred (Photo 7.7). 
With mobile phone calls to their counterparts or household members, the pastoral-
ists get regularly informed of the foresters’ patrols. This helps them change position 
by getting deeper into the forest or quickly getting out altogether when they are not 
Photo 7.7: Receipt for sixty head of cattle in Berle Fulani camp
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entirely in accordance with the forestry law. The illegal invasions of pastoralists into 
the forests are also profitable logoligi173 for forest officers and their local assistants.
Grass cultivation and fodder-tree planting
The forage crops introduced by pastoralist associations are increasingly being ad-
opted by Fulani herders who do not plan to leave Gogounou. They are encouraged 
to utilize 0.25 hectare of their owned land to grow fodder crops. Different training 
and awareness-raising sessions are organized for the associations’ members. Seedlings 
are also provided free of charge to them.
The main grass and legume species promoted are: Panicum maximum C1, An-
dropogon gayanus, Leucaena leucocephala, Aeschynomene histrix, Mucuna pruriens and 
Sorghum forage. The two most promoted fodder trees are Afzelia africana and Khaya 
senegalensis. There is a growing adoption of forage crops in order to maintain at least 
some dairy cows to supply milk to the household during the dry season. According 
to the agricultural extension service of Gogounou, about 25 Fulani pastoralists culti-
vate about ten hectares of Panicum maximum C1 and four hectares of Afzelia africana 
throughout the district. There are also few plots of Andropogon gayanus, Mucuna 
pruriens and others, which are not officially registered. The UDOPER B/A reported 
that 57 hectares of fodder fields were installed in 2013 by 117 agro-pastoralists in 
Borgou and Alibori Provinces (Boukari Bata, 2013: 20).
Despite the willingness of pastoralists to grow forage species, several constraints 
limit their adoption. The land constraint however remains the main factor as re-
vealed by the pastoralists: 
We made 0.5 ha last year. But this year we have reduced it to 0.25 ha be cause 
we do not have enough land for food millet. This forage can feed three head 
of cattle from November to February. But from March we must use some fod-
der trees. It also becomes necessary to move for transhumance. (Alou, Pariki 
village, 12/03/14)
We are ready to grow the herbs that are being distributed by UDOPER.  
But we have no land. If we take the small plots we have to cultivate herbs  
for cattle, where can we grow food crops to feed ourselves and our families?  
If the animals eat, we must also eat. (Focus group discussion, Fana-Peulh vil-
lage, 21/03/14)
173 This is a coded language used by the forest people (forest officers, trackers/guides) to refer to 
“business”. This can be understood as a “mafia”, or opportunity to extort a lot of money from Fulani 
offenders. These are profit-making opportunities where various interpretations are made of forest 
laws. A tracker of “Trois-Rivières” forest told me during an interview in Zougou-Pantrossi that the 
monitoring of forests is interesting and exciting if there is so much logoligi. When there is no logoligi, 
his work is quite unattractive. In order to make forest monitoring a worthwhile business, forest work-
ers used traditional methods called Yoomani involving magical powders and formulas, which caused 
Fulani herders to enter illegally into the local forest.
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The growing adoption of forage species is seen as competing with food crops on the 
small plots to which Fulani herders generally have access. The seasonality of fod-
der sorghum and fodder bean is seen as burdensome by the herders. Further, the 
technical management of Aeschynomene histrix is perceived by the pastoralists as very 
complex. Therefore, Panicum maximum C1 (Photo 7.8) is the most popular forage 
adopted by pastoralists due its easier cultivation and its adaptation to local ecological 
conditions (Boukari Bata, 2011: 10). 
Introduction of new species into livestock feed
Many plant species formerly useless for animals are being gradually introduced into 
their daily diet. Some species that are more readily available on the poorer rangelands 
are also routinely chosen by the animals themselves. But others were tested by herd-
ers who successfully trained their herds over a period of time to feed on these plants. 
One of my informants in Borodarou village explained how he made such an experi-
ment with his cattle:
As there was plenty of grass, the animals chose which of the feed types to 
consume. As grass and plants are lacking now, they have no choice. They are 
ready for anything. Sometimes I am surprised myself to see my animals eating 
Photo 7.8: Seedlings of Panicum maximum C1 supplied by UDOPER B/A
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some grasses that I had never seen them eat before. Nowadays, the animals 
eat everything they find. [...] But we ourselves have also trained them to have 
some leaves, especially from the tree – such as mango leaves, shea leaves, and 
so on. My cattle even eat neem tree leaves and seeds; it was not so in the past. 
(Belki Abou, Borodarou, 07/04/14)
Belki showed that the scarcity of resources led the animals instinctively to consume 
some species that they were not used to. The herders have just taken advantage of 
this to offer to them other fodder trees which they could not directly access them-
selves. The new herbs are willingly consumed by the animals themselves, while the 
newly-introduced fodder trees are from the initiatives of some pastoralists. Not all 
of the new species have had positive effects, even if the herds continue to feed on 
them. This is the case of luɓuŋan (Hyptis suaveolens), which is an invasive species 
that has recently spread across the rangelands in Alibori Province. Its use by animals 
is suspected to be the cause of some negative impacts such as the discoloration of 
their coats. In addition, the milk produced is viscous, lacks its true white color and 
becomes unfit for conservation and trading. A short list of new and old forage species 
used by pastoralists in Gogounou is provided in Appendix 2 of this document.
Adoption of industrial concentrates and mineral supplements 
The use of different industrial feed concentrates, vitamins and minerals for better 
maintenance of herds in Gogounou District is an initiative promoted mainly by 
pastoralist associations. With support from development agencies, a veterinary phar-
macy and an input store were built in Gogounou. The pastoralists are seasonally sup-
plied with different agro-industrial byproducts and veterinary inputs. For example, 
in 2011, 275 40-kg bags of cottonseed cake with a total value of 1.309 million CFA 
francs were supplied in Gogounou, but, by the end of the year, only 60 bags were 
bought by the herders for 0.359 million CFA francs (Boukari Bata, 2011: 8). Despite 
the still limited demand from pastoralists for such products, awareness campaigns are 
being undertaken to increase their interest; and this is bringing some very impressive 
results. For example, in 2013, eight agro-pastoralists from Gogounou made a request 
to UDOPER B/A for 24 bags of cottonseed cake and 390 multi-nutritional mineral 
blocks to feed about 26 head of cattle (Boukari Bata, 2013: 43f.). 
The production of minerals is the most preferred option of Fulani associations 
for maintaining the cattle herds on site. Fulani females were trained in using lo-
cal materials to manufacture animal mineral supplements, especially the lick-blocks 
made of bones, salt and cement. Twenty-eight Fulani females were trained in 2011 
in Gogounou for this purpose. One hundred lick-blocks of five kilograms each were 
produced. These were sold to pastoralists at 2,000 CFA francs per unit, a price far 
better than the imported ones that cost 2,350 CFA francs per 2-kg block (Boukari 
Bata, 2011: 13). Regular sensitization programs were also undertaken to convince 
herders to use such mineral products in their livestock production systems. However, 
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these products were not fully adopted due to the reluctance of herders, strengthened 
by stories of some dangers faced by earlier users. In fact, some animals received some 
injuries on their tongues after using the locally produced lick-blocks. Some of these 
animals have had their tongues cut off due to the abnormally high concentration of 
cement used in the design. The victims of this problem started to campaign against 
the products from UDOPER B/A, doubting their quality. Awareness campaigns 
were quickly undertaken to rebuild the confidence of pastoralists, but so far without 
success. More recently, Fulani women were trained to manufacture multi-nutritional 
blocks (with urea, salt, bran, bone, straw, etc.). These products are being integrated 
into the extension plan to convince herders to use them.
Mobile telephony among settled Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou
The mobile phone plays an important role in the management of the herd. It is used 
for handling issues related to pasture, veterinary care and market access. In trans-
humance, pastoralists use the cell phones to inform the camp of their movements 
and their difficulties. They often call their veterinarians for animal care. The herders 
often call their butchers to sell sick or dead animals. They also use mobile phones to 
learn about livestock prices in different local and regional markets. Some also have 
contacts with cattle dealers to whom they sell animals before the market day in case 
of necessity. When there is no suitable network coverage, specific network recep-
tion spots (Molony, 2009: 100), such as tall trees, termite-hills and areas of high 
Photo 7.9: Contact-saving strategy by some Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou
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altitudes174 are identified and accessed in order to receive better coverage and make 
occasional calls. It is not uncommon to also see some herders who have several SIM 
cards from different GSM network operators. They regularly change them when 
they find themselves in areas where there is no network coverage from one of the 
operators or the other. Some of the benefits of mobile phones were shared by my 
interviewees during a group discussion in Garikoro camp: 
Nowadays, mobile phones have given us a rest because, in the past, we were 
forced to move before talking to our children who are also on the move with 
our animals. Now, everything has changed. With the arrival of mobile phones, 
we can stay home and be aware of what is happening with the animals in 
the bush. [...] Even if at some point in the deep bush they do not have the 
network, as soon as they find the network, they call us. [...] With the motor-
bikes, everything has become easier. Even if our children are in transhumance 
far away, we can visit them easily. We even use our motorbikes to move the 
equipment and materials that we use during the transhumance. (Focus group 
discussion, Garikoro village, 20/03/14)
When looking closely at technology appropriation, various lessons emerge from my 
ethnography of telephone usage by Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou. The first aspect 
concerns the registration of contacts. The main strategy used locally to save the con-
tacts is based on using a homogeneous combination of figures or letters (Photo 7.9). 
With these combinations, the herder has the ability to record 10x26 series of figures 
and 10x9 series of letters, making a total of 350 phone contacts. They also have the 
ability to assign specific figures, symbols or letters to different members of their social 
network. The close relatives may be A, B for distant relatives, C for friends, D for 
butchers, E for veterinarians, F for Fulani association leaders, G for cattle traders, 
etc. This strategy allows Fulani herders to classify the most important useful contacts 
for themselves and their animals. They could also classify the farmers and the forest-
ers according to the friendly or hostile relations between them. The phone numbers 
of the “good” farmers with whom they have the opportunity to establish manure 
contracts can be designated as number 1, while the “bad” farmers, who are consid-
ered as enemies, can be number 2. Each number or letter in the cell is indicative of 
the relationship that binds the herder and his herd with the owners of those contacts. 
Thus, the mobile phone makes out of Fulani pastoralists real social planners.
The phone learning process underway in Gogounou also provides new trajec-
tories on how endogenous communities appropriate various communication tech-
nologies. The enthusiasm of Fulani pastoralists for using mobile phones is supported 
in some regions by the efforts of some young educated Fulani who offer learning 
services. Certain devices, which are relatively easy to use, such as Nokia C1 (Photo 
174 This actively sought physical network reception is what some authors call opportunistic network 
(Molony, 2009: 100; Kibora, 2009: 119).
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7.10) and the like, are used for capacity building for illiterate Fulani people. The 
learning process often takes two weeks to three months to know the basic functions 
necessary for making and receiving calls. This all depends on the degree of assimila-
tion of the learners. The Nokia C1 is divided into two different parts: the first sec-
tion called Buto wodi alfani in Fulfulde language means all the function keys; and 
the second section Buto konto rogel includes all the alphanumeric keys. The young 
educated Fulani like Sanda and Arouna in Fana-Peulh village offer adult training 
courses, with a special training curriculum designed to meet the lower technological 
profile of Fulani pastoralists (Table 7.3).
The division of the keypad of the Nokia C1 phone, according to the functions of 
its buttons, aims to help illiterate people to rapidly and easily learn the basic elements 
for manipulating the technology. Young educated Fulani can devote five minutes to 
two hours per day for this work, which also brings them huge benefits. All locations 
are good for them to offer this service without requiring special conditions (cf. Photo 
7.11). Dependency relationships may also arise between the trainers, who benefit in 
cash and kind (money, chicken, eggs, milk, wagashi cheese, and invitations to vari-
ous ceremonies) from their trainees. People who have learnt how to use the mobile 
phone periodically offer to their instructors, small gifts to preserve social ties in order 
to call on their competence at any time for learning new aspects or refreshing their 
memory in the cases where they forget. I was eyewitness to how a pastoralist from 
Dougoulaye village offered a chicken to Sanda Aboubakar, having been satisfied with 
the way the young Fulani taught him to handle his mobile phone that now gives 
him huge advantages. Sanda enjoys the great appreciation shown by the beneficia-
ries of his mobile phone teaching services. He takes advantage of this to increase 
his popularity within the electorate, as he was planning to run in the next local and 
Photo 7.10: 
Nokia C1 mobile phone
Section 1
Section 2
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Table 7.3: Training curriculum for illiterate pastoralists on mobile phone use
Keypad Functions
Button Position Identification Signification
Buto dowroa The upper left 
button.
Gatowa e kutowo This is the button that can re-
cord and delete something on 
the screen. It must be tapped 
with care in order not to ac-
cidentally delete important 
things or save unnecessary 
things.
Buto becea The upper right 
button (taught as 
the similar button 
on right side and 
opposite to the 
first one)
Buto becea e waw 
aco witi noi tagaaɗo 
e to woo no, ma or 
wama co ɗedi batu 
tagaaɗo
This is the button that allows 
reaching unknown functions. 
When pressed a second time, 
it brings back to the starting 
point. It is also a button to 
turn the device on loudspeak-
er when calls are in progress.
Buto bogoel The green button Buto bogoel can 
nu wolita nodol 
numoroji
It allows calling the contacts.
Buto boɗel The red button Can nu warata e 
umiina hite potabu
It will turn off or turn on the 
phone.
Buto leroel The button which 
is down
Can nu holata 
numoroji
It allows verifying the num-
bers of contact persons.
Buto dowuroel The button is 
above
Can nu yarata nu-
moroji dowu ma bo 
can nu hulata tosu
It allows caller to go directly 
to the contact numbers, to 
check the numbers before 
and those after. It also helps in 
lighting the torch.
Buto nanowel The left button – It is taught to the advanced 
learners.
Buto yamowel The right button – It is taught to the advanced 
learners.
Buto caka e  
buto manga
The central but-
ton or the largest 
button
– Direction button to go up, 
down, left or right.
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municipal elections in his region (Zougou-Pantrossi). Like Sanda, Arouna also gains 
huge benefits from teaching mobile phone usage to adult Fulani pastoralists within 
Fana-Peulh. The youth, in his fourth year of secondary school, earns from 100 up 
to 1,500 CFA francs per day in teaching mobile phone use to illiterate people. This 
money helps him a great deal in covering some school and personal expenses. He 
has even recently paid for a heifer that is kept in his father’s herd. Thus, the mobile 
phone increases the socio-political commitment and the business acumen of young 
Fulani. Their parents also enjoy its usefulness through easier access to resources and 
the market.
The enthusiasm of pastoralists to proficiently use mobile phones is also seen 
as having a positive impact on the literacy rate in different regions of Gogounou. 
The trend is even stronger within those villages where the youth are committed to 
training Fulani adults. The herders who wish to have more knowledge about phone 
technology massively enroll in local literacy programs where they are given the op-
portunity to learn both French and Fulfulde languages. Many Fulani pastoralists of 
Fana-Peulh village registered for literacy courses in order to increase their knowledge 
of handling mobile phones. They even collectively sought out and struggled for a lo-
cal literacy center that was successfully granted by a local NGO promoting Fulfulde 
and French literacy, with the support of Fulani association leaders. This positive 
influence of mobile phone appropriation on literacy rates was also observed among 
some pastoralists of Mali, who have developed a particular enthusiasm for writing in 
French and Arabic languages (Keita, 2015: 95f.).175 
Some Fulfulde songs, which were inaccessible to herders in the past, are now 
available at lower prices. The pastoralists often buy digital MP3 or MP4 versions 
from 150 to 1,000 CFA francs, and they play these when grazing in the bush or 
during other everyday routines. Music not only break the monotony and, therefore, 
loneliness of herding, but also helps youth to stay inspired by Fulani traditions, the 
authenticity of which is confirmed by the various songs and music styles they listen 
to. Thus, mobile phones are seen as contributing to the promotion of Fulani cultural 
values and to the reconnecting of acculturated Fulani to their traditions, while reliev-
ing young Fulani herders from the bulky radio sets that they used to carry around 
in the past. Cell phones also have other important uses in the daily life of Fulani 
pastoralists in Gogounou. Their clocks, alarms and timers are variously used during 
grazing, watering and marketing times, etc. Their calculators are also involved in 
accounting or making small calculations by the more educated people, which are 
typically those involved in French literacy programs. Another quite fascinating use 
of mobile phones is the way in which some herders with multi-media phones take 
pictures or short videos of sick animals with their different symptoms in order to re-
175 The link between mobile phone culture and forms of literacy (alphabet learning, text messaging, 
nicknaming practice, codification and abbreviation) was also established by Brinkman et al. (2009: 
84) in their study in Khartoum (Sudan). Kibora (2009: 120) also reported that the presence of literate 
adults in the villages of Burkina Faso has promoted the use of Short Message Services (SMS).
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ceive some tips from their peers during the livestock market days, or from their vets, 
for diagnosis and care. The full potential of multimedia phone appropriation among 
Fulani pastoralists has not yet been revealed.176 
The adoption of mobile phones by pastoralists has also developed the entrepre-
neurship of Fulani youth. Abou, formerly a Fulfulde literacy teacher in Sori Region, 
has taken advantage of the local demand of mobile phone services to develop his own 
small-scale business. His kiosk is strategically located in front of the livestock mar-
ket of Sori village, which is the largest livestock market in Gogounou District. This 
enables him to do good business every week through the various services he offers to 
Fulani pastoralists. The main service provided by the young Fulani entrepreneur is 
the charging of batteries with a small power generator. Phone accessories and small 
repairs are also available to the customers (cf. Photo 7.12). The profits from this busi-
ness are often directed towards supporting his family members, building up a cattle 
herd and making various small-scale investments.
This is also the case of Amadou, a young Fulani pastoralist living in Diadia vil-
lage, who has originally trained in veterinary services. He offers to Fulani herders 
176 I fully agree with Keita (2015: 95) who postulated against the diffusionist anthropological model 
that underestimates the creativity of social actors and argued that the “technological culture cannot be 
limited to a functional model, but requires a functioning, compatible with constraints being regional, 
political, economic, geographic, cultural, etc.” (ibid: 96).
Photo 7.11: Arouna training two Fulani pastoralists in Fana-Peulh village
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various services – recharging of batteries, sale of SIM-cards and prepaid-cards of vari-
ous GSM operators, and the promotion of a video club – which provides him with 
significant income, strengthening his pastoral livelihood. This economy of resource-
fulness induced by the advent of information and communication technologies and 
which requires no prior training, is also visible in many other villages and camps in 
Gogounou where it gives young Fulani the opportunity to make money and improve 
their living conditions in a totally uncertain pastoral environment. Fulani pastoral-
ists in their adaptation strategies take advantage of the “smart informal economy” 
falling under the imagination and the creative genius of social actors who design 
small jobs or invent various trades (Touré, 1985: 290; Chéneau-Loquay, 2004: 355; 
De Bruijn et al. 2009: 18; Keita, 2015: 96f.).
Transport technologies and livestock management
The transport technologies increasingly play an important role in the pastoral econ-
omy in Gogounou. A variety of vehicles with two or three wheels (Photo 7.13 and 
Photo 7.14) are used by herders to access resources located deep within local forests, 
or in various regions where they try to prospect grazing opportunities. They also 
Photo 7.12: Mobile phone kiosk of Abou, a young Fulani in Sori village
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facilitate market access and strengthen in several ways the economy of Fulani house-
holds. 
In Ilaagi, a site located deeper within “Alibori-Supérieur” forest, about 25 km 
from Diadia village, several pastoral households seasonally install makeshift shel-
ters (Photo 7.15), where they spend the dry season peacefully grazing their animals 
before returning to their affiliated camps at the beginning of the rainy season. Part 
of the household is relocated to the forest where there is access to resources. Even 
though these resources are no longer as abundant as before, it is still better than 
outside the forest. During this stay in the deeper parts of the forest, where access to 
resources improves, substantial animal growth benefits are recorded as well as signifi-
cant improvements in milk production. The processing equipment transported into 
the forest by Fulani males with motorbikes (Photo 7.13) allow women to convert 
the abundant milk into wagashi cheese, which is regularly taken to Diadia market to 
be sold at a more expensive price and to take advantage of the flourishing demand 
177 The Fulani pastoralists are very well known for these kinds of Chinese motorbikes and are particu-
larly fond of them because of their length, which facilitates the transport of many and heavy loads. 
In northern Benin there is even a stereotype that equates anyone with this model of motorbike to a 
Fulani.
Photo 7.13: A Fulani pastoralist carrying back milk-processing materials from “Alibori-Su-
périeur” forest177
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Photo 7.15: Seasonal shelter of transhumant pastoralists within “Alibori-Supérieur” forest
Photo 7.14: Tricycles awaiting loading at the livestock market of Petit-Paris in Gogounou
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during the dry season. At the end of the dry season, Fulani herders are happy with 
their herd being totally overweight, as are the women, who also make huge profits 
that contribute to the wellbeing of their households. During my visit to Ilaagi, where 
I observed both cattle grazing and cheese processing within the forest, pastoralists 
claimed that four months in the forest are better than two years outside. This justi-
fies, once again, why paying for grazing permits in the classified forest was agreed on 
by many Fulani pastoralists: once they get in, they can take advantage of their graz-
ing permits by exceeding the boundaries established by the forest laws. 
Similar practices were also observed in Dougoulaye village, where pastoralists 
travel deeper into the “Trois-Rivières” forest, to spend their transhumance time and 
to develop their pastoral economy. The Fulani have also recently collaborated with 
Boko farmers of Dougoulaye village to build, at their own expense, a large wooden 
bridge to facilitate the transport of animals and various commodities by motorbike 
to various local markets in Gogounou. Since this village is isolated by a large river, 
which causes seasonal drowning of people and goods, and prevents market access, 
the motorbikes, manufactured in China and abundantly acquired by Fulani pastoral-
ists, have become essential in this forest-dependent pastoral economy. In addition, 
without being owners, Fulani pastoralists often seek tricycle services for delivering 
animals to the marketplaces (Photo 7.14), and for the transport of water and fodder 
to their camps. The same means are also used for transhumance movements within a 
50-km radius, especially when there is a need to move sick or injured animals, cook-
ing items, milk-processing equipment, household members, etc. 
Willingness to use and pay for modern livestock health care
The pastoralism in Gogounou District has been characterized by a greater use of vet-
erinary care during the recent decade. Apart from the mandatory annual vaccination 
campaigns proposed by the Ministry of Livestock for certain diseases (Pasteurellosis, 
Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia, etc.), Fulani herders benefit daily from the 
services offered by various veterinary specialists, paravets and barefoot vets (piqueurs 
sauvages). Since the livestock health sector is liberalized, it is mainly the private ac-
tors who control the basic services to the pastoralists. The local private operators 
outnumber those working in the local public livestock production office. The failure 
of control in the veterinary sector subjects the pastoralists to serious problems related 
to the quality of the vet inputs and service delivery. However, Fulani herders require 
now more veterinary care than in the past, especially those with whom they have 
trustworthy relationships. The latter are regularly called upon on mobile phones to 
take care of sick animals. When the herd is far away, some instructions may be given 
by the vet through mobile phone calls to help the herder to care for the sick animal 
himself. Some diagnoses are also made based on pictures or videos provided by the 
pastoralists when conditions do not favor immediate on-site care by the specialist. 
These kinds of cases have often been reported by the Municipal Agent for the Con-
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trol of Animal Products (ACCPA178), who is responsible for livestock health care in 
Gogounou District. This easier access to veterinary care is perceived by herders as 
having positive effects on their livestock production:
Nowadays, there are veterinary products available everywhere. There are also 
veterinarians everywhere. This reduces the mortality in our herds. If your ani-
mal has a problem, just take your phone and call the vet and he will come 
and provide care. We are now accustomed to veterinarians, and they are our 
best friends. We also use animal health products more than in the past. In the 
past it was not like that. But all these help us to save our animals. (Sammon, 
Gounarou, 08/04/14)
The pastoralists are also involved in various learning programs on basic animal care. 
These courses are offered to them by Fulani associations with technical and financial 
support from various development partners. This allows them to perform more eas-
ily parasite treatments and to undertake other primary health care. In most Fulani 
settlements, only the unknown and complicated animal diseases require veterinary 
services. However, after the vet has been once to administer a particular treatment, 
that same treatment is sometimes systematically repeated by other pastoralists when 
their animals exhibit similar symptoms. This is the reason why self-medication for 
animals is also well developed within Fulani camps in Gogounou.
The proliferation of barefoot vets and the development of informal flows of veter-
inary products are very important factors that help some herders to take regular care 
of their animals. This is not without consequences, and here I bring attention to the 
dubious quality of drugs and remedies available on the local market, as well as, the 
limited capacity of the pseudo-vets in providing targeted and effective treatments. 
Therefore, pastoralist associations have become well engaged in fighting for better 
access to quality veterinary products. With donors’ support, a veterinary pharmacy, 
created by UCOPER-Gogounou, supplied veterinary drugs in 2011 for a total of 
3.005 million CFA francs. These products, often considered to have fair and attrac-
tive prices, are gradually gaining interest from herders, even though the black market 
remains the first resort for many of them. Despite all of the named and unnamed 
constraints in the veterinary sector, improvement in the level of access to veterinary 
care has been widely recognized by local pastoralists as having positively influenced 
their activities and general wellbeing.
Cultivation practices among dariɓe gite Fulani pastoralists
Small-scale farming is inseparable from the life of the permanently settled Fulani 
herders in Gogounou. This crop farming integrated with livestock keeping continues 
to be guided by the concern of using animal manure. While their farmer neighbors 
178 Agent Communal pour le Contrôle des Produits d’origine Animale.
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have less and less need of manure because of multifunction herbicides, and are less 
willing to engage in contracts involving crop residues, Fulani herders continue to give 
prominence to livestock manure in their own farming practices. Cattle manure is, for 
example, perceived as more effective than chemical fertilizers. Subsistence farming 
practices that involve millet, sorghum and sometimes maize is enough to cover the 
food needs of households that have access to only a little land:
No matter the number of animals one has, Fulani herders still cannot live here 
in Gogounou without cultivation. […] Animal wastes are good fertilizers. A 
hectare of land well-fertilized with animal manure is better than several hect-
ares treated with chemical fertilizers. Where the Fulani finds 0.5 ha to tether 
his animals, its yield is sufficient to satisfy the needs of his whole family for the 
entire year. It is because of all this wealth that the haaɓe [farmers] are jealous 
of us. (Focus group discussion, Lougou village, 06/05/14)
The manure is perceived by the Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou as an important 
wealth – enabling successful crop farming to meet the household needs. As an in-
tegral part of their rich capital, they think it attracts the covetousness of their farm-
er neighbors. This kind of perception is not new among pastoral societies. Fulani 
herders have always seen farmers as bad people, poor and envious (Diallo, 2000: 
89; Schareika, 2004: 177; Juul, 2005b: 119; Korbéogo, 2013: 138f.). Many of my 
Fulani interlocutors often communicated the abuse of herbicides by farmers so as 
to cultivate large areas in revenge, to get extremely rich, and to ultimately impover-
ish the Fulani pastoralists. Herbicides are portrayed as supporting a kind of “ethnic 
catch-up”, allowing the ethnic group that considers itself in a weak position on cer-
tain aspects of its cohabitation with other ethnic groups, to take advantage of these 
chemicals to strengthen its power.179
Alongside this subsistence farming presented above, a market-oriented agricul-
ture involving cash crops such as cotton and especially maize has also developed. This 
is the case for some Fulani pastoralists who have access to land and can sometimes 
cultivate up to two hectares of these crops. It is a good way to earn cash in order to 
meet their diverse household needs. Therefore, Fulani pastoralists are also engaged 
in the use of herbicides, as I observed in both farms and local markets (Photo 7.16). 
However, they regularly claim that their way of using those products is more envi-
ronmentally friendly and better safeguards the livestock compared to the practices 
of their jealous Bariba neighbors. This trend contradicts findings of some authors 
who observed a few decades ago that Fulani pastoralists in northern Benin practiced 
179 The dynamics of ethnic catching-up is linked to both opposing ethnic groups in Gogounou. 
Here, Fulani pastoralists consider they are richer than Bariba farmers, and that is why the latter use 
herbicides against their herds. But to improve their access to land for which they are in a weak power 
position, pastoralists also use the same chemical weedkillers as tools of resistance to strengthen their 
presence on land.
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only subsistence agriculture, not cotton production and therefore were not market-
oriented (Schepp, 1989: 32ff.; Guichard, 2000: 95).
The Fulani households in Gogounou also keep small ruminants (goats and es-
pecially sheep) and poultry (chicken, guinea fowl, etc.). These activities that were 
recognized as being for females in the past are currently widely controlled by men 
in many households. They play a supporting role in generating cash income to cope 
with the everyday household needs (food, health care, child school fees, female fash-
ion accessories, etc.). These animals are also sold to swiftly purchase implements and 
various chemicals (fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides) for the crop enterprise, as the 
Fulani develop an interest in cash farming, despite their land constraints.
Although the productive use of manure has been key for Fulani crop cultivation 
practices, the herders have become increasingly committed to chemical-based agri-
culture and would have obtained more substantial benefits from it by now, if land 
access were not a limiting factor. They have failed to extend their farming area like 
the Bariba farmers, since they have to divide their small plots between food, forage 
and cash crops. I have not been able to assess thoroughly the difference between the 
crop farming practices of Fulani herders and Bariba farmers, but it seems overall that 
the former intensify their small-scale farming in comparison to the latter who take 
advantage of their power over land ownership to continuously extend their crop 
Photo 7.16: A Fulani pastoralist negotiating herbicide prices in Gogounou market
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fields. What is obvious is that Fulani pastoralists seldom use tractor and other mod-
ern farming implements, or call on waged labor to help undertake farming activities. 
Rather, they mostly depend on the active members within the household. Most of 
the Fulani who own tractors or use tractor services are the intellectuals – generally 
leaders of pastoralist associations who take advantage of their political influence to 
buy or borrow more land. This is, for example, the case of Sidi Djobo in Pariki camp, 
and Alfa Tidjani Aboubakar in both Fana-Peulh and Binga camps. A few other Fu-
lani pastoralists who use agricultural machinery services to farm large areas are those 
who have increased their land access by making secret arrangements with emigrant 
herders. Matchoud, who has about two hectares of maize in Bagou village, is a case in 
point. One could assume therefore that the intensification of farming is an effective 
coping strategy among Fulani herders in Gogounou District.
Diversification and social change among dariɓe gite Fulani pastoralists 
Apart from growing crops and the rearing of small stock, both of which play an im-
portant role in Fulani households in Gogounou, several other activities are comple-
mentary sources of income for them. Many Fulani herders have decided to gradually 
leave the “bush” life to find a place in the modern society. Unlike the 1980s and 
1990s, when the life of Fulani in northern Benin was still highly traditional, the 
transformations nowadays are deep and quite visible. As it appears in pictures 7.2 
and 7.3 above, the Fulani now live in rectangular houses, which are metal-roofed, 
painted and sometimes equipped with metal gates and modern pieces of wooden 
furniture. Building standards and spatial ordering principles as required by Fulani 
tradition and socio-cultural values (Bierschenk, 1999: 197ff.) are often no longer 
respected. The main reason often cited by the Fulani herders is that there is no more 
grass, as the bush is disappearing, and as such the use of corrugated iron roofs has 
even become cheaper than the use of straw to cover their houses. The houses (suudu), 
the farms (wuro) and the hamlets (gure) are no more like before. Everything has 
changed and has become “modern”, as the Fulani themselves put it. The economic 
organization and the household strategies are sufficiently open to modernity, as one 
can also find schools in the Fulani camps. Using two case studies, I will focus on 
some of the socio-economic and even political strategies used by Fulani pastoralists 
to become sustainable in a context of uncertainty.
First case study: Sidi Fana, a Fulani herder with three lifestyles
Sidi is a Fulani pastoralist living in Zougou-Pantrossi Region. He was formerly a 
milk collector for the mini-dairy of Gogounou (SOCOLAIG). Although he had no 
formal written contract with this company, this milk-collection activity from 2006 
to 2010 brought many changes in his life. He was twice given motorbikes and was 
able to earn each month more than 20,000 CFA francs to offset his household finan-
cial challenges. Sidi has four wives residing in three different areas (Figure 7.3). The 
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first dwelling is a bush camp where his first two Fulani wives are living. These women 
are occupied mainly with a herd of about 20 cattle. The second dwelling in Fana-
Peulh village capital is where Sidi’s third wife from the Gando ethnic group lives. 
Finally, Sidi has a third dwelling place in Gogounou city center, where he has rented 
a house for his fourth wife, who is from the Bariba ethnic group. This modern herder 
places a strong emphasis on education. All of his children are schooled in the village 
capital, except the eldest boy who takes care of the herd. The main aim of Sidi is to 
ensure a better future for his children, such that they will no longer have to depend 
on livestock keeping, which is becoming increasingly difficult in Gogounou. The 
children who reach secondary school level are accommodated by their stepmother 
in town in order to complete their course. Sidi regularly argues that the best strategy 
available to the Fulani to ensure a future in Gogounou is to mix, as much as pos-
sible, with other local ethnic groups (Gando, Bariba and even others) and to look for 
alternative livelihoods. I give hereafter some details about Sidi Fana’s life in his three 
different residences.
Sidi in the camp: The first two wives of Sidi are Fulani and live in a pastoral 
bush camp (Figure 7.3 – Sidi dwelling place 1). Their main activities are managing 
the milk (milk trading, wagashi processing and sale) and collecting shea nuts to be 
processed and/or sold as food. They are also involved in food crop farming activities 
on 0.25ha of land. Here, some relics of the traditional farm organization in Fulani 
society still exist. One could find round houses, the place of a former shea tree, the 
position of seniors’ apartments in relation to those of youth, the place to tether the 
animals, etc (cf. Bierschenk, 1999: 198). It is in this residence of Sidi’s that Fulani 
traditional building standards are still being met. The house was built by his late 
father and his uncle, who is the oldest person still living in the camp. Sidi perceives 
this camp as a family home. This is also the only place where he feels like a true Fu-
lani, although many innovations have been introduced. Some rooms are rectangular, 
sheet-roofed, cemented, painted and do not seem to match with the lifestyle known 
to Fulani herders. Sidi is often in his Fulani home for making decisions about his 
herd (animal feeding, veterinary care, transhumance in “Trois-Rivières” forest). He 
is also often occupied with family responsibilities and challenges related to his very 
old uncle and his two wives.
Sidi in the village: The third wife of Sidi comes from the Gando ethnic group 
and lives in the second residence in the village capital (Figure 7.3 – Sidi dwelling 
place 2). This house was built on the roadside and is where Sidi receives his visitors. 
I was myself hosted in this house many times during my research stay. The Fulani 
original construction standards are not met here. The two buildings are rectangular, 
roofed with corrugated iron, color-washed and fitted with metal gates. The living 
room is equipped with wooden armchairs showing certain modernity. The whole 
yard around the house is fenced. Sidi, with the support of a local NGO, has installed 
a biogas plant that provides energy for lighting and cooking. About four fruit trees 
(mango, lemon and guava) are planted in the courtyard. A part of the courtyard is re-
served for small-scale gardening. This allows Sidi’s third wife to plant vegetables like 
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Figure 7.3: Dwelling types of Sidi Fana
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okra, pepper, tomato and so on for her own use, or sometimes for small sales. This 
wife is a food vendor along the main dirt track connecting Gogounou to Zougou-
Pantrossi and is not so much involved in herding. She is sometimes able to access 
milk when her husband returns from the bush camp, where the milking is usually 
done. However, there is no regulated milk sharing system that assures her access to 
milk. Apart from her petty trade, she is more involved in the annual cash-crop life of 
Sidi, who cultivates cotton and maize on about one hectare of land to which he has 
access on the other side of the village (in the opposite direction from his family bush 
camp). This small-scale cropping allows him to earn cash at the end of the farming 
season. The cotton is directly sold through the government formal system whereas 
maize is stored until a high price can be attained on the market. The storage of maize 
strongly determines the life of Sidi in Gogounou’s city center, described in the next 
paragraph.
Sidi in the town: The fourth wife of Sidi, Bariba, lives in the heart of Gogounou 
city in a house rented by her husband (Figure 7.3 – Sidi dwelling place 3). She is a 
weaver by profession, with several apprentices. She is also actively engaged in maize 
trading with Sidi. She has no part in Sidi’s life in camp and knows very few things 
about the management of the herd. The maize stored in the Fana village capital is 
often transferred to the third house in the city. It is from there that it is sent to the 
market to be sold at a better price. Sidi and this wife sometimes buy cheap maize lo-
cally, which they transport to big cities like Parakou and Malanville to resell at higher 
prices. This business is an important part of the urban life of Sidi. However, it is not 
the sole urban occupation of this modern herder. He is also involved in different ini-
tiatives of Fulani associations and was even enrolled as a milk collector (as previously 
mentioned) for three years before the closure of SOCOLAIG in 2010. He still holds 
this position and will probably continue when the factory is relaunched, as envisaged 
for the very near future.
Synthesis: The dwelling types and livelihood strategies of Sidi, as described above, 
are threefold. Firstly, his four wives and multiple residences help to strengthen his 
social ties. His exogamy is particularly revealing. The hypogamic and hypergamic mar-
riage to a Gando woman and a Bariba woman, respectively, allow him to improve 
his social network by easily getting along with influential contacts.180 This is a great 
achievement in a context of extremely limited matrimonial alliances between Fulani 
and other local ethnic groups (Lombard, 1960; Lombard, 1965: 36f.; Boesen, 1999; 
Guichard, 2000: 94; Van Santen, 2000: 139; Van Driel, 2002; 81; Adégbidi, 2003: 
180 Although these perceptions have evolved over time, a Fulani is always seen as having higher social 
status than a former slave, Gando. Similarly, a Fulani is considered socially lower than a Bariba. This is 
what justifies the “hypogamous” and “hypergamous” nature of Sidi’s intermarriages with a Gando and 
Bariba woman, respectively. The ideological and cultural structures of the Fulani have always favored 
endogamy as a marriage strategy. Hypogamy was, for example, fundamentally prohibited between 
Fulani in Fuuta Jaloo and their former slaves Runndeɓe, in order to preserve social cohesion and per-
petuate “Fulanity” through heredity (Botte, 1994: 122). Details on “Fulanity” are found in Chapter 8. 
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36f.). The inter-ethnic marriage phenomenon seems new in Gogounou and deserves 
attention.
Several authors have shown the role of marriage covenants in bringing togeth-
er and uniting formerly antagonistic or disparate social entities. Intermarriage has 
always played an important role in the ethno-cultural transformation of Fulani, 
whenever their history makes them evolve from simple livestock farmers to becom-
ing major economic and political players (cf. Burnham, 1991; Burnham and Last, 
1994; Dupire, 1970; 1994; Hodgson, 2001; Homewood et al. 2009; De Jode, 2010; 
Hodgson, 2011). In the interest of safeguarding long-term rights to land use, some 
immigrant Fulani pastoralists in the sub-humid Abet area of Nigeria had married 
the daughters of indigenous farmers (Waters-Bayer and Bayer, 1994a: 224). Simi-
larly, by giving their women to Weheeɓe farmers, the Jallouɓe herders in central Mali 
were able to forge open and friendly ties through the cousins of their offspring. This 
relationship was mutually beneficial to both ethnic groups, enabling the former to 
strengthen their political power and the latter to take care of the stock they collected 
from the raids successfully perpetrated against the Tuareg and Mossi (De Bruijn and 
Van Dijk, 1994: 89). The existence of Fula Muru (Fulani who later became Bwa) and 
Bobo Fula (Fulani born from relationships between Fulani men and Bwa women) 
in Gondo-Sourou (Burkina Faso), conforms to the same logic of identity transfor-
mation (Diallo, 1999: 377). The “hausaïzation”181 was also one of the successful 
strategies used by Fulani to overcome the efforts of the Hausa States (Niger-Nigeria) 
in establishing their political domination. It was also the breeding ground for re-
ligious and political manipulations used by Usman dan Fodio182 to feed the Jihad 
between 1804 and 1808 (Smith, 1966: 408ff.; Dupire, 1994: 276ff.). Within the 
post-war Sokoto Caliphate, the same Sheikh Usman dan Fodio led by a unification 
rationale had also encouraged the intermingling among Fulani from various social 
backgrounds. This contributed to their adaptation to an unusual city life (Burnham 
and Last, 1994: 327). 
This way of integration has sometimes resulted in an ethnic conversion in which 
the Fulani are quick to adopt the ethnic identity of their wives. Accordingly, a Sidiɓe 
pastoralist who became a fisherman on the shores of Korienzé Lake in Mali adopted 
the ethnic identity of his Bozo spouse (Gallais, 1962: 107; Dupire, 1994: 270). This 
is the reason why Gallais (1962: loc.cit.) argued that the original link between one 
ethnic group to its production techniques can cause the individual to willingly deny 
his origin if particular circumstances obliged him to change his livelihood. Intermar-
181 The Fulani became deeply integrated in Hausa communities, speaking the Hausa language and 
marrying Hausa women (Boutrais, 1994a: 141 & 144; Dupire, 1994: 276). This enabled them to 
establish a kind of aristocracy controlling Hausa government positions and initiating a Jihad against 
the Hausa States (Dupire, 1994: loc. cit.). Some Fulani were also mossized in Burkina Faso, others 
sonrayzed in the valley of Niger River (Boutrais, 1994a: 140f.); others again got arabized, songhaïzed or 
dogonized in Mali (De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 1988 cited by Schlee, 2000: 9). 
182 In the English scientific literature, one finds both Uthman dan Fodio and Usman dan Fodio refer-
ring to the same person. I have chosen to use Usman in this document. 
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riage is therefore for pastoralists an important social way of coping with resource 
scarcity and conflicting environments. 
This was a strategy used by different pastoralist groups in both East and West 
Africa. The exogamy in Cameroonian Adamawa has enabled the incorporation of 
a new social group of Fulani, although considered “non-genuine”, in the political 
apparatus at both local and national levels (Dupire, 1970; Burnham, 1991: 87). 
Likewise, new generations of children from mixed marriages between Maasai pasto-
ralists and Kikuyu, Kamba and Chagga women in Kajiado District of Kenya identify 
themselves with the ethnic group of their mothers. This change in ethnic self-identi-
fication offers them more flexibility in a context of livelihood diversification induced 
by multifaceted risks (Campbell, 1999: 388). I have not personally encountered such 
profound transformation in Gogounou. However, the cases of Sidi and of many 
other local pastoralists not covered in this study show that the future of Fulani pas-
toralists in northern Benin is hinged on their social integration with other ethnic 
groups, with intermarriage being a key way. 
The social aggiornamento among the Fulani in Benin could also be more deeply of 
an identity order. This is because “identity oscillation”, although seen as “accultura-
tion”, seems an effective strategy for coping with political, socio-economic and en-
vironmental trends. This works especially well whenever being Fulani becomes chal-
lenging and therefore unproductive (Boutrais, 1994a: 140).183 Times have changed 
since the time of Stenning, who reported in the 1950s a euphemism of Woɗaaɓe 
pastoralists who disregarded the marriages with non-Fulani that they considered as 
“eating the fruit of the bitter black plum-tree” (Stenning, 1959: 57). Today, inter-
ethnic marriages have become for Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou like “eating the 
fruit of the sweet plum-tree”. It enables them to enlarge their social networks and 
address threats. It therefore appears that Fulani social values do not resist shocks – 
they disintegrate, evolve and adapt to the changes in their lives and surroundings. I 
do agree with Schlee (2000: 7f.) that the Fulani ethnicity, which actually changes in 
different contexts, must be redefined at the new boundaries between them and the 
other ethnic groups.
Secondly, Sidi combines agriculture, livestock, trade and other small businesses 
to have more diversified sources of income. His priority is no longer focused on 
herding alone. He is changing his life and fits more into the category of the modern 
Fulani despite the fact that he was not educated and is seen as an ignarus. However, 
his literacy has enabled him to express himself fairly well in French, and he was able 
to communicate sometimes with me without an interpreter. All these skills increase 
his business opportunities. 
Thirdly, his children’s education plays an important role in Sidi’s plan. He no 
longer believes in a better future for pastoralism. This is why the school is seen as 
the only way to ensure a better future for his offspring. These changes noted in Sidi’s 
183 This identity reclassification, according to Boutrais (1994a: 140) is also what Dupire (1994: 269 
& 278) calls the principle of “moindre effort culturel” or “moindre écart culturel”.
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life are also attributable to Fulani associations, which have made significant efforts 
in raising awareness for transformation among Fulani herders. In conciliating the 
economic assets with the social ones in order to adapt to hardship, education among 
African pastoralists has become a sound investment for enhancing their capabilities 
(Devereux, 2006: 17; Homewood et al. 2009; Hodgson, 2011: 198). This is why the 
trend of schooling, as Sidi’s example of educating his children illustrates, is followed 
by many pastoralists permanently settled, despite the poor infrastructure and lack of 
teachers.
Second case study: Sanda Wesseke, a Fulani herder with two lifestyles
Sanda is a Fulani pastoralist from Wesseke Fulani hamlet. He works with the Local As-
sociation of Livestock Market Management in Gogounou (ALGMB-Gogounou184), 
who has worked for five years as a sedeeɓe185 for securing livestock transactions and 
collecting taxes during market days. This work, through which he earns about 25,000 
CFA francs per month, provides important support for his household. He has three 
Fulani wives: the first two are living in the bush camp, and the third one in the town 
(Figure 7.4). Sanda aspires to be better integrated into town life, while continu-
ing with his struggle to secure land for his animals. He does not intend to give up 
livestock keeping, and is therefore open to every modern way possible to develop 
this activity. He would like to obtain official papers to own his camp area and the 
surrounding arable land, but this depends on whether or not the Bariba farmers will 
allow him to do so. Sanda has also sent all but one of his children to school; only 
his eldest son takes care of the herd. This strategy is to ensure the children a town 
life with safe employment opportunities that will prevent them from facing the land 
problems that are suffocating pastoralism. He is among the herders who grow forage 
to feed their animals. He also believes in the complete settlement of herds and the 
modernization of local animal farming systems. He always expresses a strong enthu-
siasm for animal breeding technologies that are less demanding in terms of land. 
Below, some details are provided on the way Sanda Wesseke manages his life in both 
the bush and town.
Sanda in the camp: Sanda’s first two wives are Fulani and live in the bush camp. 
Their business is to trade and process cow’s milk, collected from the family herd. 
Recently, the hamlet was administratively recognized as a village, part of the urban 
region of Gogounou. The area, where Sanda has been living for more than fifty years, 
is not acknowledged as his property by Bariba farmers, who always claim ownership. 
However, Sanda is engaged in various legal processes to eventually own this land. 
He has asked for an official recognition certificate or a deed of gift for his land from 
the Municipal Authority. He is even willing to take a land title, if possible. But he 
184 Association Locale de Gestion du Marché à Bétail de Gogounou.
185 The sedeeɓe are witnesses and approvers of transactions in the self-managed livestock market of 
Gogounou. More details are provided about these agents in Chapter 8.
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Figure 7.4: Dwelling types of Sanda Wesseke
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has still not received a positive response, since the local government, dominated by 
the Bariba, does not consent to recognizing Fulani ownership of any local land plot. 
Sanda started building different types of infrastructure in order to increase his chance 
of winning the lawsuit and owning the land. All of the houses in his bush residence 
are rectangular, metal-roofed and fitted with metal gates (Figure 7.4 – Sanda dwelling 
place 1). Sanda has built a small private well for water supply on his farm. He also 
managed to benefit from the borehole offered by a development agency to supply 
water to the entire Wesseke village. He was able to have this borehole drilled on his 
farm thanks to his inclusion in the work of the pastoralist associations that greatly in-
fluence decision-making regarding pastoral development at the local level. This is the 
same strategy that he used to have built a primary school, also promoted by the local 
pastoralist associations, close to his farm. This school has recently been recognized by 
the Benin Government. Seven of his children are enrolled in this Fulani community 
school. He is very involved in promoting this school and often motivates his peers 
to enroll their children. He also benefited from the support of a local NGO, which 
enabled him to install a biogas unit for energy supply. More recently, Sanda has in-
stalled on his farm a toilet with durable building materials (Photo 7.17). He is always 
seeking external assistance to access livestock farming technologies that demand less 
land, also from me.
Sanda in the town: Sanda’s third wife is also from the Fulani ethnic group. She 
lives in Gogounou city center in a house that Sanda built on a plot that he bought 
some years ago and for which he holds all the legal documents (Figure 7.4 – Sanda 
dwelling site 2). Sanda’s wife is a seamstress and also sells porridge across the city 
center. These two activities allow her to contribute substantially to the household 
expenses. Sanda is in town almost every day (sometimes several times a day) to see his 
household members, and also in response to various invitations from his employer 
in connection with the livestock market. He has also attended different trainings 
organized by Fulani associations that allowed him to learn about animal care, forage 
cultivation and other modern ways of managing livestock. Five of his children are in 
school in town – two are in primary school and three in secondary school.
Synthesis: The strategy of Sanda is also of three kinds, despite the fact that he 
only has two residences. However, it differs from that of Sidi’s in many ways. Firstly, 
he has a desire to modernize livestock farming. Sanda no longer follows the logic of 
pastoral mobility, but continues to give priority to livestock farming. He thinks that, 
given the issues about land, the Fulani must completely settle down and rely on more 
modern ways of keeping animals. He is involved in food cropping only on a low level 
and prefers to dedicate a portion of the land to growing forage. He also continues 
to fight for legal documents that will allow him to own land, since modern farming 
cannot be performed without a minimum of land. 
Secondly, Sanda attaches paramount importance to the education of children. 
For him, this is the key to the future of Fulani, who must also be participants in the 
socio-political and economic life in urban area. This is why his house in town is built 
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on a legally acquired plot. He assumes that the future of Fulani is in town and not in 
the bush. His view agrees perfectly with that of Sidi’s on this point. 
Thirdly, Sanda combines various alternative livelihoods to sustain his income. 
He does not rely only on the herd to meet his daily expenditures. He is increasingly 
involved in small jobs and businesses that ensure greater financial security. Adoption 
of technologies and the diversification of income sources are the main strategies used 
by Sanda to be sustainable as a part-time pastoralist in Gogounou. Some of these, 
as well as, other strategies (e.g. education, livestock markets and Fulani associations) 
used by Sanda and other Fulani pastoralists are introduced/expanded on below.
Children’s education among dariɓe gite Fulani pastoralists
Education plays an increasingly important role in the pastoral community of 
Gogounou, and even in the whole country. The trend well depicted by Guichard 
(1990; 2000: 96f.) about the limited education of Beninese Fulani in the formal 
centers is now very much a thing of the past. The education rate of the Fulani, even if 
there are no official figures to prove it, has greatly improved in recent years. This can 
be attributed to Fulani associations, which have been very active in raising awareness 
among the pastoralists. Several primary schools were created in many camps with the 
willingness of Fulani herders who usually recruit and pay the teachers during the first 
years. These schools are generally recognized by the Government about two to three 
Photo 7.17: A toilet under construction on land of which Sanda does not have “ownership”
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years after having been set up (Onibon, 2004). The association of Fulani students in 
the bigger cities like Parakou and Cotonou, under the mentorship of Fulani associa-
tion leaders and different politicians, also undertake seasonal awareness campaigns. 
Their delegates roam from camp to camp explaining to parents the benefits of educa-
tion, in order to motivate them to send their children to school. Each household is 
encouraged to enroll at least two children. The presence of formally educated chil-
dren in a Fulani camp is seen as the safest way to maintain access to land: 
Education is good. It [the lack of education] is very regretful for Fulani. If we 
were educated, we would not be facing all of these challenges. Things would 
not be happening the way they are now in this area. No one could take hold 
of our land. If we were schooled, we would be even more intelligent than 
those Bariba. The Fulani have learnt to adapt to difficult situations with their 
animals. But now we have understood; and things are already changing. (Ma-
madou, Bikou village, 07/05/14)
As expressed by Mamadou in his reported speech above, there is a sense of regret 
among many Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou about their illiteracy.186 In most 
camps, there is an enthusiasm for the education of children and change is actually 
visible. The Fulani associations support all the education initiatives and reward the 
deserving pupils. School supplies and other gifts are awarded all the time to the most 
talented schoolchildren. The young Fulani students and graduates who are part-time 
teachers in various primary and secondary schools of Gogounou, travelling here and 
there on their Chinese motorbikes, and living a kind of “Western life”, are also a 
great source of inspiration to their younger brothers and sisters. I will present now 
the willingness of Fulani pastoralists to provide school education to their children, 
through a case study.
Case study of the Fulani community school of Wesseke
The Primary School of Wesseke was created in 2008 by Fulani herders with support 
from the pastoralist association, UCOPER-Gogounou. The fifty households that 
make up the camp of Wesseke built the first classrooms and a toilet. Two community 
teachers were recruited and paid by the parents of the student themselves. Every Fu-
lani herder was encouraged to enroll two children, but this was not respected by all. 
Some did not enroll their children at all, while others have schooled one, two or even 
many. Sanda, who is the main promoter of this school, has enrolled seven children to 
set an example as the president of the parent-teacher association. 
186 The Fulani often express this regret by the concept: “Tomi, annuo ɗum waɗataa” which means “If 
[only] we knew”.
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In order to cover the salaries of the teachers, each parent pays 5,400 CFA francs 
per school child187 annually. Each teacher receives a salary of 33,000 CFA francs 
monthly. Three years after its inception, the school has been recognized by the Gov-
ernment, which even sent a director. However, the salaries of the two former com-
munity teachers remained the responsibility of the Fulani herders. The total number 
of pupils was 77 at the beginning, but this decreased to 57 in 2014. The main reason 
was the massive emigration of herders from the camp to Togo and other regions in 
southern Benin. This has led to the disenrolment of about 20 pupils. Sanda, who 
pays 37,800 CFA francs yearly in school fees for his seven children, sometimes has to 
come up with a lot of money to support the expenses of the school. This additional 
burden is difficult to bear and hinders the education of some of his other children. 
Many Fulani perceive education as the ultimate solution to their problems, but the 
high cost it requires is seen as a limiting factor.
Schooling is also perceived by the Fulani as a way to secure land. The Fulani 
also showed that, when there is a school-educated child in a camp, the probability 
of losing the land is significantly reduced. The most cited example during my field-
work was about a young student from Binga Fulani camp who prevented his parents 
from losing their land. When some Bariba farmers claimed ownership and wanted 
to take control of the land in question, this undergraduate Fulani student took the 
issue directly to court. They won the lawsuit and are still living on their land. Since 
the Fulani are judges, teachers and other professionals in the public administration, 
pastoralists in Gogounou are more recognized now than in the past, although their 
troubles are far from over. School education is also seen as a way for the Fulani to 
“catch up”, both socially and politically, to the people of other ethnic groups, espe-
cially the Bariba and Gando who often claim to be ahead of them:
We struggled to build a school for our children to attend. It is thanks to the 
educated young Fulani that we can interact with you now. Therefore, it is 
these ones who are educated who will protect us. With education we can solve 
all the problems, because the Bariba are too far ahead of us. That is why they 
tease us and abuse us. (Focus group discussion, Garikoro, 20/03/14)
After explaining the enthusiasm and conditions of pastoralist education in Gogounou, 
and within the framework of the coping strategies, I would like to give below some 
details on the place of livestock marketing for the Fulani pastoralists.
187 This amount is not for tuition fees, since the school is decreed by the Government to be free of 
charge for primary school children across the country. The major expense for the Fulani herders is the 
subscription required within their camp in order to supplement costs, which result from a deficit of 
teachers and infrastructure.
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Livestock marketing in Gogounou
Livestock marketing is an important means of destocking and enables Fulani herd-
ers to better manage their herds in a context of difficult access to pastoral resources. 
Selling animals allows many herders to meet the urgent needs of their households. 
Animals are sold mainly in local livestock markets: Gogounou and Petit-Paris. Some 
resellers (dealers) could be reached through mobile phone calls to come and buy ani-
mals in the camps in the case of emergencies. Many Fulani herders are also engaged 
in cattle resale, providing them with substantial income. They collect animals from 
Fulani camps and resell them to large traders in the livestock markets. When an ani-
mal is very sick and cannot wait up to the market day, it is slaughtered at the camp. 
With a mobile phone call, the butcher is then called to come in and buy the carcass 
from the farm. In anticipation of such situations, Fulani pastoralists have the mobile 
phone contacts of one or several butchers, saved on their own phones or written on 
a wall on their farms. Through some programs sponsored by the pastoralist associa-
tions (ANOPER and its regional branches), Fulani pastoralists can access market in-
formation on local and community radio stations, in order to make good decisions. 
Phone applications that access markets are not yet operational in Gogounou. I will 
provide more details on these aspects in Chapter 8 on the achievements of pastoralist 
associations.
Resorting to Fulani associations for managing conflicts
Most settled Fulani herders who do not want to leave Gogounou generally rely on 
Fulani association leaders to assist them in managing their conflicts. When there is 
a good relationship between actors, the conflicts are peacefully managed. But when 
there is no clarity about the true instigator of the overt offence (generally crop dam-
age), the conflict is more difficult to settle. When the attempt to settle a conflict 
peacefully fails, the Fulani leaders are called upon to reconcile the disputing parties. 
This is done through a bottom-up approach to be presented in Chapter 8. Despite 
the hierarchical structuring involved, most Fulani pastoralists prefer to carry their 
problems on to the highest Fulani association leader in Gogounou city center di-
rectly. They believe he is the most appropriate person to solve their issues. When 
the conflict resolution fails with the Fulani leaders, police officers are called upon to 
help, and they take over the legal process: 
If we know the offended farmer and if it is really our animals that caused the 
damage, we can settle the problem in a friendly manner by giving something. 
But if there is no evidence that our animals have committed the damage, we 
do not accept to compensate the farmer. In this case, we can no longer settle 
the case in a friendly way. Sometimes, it is someone else’s herd that caused 
the damage, and innocent people are falsely accused. Farmers often want to 
take a lot of money for minor damage. When they seek to harass us, we are 
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obliged to call the president Demmo or we go straight to his residence. When 
we are with the president, our problems always find solutions. If the farmers 
do not agree on the decision of the president, he can call the police. But we 
always have the support of the president in such situations. If he were not 
in Gogounou, all the Fulani herders would have moved away. (Focus group 
discussion, Garikoro, 20/03/14)
Recently, a lawyer has been recruited by ANOPER through financial support from 
an international development agency. He is systematically involved in the resolution 
of all the major conflicts involving Fulani pastoralists across the country. The conflict 
management approach by pastoralist associations appears to be recognized by local 
pastoralists in Gogounou as having a positive influence on their pastoral activities.
Conclusion7.4 
Throughout this chapter, I have shown that crisis does not mean the disappearance 
of pastoralism. Fulani pastoralists continue to deal with threats by developing a va-
riety of strategies as favored by various technologies available in their contemporary 
world. Those who see the situation as hopeless leave Gogounou altogether. The spa-
tial outmigration is for them a measure for safeguarding and supporting their Fulani 
pastoral identity. Those who fear never to find proper living conditions somewhere 
else have chosen to stay, while continuing to take advantage of the resources avail-
able elsewhere. The outmigration of part of the household is for this latter group a 
complementary strategy. The third group is made up of those who have chosen to 
remain permanently in Gogounou without seeking to emigrate at all, either totally 
or partially. These are herders who are more open to modernity in terms of social 
and technological mobility. They use several strategies based on social integration, 
child education and various alternative livelihoods. The pastoralist associations have 
played an important role in the transformation pathways among these settled Fulani 
pastoralists. However, different constraints also limit the effectiveness of the associa-
tive struggle, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter (Chapter 8).
Being Fulani, becoming professional8 
Identity politics and development brokerage  
within pastoralist communities in northern Benin
Beyond the strategies implemented at the household level to cope with the dwin-
dling of natural resources, my investigations tried also to understand how Fulani as-
sociations, which have developed in recent decades, defend the rights of pastoralists 
to access land and pastoral resources. As amply demonstrated in Chapter 7, there is a 
mass outmigration of pastoralists from Gogounou and many other regions of Benin, 
seeking refuge in other West African countries.
Why is it that the largest pastoralist associations are based in Gogounou, yet their 
local constituents are facing such strong exclusion to the point of massively migrat-
ing out? Why are the highest Fulani leaders personally present in Gogounou, yet 
Togo and Ghana have become the safest destinations for their people? Are we in the 
presence of “gatekeepers” who use their communities as commodities traded with 
an international industry of civil society (Igoe, 2003), or, are we in the presence of 
“new compradors” who derive their resources and positions from the international 
bourgeoisie (Hearn, 2007); or are we in the face of activists who were not necessarily 
guided by a priori interests, but who “position and reposition themselves in the face 
of changing opportunities, challenges and experiences” (Hodgson, 2011)? 
My ethnographic study within pastoralist associations in northern Benin was a 
way to better understand how pastoral “civil society organizations” represent and 
230 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
struggle on behalf of local pastoralists, and the impacts of their struggles and actions 
on their local constituents. Here, I argue that many Fulani elites, who specialize in 
the identity struggle to defend the rights of pastoralists, have become professional 
development brokers without being able to solve the main issues of the pastoralists. 
They are capable, however, of involving a large range of international donors to 
initiate changes in pastoralism, which the elites also benefit from economically and 
socio-politically.
To better understand how actors defend the interest of pastoralists, in particular 
those whose only option is to leave their own country where the struggle is taking 
place, I have resorted to the concepts of “development brokerage” (Blundo, 1995; 
Bierschenk et al. 2000), “translation” (Callon, 1981; 1986) and “positionings/reposi-
tionings” (Hodgson 2011), which guided me throughout my analysis of the ways in 
which Fulani associations, with links to international donors, struggle to defend the 
rights of their constituencies and ensure sustainability for their pastoral livelihood.
Political background of Fulani in northern Benin8.1 
Fulani during the pre-colonial period
The Fulani of Benin were not established in states or political organizations, as were 
their counterparts in other countries of West Africa, notably in Nigeria and Camer-
oon (Stenning, 1957; Burnham, 1991: 77; Boutrais, 1994a: 140; Van Santen, 2000: 
141f.; Kossoumna Liba’a, 2012: 58f.). They lived without authority under the he-
gemony of other ethnic groups, which were already established before them. The 
best-known community to which the history of Fulani is bound is the Batoumbu/
Bariba ethnic group. The latter came from Bussa in Nigeria in the fourteenth cen-
tury and were already established in the region of Nikki188. They were divided into 
two classes respectively composed of Wasangari princes and Bariba common farmers 
(Quarles van Ufford, 1999: 85; Guichard, 2000: 107; Djedjebi, 2009: 32f.). Earlier, 
Lombard (1957) reported on the integration of Fulani pastoralists with Bariba who 
had a very strong military power. The author goes as far as qualifying the Fulani 
community as a “caste” in view of their ethno-social organization within the Bariba 
society. But it was understood later on that Fulani were quite different from Bariba 
and only a power relation existed. Their Islamic faith and their cattle wealth did not 
guarantee them any place in the prestigious society of Wasangari. They could not 
access noble functions and also should not associate with the princely race through 
marriage bonds (Lombard, 1960; 1965: 36f.). The Fulani, like most other ethnic 
188 Nikki is located in the current Benin’s northeastern province of Borgou. It is close to the Nigerian 
Kwara State, on its eastern border.
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groups in the pre-colonial Borgou189, had no freedom. Their lives as well as their 
economy were not as independent in such a statutory and professional society living 
from a “war economy” (Bierschenk, 1996). The frequent warfare they suffered from 
Wasangari warriors forced them to place their farms under the protection of the lat-
ter.190 They regularly pay tribute to their protectors or offer a few beasts during major 
holidays and festivals. The raids undertaken by the enemies of their masters were just 
as damaging for them, as a portion of their livestock could also disappear (Lombard, 
1965: 232; Brégand, 1998: 133).191 This situation was so critical, since they had no 
leaders and, instead, had to depend on a few mouthpieces nominated and subor-
dinated to Wasangari who owned the political power. Their language and religion 
shared with only a few other individuals (slaves and caravanserais merchants) and 
their practice of endogamy were barriers to their social integration. This is the reason 
why Lombard (1965: 37) described them as “particularist” and “traditionalist”. The 
French penetration in the early nineteenth century upset rivalries and restructured 
the socio-political relations between social groups. The Fulani were one of the main 
beneficiaries of this change as I present in the next lines.
Fulani during colonial era
The colonial domination from 1895 marked a new era in the social and political life 
of the Fulani in Borgou. The “divide ut imperes” policy implemented by the colonial 
power granted some autonomy through the cancellation of the power relationship, 
which bound Fulani and other groups, mainly Wasangari. The Fulani, who previ-
ously had neither leaders nor political autonomy, were integrated into the indigenous 
command directly attached to the colonial power. Each district circle was led by a 
commander, who was supported by local leaders, and consisted of three levels of 
power: senior chiefs, canton chiefs and village chiefs.192 In the two administrative 
districts of the French Borgou – Borgou with Parakou as capital and Middle Niger 
189 The former province of Borgou includes the current provinces (departments) of Borgou and Ali-
bori. This resulted from an administrative division based on the Law No. 97-028 of 15 January 1999 
(Government of Benin, 1999). For details about the territorial division in the decentralization era, see 
Syll (2005) and Geopolis (2012). 
190 The Fulani pastoralists were not the sole victims of this power asymmetry. Denise Brégand who 
was concerned with Wangara traders in the Borgou Province showed that the latter practically bought 
their safety from Wasangari (Brégand 1998: 57). However, the barter of horses and slaves, which 
deeply developed between both, resulted in two ruling classes, although of different nature (ibid: 
129ff.).
191 The cattle from raids against the Fulani were more valuable than the hunted wild meats. They 
have a symbolic role in the official celebrations of the Bariba kingdom in Borgou. Moreover, the 
raids had not only an economic goal, because the princes did not accumulate wealth, they were also 
forms of power display, enabling the Wasangari to gain some legitimacy to contest later for the throne 
(Débourou, 2013: 56ff.).
192 For a detailed description of the various levels of chieftaincy during colonial period, see Lombard 
(1967: 138ff.).
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with Kandi as capital – Fulani cantons were created in parallel with that of other 
ethnic groups. 
This institutionalization of a Fulani chieftaincy has completely changed the re-
lationship of Fulani with the colonial administration and the other ethnic groups 
(Bierschenk, 1996: 105ff.). The seniors of Fulani farms and other influential people 
were mandated to choose among themselves a “canton chief”, confirmed later by 
the district commander.193 These Fulani leaders became very powerful through their 
contact with the colonial administration and their peers in other ethnic groups. They 
were integrated with and married into other communities, notably Bariba (ibid: 
108f.). This period had the advantage of ensuring Fulani a better social status. How-
ever, it also imposed a stronger involvement in agriculture by freeing their slaves, 
the Gando, who constituted their main labor force. An agro-pastoral economy was 
therefore, built (ibid).
Another change brought about by colonial rule in Benin was over land. The 
groups which were previously under the domination of the ruling classes moved 
away from areas where the authority of their former masters was still prevailing. 
For example, the former slave groups often founded freedom villages. While others, 
seeking new land, left the villages to settle in neighboring farming hamlets (Lom-
bard, 1967: 75f.). Thus, the colonial power enabled Fulani herders to settle away 
from Bariba villages and make their transhumance in remote areas (Lombard, 1965: 
39ff.). This geographic remoteness limited land disputes emanating from crop dam-
age (De Haan et al. 1990).
This was somehow beneficial for Fulani, who developed their pastoral activities 
during this period, despite the fact that some stereotypes were created as a result. 
They were considered a puny race, frailly constituted and therefore physically unfit,194 
since they were the only people who did not participate in the forced labor imposed 
by the colonial administration, by exchanging a few head of livestock against their 
labor forces, and by only taking care of small craft works. The Beninese Fulani were 
stereotyped as nomadic shepherds and homeless (and therefore landless) people dur-
ing this colonial period (Bierschenk, 1996: 103ff.).
Two events in the past have also influenced the relationship between Fulani and 
Bariba. First, a Fulani herder, who was the guard of seventy horses belonging to 
Bio-Gera195, took part in the plot of the colonial administration that led to the ex-
193 This principle of choice was not uniform in all the regions. Other Fulani leaders were directly 
selected by the district administrators and imposed on Fulani populations. Some choices of Fulani 
leaders were also subject to the approval of Bariba leaders (cf. Bierschenk, 1996: 106).
194 The Fulani themselves are fond of this stereotype whenever it is to their advantage. They often 
invoke this physical weakness by bringing their old slaves (Maccuɓe) to build their houses and clear 
their crop fields. They also develop alibis around this same physical inability to take advantage of their 
Bariba friends that they ask to build their houses when they do not have the means to compensate the 
Maccuɓe for this service (cf. Guichard, 2000: 115).
195 Bio-Gera is a powerful Wasangari, a genuine missus dominicus who was supposed to have saved the 
Bariba community from the colonial rule and restore its dignity and its supremacy over other ethnic 
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termination of those animals. Second, another Fulani named Yoro was also blamed 
for having betrayed Bio-Gera by revealing his hiding place during a revolt that he 
had organized against the colonial administration. The death and decapitation of this 
Bariba hero that followed led to a kind of enmity between the two groups. Thus, the 
Fulani are treated as “deceitful”, “prying”, “birds of ill omen”, carrying out devilish 
acts (cf. Débourou, 2013: 65ff.).
Being Fulani: Postcolonial politics and identity politics 8.2 
among Fulani pastoralists
After the independence of Benin in 1960, several factors negatively affected the situ-
ation of Fulani herders. Human and livestock population growth led to an increasing 
demand for land. The introduction of draft animals, coupled with the promotion 
of cotton production, enabled an increase in agricultural productivity of the land. 
The monetization of the rural economy also weakened the common complemen-
tary and reciprocal practices within local communities. All of these factors upset the 
relationships between Fulani and their neighbors (De Haan et al. 1990; De Haan, 
1995: 134; Bierschenk and Le Meur, 1997: 14ff.). Other elements that negatively 
affected the life of the Fulani during the postcolonial period are depicted by Bier-
schenk (1995). First, the revolutionary political regime of the 1970s, inspired by the 
Marxist-Leninist model, abolished the traditional chieftaincies, considered as feudal. 
Second, the prevalence of plural and unclear systems of land tenure in northern 
Benin reduced the Fulani’s chances of accessing land because of their political disad-
vantage. This led to an upsurge of conflicts between farmers and Fulani herders. The 
low representation of Fulani in the modern decision-making apparatus made them 
more prone to suffer from the widespread corruption found among the state officials. 
Therefore, they are the main victims of the “politics of the belly”196 (Guichard, 1990: 
19) developed by local officials who regularly fleeced them. Their low level of formal 
education played greatly against them and they were dedicated to all forms of client-
age. This continued until the 1980s, when they mobilized to reverse the trend. The 
Fulani, who were previously incapable of taking collective action and making public 
claims because of their “self-marginalization”,197 which has roots in their senteene198, 
were massively mobilized in December 1987 for their first ethnic seminar. Before 
giving more details on this historic meeting, I will present the national context in 
which the so-called civil society organizations have emerged in Benin.
groups in the Borgou Region, as was the case before the colonial times (cf. Débourou, 2013: 65).
196 Cf. Bayart (1993) for details about the “politics of the belly” in African states.
197 For marginalization and self-marginalization of Fulani in northern Benin, see Bierschenk (1995: 
462).
198 The senteene is a component of the Pulaaku, “the way of Fulani” (cf. Boesen, 1999).
234 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
The former Dahomey, which later became the Republic of Benin, had a political elite 
made up of educated people bearing a good reputation across West Africa. This led 
Mounier (2007: 93ff.) to call Benin “The Latin Quarter of French West Africa”199. 
The author added that Benin produced the most “intelligent Africans” (ibid: 96). 
But, this intellectualism did not prevent the country from deep instabilities in the 
post-independence period. This is why the Benin Republic was termed “The Sick 
Child of Africa”200 (Bierschenk, 2009: 348; Banegas, 2015). All forms of political, 
social and economic crises were present in Benin from 1961 to 1972 (Akindès, 1995: 
264).201 The worsening of the economic and financial situation of the country and 
its multifaceted impacts led the Government – under pressure from Bretton Woods’ 
institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) – to initiate the Struc-
tural Adjustment Program (SAP) (Dagba, 1993: 57; Sinzogan, 2000: 3). All facets of 
this program were executed in total from 1989 to 1997 with different reforms that 
led to a total withdrawal of the State from many sectors, including agriculture (Jo-
hansen, 2002: 50ff.).202 This “emptiness of political space”203 paved the way for the 
emergence of intermediary organizations of pluralistic forms and discourses, often 
under the aegis of officers or former officials who took advantage of the “worthwhile 
brokerage” between the grassroots communities and the State apparatus (Bako-Ari-
fari, 1995; Le Meur, 1998: 212ff.; Le Meur, 2000; Bierschenk, 2009). The mobiliza-
tion of the Fulani was also part of this sociopolitical landscape (cf. Guichard, 1990: 
17; 1992: 521; 2000: 97f.; Bierschenk, 1992: 512; Bierschenk, 1995: 464). Now 
that I have explained how it came to the diversity of civil society organizations in 
Benin, I would like to go back to the establishment of the first cultural association 
of the Fulani.
I would have shared highlights from this mobilization of the Fulani, but accurate 
accounts already exist by Guichard (1990), Bierschenk (1995) and other members 
of the ethnology team at the Free University of Berlin, who were firsthand witnesses. 
However, I will try to reiterate some of the stronger slogans distilled during the cer-
emony to bring up the associative background of the Fulani in Benin.
Bierschenk (1995) reported that, on white streamers hung in the great hall where 
the Fulfulde seminar took place, one could read: Laawol fulfulde yaha yeeso (The 
tradition of Fulani is moving forward), Pullo, tinna, tokku laawol fulfulde, gam jiita 
dimaaku maa (Pullo204, compel yourself to follow the tradition of Fulani to regain 
199 “Le Quartier Latin de l’Afrique Occidentale Française”.
200 “Enfant malade de l’Afrique”.
201 Débourou (2013: 92) puts more emphasis and speaks of a criminal and immoral economy.
202 The three structural adjustment programs implemented in Benin are well described by Johansen 
(2002: 50ff.).
203 I borrowed this concept from Martine Guichard, who spoke in French of “vacuité de l’espace 
politique” (Guichard, 1990: 17) or “vacuité du champ politique” (Guichard, 2000: 97).
204 Pullo is the singular form of Fulɓe. But the English version “Fulani” is preferred in this document 
and is used to refer to either single persons or a group of these pastoralists.
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your honor).205 These slogans were shouted regularly throughout the event and were 
reinforced by many others. Fulani intellectuals, organizers of the event as well as 
other participants could sometimes be heard shouting in unity, “En kappi?” (What 
did we get?); finishing equally in strength with, “yaha yeeso” (going forward). 
The purpose of this seminar – as presented by its organizers and recalled by Bier-
schenk (1995) – was to know the problems of the Fulani and join forces to address 
them. That is why another slogan, potal men, womi semme men (unity is strength), 
though borrowed from the revolutionary political regime of that time, was an im-
portant catchphrase (Guichard, 1990: 31). By mixing the traditional assets with the 
modern ones, Fulani intellectuals “positioned” themselves as legitimate referees to 
bridge their ethnic group with the “others”. Although fairly ritualized, this event had 
the merit of building a modern Fulani ethnic identity while providing political vis-
ibility to its “makers” (Bierschenk, 1995: 480).
Guichard (1990), rather, perceived the gathering of Kandi as an exploitation of 
the collective consciousness by Fulani intellectuals who created, through the cultural 
association Laawol Fulfulde, a new structure of domination over “bush Fulani”. She 
regarded the awareness campaign preceding the seminar and the seminar’s theatrical 
form as part of an aggressive strategy of ethnic revalorization. The ambivalent and 
polarized messages given here and there were aimed at overthrowing the existing pa-
tronage structures for the benefit of the “brokers”. They gave Fulanity206 a new mean-
ing and introduced new values likely to transform the “traditionalist” bush Fulani 
(ibid: 41ff.). It was also an opportunity for educated Fulani to send strong messages 
to various actors (other Fulani intellectual non-supporters, representatives of central 
power and guests from competing ethnic groups). 
Bierschenk (1992), while supporting the theoretical and empirical basis of Guich-
ard, denied the process of identity construction that took place among the Fulani to 
be seen as a dichotomization of the social group. Fulani officials – while belonging to 
the state machinery – nevertheless have always interacted socially with their people, 
the “bush ones”. They often have family ties (patrilineal, matrilineal or marital) with 
the bush Fulani. Therefore, the differences between them are not enough to claim 
socio-cultural distancing. Thus, the perceived aggressors vs. victims argument – de-
nied later by Guichard (1992) in her reply to Bierschenk – was powerfully criticized 
by Bierschenk (1992: 511f.).
205 These slogans extracted from Bierschenk (1995: 465f.) were translated by myself from French 
to English. Guichard (1990: 29ff.) proposed other French translations that could be in English respec-
tively “The Fulani culture is going forward” and “Pullo, hurry yourself, follow the tradition of Fulani 
to conquer your dignity”.
206 Fulanity is “being a Fulani” or “Fulani culture”. Pulaaku or (sometimes Fulfulde) is the strongest 
word used in the ethnographic literature to refer to the Fulani way or all rules of conduct that make 
someone a true Fulani (Kirk-Greene, 1988: 41f.; Guichard, 1990; Boesen, 1999). Any time I use the 
concepts Fulanity, Fulbe-ness or Fulaniness in this document, I mean simply “being a Fulani”, with 
regards to the traditionally mobile livestock-keeping practices.
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My goal in noting this controversy is not to decide who is right and who is not. I 
intend, rather, to present for instructive purposes the diverging views of ethnologists 
who attended this first greater mobilization of the Fulani in Benin. Furthermore, 
this enables an understanding of the role Fulani intellectuals played and continue 
to play – as I will detail later on – in the associative life of pastoralists in northern 
Benin. Beyond all, a reality has remained: the ethnic movement of the 1980s marked 
the beginning of a new era characterized by a particular associative dynamic among 
Fulani pastoralists in northern Benin. Now that the political trend and impetus for 
mobilization have been elucidated, it is also important to understand how the as-
sociative landscape has been enriched among and by the pastoralists over the last 
fifteen years. In this regard, I will provide in the next paragraphs a short overview of 
the main associations working for the wellbeing of the Fulani.
Frustration, differences and dissidence:  8.3 
Repositionings in identity politics
Three decades after the ethnic event of 1987 in Kandi, the associative landscape 
among the Fulani has developed considerably. Several Fulani associations emerged to 
protect the interests of Fulani herdsmen and to fight to ensure better socio-political 
conditions for them. The Laawol Fulfulde, which was originally a joint association 
of all Fulfulde native speakers, experienced internal dissidence between the white 
Fulani and their former slaves Gando or Maccuɓe (sing. Maccuɗo) commonly referred 
to as black Fulani. The latter accused the former of despising and marginalizing 
them during their united struggle against Bariba domination. The emancipation of 
Gando from the common socio-cultural structure and their repositionings in the 
ongoing identity politics gave birth to several associations, including Yidi Wadi, Jam 
Naati, En Jetti Allah, E Semmee Allah, Ko Yida Wadi, Allah Wadata, To Allah Yidi 
(Hahonou, 2011; 2013; list completed through my own field inquiry). They joined 
forces with Potal Men NGO, another pastoralist organization in Atacora and Donga 
Provinces, to form the Faaba Men207 a consortium created in February 2007.
Another unobtrusive division was more ideological and related to the way in 
which Fulani locals identify themselves. The Fulani of Dendi regions (Kandi, Malan-
ville and Karimama) identify themselves as Dendi-Fulani, while those in the Bariba 
regions (Gogounou, Banikoara Ségbana, Kalalé, etc.) regard themselves as Bariba-
Fulani.208 They usually evoke differences based on historical discontents, geographic 
and environmental patterns, and livestock breeds. The Dendi-Fulani considered 
207 Faaba Men means “our blossoming” or “our development”. The consortium was originally created 
by Yidi Wadi, Jam Naati, E Semmee Allah, En Jetti Allah, and was joined by the other associations 
cited.
208 The way that the Fulani identify themselves through the names of local ethnic groups was also 
observed in Burkina Faso (cf. Hagberg, 2011: 150). 
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themselves as a traditional power established since the colonial period and used the 
paramount Fulani chief of Kandi, Ruga, as an example of this power. The Bariba-
Fulani regularly mocked these authorities, portraying them as useless for pastoral 
development. On the one hand, one has a former political power, considered un-
necessary and outdated; and, on the other hand, a new generation of power, which 
considers itself more professional, modern and oriented towards the development of 
the Fulani and their pastoral activity. Without going further into the division within 
the Fulani and the various discourses that support it, I will turn now to describing 
the most visible associations in the pastoral landscape of northeast Benin.
The associations which most visibly operate and implement various activities re-
lated to Fulani pastoralists are of two main groups: ASPEB and ANOPER. ASPEB 
(Association for the Safeguard and Promotion of Livestock in Benin) is a Fulani 
region-wide association located in Malanville District. The leaders cooperate with 
Sehu Suudu Baba, another Fulani grassroots association in Karimama District. Both 
associations have almost the same vision and a similar modus operandi and claim to 
belong to each other. Suudu Baba in Karimama is identified as a local representative 
of ASPEB, which is bigger. ASPEB, which identifies itself as a non-governmental or-
ganization (NGO), has a local influence practically limited to the districts of Malan-
ville and Karimama (Schönegg et al. 2006: 38f.). In Kandi District, it has a local 
representation, which is non-operational and almost non-existent.
The second group of Fulani associations is made up of ANOPER (National As-
sociation of Professional Organizations of Ruminant Herders) and its components. 
ANOPER is the largest Fulani association created in Benin since 2007 and has a 
national influence. Headquartered in Gogounou District, ANOPER is the fusion 
of community organizations called UCOPER (Communal Union of Professional 
Organizations of Ruminant Herders), which also form, at the provincial level, an 
umbrella association called UDOPER (Departmental Union of Professional Orga-
nizations of Ruminant Herders). The first UCOPER was created in Gogounou Dis-
trict in 2002. The first UDOPER, which is found in Borgou and Alibori (B/A) Prov-
inces, was established in 2004 and also headquartered in Gogounou. The ANOPER 
system consists of local groups of Fulani men and women in grassroots associations 
respectively called GPER (Professional Group of Ruminant Herders) and GPFER 
(Professional Group of Female Herders of Ruminants). 
One of the most significant changes has been the passage from the Fulani ethnic 
association Laawol Fulfulde to the new generation of Fulani NGOs and “PER” as-
sociations. The latter might be called “professional groups” on the ground, “profes-
sional organizations” at district and provincial levels, and “professional association” 
at the national level. However, the key messages do not change. They are all involved 
in defending the rights of the Fulani and improving their living conditions, fighting 
for their future, etc. This emergence of pastoral civil society organizations is inter-
preted differently by several actors. For example, the establishment of UDOPER was 
seen as an effort by the Fulani to claim additional resources to fully assure their social 
integration; this association would become a tool for the crystallization of Fulani 
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awareness around livestock farming, which ensures their welfare (Djenontin, 2010: 
40). ANOPER would become essential in promoting animal industries and enabling 
participation in decision-making for the “professionalization” of the livestock sec-
tor and the identification of “business” opportunities (MAEP, 2013: 26f.). It is also 
among the professional associations that have received considerable support from 
various governmental projects and programs that attempted to boost the livestock 
sector (MAEP, 2011: 30). ANOPER and its components interact with the livestock 
department as part of a national consultation body that enables the Fulani to take 
part in exchanges of views and decision-making on various issues: animal health, 
farm hygiene, livestock marketing, funding access, etc. (MAEP, 2009: 22; 2010: 
23). Initially a means of social struggle for Fulani herders, pastoralist associations 
have become renowned intermediaries for the development of the pastoral sector. 
They cooperate with the Government and the international development agencies 
in implementing pastoral development policies. As I have shown here, the forms of 
Fulani association have evolved over the years, and their positions and functions have 
also changed. Now it is important to understand how these associations came into 
being and how they became part of the regional landscape of civil society organiza-
tions to defend the rights of their local constituents.
Fighting trade brokers, improving livestock trade:  8.4 
Socio-technological process of showcase building
As previously shown, the internal conflicts that arose within the joint cultural asso-
ciation of the Fulani and their former slaves did not lead to discontents only among 
the latter. Several small groups of Fulani intellectuals were also frustrated by the 
governance approach that seemed to prioritize the Fulani pastoralists of some re-
gions over others. The categorical shift from “cultural association” to “professional 
organization” appeared to have happened in this context to make a clean break with 
the past model of struggle. This could be seen as the umbilical cord linking the two 
forms of institutions (cf. also Ciavolella, 2013). This enrichment of the associative 
landscape has favored the emergence of new leaders, who I will call “brokers”, who 
have developed their own initiatives of struggle in order to better position themselves 
between the “inside” and the “outside”. The change from the state-run develop-
ment approaches (top-down) to the community-based ones (bottom-up) favored this 
dynamic by making increasingly available external funds through a host of interna-
tional donors jostling with each other in the Global South (cf. Igoe, 2003; 2006; 
Hodgson, 2011: 75). 
The evolution of Fulani professional associations in Benin is also part of this 
dynamic of mobilizing “development rent”, which is oriented towards defending the 
rights of pastoralists and implementing actions for the “professionalization” and the 
“modernization” of their livelihoods.
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The history of pastoralist professional associations in Benin began in the 1980s when 
Alfa Tidjani Aboubakar209, a Fulani leader, also known under the pseudonym Dem-
mo Cheenon, rebelled against the traditional livestock marketing system. In fact, 
in the so-called Traditional Livestock Markets (MBT210), the seller has no direct 
contact with the buyer. The commercial broker called the dillali211 is at the center of 
negotiations, without any of the other parties being really aware of the actual price 
at which their commodity is eventually sold or purchased (cf. Quarles van Ufford, 
1999; Djedjebi, 2009). This system benefits the dillali, who is able to determine the 
price of most animals from the Fulani camps, making the attendance of livestock 
marketplaces almost useless for the Fulani herders (UDOPER B/A, 2007). This situ-
ation continued until 1976, when Demmo initiated a reform for more “transpar-
ency” in the way of marketing livestock to make it more beneficial to the pastoral-
ists. The strategy of Demmo, without being exactly the same, yet recalls that of 
Parkipuny’s, as reported by Hodgson (2011: 27), a visionary Maasai leader who, with 
his peers, were able to “reframe the long-standing claims to land rights and cultural 
self-determination in the language of indigenous rights”. 
Demmo is a Fulani, born around 1950 in Kèrou District (northwest Benin). He 
was enrolled at school in 1957 “by accident”, as he would often say. In fact, his uncle, 
who was living in the same household, was the first one to be enrolled at school after 
facing pressure from the colonial administration, which, at that time, required that at 
least one child from each household attend school. But, one day, his father, who was 
angry with Demmo, arranged with the District Officer to send Demmo to school 
instead of his uncle, who was then taken out of school to look after the family herd. 
This “punitive” schooling of Demmo allowed him to benefit from formal education 
up to the last class before entering college. An incident at school led to his expulsion 
209 Demmo is considered by some to be of Guinean origin and a member of the Tijâniyya Muslim 
brotherhood (Ciavolella, 2013: 16). The Tijâniyya is an African brotherhood of Maghrebian origin, 
which spun during the nineteenth and the twentieth century in North Africa first and then East and 
West Africa, and is active in the religious and political life of certain territories in Saharan Africa (Tri-
aud and Robinson, 2000; El Adnani, 2007). It is regarded as the dominant Sufi order in West Africa 
(Schritt, 2015: 50).
210 Marché à Bétail Traditionnel.
211 It is a word of Hausa origin. Other variants are also available in the literature: dilani, dilaali, dilaï 
or dilaal etc. (SOS-Faim, 2006; Maroowo, 2007: 3; Hestin, 2012: 90; L’Haridon, 2012; Ciavolella, 
2013; Houedassou, 2013; Droy and Bidou, 2015; The Economist, 2015: 5). But in the scientific 
literature on Benin, dillali is used more frequently (Quarles van Ufford, 1999; Djedjebi, 2009), which 
is why I chose to use dillali in this document. In the literature on Nigeria, which strongly influences 
livestock marketing practices in Benin, the concept of dillali was also used with dillalai as the plural 
form, whereas dillanci is used to refer to the system or the practice of trading livestock through those 
brokers (Adamu, 2000; Adamu et al. 2005; The Economist, 2015: 16). Devereux (2006: 54) has used 
dilal or dilala when referring to those brokers found in livestock marketplaces across the Horn of 
Africa and who operate very much on a clan basis. 
240 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
with two other friends212, forcing him to leave Benin in 1969 to reach Niamey in 
Niger, where he attended college for two years. In 1971, he then traveled to Burkina 
Faso where, with the support of an expatriate missionary, he became literate in the 
Fulfulde language in Gorom Gorom and then in Dori regions. He returned to Be-
nin, precisely to Gogounou, two years later (in 1973), where he began to work as 
a literacy teacher and trainer. He spent much of his time in the neighborhoods of 
Catholic missionaries, to the point of becoming their driver; visiting many regions 
in Benin and across West Africa. Alongside these activities that enabled him to be 
well known regionally, Demmo began, as he often says when telling his life story, 
“by looking around”. He was interested in the marketing of livestock, which allowed 
him to visit and even operate in most of the livestock markets across Benin, and 
also to travel in the sub-region, criss-crossing West African countries such as Niger, 
Nigeria, Burkina Faso and others. He ended up capturing the livestock marketing 
landscape, and framed what was happening in the livestock trading system in the 
language of “injustice”, “unfairness” and “teasing”, as used by the Fulani pastoralists. 
He argued:
I got disappointed a bit, seeing how our brothers and our parents were swin-
dled. The animals are raised by the herders, but when they are brought to the 
market, the brokers earn the most. […] These middlemen are called dillali. 
They are like the “maquignons” in France, but here they are stronger. […] I 
explained all this to my brothers and they were also really outraged, as I was. 
We thought about how to reorganize ourselves to help our parents enjoy a bit 
more the fruits of their labor. That is where I told these youths that we need to 
create another kind of market where we will ban the trade brokers. (Demmo 
in AFDI video, 17/03/11)
The profile of Demmo, briefly introduced above, highlights “education” (formal 
schooling, literacy, driver apprenticeship and on-the-job training in livestock mar-
keting etc.) and “travel” (travel to other regions of Benin and beyond country bor-
ders; being close to white people) as the main factors that launched the career of the 
Fulani leader as a development broker. Education and travel connected the future 
broker with new contexts that the village could not provide, while also providing 
know-how and the right tools to know how to live, talk and work in these differ-
ent contexts. The experiences he had across a broad range of cultures were later 
reinvested in brokerage (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 25). Therefore, Demmo was able to 
reframe the long-standing problems of socio-political marginalization and access to 
pastoral resources into an economic issue. He developed a very derogatory picture of 
livestock trade brokers and engaged in awareness-raising with his so-called “broth-
212 One of the two friends of Demmo became the first president of Laawol Fulfulde. Demmo was the 
boss of Laawol Fulfulde in Gogounou District. He often said he assumed his responsibilities in the 
cultural association upon the death of his friend.
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ers” and “parents”. This negatively framed identity of the livestock trade broker was 
widely shared by the Fulani pastoralists, as they regularly exemplified their various 
definitions in which the dillali appeared as: “thief of livestock sellers and buyers”, 
“lazy person running after easy gain”, “irresponsible agent abdicating all responsi-
bilities in the face of risks”, “troublemaker supporting waste of time and hindering 
Fulani from achieving life purpose”, “anti-development person”, etc. (Quotes from 
field notes, February-October, 2014).
The livestock trade broker was portrayed as the major profiteer of transactions 
within the cattle markets, to the detriment of those who should earn profits from 
their efforts. The Fulani herder has worked hard for several years to raise an animal. 
The buyer has also worked hard and perhaps long to earn money to buy that animal. 
But the livestock broker, who mediates the transaction, stands to gain the most. Hav-
ing made little, if any, effort, the broker is the winner on market day. In addition, 
the broker offers no guarantee in the case of risk, for example, if one of the actors 
involved in the transaction is in trouble. He is blamed for pursuing only easy gain. 
This portrait of livestock brokers, skillfully designed by the Fulani elite, is widely 
shared among Gogounou Fulani herders, who often assume that these commercial 
intermediaries are “enemies” of the Fulani. As stated by Houedassou (2013: 154), 
the dillali-based brokerage system (caricatured in Figure 8.1) lacks transparency and 
professionalism in managing livestock markets for improving incomes for Fulani 
pastoralists. 
213 Illustration by the author based on Houedassou (2013: 155).
Figure 8.1: A dillali brokering a cattle deal between a pastoralist and a buyer213
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It then became important for all to rally to the cause of abolishing this traditional 
institution to ensure “transparent” transactions that are more beneficial to all Fulani. 
This negative depiction of the middleman turns him into a public danger for the 
whole Fulani community. Inversely, Demmo succeeded in masquerading himself as a 
legitimate agent of change. This reflects the ingenuity of Fulani intellectuals in fram-
ing Fulani problems in order to gain legitimacy from their communities and to act 
on their behalf (cf. also Hodgson, 2011). Accordingly, the Self-managed Livestock 
Market (MBA214), an innovation developed by Demmo, was introduced as the cat-
tle-trading model that would save the Fulani herders and improve their livelihoods. 
An MBA, often locally opposed to the Traditional Livestock Market (MBT), is 
a marketplace where negotiations and transactions take place directly between the 
buyer and the seller without the intervention of any intermediary. Demmo took this 
one step further by trying to completely remove the dillali from the livestock market 
of Gogounou. The inception of his innovation, which did not take into account 
the interests of intermediaries, was quickly confronted by the opposition through 
intense defiance and verbal confrontation of these, who used their economic power 
and connections in Governement to have Demmo imprisoned for troublemaking. 
Consequently, Demmo was transferred to the civil prison in Parakou District about 
180 km south of Gogounou, but was released about three weeks later after the col-
lective mobilization of Fulani pastoralists against his imprisonment.
Coalesced into an oppositional force, the Fulani community of Gogounou or-
ganized a protest movement including three types of action: i) the Fulani herders 
refused to bring their animals and other tradable goods to the livestock market; ii) 
they sought another place for the livestock market where they would be less influ-
enced by trade brokers; and iii) they invaded the civil prison of Parakou to demand 
the release of their “spokesperson” (BAA, 2012: 19). Reciprocal distrust and power 
plays between social forces, as is the case here, are seen as manifestations of techno-
logical controversies that pave the way for negotiations for new choices to be made 
in a more inclusive framework (Callon, 1981). By framing and politicizing the griev-
ances and discontent (cf. Piven and Cloward, 1979; Gamson et al. 1982; Snow et 
al. 1986) against the dillali, Demmo was able to generate mass defiance among his 
people, who came “to believe that change is possible and that their own participation 
will make a difference in the outcome” (Buechler, 2011: 143). 
By “problematizing” (Callon, 1986) the need for technological and institutional 
change, the Fulani leader was able, through “smear campaigns” against the dillali 
and through various promises, to mobilize the local Fulani pastoralists, while mak-
ing himself essential in this new network in which a livestock marketing innovation 
should come into being and develop. However, since the positions of the conflicting 
parties were uncompromising, there was not much room for negotiations. The re-
lease of Demmo did not prevent a continuation of conflict between the proponents 
and opponents of the MBA up to 1998: the former using their capacity of mobiliz-
214 Marché à Bétail Autogéré.
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ing pastoralists to prevent the convoying of livestock to the market, and the latter 
relying upon their economic and relational power to have “public order disturbance” 
officially claimed and condemned. 
Instead of continuing with this struggle, which seemed to be against the State, 
and which portended no real success for Demmo’s innovation, the Fulani leader 
changed his tack and quickly repositioned himself as conciliator of everyone’s inter-
ests through a democratic process. On 4 March 1998, he instigated the creation of 
the Local Association for the Management of the Livestock Market of Gogounou 
(ALGMB215) and became its president, a position that he held until October 2014, 
when I was completing my fieldwork. The ALGMB became the democratic com-
mittee leading the governance of the MBA and included the representatives of all 
stakeholders in the livestock market: cattle traders, butchers and other livestock buy-
ers, Fulani cattle sellers and trade brokers. The latter (dillali), instead of maintaining 
their former status and continuing their practices decried by the MBT, also agreed to 
be reconverted into transaction witnesses (sedeeɓe). This repositioning of the Fulani 
leader allowed him to take the lead in the first democratic association of the livestock 
market, and it also allowed the former trade brokers not to lose completely their 
place in the livestock market. This “enrolment” (Callon and Law, 1982; Callon, 
1986) of the livestock trade brokers was the main reason for the success of the MBA 
movement in Gogounou.
The trade witness (sedeeɓe) is now responsible for observing and certifying the 
transactions between the two parties involved in the sale or the purchase of livestock. 
He is not allowed to intervene or to influence the respective positions of both ac-
tors. Instead of earning money by selling his expertise to both buyers and sellers in 
the market, he is offered compensation, an “interessement” in the sense of Callon 
(1986), proportional to the number of transactions he has actually recorded during 
each market day. 
The relatively successful control of middlemen within the cattle market of 
Gogounou enabled Demmo, joined by other Fulani elites, to highly publicize their 
innovation beyond the borders of Gogounou. The MBA is presented to various ex-
ternal donors as the most “transparent” and “democratic” way of trading livestock, 
and also a major contribution for local development. In fact, through the taxes col-
lected in the market, development actions were often locally taken. Primary schools 
were promoted in Fulani camps, teachers were recruited and paid, adult literacy was 
promoted within the Fulani community and various charitable actions were also 
performed (cf. Onibon, 2004: 39ff.; BAA, 2012: 20ff.). 
Under the leadership of Demmo, the MBA model was successfully promoted 
beyond Gogounou borders and led, in April 2001, to the creation of the Luumondji 
Mareefuji Sago Network (RLMS216), a network of nine livestock markets that adopt-
215 Association Locale de Gestion du Marché à Bétail de Gogounou.
216 Réseau Luumondji Mareefuji Sago: the term means “livestock markets according to the own 
agreement of pastoralists”.
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ed the same innovations in livestock trading (Orou Guetido, 2012). What is clearly 
reflected in the trajectory of MBA’s development is the success of the “translation” 
process (Callon, 1986), which made Gogounou change its MBT into a new type of 
livestock market (MBA); one regarded as a fairer alternative for Fulani pastoralists. 
Demmo then became the “obligatory passage point” (OPP)217. The key allies (Fulani 
pastoralists, trade brokers etc.) were keenly interested and properly enrolled; their 
mobilization proved to be successful. Demmo and his fellows provided an excel-
lent “showcase” or “dressed window” (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1997: 448; 
Bierschenk et al. 2000: 27; Coll, 2000: 117) of a “successful” endogenous market 
innovation that attracted international donors and led to a successful career in devel-
opment brokerage. As I will detail later on, guided tours (of the market and about 
its achievements) were often organized for representatives of international donors 
passing through the region to highlight the innovative and organizational capacity of 
the Fulani in Gogounou. This had to do with the competence of the broker and his 
ability to create a reality that fit the agenda of international donors (Bierschenk et al. 
2000: 27; Neubert, 2000: 255f.; Igoe, 2003; 2006). 
Grassroots organizing:  8.5 
Repositioning and extroversion strategies
The success of the MBA livestock markets in Gogounou and other parts of the coun-
try increased the reputation of Demmo, both locally and regionally. While fiercely 
promoting the MBA, the president of the ALGMB-Gogounou participated in the 
Constituent General Assembly of the Inter-African Union of Herders’ Professional 
Organizations (UIOPE218) held on 27 November, 1999 in Nouakchott (Mauritania), 
where he represented the Fulani pastoralists of Benin. The presence of Demmo in 
Nouakchott coincided with the ambitions of this sub-regional platform, which was 
seeking a contact person in each country to promote and develop Fulani grassroots 
organizations (cf. Onibon, 2004: 22; Ciavolella, 2013). Demmo began to travel219 
abroad, which had the advantage of making him aware of the sub-regional impetus 
behind the creation of grassroots civil society organizations among pastoralist com-
munities. His effort in organizing the “grassroots” gave birth in the year 2000 to 
the creation of the first male and female grassroots Fulani associations, respectively 
called, GPER220 (Professional Group of Ruminant Herders) and GPFER221 (Profes-
217 Details are provided on OPP concept in Chapter 3.
218 Union Interafricaine des Organisations Professionnelles d’Eleveurs.
219 Since then, he has traveled extensively in several African and European countries. He often 
referred to his many passports with filled pages. This is in line with Blundo (1995: 83), who assumes 
that development brokerage provides an opportunity for brokers to continue to travel, to make new 
connections and expand their profiles as experts in self-promotion.
220 Groupement Professionnel des Eleveurs de Ruminants.
221 Groupement Professionnel des Femmes Eleveuses de Ruminants.
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sional Group of Female Herders of Ruminants). The gendered perspective has been 
very important to the international development agencies and has therefore been 
well considered.
Although collective mobilization had begun in the 1980s with the organization 
of the Fulani ethnic seminar of Kandi in 1987 and various dynamics around the eth-
nic association Laawol Fulfulde, the transnational connections of Demmo with the 
sub-regional grassroots associative movements, prompted the creation of grassroots 
organizations among pastoralists in northern Benin. Demmo, who was no longer 
fully in line with Laawol Fulfulde222 and who had already a successful “showcase”, 
took advantage of these connections to reposition himself in grassroots community 
development.
Subsequently, the local professional groups, including almost all Fulani camps on 
the same village land, were regionally constituted in the Regional Union of Profes-
sional Groups of Ruminant Herders (UAGPER223). Their main activity was initially 
awareness-raising and the organization of compulsory vaccinations for animals with-
in each region. It is important to notice that membership of Fulani groups was nor-
mally optional, since it was subject to several payments: a membership fee of 5,000 
CFA francs, 500 CFA francs for membership card delivery and 25 CFA francs per 
animal per vaccination session (Onibon, 2004: 22; Maroowo, 2007: 7). However, 
vaccination was compulsory for all herders, since it was included in the State prophy-
lactic plan to prevent and control livestock diseases such as pasteurellosis, contagious 
bovine pleuropneumonia, anthrax and Newcastle disease (MAEP, 2013: 21). Fulani 
leaders took advantage of the compulsory animal vaccinations to mobilize necessary 
funding resources for their associations with, supposedly, optional membership. This 
fundraising policy seemed to consider de facto all Fulani pastoralists as members of 
the created associations, since the struggle was more oriented to Fulani identity.
Since 2001, all of the UAGPERs of Gogounou District were grouped into a Com-
munal Union of Professional Organizations of Ruminant Herders (UCOPER224) 
covering the whole district. Demmo became the president of UCOPER-Gogounou, 
which was, at that time, the largest professional association of Fulani pastoralists. A 
few months later, this Fulani association model spread across northern Benin, and, 
in 2002, to six districts in the provinces of Borgou and Alibori (B/A). From there a 
departmental umbrella Fulani association called UDOPER225 (Departmental Union 
of the Professional Organizations of Ruminant Herders) was created. However, its 
organization was formalized only in 2004, after holding its first General Meeting 
on 7–9 April of that year. The first UDOPER, of which Demmo became the presi-
dent, consisted of 650 GPERs and 227 GPFERs, distributed in all regions of the 
222 Demmo was active supporter and even local leader of the Fulfulde committee (cf. also Ciavolella, 
2013). 
223 Union d’Arrondissement des Groupements Professionnels des Eleveurs de Ruminants.
224 Union Communale des Organisations Professionnelles des Eleveurs de Ruminants.
225 Union Départementale des Organisations Professionnelles des Eleveurs de Ruminants.
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six municipalities (Onibon, 2004: 23f.). The UDOPER B/A became an exemplary 
grassroots organization and the focal point for several national and international 
programs oriented towards pastoralism and its grassroots players. This opened the 
way for Demmo, the Fulani broker in development, to implement his “strategies of 
extroversion”226, common to African elites, as strongly supported by the postcolonial 
“politics of the belly” (Bayart, 1993; 2000).
Demmo and his colleagues managed to access their first funding from some in-
ternational donors. He often confessed during our interviews and major events by 
pastoralist associations to the support of certain international donors whose names 
he called and declared: “they are the first who propelled me forward”227. For instance, 
a three-year action plan was designed and implemented by UDOPER B/A from 
2004 to 2007. The various activities in this plan, funded by the European Com-
mission, focused on institutional empowerment, fodder cultivation, animal health 
improvement, animal product marketing and information access among other issues 
(L’Haridon, 2012: 16; ANOPER, 2013b). 
The UDOPER B/A became over time an association with a good reputation and 
visibility beyond Borgou and Alibori, which were initially the geographical boundar-
ies of its interventions. The Fulani leaders were involved in government consulta-
tions and became part of some key decision-making bodies regarding the pastoral 
world. The UDOPER B/A defends the interests of herders within these frameworks 
and provides its members with various socio-professional services oriented towards 
training, literacy, veterinary care and conflict management (Hestin, 2012: 32). The 
association was ranked among the favored partners of the Technical Centre for Agri-
cultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA), which is a joint international institution of 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States and the European Union 
(Monde, 2008: 11; Ciavolella, 2013).
The national scope of the representation of Fulani leaders, already noticeable 
through the various actions of UDOPER B/A, was finally formalized in February 
2007, with the creation of the National Association of the Professional Organiza-
tions of Ruminant Herders (ANOPER228) by 24 UCOPERs from six provinces of 
Benin (Maroowo, 2007: 4). During the first General Meeting, held in Gogounou on 
15–17 February 2007, Demmo was named president of the association; a position 
he held up to October 2014. The ANOPER currently mobilizes 48 UCOPERs, 506 
GPERs and 120 GPFERs, with about 35 thousand members covering 75% of the 
territory of Benin (AFDI, 2015: 2f.). Thus, the Fulani association with local influ-
ence, and limited only to Gogounou District, became a national civil society body 
also open to non-Fulani, provided that they were livestock (cattle and small stock) 
226 The author uses “extraversion” as synonymous with “extroversion”.
227 “Ce sont eux qui m’ont lancé”: This must be understood in the sense of “scaling-up” the flow of 
aid by international donors (cf. Igoe, 2003; 2006), making external funds more available to the Fulani 
leader and the associations that he created, in order to be more effective in the struggle for their com-
munities.
228 Association Nationale des Organisations Professionnelles des Eleveurs de Ruminants.
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farmers. The pyramid shape of ANOPER is represented in Figure 8.2. The Fulani 
associations have largely benefited from the structuring and the funding resources of 
the self-managed livestock markets, although nowadays the markets also enjoy the 
scope of the representation and advocacy of the association (ibid). The grassroots 
organizations of Fulani pastoralists are put forward as being the ultimate means for 
securing pastoralist livelihoods, as it is expected to favor better control of livestock 
production and marketing (Alfa Tidjani, 2010: 53). 
Becoming professional: The dialectics of  8.6 
a controversial legitimacy
As in the case of the Tanzanian NGOs reported by Hodgson (2011: 108), the Pro-
fessionnel Eleveurs de Ruminants (PER) associations that have emerged in the cul-
tural landscape of Fulani to defend the interests and rights of pastoralists initially 
encountered controversies. Disagreement between Fulani elites about representation 
was intense. The main issue was to know which, between Laawol Fulfulde and PER 
organizations, holds the legitimacy to represent the Fulani. Who was the leader to 
speak and act on behalf of the Fulani? Schönegg et al. (2006), who worked on the 
issue of managing conflicts related to cross-border transhumance in Niger, Burkina 
Faso and Benin, reported the following:
Pastoral associations [in Benin] are few […] and compete for leadership. Yet 
they are not on the same playing field in terms of intervention. Laawol Ful-
fulde is a national structure set up by the old Fulani elite. It focuses on literacy 
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Figure 8.2: Organizational chart of pastoralist associations in Benin
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and the preservation of the Fulfulde language in Benin. It also claims to be 
the sole legitimate representative of the Fulani herders in Benin. This role is 
challenged by other younger associations, particularly by UDOPER, which is 
formed around the management of livestock markets. It is supported by [some 
international donors]. (Schönegg et al. 2006: 39; emphasis added)229
Since the 1980s, the Laawol Fulfulde or Fulfulde Committee, which was part of the 
identity struggle of Fulani intellectuals (cf. Guichard, 1990; 2000; Bierschenk, 1992; 
1995) and known as a cultural association, especially through its active involve-
ment in literacy and adult and children education, claimed legitimacy as the leading 
organization in the fight for the welfare of Fulani pastoralists. My conversations 
with the Ruga in Kandi during my research also provided evidence that confirm this 
position of the Fulani chieftaincy, which claims that the pastoralist organizations 
in Gogounou usurped power. Meanwhile, UDOPER – which was rather special-
ized in autonomous livestock marketing – had already invested in these sectors in 
which Laawol Fulfulde previously had the monopoly. Through the promotion of 
camp schools and literacy centers, UDOPER leaders headed by Demmo were able 
to demonstrate their ability to deal holistically with the concerns of the pastoral com-
munity, linking their originally economic struggle through MBA with the social and 
cultural dimensions of pastoralist livelihoods. Therefore, the PER association leaders 
were able to use all the baiting rhetoric around their innovative showcase (described 
above) to capture their first development funds, which they happily spent on their 
own areas of interest. This was a capability that Laawol did not have, since it lost its 
first glories of the 1980s and fell into lethargy, partly linked to the dissent it experi-
enced and to the death of some of its key instigators.
Since local pastoralists often look for tangible services and more concrete results 
in the fight of their leaders (cf. Hodgson, 2011: 108), legitimacy is measured not 
in verbal confrontations and complaints about one another, but rather through the 
ability of each institution to undertake actions that leave footprints in the pastoralist 
regions and can provide immediate assistance for pastoralists during difficult times 
(conflicts and all forms of marginalization). The PER organizations, which now have 
a range of international donors to support their activities and implement their action 
plans, have completely outdone the cultural associations by claiming that they are 
not only “cultural” activists but also, and primarily, “professional” activists.
229 I have personally translated this excerpt which was originally in French and German in the report 
used.
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Deserving of legitimacy: Defending pastoralists  8.7 
and reforming pastoralism
ANOPER Benin and its multi-scale branches are median-level institutions that stand 
in defense of pastoralists and in ensuring them improved livelihoods and secure fu-
tures. The action plans, implemented with the use of international funds, highlight 
technological and social services for improving the inclusion of the Fulani in the 
political, social and economic national context. To understand the transformations 
in pastoralism in northern Benin brought about by Fulani activists, some key areas 
of their interventions need to be examined.
Improving information access
Illiteracy, which remains one of the major bottlenecks for the social and political 
inclusion of the Fulani pastoralists, is addressed through various programs designed 
and implemented by technical staff members.230 Pastoralist associations work hard 
to translate and disseminate various programs related to pastoralism and mobility 
into the local languages, particularly Fulfulde, in order to raise awareness of the 
pastoralists and the institutional framework that governs their activities (UCOPER-
Gogounou, 2013: 6). A booklet of good practices, inspired by the national laws gov-
erning the pastoral sector in Benin, was recently issued (GERED/ANOPER/Potal 
Men, 2012) and actions are being taken to inform a larger audience. A market-in-
formation program, implemented together with transnational donors, was approved 
by pastoralists as being of great benefit to them. Livestock prices and other useful 
notices were disseminated through a partnership between UDOPER B/A and radio 
stations, including Nonsina Radio (Bembéréké District), Bani Ganse Radio (Bani -
koara District), Su Tii Dera Radio (Nikki District) and Radio Parakou, a regional 
station of ORTB231, the National Radio of Benin (Djegga, 2007).
Vaccination programs, cattle rustling and other livestock keeping events were 
also announced on such channels. Fulani herders have easier access than before to 
such radio programs, even if some have stopped since the development programs 
supporting them came to an end. ANOPER and its regional branches regularly issue 
press releases to inform pastoralists about the vaccination programs. This enables, for 
instance, better epidemiological control of the local herds. Most herders interviewed 
in this study have accessed the immunization schedule several times, getting to know 
230 The illiteracy rate is still very high among Fulani pastoralists and was estimated at 97% in 2007 
(UNESCO, 2007: 16). The literacy campaign widely implemented by the PER associations has also 
benefited from support from some local NGOs such as DERANA, SIA N’SON, etc. Considerable ef-
forts were also made by the Fulani NGO “Potal Men” in Atacora and Donga Provinces, where 7,364 
Fulani (including 1,932 women) were trained in literacy (UNESCO, 2007: 17). 
231 Office de Radiodiffusion et Télévision du Bénin.
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the venues and logistical instructions through the aforementioned radio stations they 
passionately follow every day in their mother tongue.
The initiative of creating a local radio station was also tried through a partnership 
between the pastoralist organizations and the municipality of Gogounou, but this 
was not fully fulfilled. However, evidence of the symbolic value of local radio sta-
tions for pastoralists is conveyed, for example, by a large billboard bearing the name 
“Maroowo Fm”232 (cf. Photo 8.1), located at the entrance of Gogounou city and very 
close to the head offices of ANOPER and UDOPER B/A. During my visits to the 
camps, some Fulani pastoralists expressed a sense of pride about this achievement, 
which is proof to them of the technological progress among Fulani pastoralists.
The Maroowo newsletter (Dewtere habaruuji Marooɓe)233, edited by UDOPER 
B/A, with support from the EU and CTA, has allowed information about the differ-
ent achievements of pastoralist associations to flow. Readers can find general infor-
mation about the self-managed livestock markets, as well as the organization and the 
functioning of pastoralist associations. Another fascinating aspect of communication 
through UDOPER’s bulletin pertains to how technological innovations (new cattle 
breeds, milk processing and marketing, livestock inputs and veterinary products, 
232 Maroowo (plur. Marooɓe) means “livestock farmer” in Fulfulde language. More explanations are 
made on the concept later in this chapter.
233 Newsletter of livestock farmers: “Bulletin d’information des éleveurs”; or “Bulletin d’information 
de l’UDOPER”.
Photo 8.1: Board of livestock farmers’ radio station (Maroowo Fm) in Gogounou
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etc.) are announced and arguments extensively developed to attract the attention of 
the herders.
In the first and fourth issues of the Maroowo newsletter, scanned excerpts (see 
Photo 8.2) about highly productive exotic cattle breeds called na’i batuure (cow of 
the white people) were portrayed as a welcome innovation. This is the kind of news 
that herders would be glad to hear about. Demmo, who is the former president of 
UDOPER B/A, and the current president of ANOPER Benin, dedicated his editori-
al “Hoore Haala” in the fourth issue of the Maroowo bulletin to exalting the produc-
tive values of the Blondu dakiten (Blonde d’Aquitaine). This French cattle breed was 
planned to be introduced in Gogounou in order to meet the challenge of higher milk 
production that the na’i bargu (Borgou cow), the main local breed, could not reach. 
The adoption of new technologies is thereby portrayed as the way to bring herders 
“out from darkness to light” (Illa e niwre, hanne beeggol faanake), “from ignorance to 
knowledge” (Illa der lokooru, hanne ɗum wartii e hunnuko lokooru) and “from stagna-
tion to advancement” (Joowinooɓe fu fuɗɗii ladugo) (Maroowo, 2008).
Improving veterinary services and livestock health care
Fulani civil society organizations have been involved with the governmental deci-
sion-making body for animal health since 2001 (Maroowo, 2007: 7). Several diseases 
that affect local livestock are targeted annually. These include: pasteurellosis, anthrax, 
foot-and-mouth disease, bovine contagious pleuropneumonia, and sheep and goat 
plague. The Government of Benin has developed a regional strategy, which recom-
mends an annual vaccination campaign over five years and a seasonal monitoring to 
facilitate systematic slaughtering of sick animals and application of ring vaccination 
when new outbreaks occur. The pastoral leaders, in partnership with the decentral-
ized structures (CARDER and SCDA) of the Ministry of Livestock, are associated 
234 Source: Maroowo, 2007 [A]; Maroowo, 2008 [B].
Photo 8.2: 
UDOPER B/A newsletter 
(Maroowo) showing exotic 
cattle breeds234
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with the consultation body in designing and implementing such a policy (cf. MAEP, 
2012; 2013).
Apart from the governmental veterinary services, the Fulani associations also car-
ry out a number of initiatives independently to improve the accessibility of their con-
stituencies to veterinary care. UDOPER B/A and UCOPER-Gogounou facilitate 
their members’ access to veterinary products through their own veterinary pharmacy. 
A drugstore, installed within the cattle market of Gogounou, enables Fulani herders 
to buy their veterinary products easily in this market that they regularly visit to sell 
animals or to socialize with their network members. The herder associations also of-
fer their members training in primary veterinary care. The local Fulani pastoralists 
recognize all these facilities as having a positive impact on the production and the 
reproduction of their herds (cf. Chapter 7).
Improving feeds and mineral supplements
Several innovations related to forage are practiced in Gogounou District, includ-
ing the cultivation of grass and browse species as well as fodder conservation tech-
nologies. These forage technologies, although still used only on a limited scale, help 
maintain or improve animal productivity in conditions of scarcity. Only dairy cows, 
calves or draft animals are generally catered for by the forage reserves and the small-
scale forage plots. However, ANOPER and its local branches are fighting for the 
development of these technologies, which are often impeded by the poor access of 
the Fulani to land, as discussed in Chapter 7.
Forage seedlings are provided free of charge to herders who want to grow forage. 
For example, in 2013 UDOPER B/A distributed 800 woody fodder seedlings to its 
members, including: 550 Khaya senegalensis and 250 Leucaena leucocephala. Eight 
ox-carts of Panicum maximum cuttings (covering 0.25 ha of land with 40/80 cm 
spacing) and 80 kg of forage cowpea were also offered free of charge to the pastoral-
ists and agro-pastoralists in order to encourage the adoption of these forage crops 
(Boukari Bata, 2013: 20). Some experimental plots were also developed by the pas-
toralist associations in order to have a seed bank (another showcase) for easier supply. 
The seed banks are hosted by pilot herders, who will be later in charge of supplying 
seeds for further development of forage cultivation among pastoralists. UCOPER-
Gogounou recently requested and obtained from the local authorities of Zougou-
Pantrossi Region, specifically in Fana-Peulh village, a grazing area of 103.75 ha for 
setting up a forage farm (UCOPER-Gogounou, 2013: 14). This project is expected 
to help cover the forage needs of some exotic cows to be imported to Gogounou with 
funds from external donors. This was the solution found to supply SOCOLAIG, a 
mini-dairy unit managed by UCOPER-Gogounou, closed down since 2010 due, 
inter alia, to shortage of milk on account of the massive outmigration of Fulani 
pastoralists.
Apart from forage crops, pastoralist associations also promote several types of 
livestock feed, namely agro-industrial by-products and mineral supplements. Fulani 
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associations promote cottonseed cake, grain bran, brewery waste and fishmeal. Stores 
have been built to conserve various livestock feeds that Fulani leaders sell to herders 
at a “good price”. To facilitate the feed supply, ANOPER Benin partners as needed 
with cottonseed oil-mills or other private businesses (CTA, 2004: 21). The govern-
ment livestock programs also provide support in this direction. For example, with 
support from the Livestock Ministry through the PAFILAV235 (Support Program 
for Milk and Meat Sectors), UDOPER B/A could supply about 50 tons of livestock 
concentrate feeds in 2013 in Borgou and Alibori Provinces (UDOPER B/A, 2014: 
40). Some donors also supported such livestock concentrate feeding initiatives by 
funding the supply of several tons of animal feed. However, the results were less posi-
tive for several reasons, including the newness of the products, the sale price consid-
ered too high by the pastoralists and some supply difficulties by Fulani associations 
(AFDI, 2012: 5f.).
Mineral supplements are also gradually being used by Fulani pastoralists in 
Gogounou. Mineral licks and multi-nutritional blocks have been available to herd-
ers since 2010. These products are locally manufactured by Fulani women trained 
by pastoralist associations. Between 2010 and 2013, 197 livestock supplement licks 
were produced in Gogounou (Boukari Bata, 2013: 53). These mineral concentrates 
are supplied at 2,000 CFA francs per unit, a cheaper price compared to that of con-
centrates imported and marketed by the feed-supply businesses.236 However, by Feb-
ruary 2014, local Fulani herders had purchased only 26 of the mineral licks (about 
13%). Demand for these products is low because they are not well known to the 
Fulani. Some incidents already mentioned in Chapter 7 (injuries and cuts to cattle 
tongues) also impeded the uptake of these lick blocks. Despite this, mineral sup-
plements are being produced in Gogounou and UCOPER-Gogounou even has an 
equipped manufacturing unit. The products are still in stock and their production is 
expected to increase in the coming years, along with a strong awareness campaign by 
Fulani leaders to improve their integration into livestock production practices. It ap-
pears that the pastoralist associations introduce new technologies, provide extension 
and advisory support and establish the institutional contacts necessary for change.
Demarcating and mapping livestock routes
In a context of land insecurity, identifying and mapping livestock corridors remains 
a key activity of the pastoralist associations; and there is seldom an annual action 
plan that does not include such operations. In Benin, the livestock routes or cor-
ridors are strips of land 25–50 meters wide that enable herders and their livestock 
235 Programme d’Appui aux Filières Lait et Viande.
236 Indeed, this activity benefits both herders and their associations. A profit margin of 5,800 CFA 
francs is generated when 10 kg of mineral licks are made from local raw materials costing about 1,700 
CFA francs. Otherwise, an imported lick block of less than two kg is sold by private operators for 
2,350 CFA francs (Boukari Bata, 2011: 12).
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to access grazing lands, water points, livestock markets, etc. In most cases, the live-
stock corridors are mapped by Fulani associations in partnership with the municipal 
authorities, donor representatives, the local structures in charge of agriculture and 
livestock, and representatives of all the local stakeholders. However, their life span is 
very limited due to the land insecurity to which the Fulani are subjected (cf. Chap-
ter 6). My stay among Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou for almost a year enabled 
me to understand that the perpetual resumption of these “peaceful pastoral mobility 
infrastructures” (Rosier, 2009) is not entirely irrelevant to the pastoralist association 
leaders, who also enjoy very much the funds provided each year by external donors. 
All of this seems in line with the projetose [Development project sickness] (Marty, 
1990: 126), which propels several international donors towards their doors. Many 
Fulani pastoralists regularly complained of dealing with “laawol” or “attal”, rather 
than “laadi na’i”237 and link this situation to the “toolon tirol” (vb. tolaago)238 of their 
leaders, whom they criticize sometimes of pursuing the “ceeɗe Batuure” (white peo-
ple’s money). One of the causes of dissatisfaction of Fulani pastoralists is that, despite 
well-funded budgets, some “corridors” are mapped in ways that do not always take 
into account their stated needs. This explains why the corridor issue is often a major 
one, since both farmers and herders are often guilty of not complying with the rules 
established consensually (PDC2 Gogounou, 2010: 47; Edja, 2014).
Unlike the trend in some municipalities, such as Banikoara, where livestock cor-
ridors mapped by Fulani leaders (cf. Figure 8.3) have been recognized by the mu-
nicipal authorities through administrative acts, the livestock routes in Gogounou 
District and many other regions in Benin have no legal status. This makes it difficult 
to prevent them from being taken over by annual or perennial crops and the like. 
Therefore, livestock mobility is not a reality along the corridors recently traced and 
signposted in Gogounou District. The corridors are either encroached by fields of 
cotton, maize or cashew orchards (cf. Chapter 6)239. In Banikoara, where the situ-
ation seems better, the 208 corridors, which vary in length from one to 75 km, 
with a total length of 2,020 km, were identified and officially certified by the Local 
237 The first two concepts (laawol and attal) refer to “ways” or “paths” that facilitate the movement 
of people in the bush by simply connecting point A to point B. Further, laawol can refer to ethnicity 
or social identity, while attal may also refer to an appointed social mediator. But the third concept 
(laadi na’i), which literally means “livestock passageway”, has a totally different meaning for herders. 
For the Fulani pastoralists, animal routes are more than bush trails. It is an infrastructure that strongly 
determines their pastoral identity (Edja, 2014).
238 This literally means a “joker”, in the sense that the person is well aware that the mapping of cor-
ridors, like other political rituals, is a means of taking advantage of the resources provided by donors.
239 For the last five years, the Municipal Authority of Gogounou has been planning to open up, 
rehabilitate and secure 200 km of livestock corridors, at a total cost of 10 million CFA francs (PDC2 
Gogounou, 2010: 135). However, there has been little action in this direction.
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Government. However, nothing prevented these corridors from also being complete-
ly narrowed by crop fields, dwellings, etc. (UCOPER-Banikoara, 2014: 8; Katé et 
al. 2015). 
Improving livestock market access and contributing to local development
The level of involvement of local pastoralists in livestock trade is said to have in-
creased with the advent of the MBA Gogounou. Figure 8.4 is drawn from the da-
tabase provided by the ALGMB-Gogounou and should be treated with caution, 
given the context of the data production; nevertheless, it gives an idea on the annual 
trends of livestock transactions within the MBA market of Gogounou in the period 
2003–2013.
The period 2003–2006 is characterized by a decrease in the number of animals 
sold in the market. The annual average number of animals sold is 527 cattle and 255 
small ruminants. This period corresponds to that of the stronghold of the Municipal 
Authority over the MBA in the decentralization era. The advent of decentraliza-
tion in Benin from 2003 destabilized the proper functioning of most MBA markets 
across the country by generating conflicts between Fulani leaders who claim legiti-
240 Source: Orou Guetido (2012: 20), redesigned and translated into English by the author.
Figure 8.3: Animal routes mapped and formalized in Banikoara District240
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mate paternity of those markets that were finally put under the control of Municipal 
Authorities by the decentralization acts. The competition between stakeholders for 
the control of revenues from the livestock trade is often fierce, and the rivalries and 
legitimacy demonstrations in this regard are very common (Guibert et al. 2009: 
61f.; Bonnassieux et al. 2013: 4; Houedassou, 2013: 154). The conflict between the 
Municipal Authority of Gogounou and Fulani leaders led to the downward trend 
in livestock transactions in the MBA livestock market, for reasons similar to what 
happened at the inception of the MBA. First, Fulani pastoralists were discouraged by 
their leaders from bringing their animals to the market, in order to strengthen their 
position in the political negotiations with the Local Government. Second, Fulani 
leaders challenged the Municipal Authority by purposely “misreporting” the transac-
tion data provided at the end of each market day. Third, the disagreements between 
stakeholders over control of the market also contributed to the return of the former 
trade brokers, threatening the principles of self-management and good accounting 
(Maroowo, 2007: 5). All these factors explain the decline during this period. Here 
again, as already shown in the Fulani outmigration data in Chapter 7, the “engineer-
ing of figures” is a strong lobbying and political bargaining tool that is skillfully used 
by pastoral civil society organizations in Benin.
The period 2007–2010 shows an increase in the number of animals sold in 
the market. This is the result of the relatively good partnership that prevailed after 
the signing on 4 December 2006 of a lease contract between the municipality of 
Gogounou and the Fulani leaders (UCOPER-Gogounou, 2006; Maroowo, 2007: 
8). The pastoralists were motivated again to bring animals into the local livestock 































Figure 8.4: Trend in the annual average number of animals sold from 2003 to 2013241
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market, while the financial governance system was also strengthened to secure confi-
dence and reliability between the contracting parties.
The period 2011–2013 shows a decline in the number of animals sold on the 
market, but with some exceptions. The sale of small ruminants continued to increase 
until the end of 2010. This explains their high annual average of 1,444 head sold. 
As for cattle, the decline was observed in 2010, when the average number of ani-
mals sold per year during this period was 802. The outmigration of Fulani pastoral-
ists from Gogounou and the bordering districts of northern Benin to other regions 
further south and to other countries (Togo, Ghana), helps to explains this trend. 
Fulani pastoralists began their perol and egirol moves with their cattle most notice-
ably from 2010 onwards. This explains the fall in the cattle sales in favor of small 
ruminants, upon which many of the Fulani households then relied. However, from 
2012 onwards, the number of small ruminants sold in the market also clearly began 
to decline and could be explained, inter alia, by the fall in the local population of 
small ruminants and the moving by truck of all the belongings of the migrant Fulani 
pastoralists. As is often stated by the market officials themselves, the MBA market 
of Gogounou currently depends mainly on animals brought in from other regional 
livestock markets, mainly by large livestock merchants. I will now present how MBA 
innovations enable fundraising to support the activities of pastoralist activists and to 
contribute to the bargaining power of Fulani leaders in negotiations with local po-
litical forces. This will be done with reference to Figure 8.5, which shows the yearly 
average amount of taxes collected in the MBA market of Gogounou from 2003 to 
2013. 





















































































Figure 8.5: Trend in average annual amount of tax collected from 2003 to 2013242
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From 2003 to 2013, the average annual amount of taxes collected from the MBA 
Gogounou was 17.845 million CFA francs. The increase between 2003 and 2010 
is due not only to the amount of tax tickets issued on the market, but also to the 
increase in tax levied per head of cattle, which rose from 1,000 CFA francs in 2003 
to 1,500 CFA francs in 2005 and finally to 2,000 CFA francs in 2006 after the 
signing of the lease contract between the Fulani leaders and the Local Government. 
The tax levied is currently 200 CFA francs per head of small ruminant sold in the 
market (UCOPER-Gogounou, 2006: 4). This amount was initially 50 CFA francs 
before being changed respectively to 100 CFA francs in 1988–2002, 150 CFA francs 
in 2003–2005, and finally 200 CFA francs from 2006 onwards as a result of the 
aforementioned lease contract (ibid). All the increases in livestock trading taxes did 
not, however, prevent the fall in the total amount collected in the market after 2010. 
This is indicative of the drop in the number of transactions. The outmigration of 
local herds since 2010 has remarkably influenced the level of fundraising within the 
MBA livestock market. Figure 8.6 depicts the evolution of the total yearly turnover 
of MBA Gogounou between 2003 and 2013 as well as the contribution to the mu-
nicipal budget. 
The annual average income of MBA Gogounou over the 2003–2013 period is 
30.413 million CFA francs. This consisted of 59% from taxes levied on livestock 
transactions and 41% of ancillary sources such as bike guard, truck loading and 
animal watering from the borehole of the market. The market workers are subject 
to penalties in case of delays, absence at work and involvement in fraud. There are 















































Figure 8.6: Trend in total income of MBA Gogounou and its contribution to the municipal 
budget from 2003 to 2013243
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also small taxes levied on food sales by women and on other trade in motorbikes, 
farming inputs and various other products widely demanded by the Fulani. The 
market management committee has also invested in recent years, with support from 
international donors, in building a hostel and a guest house that bring a significant 
income. The investments in agro-industrial livestock feeds, mineral supplements and 
veterinary products are also supposed to provide positive returns in the long run. The 
total income of MBA Gogounou significantly increased over time to reach a peak of 
98.052 million CFA francs in 2010, but decreased to 33.719 million CFA francs in 
2013. The turnover generated by the market is used to cover the salaries of the market 
workers and the association’s technical staff, while promoting various charitable and 
development activities such as students awards, and building and equipping schools, 
mosques and literacy centers (Onibon, 2004; Maroowo, 2007: 8; BAA, 2012). 
Beyond the potential of the self-managed livestock market to generate significant 
income to support the Fulani associations’ activities, it is also an important source on 
which the Local Government relies in funding local development initiatives. Over 
ten years (2003–2013), MBA Gogounou made an annual average contribution of 
4.307 million CFA francs to the budget of Gogounou Municipality. The trend in-
creased from 150 thousand in 2003 to 11.589 million CFA francs in 2012. But this 
contribution drastically dropped to 886 thousand in 2013. There were complaints 
from the Local Government leaders, who also deplore the considerable reduction in 
the funds they received from the MBA market that could go towards local develop-
ment activities.
The financial capacity of MBA Gogounou, and the high dependence of the mu-
nicipality on this for funding its development policy, puts the Fulani leaders in a 
strong position of power. The self-managed cattle market has become a powerful 
tool used by Fulani leaders to challenge the policy options and decisions of the lo-
cal political leaders. Accordingly, the antagonisms that emerged between the Mayor 
of Gogounou and the main Fulani leader have fueled in recent years several forms 
of mutual distrust, with consequences for local pastoralism. This reveals the power 
struggles and the “incapacitation” or “neutralization” strategies that can result from 
straddling between development brokerage and the exercise of local political power, 
when the two networks are not embodied in the same player (Blundo, 2000; Bier-
schenk et al. 2000: 32f.). If solutions have sometimes been found with mediation 
from international donors, as shown by the lease contract mentioned above, it has 
not always been the case, and local pastoralists tend to be victims of the partisan 
positions. 
Improving conflict management and promoting justice
Conflict resolution, although political, has multiple implications for livelihoods in 
pastoral areas (Devereux, 2006: 18). Conflict management is one of the most im-
portant areas of intervention of Fulani associations in Benin. The various grassroots 
branches of ANOPER record and manage a variety of conflicts involving Fulani 
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pastoralists and other actors (farmers, foresters, other State officials, etc.). Amicable 
settlement is favored in all conflicting situations (cf. Chapter 7). Although there are 
no official and reliable figures, Fulani pastoralists emphasize that the pastoralist as-
sociations play an important role in managing conflicts that occur in their daily lives. 
The conflict management approach is bottom-up ranging from the GPER in the vil-
lage to the ANOPER at national level (cf. Figure 8.2 above). At the provincial level, 
the UDOPER is involved whenever attempts to settle disputes peacefully through 
the local Fulani officials fail at the village, regional or district levels. This is why Edja 
(2012) stated that UDOPER is like an “Appeal Court” for Fulani pastoralists who 
can lodge an appeal whenever they are not satisfied with the decisions made by the 
lower bodies of conflict governance. Pursuing the same logic, I could also say that 
ANOPER is the “Supreme Court” for Fulani pastoralists. It is the highest mediation 
body where a peaceful settlement could still be expected for a conflict in which Fu-
lani herders oppose other actors. If the settlement fails definitively at this level, the 
conflict is then referred to the judicial apparatus.
However, some conflicts that involve intentional assault and battery, or death, 
are directly assigned to the relevant police offices. Similarly, some Fulani pastoralists 
who are seeking a faster and more effective treatment of their conflict situations skip 
all preliminary steps and call directly on the highest court (ANOPER), whose presi-
dent is also the “supreme judge”. The decisions of ANOPER’s president are final for 
all parties in conflict; otherwise, it falls into the hands of the judicial system and its 
experts, without pastoral leaders being totally in control of how things will turn out. 
The Fulani are generally satisfied with most of the judgments passed by their greatest 
leader, even if the farmers are sometimes disappointed and prefer in such cases to 
bring their issues to the police and the judicial bureaucracy.
The success of pastoralist associations in conflict resolution is recognized by most 
Fulani herders interviewed in this study. However, there are no reliable and up-
dated figures to prove it. L’Haridon (2012: 18) reported that out of 283 conflicts, 
recorded between 2006 and 2007, involving crop damage and cattle rustling, 89% 
were amicably settled. About 19% of these conflicts were managed amicably by the 
local leaders of UDOPER, who were involved in 37 mediation sessions between 
2004 and 2007. The personal involvement of ANOPER’s highest leaders and local 
leaders promotes a more peaceful conflict management. Some Fulani herders even 
claim that they owe their being in Gogounou to ANOPER and its leaders; otherwise, 
they would have also migrated out like their peers who are engaged in perol and egirol 
moves. The increasingly remarkable involvement of Fulani leaders in the local con-
sultation and decision-making bodies has successfully enabled better management of 
conflicts, which is also currently the case in Banikoara District, as reported by Katé 
et al. (2015).
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Another innovation in conflict governance by pastoralist associations in Benin is the 
recent appointment of a legal expert (Alankaliijo or Sirboowo)244 in the defense of the 
rights of Fulani herders. Conflict management has experienced a major change since 
2013. Apart from the small cases that can be managed amicably with the grassroots 
Fulani leaders, conflicts involving willful injuries and losses of lives are forwarded to 
the Legal Adviser of ANOPER, who is a lawyer recruited and paid through external 
funds. When ANOPER leaders are informed about hotbeds, the Legal Adviser is 
directly sent as part of a mission to investigate the case and take action to pursue the 
interests of the Fulani pastoralists involved. The main function of ANOPER’s lawyer 
is to understand the real causes of each major conflict. When sufficient evidence is 
found, he makes a complaint before the courts and tries to defend the pastoralists 
known locally as association members. During an interview that I had with the 
Legal Adviser of ANOPER, to better understand his position within the pastoralist 
organizations, he cited an African proverb that says, “Until the lions have their own 
historians, tales of the hunt will always glorify the hunter”. This portrays his work as 
a “historian” of Fulani pastoralists, which is concerned with correcting the “hunting 
stories” or wrongs they suffer from other social forces in the country. Conflict man-
agement definitely remains one of the most important sectors where ANOPER and 
its branches are greatly admired by their constituents.
Communicative power has greatly improved within pastoral civil society orga-
nizations in Benin during the last decade. Significant changes were recorded in the 
approaches of communication between the Fulani leaders at different levels, the 
experts and facilitators within the technical staff and the daily contacts with local 
pastoralists. Mobile telephony has greatly facilitated the degree of mobilization of 
Fulani activists and their closeness to their constituents. I was always amazed at how 
quickly Fulani leaders could get to the various hotbeds of tension through mobile 
phone calls. Aboard a sport utility truck (Toyota Four Wheel Drive Pickup, double 
cabin) acquired with external funding, Fulani representatives always travel with ease 
to assist the victims of the various clashes involving Fulani pastoralists and other ac-
tors. The gathering of relevant information often facilitates the better management 
of conflicts by the Legal Unit of ANOPER.
Designing and implementing advocacy and lobbying
The most common buzzwords within the pastoral civil society organizations in Benin 
during the last years include “advocacy” and “lobbying”. There are not many days 
that the Fulani leaders do not use these concepts to picture their achievements and 
show their ability to defend the interests of the pastoralists at the highest political 
level of the country. In effect, the advocacy and lobbying initiatives implemented by 
ANOPER rely extensively on international donors and some pan-African networks 
244 Alankaliijo (plur. Alankaliiɓe) means a counselor, while Sirboowo (plur. Cirbooɓe) refers to anyone 
who has the responsibility to mediate or make a judgment in a conflictual situation.
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of civil society organizations such as RBM and APESS, joined by ANOPER (cf. 
Chapter 2). The MBA and all the related innovations presented so far have largely 
contributed to an increase in the bargaining power of Fulani leaders with a variety 
of actors. Always presented as the secure solution for the development of pastoral-
ists, local collectivities and the country as a whole, Fulani leaders have imposed the 
self-managed cattle market as the technological model that preserves and improves 
Fulani livelihoods.
The MBA marketplace is often suggested as the first place to visit for the repre-
sentatives of transnational donors, who have contributed significantly to its “mod-
ernization”. I still remember all of the guided tours in which I also participated, 
where all of the market workers wore uniform (blue tunics and pants) and some 
carried the transaction record booklets (yellow booklets). These tours, headed by the 
permanent secretary of the market, tried to demonstrate the potential of the MBA 
in order to promote local development. We often visited the animal pens and the 
loading platforms, the traditional infrastructure that one would expect to find at any 
cattle market along with some modern touches (e.g. borehole, water tower, watering 
troughs, veterinary drugstore and livestock feed store). Fulani leaders also managed 
to seduce their audience by displaying their ingenuity through, a hostel and a guest 
house they had built, with support from external donors. These buildings were open 
for visiting at the market site. Demonstrations of this kind of social entrepreneurship 
were intended to arouse the generosity of reluctant donors to join those who already 
believed in the capabilities of Fulani leaders and to provide them with resources to 
make changes in pastoral areas. An administrative block consisting of three offices, 
shared by the technical staff of UCOPER-Gogounou, the permanent secretary and 
the cashier of the market, was sometimes intentionally showed off to donors.
In one of the offices, equipped with a desktop computer, sat a young lady, who 
worked as an “Accountant”, even though she had no background in accounting and 
had been trained on the job, Fulani leaders had managed to convince their foreign 
interlocutors about the professional and transparent management of the market re-
sources. An Excel spreadsheet was often opened to display how transactions were 
recorded and workers’ performances assessed. After this, visitors were usually taken 
off the market and then across the road to visit a lick-block manufacturing plant and 
a closed mini-dairy (SOCOLAIG) to complete the staging of technological progress, 
driven by the MBA and its promoters.
This kind of tour eventually ended at the headquarters of ANOPER, located 
about 200 meters from the marketplace. This is a building, located at the southern 
entrance of Gogounou District about 20 meters from the interstate lane Cotonou-
Niamey and painted yellow-brown – bearing in its upper front corner a dark green 
French inscription “SIEGE”245, with two copies of the logo of the association su-
perimposed on it. Here, Fulani leaders dressed in traditional clothes and hats are 
often found sitting around a long table, well decorated for the occasion. This could 
245 Headquarters.
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be perceived as a genuine encounter, where Fulani leaders praised and prized for 
their achievements, can bargain with various donors. The Fulani leaders are second 
in these negotiations to other more educated young Fulani, generally technical staff 
members, well and modernly dressed. The Fulani activists had laptops equipped with 
different GSM operators’ internet kits switched on, while taking notes during talks 
with the new visitors or current donors on tour. 
With various high-end phones in their hands, or next to them on the table, 
Fulani leaders did not prevent themselves from taking the many phone calls they 
received, so as to show somehow their closeness to their constituents and their con-
nection with the world. They were quick, if necessary, to brandish photos of different 
situations (conflict hotpots, training sessions, technology experiments and notewor-
thy events) or to use beamers to play videos recorded on various phenomena (MBA’s 
achievements, international encounters, cultural assets). In this regard, I was regu-
larly solicited by Fulani leaders, who always wanted to access digital copies of photos 
and video clips that I was taking during my research. All this enables them to gain 
credibility with outsiders and trust from their own constituents.
As an example, I repeatedly witnessed how the Fulani leaders showed themselves 
through a photo they had taken with the President of Benin Parliament during a 
hearing on 11 September 2013. This photo (cf. Photo 8.3), showing the ANOPER 
president and other members of the steering committee and the technical staff of the 
organization, is hung on the wall inside the head office of the organization. A sense 
of pride is delivered through this close-up shot that carries a symbolic value. It is 
proof of the advocacy and lobbying capability of the pastoral leaders. Therefore, it is 
constantly shown – sometimes even by taking it off the wall – to the various delega-
tions that come to ANOPER and the Fulani members during the major meetings.
During the Annual General Meeting of the association on 24 April 2014, where 
delegations from all the UCOPERs of Benin, state officials and donors represen-
tatives were present, this picture was exhibited to the pastoralists to demonstrate 
the power of their leaders and how their future is promising if they can stick to-
gether and stay united to allow for greater exploits. Other international meetings 
attended by the Fulani leaders were also viewed through video records and photos 
projected sometimes through PowerPoint. Shouts of joy, slogans and dances, noth-
ing was missed that day to celebrate the success of the pastoralists; although some of 
them would return moments later to land threatened by expropriation. This descrip-
tion shows that pastoral leaders in their advocacy strategies manage the meaning of 
various technologies (cf. Cohen and Comaroff, 1976), enabling them to develop the 
proper rhetorical discourses of development, to engage the external donors and to 
strengthen their local and nationwide patron-clientage networks.
Fulani leaders, as professional development brokers (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 
27f.), were also able to meet the President of the Republic of Benin, whom they 
strongly support and for whom they mobilize the Fulani electorate, several times in 
person. On 30 November 2013, ANOPER leaders submitted to the Head of State 
a Pastoralist Memorandum in which the potentials of and the threats to pastoral-
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ism were widely portrayed, and his favor was sought to better take into account the 
concerns of the Fulani (ANOPER, 2013a). This feat was constantly repeated during 
my research stay in Gogounou by the Fulani leaders at all meetings of the herders, 
either alone or together with external partners, to demonstrate how Benin’s Fulani 
nowadays can communicate directly with the laamu leydi (Father of the Nation) 
to deal with their issues. I remember the speech of the ANOPER president, who 
exhibited at a meeting on 25 April 2014 at the headquarters of the association, his 
good relationship with the President of the Republic: he could call the President by 
phone to discuss the problems of pastoralists. A round of applause went up from 
the participants, who showed great pride in and satisfaction with their leaders. This 
was followed by a set of slogans such as potal men, womi semme men to say, “unity is 
strength”. I then realized that I was following live one of the symbolic rituals already 
well known about the Fulani of northern Benin (Guichard, 1990; 1992; Bierschenk, 
1992; 1995).
ANOPER, with support from international donors, was recently able to initiate 
and lobby the process of drafting a pastoral code in Benin. A delegation of pastoral 
leaders and Members of Benin’s Parliament visited the Sahelian countries such as 
Niger and Burkina Faso, in order to inquire about their experiences in the develop-
ment and implementation of pastoral codes. A commission was set up afterwards to 
draft the pastoral code to be submitted for vote in the Parliament. This is expected 
Photo 8.3: Fulani leaders with the President of Benin’s Parliament, photo hung on wall in 
ANOPER head office in Gogounou
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to bring significant change in the land situation of Fulani pastoralists and to enable 
them to have sustainable access to natural resources. The strategic guidance docu-
ment (DOS246) recently developed by ANOPER and its branches is also expected 
to allow the Fulani organizations to reconnect the past and the present trends of the 
pastoralism in Benin, to open up the path for a better future (cf. ANOPER, 2014).
The media are key tools in the communication strategies of pastoralist associa-
tions. Fulani leaders use radio stations with local, regional or national coverage as 
well as public and private TV stations to share information among pastoralists and 
to lobby the public authorities. With support from international partners, the ac-
tivities of pastoralist associations have gained increasing media coverage. Some are 
part of raising awareness of herders on various aspects of livestock production (press 
releases, market information, etc.), while others aim to put pressure on policymak-
ers (televised panel, press conference, etc.). In the latter case, ANOPER organizes 
an annual press conference (cf. Photo 8.4), often covered by television, radio and 
newspapers, to expose the abuses suffered by Fulani pastoralists (Agbikodo, 2013; 
Kouagou, 2013; own field records and notes, 2014). This often takes place the day 
after the Annual General Meeting of the association, when all the local and regional 
branches are present. Symbolic discourses by various Fulani officials are sent out to 
246 Document d’Orientation Stratégique.
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publicly regret the relegation of pastoralism to last place in the government’s rural 
development policy. The contribution of Fulani herders to the socioeconomic devel-
opment and peaceful political situation in Benin are often highlighted. The messages 
of Fulani leaders regularly criticize or accuse, in a veiled manner, the political and 
administrative authorities. 
In summary, advocacy and lobbying by pastoral civil society organizations have 
become more visible, are well covered by the media and provide significant symbolic 
capital among the Fulani. However, practical solutions are far from being found 
for the everyday pastoralist concerns in terms of land rights and access to natural 
resources. The evidence is the critical land exclusion prevailing in Gogounou, where 
three of the most active pastoralist associations in Benin (ANOPER, UDOPER 
B/A and UCOPER-Gogounou) all have their head offices and where most of their 
highest officials are based. This is not unknown to local pastoralists, who express it 
sometimes in many ways. A Fulani herder of Djolè camp, criticizing the association 
leaders, mockingly told me during a conversation that: “Driving big cars, going to 
Parakou and Cotonou all the time, meeting the President of Republic, or browsing 
Africa and the whole world does not mean that solutions are found for Fulani prob-
lems” (field notes, 07/05/14). These critiques generally have to do with the more 
concrete outcomes expected by the pastoralists from their spokespersons (cf. Coll, 
2000: 118; Hodgson, 2011: 108).
Dealing with ambiguities, cultivating the interfaces8.8 
Social scientists have recently used the concept of “ambiguity” to describe a number 
of ambivalent options and positions of the Fulani civil society organizations, in their 
ways of organizing Fulani ethnicity and achieving socio-political inclusion (Coll, 
2000: 111; Hagberg, 2011; Ciavolella, 2013). This also has to do with the “cultiva-
tion of the interface”, in that Fulani leaders in their brokerage strategies, position 
themselves between different individuals, organizations or worlds. Therefore, they 
navigate between “inside” and “outside”, and use the rules and resources mobilized 
from the different worlds in shaping both “identity” and “otherness” (Coll, 2000: 
109). I present some interfaces used by Fulani leaders, brokers in development, in 
their struggle to make a better life for their constituents. After having detailed how 
ANOPER and its agencies fight for pastoralists to obtain the legitimacy of their rep-
resentation, I present now how Fulani activists manage interfaces.
Between single-ethnicity and multi-ethnicity
The pastoral civil society organizations in Benin depend on external funding. The 
associations receive abundant support from international partners. Despite the sig-
nificant financial potential with its livestock markets and other related initiatives, 
self-financing is not yet a reality. The situation has further deteriorated with the mas-
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sive emigration of herds to other countries. The markets are in decline and income-
generating activities lack customers. In short, everything that made the fame and 
the financial power of the Fulani associations and their leaders is in decline. Most 
activities cited in this chapter would not be possible without the support from exter-
nal donors. This requires action to preserve credibility before external partners, since 
only the capacity to raise their own funds will make the organizations sustainable. 
This is a crucial issue, well known by the Fulani leaders themselves, as it appeared in 
a report by UDOPER B/A: 
Only the raising of our own funds and the respect of the distribution key 
of the members’ contributions can make an organization credible before its 
partners. One thing desirable is to strengthen the fundraising. This may al-
low a sovereignty of the organization, the implementation of its activities and 
services to its members. (Boukari Bata, 2012: 18)
The withdrawal of outside donors remains a threat for ANOPER (AFDI, 2012: 7), 
even if it seems to have acquired credibility from many of them (CTA, 2004: 21; 
SOS-Faim, 2014: 6). Therefore, it has become important to take action to increase 
capital and achieve self-funding as much as possible. The membership was then revis-
ited and the conditions to access the services of the association were further clarified. 
The boundaries of membership were always vague within the Fulani professional 
groups in Benin. Although membership was optional and subjected to certain con-
ditions already mentioned in the first part of this chapter, being a Fulani pastoralist 
was almost synonymous with being a member of UDOPER. All the Fulani could 
then benefit from the services of UDOPER, since it was their walde men and potal 
men.247 UDOPER was usually portrayed as a common and non-excludable good, at 
the service of all Fulani. The quest for legitimacy did not allow Fulani leaders, the 
founders of the association, to exclude those who were not paying either member-
ship fees or annual contributions. The only time that Fulani leaders are often able to 
collect money from the local Fulani pastoralists is during the compulsory vaccination 
sessions. All herders who attend these sessions often have on their heels the represen-
tatives of the associations or veterinary officials who cooperate with Fulani leaders to 
mobilize funds.
Recently, talks about membership have changed in order to exclude the Fulani 
“free-riders” who take refuge in ethnicity to receive services without fulfilling their 
obligations. The last reform of 2014 provides conditions for excluding certain Fulani 
pastoralists from benefiting from the services of the pastoral civil society organiza-
tions. This is to avoid the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), attributed to 
those who benefit from the services without contributing to keeping the association 
247 The two concepts are used by Fulani to mean they are among themselves, people sharing the same 
social identity, making consensus around a minimum of moral values, and fighting against the same 
enemies.
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alive. Remaining alive means achieving self-financing and being credible to the ex-
ternal donors. Self-financing ensures the credibility of the associations and improves 
their bargaining power (Maroowo, 2007: 7). This is why the individual cash contri-
bution is always portrayed as being the lifeline of the collective action: “ceeɗe laatiwa 
ɓogool nyonki”. The exclusion from ANOPER services, recently considered by its 
leaders, aims at avoiding the aforementioned drama, which will make pastoralist 
associations unable to provide adequate services to their members. This issue was 
broadly discussed during the Annual General Meeting on 24 April 2014, and the 
following point was made by the ANOPER president: 
We will no longer provide services to everybody. Only our members will ben-
efit from our services. When someone will call us to come and settle his prob-
lem, the first thing we will check is his membership card. Every herder has 
to pay his membership fees, which entitles him to a membership card, and 
[he] must also regularly pay his annual contributions. If he fulfills all these 
conditions, we will move to assist him. Otherwise, we will no longer do some-
thing for the people who are not up to date and who call us when they are in 
trouble. We are not forcing anyone to join. Membership is optional and our 
support will go henceforth to our members. (Demmo Cheenon, Gogounou, 
24/04/14)
Demmo’s public statement clearly indicates that ANOPER is increasingly giving 
priority to membership over ethnicity. It will no longer suffice to be a Fulani in 
order to be systematically defended by ANOPER and its decentralized branches. 
The member, regardless of his ethnic background, has the privilege of accessing the 
association’s services. It might also be one of the reasons why the concept of marooɓe 
(sing. maroowo) has gained prominence over durooɓe (sing. duroowo) in the official 
and informal language of the Fulani leaders in Benin (cf. also Ciavolella, 2013).248 
The latter generally refers to the traditional livestock farmers and mobile Fulani pas-
toralists, very attached to their socio-cultural identity, an identity that is supposed to 
be preserved by ANOPER and the like. The former refers to all livestock owners who 
do not necessarily have a commitment to mobility. The exclusion reform was also 
reinforced by a number of measures including the upward revision of the amount 
of the annual contribution of the members. This amount increased from 1,200249 to 
2,000 CFA francs. Moreover, the allocation of membership funds between the dif-
248 Durooɓe literally means “grazers”, and marooɓe literally means “livestock owners”, but in common 
speech, the Fulani leaders use durooɓe to refer to the Fulani herders and marooɓe when vaguely refer-
ring to all livestock farmers including the non-Fulani agro-herders. To avoid confusion, sometimes 
they say durooɓe marooɓe to accurately target the Fulani pastoralist audience.
249 This was claimed to be based on the willingness of herders to contribute 100 CFA francs per 
month (cf. Maroowo, 2007: 8). One could then understand by this the willingness of livestock farm-
ers to contribute 167 CFA francs per month.
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ferent branches was also reviewed, so as to enable better management of their own 
funds and to stimulate the generosity of the international donors. 
This strategy of disavowing ethnicity by claiming the primacy of the up-to-date 
“member” over the “Fulani” is a way for Fulani associations to preserve their image 
before international donors, while maintaining the legitimacy to be representatives 
of not only Fulani, but also the “others” viz. haaɓe. The ethnic richness within ANO-
PER, as argued by L’Haridon (2012: 16), also adds legitimacy to its relationships 
with the Government and other socio-professional groups. Although Fulani leaders 
have kept the ethnic character of the association, controlling the key positions within 
the Executive Board, and even the salaried technical staff (cf. also L’Haridon, 2012: 
19), they must now better consider the presence of members with other ethnic back-
grounds. The ambitions of the latter to head their common association in the future 
could become an issue in the medium and long term. Towards the end of the 2014 
General Meeting, some ANOPER members present asked whether there would be 
an election, since the renewal of the steering committee should be among the items 
on the agenda. The ANOPER coordinator, who was the master of ceremonies, gave 
this answer: 
Those who are currently on the Executive Board did not tell us that they 
are tired of leading us. We did not record any resignation among them. The 
constitution of the association has planned a renewable term of five years. 
They have already completed seven years, but they are ready to continue [as 
Executive Committee members]. Therefore, there is no election. (Field notes 
24/04/14)
The lack of leadership alternation, which is an important democratic principle, is 
one of the strategies often known to development brokers who generally seek to keep 
the monopoly of brokering between their donors and their local constituents (Coll, 
2000: 118). This could become a major issue in the coming years if other non-Fulani 
or even Fulani brokers emerge from ANOPER and its decentralized structures. 
The ambiguity of ANOPER in dealing with open membership was sometimes 
very obvious during meetings of the organization. The association’s language of com-
munication is Fulfulde. Most major meetings were held in Fulfulde with transla-
tions into French. Participants from other ethnic groups who understand neither 
French nor Fulfulde regard themselves as being marginalized by the Fulani. During 
the General Meeting that I attended on 24 April 2014, several participants from 
central and southern Benin regularly asked for a translation into French of Fulani 
leaders’ statements. Participants who did not even understand French could not fol-
low what was said at that meeting. Some statements said to be part of haala Fulɓe 
or hakkune Fulɓe250 were even made in Fulfulde and purposely not translated. This 
250 The words haala Fulɓe literally mean “talk of Fulani” and hakkune Fulɓe literally means “space 
between Fulani”. These two concepts are regularly used by Fulani leaders to refer to things that other 
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kind of Fulani-targeted information was often related either to the political position 
of Fulani leaders (which might not necessarily be shared by their members from fur-
ther south) or to their tendency to use the occasion of ANOPER member meetings 
to make arrangements within and discuss important issues concerning their own 
ethnic group. During the General Assembly of 24 April 2014, some speeches were 
addressed alternately by various Fulani elites to lecture the Fulani youth. Leaving 
school voluntarily, getting married without finishing studying, getting drunk, being 
on drugs, raping, robbing and other antisocial acts were treated during the gathering 
without a word being translated for ANOPER non-Fulani members.
On this same occasion, two representatives of the Fulani students’ association 
from the University of Parakou also came and were given the floor to share a message 
from their club to their Fulani parents. In his speech, the Secretary General of this 
student group, often sponsored by ANOPER and its heads, stated: 
A wise child remains close to his father and inherits from him while he is still 
alive. But a foolish child, away from his parents, inherits after their death, 
wind and dust. This is why we came to show our support for you, our parents, 
during this meeting. In the name of all our comrades, we reassure you that we 
are on your side and we strongly support you for safeguarding the interests of 
our entire community. (Field notes, 25/04/14) 
No one could doubt that we were part of an ethnic encounter. This demonstration 
reached its highest point with a concert offered that night by the Fulani leaders to 
the participants on 24 April 2014. A Fulani traditional musical group invited from 
Banikoara District played Fulani rhythms and performed Fulani dances. Thus, the 
cultural talent and assets of the Fulani were displayed to the non-Fulani members, 
who travel annually to Gogounou to attend the General Meeting of their joint as-
sociation. This pilgrimage seems legitimate for anyone who regards himself as a live-
stock farmer or pastoralist, regardless of his ethnic background. All local and regional 
branches of the association must send representatives to the head office. Gogounou 
has become a symbol of pastoralism in Benin, and Fulani leaders take advantage of 
being at the interface between a single ethnicity and the open membership of the 
organizations.
ethnic groups should not hear. This is part of the “internal scheming” of the Fulani ethnic group. 
These are the secrets of the Fulani and those of their common paternal homestead (suudu baba).
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Between traditionalism and modernism
ANOPER, which globally aims at “contributing to the modernization and the sus-
tainable development of ruminant livestock production in Benin” (CTA, 2010; 
ANOPER, 2013b), has recently opted for an equilibrium model that seeks a balance 
between the Fulani traditional livestock practices and the Western-like modernist 
livestock farming. This was believed to be the wisest way of ensuring the sustainable 
development of Fulani pastoralism.
Keeping pastoralism in its traditional form means supporting livestock accumu-
lation, and therefore the depletion of natural resources in the absence of effective 
regulations that prevent each actor to act only on his own interests: an argument 
from the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). This traditionalistic model, as-
sumed to be socially unviable by Fulani activists, was claimed by them to lead to the 
end of pastoralism in Benin. Signs of this are increasingly obvious, as recent develop-
ment in land-use practices has made it difficult to access resources and has increased 
conflicts between actors (ANOPER, 2014).
Likewise, agribusiness, which is currently practiced by 0.13% of the livestock 
farmers in Benin, and which continues to influence governmental policies, was de-
cried by the Fulani organizations. This modern system, based on exotic breeds, raised 
in intensive or semi-intensive systems, is currently found in some state farms and 
other farms by private peri-urban operators. It is overtly blamed for being capital-
demanding, energy-consuming, labor-intensive, environmentally unfriendly, and 
unaffordable for small-scale family livestock farms. It is also generally accused of 
promoting land grabbing and marginalizing therefore the pastoral and agro-pastoral 
small-scale livestock family farms that will probably vanish as a result of agribusiness 
development. ANOPER (2014) claimed that, if agribusiness becomes the dominant 
production model, 95% of current livestock farmers in Benin would be adversely 
affected, with social setbacks being unemployment, inequality, poverty, rural-urban 
migration and a rise in conflict and other social vices. 
To avoid the “tragedies” related to the two models described above – as predict-
ed by development experts and handed over to pastoralist activists – Fulani leaders 
in line with international donor agendas promote so-called “transformed livestock 
farming” (ANOPER, 2014: 43). Therefore, Fulani pastoralists must consent to the 
following changes: reducing the size of their herds, limiting transhumance, and 
adopting new strategies and new technologies, as needed, to make proper use of the 
available resources to which they currently have access. The pastoralists must fur-
ther improve their cooperation with crop-farming stakeholders in order to promote 
better management of common resources. The pastoral code project initiated by 
ANOPER was in line with this. The complementarities between both crop farming 
and pastoral livelihoods are now given greater attention, as both are believed to help 
safeguard the interests of Fulani pastoralists, and provide positive socio-economic 
and environmental outcomes.
272 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
The major challenge for Fulani leaders that remains is achieving this balance be-
tween traditionalism and modernism. This is difficult since there is no barometer to 
measure the degree to which traditional Fulani values (assets, knowledge and power 
related to livestock) will be preserved in the restructured livestock-farming model 
that they currently support. Evidence of this is found in the technological progress 
among Fulani pastoralists in the last years. Fodder farms are promoted and are being 
tested by many herders. Fulani leaders are also eager to import exotic cattle breeds 
to increase herd productivity in order to supply the milk-processing factories that 
are being built across the pastoral regions. Cattle markets are being built and mod-
ernized across the country. Veterinary pharmacies are being set up, as well as, small 
businesses that manufacture mineral supplements. Industrial concentrate feeds are 
gaining in popularity and modern veterinary treatments are on the rise. Pastoralism 
has evolved in Benin and, as I have shown in the previous chapter, only those who 
have fully taken advantage of these changes to diversify their livelihoods have been 
able to adapt to the ongoing crisis.
Through their claims to fight for the preservation of Fulani traditional values, 
Fulani leaders have contributed immensely to transform the pastoral practices by fit-
ting these claims into the agendas of many international donors. With the continued 
involvement of local and international experts, Fulani brokers are now very accus-
tomed to “development projects”, “action plans” and “business plans”, which they 
develop and implement in various aspects of livestock production. Fulani men and 
women are invited almost daily to information meetings, trainings or other forms 
of encounters that involve donors and other visitors. Everyone is used to receiving 
a “per diem”, which refers to the attendance allowances that are well appreciated by 
Fulani pastoralists. Those who are closer to the highest leaders seemed more privi-
leged, as they were always invited to different gatherings. The cases of Sidi Fana and 
Sanda Wesseke presented in Chapter 7 are cases in point. The close relationships 
of these two pastoralists with the ANOPER leaders allowed them to build their 
respective adaptive livelihood trajectories in the prevailing context of crisis. I argue 
that the struggle of pastoralist organizations in Gogounou has made a new class of 
Fulani livestock farmers well accustomed to development projects, and involved, to 
some extent, in socio-technological change with slightly “modern” ways of breeding 
livestock.
Between civil society and political society
Development brokerage and politics are interdependent (Sahlins, 1963: 292; Blundo, 
1995; Bierschenk et al. 2000). Both patron-clientage networks often interfere, with 
the broker who adopts strategies that make his actions look like a political campaign 
(Coll, 2000: 113). Some practices of Fulani leaders enable a better understanding of 
this phenomenon.
Beyond the topical information found in the Dewtere habaruuji Marooɓe, the 
bulletin issued in both French and Fulfulde by the Fulani associations, at times, po-
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litical issues are also included. The actions of the President of Benin Republic were 
sometimes addressed, contributing thereby to his propaganda. It is quite ambiguous 
to read Fulani herders reporting in their newsletters with photographs of the Presi-
dent of Benin undertaking salutary reforms in cotton production (Maroowo, 2008: 
12), a sector they often blame for competing with their pastoral livelihoods and for 
being privileged by the Government. This contradiction between the “reality” and 
the written discourse is part of a quest to position oneself in the political arena con-
trolled by the President, whom Fulani leaders emotionally call laamu leydi (Father of 
the Nation) or mawɗo leydi (Highest Authority). Other events further demonstrate 
the political commitment of the pastoral civil society organizations in Benin:
During the ANOPER meeting on 25 April 2014 in the presence of all the repre-
sentatives of all UCOPERs in Benin, the president of the organization regretted the 
absence of the state officials invited for the event, and stated:
When elections come up, politicians need us. [But they] never come to our 
meetings. MPs, Ministers, Prefects and Mayors, nobody has come to this 
event. But when elections approach, they know that they must come to us 
to vote for them. This is why I say and I repeat that we, Fulani, we must be 
careful. We cannot continue voting for people who do not want to help us. 
(Demmo Cheenon, Gogounou, 25/04/14).
After describing what he called a lack of consideration for pastoralists, he went fur-
ther, presenting a totally bleak picture of the situation of pastoralists:
The Fulani were killed. The animals of Fulani were killed and their food gra-
naries were also burned. None of them [state officials] came to at least comfort 
the victims. I repeat again, none of them came to our rescue. A police officer 
killed a Fulani with a gun because of 25 thousand CFA francs. Those who are 
supposed to protect and defend us are killing us. If a Fulani has problems, he 
is supposed to go to the police to find refuge. It is now the police who shoot 
the Fulani, and nobody cares. Many Fulani were killed and buried in the same 
grave, many cattle disappeared, and no MP and no Minister came here. But 
if one Bariba dies, it is the President of the Republic himself who will take his 
helicopter to visit. If only one pile of cotton is burned, the whole Republic is 
shaken. Ministers, MPs, all ruling officials in this country come to the rescue. 
But when hundreds of cattle are decimated, it does not concern anyone. If it 
is so, we Fulani, we must know our place. (Demmo Cheenon, Gogounou, 
25/04/14)
Demmo’s speech continues, calling now for a general mobilization of the Fulani 
herders to meet together their life purpose:
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I say all this loud and clear for us to be more united. When elections come 
[...], they do everything to sow division among us, and we cannot support 
each other to win; and it is the people who do not want to support us, who 
win the elections. […]. I want to say to all those who are here, and who are 
livestock farmers. Let me tell you, whether you are Fon, Mina, Adja, Goun, 
Yoruba, Bariba, Dendi, Mokolé or Fulani; whoever you are, if you are a live-
stock farmer [marooɓe], consider that we are of the same family. We have to 
be careful. Our goods are being destroyed. Those who are supposed to defend 
us do not want to defend us. [...]. We must stand up as one man and fight for 
our future. (Demmo Cheenon, Gogounou, 25/04/14)
Demmo, in his statement, convinced the pastoralists that the only way to defend 
successfully their interests is to unite and vote in the next elections for people who 
can really defend their rights. He compared a cattle herd to a small pile of cotton 
(however promoted in UDOPER’s newsletters) to show how livestock and crops do 
not receive the same attention from the Government. He sent out the message that 
the incidents Fulani herders have suffered in recent years did not receive consolation 
from any political authority. Therefore, the Fulani must in a united manner stand 
up to have some of their leaders elected in the political decision-making bodies. 
Since ANOPER is a national association, all other ethnic groups present were called 
to promote “interethnic harmony”, which would enable Fulani leaders to gain a 
stronger position to defend their common good, which is “livestock”. Being labeled 
“livestock farmer” has become a strategy of the leaders of marginal groups to enroll 
the dominant groups for their own purposes of political patronage.
After this statement of the highest Fulani leader, several participants took turns 
speaking to show the need for the Fulani to have their own representatives in the 
political machinery. A first group of participants pointed out that the Fulani already 
have Ministers and MPs, and worried about how the situation of the Fulani is going 
from bad to worse, without their officials in the state apparatus being keen to defend 
them. But other participants quickly countered this by showing that the people most 
concerned about the future of the Fulani pastoralists have yet to be elected. They 
argued that it is not enough to be Fulani to defend the rights of the Fulani, but that 
the Fulani defenders must be elected by their association’s active members. 
As someone who has been pro-actively involved in the associative struggle for a 
long time, Demmo succeeded in legitimizing himself publicly as the only one who 
carries this burden of defending the interests of the Fulani. A participant finally 
asked him to be a candidate in the coming legislative elections so that the Fulani 
could vote for him. He expressed his loyalty to support the probable candidacy of the 
Fulani leader, by publicly and joyfully asking Demmo to lend him a heifer, by way of 
a covenant (haɓɓanaaye)251. Demmo then proudly stood up and volubly through the 
251 The heifer loan (haɓɓanaaye or haɓɓana’e) is a cultural institution already well presented in Chap-
ter 2.
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mike, declared: “Be it unto you immediately as you have desired”. Shouts and cheers 
could be heard as a way of endorsing this scene of solidarity across a socio-cultural in-
stitution like haɓɓanaaye, the content of which became politicized on this occasion.
All of this was part of the staging of the political brokerage for which Fulani 
leaders in my field of study are famous. The Fulani elites of northern Benin are 
well known for their potential to politicize the Fulani ethnicity and blithely gener-
ate identity statements, as far as their own patron-clientage interests are concerned 
(Guichard, 1992: 522; 2000: 97). Demmo, who had already lost in a legislative elec-
tion in Benin four years earlier, had not relented in his ambition to reach the Parlia-
ment. Accordingly, he had already started preparing for this. The General Meeting 
of ANOPER was a great opportunity to prepare his constituencies. As portrayed in 
various pre-campaign objects used in pastoralist camps during my research, Demmo 
was a member of a local political alliance called AFU (Alliance Force dans l’Unité), 
meaning “Strength in Unity Alliance”. This coalition, formed by Demmo with two 
other politically strong Bariba locals, also falls within his municipal authority and 
neutralization strategy that I mentioned earlier. The messages delivered to the pasto-
ralists were meaningful as they appear on a pre-campaign calendar: Ensemble, on est 
plus fort (Together we are stronger); Bâtissons maintenant, la commune de Gogounou 
(Let us build now the district of Gogounou); Ensemble poursuivons le développement 
de nos localités (Let us pursue together the development of our areas). Different kinds 
of calendars were widely distributed to the Fulani pastoralists who guard them closely 
in their houses. I often found them at the bedside of pastoralists in the Fulani camps 
during my stay in Gogounou. 
I was informed a few months after my return from the field to Germany that 
Demmo, who was finally included on a list by the political ruling alliance FCBE252 
(Cowry Forces for an Emerging Benin), was – much to the dismay of many Fulani 
pastoralists – not able to sit in Parliament due to his substitute position during the 
April 2015 legislative elections in Benin.253 However, he succeeded in having his 
eldest son elected as the First Deputy Mayor of Gogounou in the aftermath of the 
June–July 2015 local and municipal elections in Benin. This was possible through 
his renunciation of his former political alliance to go with a new political grouping 
in the northern Benin called the “Alliance Soleil” (Sun Alliance), for which the Fu-
lani had overwhelmingly voted. The political achievement of the associative struggle 
among the Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou is that they have now a substitute MP, a 
Deputy Mayor and other local and municipal Fulani counselors. There appears to be 
a conciliation of the political commitment with the apolitical vocation which many 
opine should characterize the Fulani associations (cf. MCRI, 2009: 1). Thus, the 
252 Force Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent.
253 The fact of putting Demmo in substitute position on the FCBE candidates’ list generated a crisis 
in Gogounou District, where young people and women mobilized to ask the President of the Repub-
lic to review the position of their leader (Nouvelle Expression, 2015: https://web.archive.org/web/201 
50317023955/http://nouvelle-expression.org/article-524.html, accessed 10/12/17).
276 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
boundary between civil society and political society remains elusive in Benin (Pirotte 
and Poncelet, 2003: 7; Mestre and Tomety, 2004: 50; Bierschenk, 2009: 353; Sonon, 
2011: 6). 
In summary, Demmo defended the Fulani pastoralists by instituting the so-called 
“fair” livestock markets (MBA). Then, he established grassroots associations to de-
fend their interests with support from various external partners. Having succeeded 
in the civil society struggle, the highest leader of Fulani associations in Benin recon-
verted his activism-generated resources into political capital, to be, as he repeatedly 
argued, more useful to his ethnic group. The marginal conditions of the Fulani are 
used in campaign messages to engage the masses by using slogans that evoke either a 
sense of misery or a sense of hope. All of these campaigns are integrated into a politi-
cal framework that can be revised whenever their chances of success are threatened 
by one or another political alliance. In any case, “bigmanism” (Cameron, 2001: 63; 
Igoe, 2003: 875)254 allows an individual like Demmo to succeed in a kind of political 
transhumance that is supported by loyal “clientele”. The evolution of pastoral civil 
society organizations in Benin, closely linked to the life trajectory of their highest 
leader, Demmo, shows the straddling of identity, development and political struggles 
among Fulani. The power built over time and the decision-making processes seem 
sometimes to suggest a struggle by proxy with associations that are like figureheads 
(Marty, 1990: 126).
Conclusion 8.9 
I have shown in this chapter that, by specializing in the identity struggle initiated by 
Fulani elites in the 1980s, some Fulani leaders, organized around self-managed live-
stock markets, have become professional development brokers (cf. Bierschenk et al. 
2000: 27f.). They mobilize several levels of skills, not just rhetorical, organizational, 
theatrical and relational, but that also include the design and implementation of 
development projects and access to decision-making arenas without intermediaries. 
This success does not seem to be premeditated, but falls within continuous processes 
of positioning and repositioning of Fulani leaders in the face of constraints and op-
portunities in their activism (cf. Hodgson, 2011). This is proof of the procedural or 
discovery logic in development brokerage (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 27). 
Seeking to fulfill the agendas of international donors, to align with government 
policies and to fulfill themselves economically and socio-politically, they find them-
selves between a “rock and a hard place” (Igoe and Kelsall, 2005. 9f.). Their constitu-
ents have been unable to overcome the exclusion against which they have struggled 
for more than three decades. Despite the presence of three major umbrella orga-
nizations in Gogounou District working with many local Fulani groups, the land 
calamity and the growing exclusion described in Chapter 6 have yet to be prevented 
254 Referring to the big-man, described by Sahlins (1963).
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and continue to be the main causes of the outmigration of pastoralists and their 
animals. 
Still, the situation has changed significantly and pastoral civil society organiza-
tions have better access than before to decision-making bodies and international 
development agencies, the actions of which are visible nationwide. Pastoralism itself 
has also changed considerably. Fulani pastoralists have better access to information 
and veterinary services. They are also provided with livestock feeding technologies 
and appreciate very much the new way of marketing livestock through autonomous 
markets. They also admire the approach used by their leaders to settle their conflicts. 
These successes in various technological and institutional innovations are precisely 
why L’Haridon (2012: 15) gave his text the following title: “Herders in northern 
Benin become more professional”. 
However, the transformations acknowledged by most of the Fulani pastoralists 
involved in this research, should not be considered as synonymous with the resolu-
tion of their main concerns. They are still facing land insecurity. They do not hold 
any right over land and have to deal every day with land expropriation as abundantly 
shown in this book.

General conclusion9 
Pastoralism at the crossroads:  
The future of Fulani at stake?
The main objective of this research was to analyze the socio-technological transforma-
tions occurring within pastoral communities in northern Benin. More specifically, it 
called for identifying the changes in access to pastoral resources by Fulani pastoralists 
and scrutinizing the individual and collective responses as favored by various tech-
nological and socio-economic arrangements. I intended to contribute to the current 
debate on development at the margins, oriented towards pastoral sustainability in 
Africa. To achieve this, I first questioned the availability of productive resources us-
ing a political ecology perspective. I have shown how pastoralists are facing exclusion 
since farmers have access to various technologies that they use to control land and 
natural resources. Second, I have shown that in a crisis situation, Fulani households 
respond with a wide array of strategies according to their perception and the assets 
they possess. Third, I have shown that a strong “pastoral civil society” has emerged 
in Benin in recent years and has contributed greatly in transforming pastoralism, 
even if the main issues of grassroots pastoralists remain unresolved. This last chapter 
of the book recalls the main findings and discusses the major contributions of my 
research to the existing knowledge on the evolution of pastoralism in West Africa. I 
have also suggested some lines of action that could lead to help pacify and develop 
the livestock sector.
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Uncertainties and pastoral adaptation trajectories  9.1 
in Benin
The first specific objective of this research was to provide insight on how access to 
pastoral resources was possible or potentially limited to Fulani herders in a changing 
environment. My ethnographic fieldwork has shown that in Benin, pastoralism is 
dealing with an unprecedented crisis. The asymmetric power relation between rural 
actors has become very detrimental to the Fulani. Various technologies promoted in 
rural areas are reinterpreted and used by crop farmers for rangeland acquisition and 
territory making. It has caused a greater exclusion of Fulani, since their neighbor 
farmers now have access to technological substitutes for all the factors that were 
favoring a complementary and cooperative relationship between them in the past. 
Land individualization, although still less pronounced, already contributes to the 
marginalization of Fulani pastoralists who must deal every day with land expropria-
tion and social stigmatization. All the factors that have contributed to the land and 
social crisis underway in my study area are summarized in Figure 9.1.
The second specific objective was to diagnose the ways in which Fulani pastoral-
ists cope with a crisis that hinders equitable access to pastoral resources. Therefore, 
my ethnographic study was interested in responses and alternative livelihoods each 
household rely on, in the face of threats. I must admit that my fieldwork did not look 
deeply at all the livelihood trajectories, and could not also target especially women 
and youth through a gender perspective. This is a weakness induced by logistical and 
financial conditions under which the study was conducted (cf. Chapter 5). However, 
with hope that these aspects will be further addressed in future studies, I was able to 
capture an overview of the major ways of adaptation. The strategies are diverse and 
guided by how everyone perceives and interprets the situation. The opportunities 
























Figure 9.1: Socio-technological factors causing pastoralists’ exclusion in Gogounou District
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be relevant to generalize. Mobility and crop farming have proven key in pastoralist 
livelihood strategies. This is supported by a number of technological innovations, 
informal social arrangements and inclusion practices which favor income diversi-
fication. School education for children has been one of the main changes recorded 
and seems relevant in helping pastoralists withstand adversities. The main pastoralist 
household-scale adaptation strategies are recapitulated in Figure 9.2.
The third specific objective of my study is concerned with how collective action 
among Fulani is to make pastoralism sustainable and improve the socio-economic 
and political conditions of those who depend on it. I have found that the so-called 
pastoral civil society is only a host of development brokers positioning and repo-
sitioning themselves continually facing various multilevel challenges and opportu-
nities. They like operating with ambiguities, navigating between single-ethnicity/
multi-ethnicity, tradition/modernity, civil society/political society, from which they 
derive significant benefits to achieve their own economic and socio-political ends. 
Their practices of struggle are not different from the classic patron-clientage, only 
that they have become very professional, being well designed technologically and 
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Figure 9.2: Pastoralist adaptive strategies in Gogounou District
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pastoralist associations to the transformation of pastoralism is quite significant. The 
model of professionalization and modernization of livestock farming, defended by 
Fulani activists, promotes behavior change among pastoralists and emphasizes the 
need for technological change to achieve added value and better integration into the 
market. The drive of Fulani spokespersons to seek rent through extroversion strate-
gies, and their fierce persistence in maintaining permanent agreement with donors 
and political powers are no longer consistent with preserving traditional pastoral-
ism. The main components of the associative struggle among Fulani pastoralists in 
Gogounou are reflected in Figure 9.3. 
Technological change and political ecology  9.2 
of development territories
Several authors have recently been concerned with pastoralism in West Africa given 
the multifaceted challenges in our contemporary world (cf. Juul, 2005b; Homewood 
et al. 2009; Kossoumna Liba’a, 2012; Catley et al. 2013a; Gonin, 2014). My research 
is part of the same perspective, focusing particularly on technologies and associative 
struggle dynamics among Fulani pastoralists in northern Benin. The main contribu-
tion of this book has to do with the political ecology of agro-pastoral development 
territories in West Africa. My study has mainly highlighted how rural actors, espe-
cially crop farmers, take advantage of the technological revolution and the fragility 
or overlapping of various rural development policies (agricultural, environmental, 
land, etc.), to increase their power over land to the detriment of their neighboring 
pastoralists. I have shown, through a detailed ethnography, which has also tapped 
into the contemporary history of Fulani in Benin, that marginalization and exclusion 
of marginal groups like pastoralists in northern Benin are the result of an imbalance 
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Figure 9.3: Components of brokerage among Fulani pastoralists in Gogounou District
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bins (2012: 21) has tried to show when stating that modernist development efforts 
to improve local production systems promote practices among local people that are 
imbued with poor sustainability and unfair resource distribution.
The proliferation in rural areas of technologies such as tractors, pesticides, land 
certificates, cashew orchards is a result of policies that are entangled in the rural 
development designed and implemented by the nation-state, in collaboration with 
international partners. These technologies, alongside high population growth, have 
significantly contributed to land control by becoming territorialization tools for some 
(cf. Chauveau et al. 2006; Gonin, 2014), and, for others, weapons in social conflicts. 
Government rural development policies and the power asymmetry they have cre-
ated, have largely contributed to strengthening the polarization of rural livelihoods 
already known in the area (cf. De Haan, 1997). This is followed by a fairly obvious 
marginalization of Fulani pastoralists that is worse today than in the past.
It should be recalled here that the territory-making politics necessarily rely on 
territorial strategies deployed by competing actors to produce boundaries to control 
some spaces and achieve some effects desired by them (Chauveau et al. 2006; Bassett 
and Gautier, 2014; Audouin and Gonin, 2014; Gonin, 2014). The different land 
control dynamics underway in Gogounou are indicative of these processes. The large 
range of technologies, presented in the first empirical chapter of this book (Chap-
ter 6), are now more accessible to farmer groups, who appropriate them and endan-
ger the mobility practices of pastoralists and their extensive use of natural resources, 
acknowledged by many as efficient and adapted to the areas where pastoralism still 
prevails (Gonin, 2014: 397).
In reality, the extensification strategies surrounding the use of tractors and CUMA 
innovations have increased the farmer’s need for labor (cf. Balse et al. 2015a; 2015b). 
Within a context of improved schooling for children from farming households, and 
an increasingly rare wage labor market, the costs of such innovations have been dif-
ficult to manage. To deal with such constraints, and to enable easier access to and use 
of land, farmers look for alternatives like pesticides, especially chemical weed killers 
that are readily available at lower purchase costs. The institutional changes in the 
agricultural sector have made possible all forms of abuse in pesticide supply and use 
(cf. Meenink, 2013a; 2013b). The de-liberalization of the cotton sector, the cancella-
tion of public-private partnership in cotton production and the inability of the Benin 
Government to control illegal flows of agricultural inputs have largely contributed 
to further destabilize the existing social imbalance between farmers and pastoralists. 
Farmers, who took advantage of these products, use them to increase their acreages 
with new crop farming practices that allow saving time and labor, continually rein-
vested in the conquest of new lands (cf. Chapter 6). The short-term profitability of 
new agricultural practices based on tractors and especially pesticides, has made crop 
production (especially grains) more attractive than in the past. The sector has started 
recruiting new actors who are increasingly interested in agriculture, such as, women, 
youth and various officials, as discussed in Chapter 6. This “return to the village” calls 
for a more nuanced approach, especially given that mobility in African countries 
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seems only focus on the move from villages into towns. I have clearly demonstrated 
in this book that since maize production and contraband pesticides have become 
easy and effective “resources” (Marfaing, 2014)255, mobility that involves the return 
back to village is no longer a choice but a necessity for many unemployed people living 
in major cities of northern Benin.
The development of the illicit trade of pesticides sold in retail locally by some 
unemployed youth and various other actors along the supply chain has also induced 
new forms of appropriation of these chemicals. Since the technology trajectories are 
also often linked to the meanings and the uses provided by their users (Latour, 1986; 
Pfaffenberger, 1992; Wajcman, 2000), herbicides have become rapid agricultural ex-
tensification technologies, tools for land control and chemical weapons used in social 
conflicts to the benefit of farmers. It is therefore clear that agricultural technology, 
especially tractors and herbicides, have greatly contributed in recent years to the 
territorialization of spaces in favor of crop farming that is more extensive than ever 
and more predatory of land compared to the situation a few decades ago. This is an 
important contribution to the recent debate on land grabbing and territorialization 
in Africa in general, which highlights that the power relations of the actors who suc-
ceed in the territory-making process lies in central state authorities or in territorial 
alliances involving actors with varied social, institutional and geographical anchors 
(Bassett and Gautier, 2014: 5). I have shown that the ability of crop farmers to handle 
pesticides, especially herbicides, as weapons against pastoralists and their herds – by 
spraying them in water sources or by using them in ambushes on rangelands – gives 
them an important advantage in their territorial control strategies.
In addition to cotton, which is a cash crop carrying significant territorial issues 
(cf. Benjaminsen, 2002), the currently flourishing grain market also offers local farm-
ers great opportunities for territorialization. Maize, which is increasingly exported 
across West Africa (cf. Baco et al. 2009; Diallo et al. 2012), and even internationally 
with the prosperous Asian market, is a crop that farmers and several new players 
(cf. Chapter 6) are excited about, since investing in the sector has proven to result in 
substantial profit. The outcome has been the redefinition of property rights and the 
process of exclusion, particularly prejudicial to Fulani pastoralists. This confirms that 
social inequalities are widening, as certain commodities, like maize, suddenlty take 
on a greater economic market value than before (cf. Gautier et al. 2011; Audouin 
and Gonin, 2014; Gonin, 2014). This same trend is also observed in the growing 
sector of wood exports. Since the browsing forage species, such as, Afzelia africana, 
Khaya senegalensis, Pterocarpus eurinaceus and so forth, have become valuable now 
that Benin opened itself up to the Asian market, particularly China, the Fulani land 
situation has become more precarious. Since the latter have no right to land and, 
255 Through the concept of “mobility by and for resources”, the author emphasizes that a “resource” 
can also be seen as a mobility opportunity, including work opportunities for which migrants move 
and by which they earn financial and material resources required for their survival and their fulfill-
ment (Marfaing, 2014: 50).
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consequently, are not owners of fodder trees on rangelands, their local citizenship is 
challenged on a daily basis. They are silenced by hate and marginalizing speeches that 
convey the domination of farmers who own all rights to sell and harvest timbers as 
they want, where they want and when they want. Thus, farmers with support from 
local political powers make their daily rounds to Fulani camps, prospecting for good 
business opportunities offered by Fulani settlements where the best preserved such 
trees still exist. After the big wave of deforestation in Benin, most local forest reserves 
have been cleared of marketable trees. 
Even chainsaws, the noise of which causes great discontent and anxiety among 
Fulani pastoralists (cf. case of Gida in Chapter 6) have been imported into the lo-
cal interactional landscape of power plays already unfavorable to herders. That the 
use of chainsaws in the trafficking of timber have been tolerated nationally and in 
violation of forestry laws, shows again how globalized markets without necessarily 
stimulating coercive territorialization from above, take part locally in a certain socio-
spatial reconfiguration conferring rights and more opportunities to some actors, who 
eventually end up winners in controlling land and natural resources, at the expense 
of others, who lose out (cf. Audouin and Gonin, 2014; Gonin, 2014 for other situ-
ations in Burkina Faso).
Yet another phenomenon typical of contemporary forms of land control is the 
development of plantations, especially cashew orchards. Like some authors in other 
West African countries (Gonin and Tallet, 2012; Audouin and Gonin, 2014; Gonin, 
2014; Fokou, 2015), my ethnographic study of rural communities of Gogounou 
has also emphasized the use of cashew plantations as an effective strategy of territo-
rialization. Fulani pastoralists, who are perpetually considered strangers and landless 
people, hold no right to plant perennial crops. Bariba farmers, who are long-standing 
land right claimants in the municipality, can take ownership of grazing areas, live-
stock corridors, and even parts of Fulani residential areas through confrontational 
practices that result in the increasingly visible development of perennial plantations. 
Cashew trees, which dominate this process, are seen as a way to prepare for retire-
ment as revealed by the president of the cashew growers association, whose speech is 
quoted in Chapter 6.
This plantation economy, introduced and supported by the State and many de-
velopment agencies, was also enhanced by the green policy recently designed and rit-
ually implemented. Political rituals, including seedling grants and highly publicized 
tree planting ceremonies, led by forestry bodies and local politicians as an expression 
of their support to the Head of State in their various electoral constituencies, have 
contributed in innovative ways for some farmers to increase their orchards (cf. Chap-
ter 6). Ultimately, the embeddedness of tree rights into land rights (cf. Fortman, 
1985; Berry, 1988), induces and facilitates territory making from below (Audouin 
and Gonin, 2014; Bassett and Gautier, 2014), as I also observed in my study area.
Livestock grazing in these unfenced cashew orchards are often followed by severe 
penalties and conflicts (cf. case of Gnoma reported in Chapter 6). Restricted access 
to these areas during dry periods negatively impacts livestock keeping. The outcomes 
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for pastoralists obviously are the same as those emanating from the authoritative and 
repressive wildlife conservation approaches, through which access has been strictly 
forbidden in recent decades. This is in line with what Bassett and Gautier (2014: 
5) have conceptualized by saying that “the processes of territorialization, whether 
driven from above or from below, play out in a terrain of social differentiation that 
results in landscapes of opportunity for some and impoverishment for others”. Fu-
lani herders seem to be the main losers in these new land dynamics that result in 
the emergence of autochthonous discourses, with a sense of local belonging that is 
further developed (cf. Lund, 2011a; 2011b). This is also in line with the increasingly 
marginalizing land policy, as revealed by the current form of PFR implementation 
in Gogounou District.
Commons privatization through PFR, followed by the issuance of CFR, also 
contributed to the increase of farmers’ power over land. Whereas, in the past, they 
could only verbally or forcefully claim ownership of local lands, farmers now have 
legal titles, which confirm their dominance over marginal groups such as Fulani pas-
toralists, who still have no access to these kinds of land right recognition documents. 
The analysis of the discourses provided by some recipients about the CFR, and those 
of some local authorities involved in the implementation of the PFR (Chapter 6), 
has revealed that the land certificate was seen as genuine proof of autochthony, and 
a way to legitimize the exclusion of non-beneficiaries. The local citizenship of Fulani 
who are often constantly reminded of their origins (cf. Chapter 6 in speeches by 
the traditional leaders in Gounarou and Gogounou who consider Fulani as being 
Nigerien and Burkinabe), is challenged on a daily basis. Although they are known as 
Benin citizens, rejecting local citizenship (Jacob and Le Meur, 2010; Lund, 2011b) 
is therefore a strategy of weakening Fulani pastoralists’ rights and access to natural 
resources, thereby making their pastoral livelihood vulnerable. This is without con-
sidering the land grabbing which is also developing in northern Benin (cf. Comlan 
Aguessi, 2014; Idrissou, 2014; Idrissou et al. 2014). Large rangelands are increas-
ingly confiscated by multinationals with facilitations from various politicians and 
other national contacts. While the evidence is still very limited in the municipality 
considered in this study, land grabbing is and remains a strong threat to the future of 
pastoralism in Africa (cf. Cotula et al. 2009; Babiker, 2013; Galaty, 2013). Allowing 
or encouraging this in northern Benin, would contribute to the extinction of the 
pastoral lifestyle and the destitution of those who depend on it.
Faced with multifaceted territorialization and the confiscation of rangelands in 
Gogounou District, Fulani pastoralists rely on various coping strategies that align 
with the ongoing debate on how African pastoralists deal with crises and uncertain-
ties.
Spatial/geographic mobility remains the primary identity preservation strategy 
among Fulani in Gogounou. The “migration proper” (cf. Stenning, 1957; 1959; 
Schareika et al. 2000) is the most effective way to permanently escape the troubling 
local dynamics of territorialization, marginalization and exclusion. The no-return 
perol move is made either inside the country or across national borders in search of 
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refuge in host countries, and is considered less susceptible to the poor and conflict-
prone farming practices caused by the all-out use of chemical pesticides and other 
technologies widely developed in this book. The peruɓe pastoralists, discussed in 
Chapter 7, prefer to be land refugees, thus managing to preserve their Fulani identity 
by remaining exclusively attached to livestock ownership. If mobility in the bush 
remains a major obstacle due to the short existence of livestock corridors, some pas-
toralists increasingly rely on transport technologies (motorcycles, trucks, tricycles) 
that they use to move their livestock, household members and other holdings to 
their new settlement areas. Staying Fulani has become strongly entangled with the 
dexterity of pastoralists in gaining access to modern transport technologies to meet 
their needs as mobile herders. 
Another important contribution of this research lies in the forms of social or-
ganization in vogue among Fulani households in the context of land recession and 
social exclusion. I have highlighted how the same pastoralist household may pursue 
complementary survival strategies, in which disparate units are engaged in liveli-
hood approaches carrying certain levels of specialization. By performing migratory 
drifts that offer livestock maintenance opportunities abroad, eguɓe households from 
Gogounou District live in perfect symbiosis with their haccaɓe / horiiɓe wuro that 
are sedentary family units. While depending on the herd and its productions, they 
make calls to their relatives, if necessary, to supply staple foods. Conversely, settled 
households also rely somewhat on livestock in exile to get through a certain period 
of the year when availability of food and financial resources are limited. While some 
income-generating activities are more possible for some (e.g. horiiɓe wuro) than for 
others (e.g. haccaɓe wuro), many Fulani pastoralist households in Gogounou have 
displayed resourcefulness and creativity in mobilizing additional resources for their 
survival (cf. Chapter 7). 
Crop farming remains the largest opportunity for them, allowing them to achieve 
small cotton or maize fields, according to the amount of land they possess, or by 
getting hired as a temporary wage laborer for farmers where cooperative relation-
ships still exist. These transitory or security agro-pastoral practices (Bonfiglioli, 1990: 
258f.) seem to be among the safest survival strategies. However, when the physical 
conditions of herders no longer favor other activities (case of haccaɓe wuro), social 
assistance acts as a means of safeguarding. Through it, members of Fulani households 
enjoy the generosity of fellow believers or distant relatives who support them through 
donations such as zakat and sadaqa which are well known subsidies in most Islamic 
faith pastoralist communities (cf. De Bruijn and Dijk, 1995: 57ff.; De Bruijn, 2000: 
31; Moritz, 2003; Devereux, 2006: 12ff.), and other informal transfers not listed in 
the study. 
The land crisis represents, then, an important moment of manifestation of intra-
ethnic solidarity, as the Fulani pastoralists of Gogounou have demonstrated many 
times in this study, even if their everyday speeches seem to convey that the Fulani 
are not sympathetic and do not show enough solidarity towards one another (cf. 
also Guichard, 2000: 117). They are capable of collective arrangements with forest 
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officers (case of Wara Region in Chapter 7) and mutual aids for supervision of their 
herds, both inside the country and abroad (cases of Lougou village and Tilla camp in 
Chapter 7). This social interdependence is also what prevailed right across Wesseke 
camp when Oumarou was afflicted by a horrible herbicide-driven tragedy, which 
decimated part of his cattle herd (cf. Chapter 6).
Another important aspect in the adaptation of scattered Fulani households in 
a context of crisis lies in how social ties are preserved and secured through comple-
mentary approaches, combining information and communication technologies (es-
pecially mobile phone) and modern means of transportation that facilitate visits and 
mobility from both sides. My study has emphasized the complementarity of physical 
contact and mobile communication in maintaining trusted relationships between 
kinsmen, in which long breaks in contact between them are treated as horrible trag-
edy (cf. Chapter 7). This is again evidence that globalization, while weakening inter-
ethnic relationships in my research site, has, at the same time, improved the practical 
and technical conditions for mobility and has also favored social cohesion (cf. Brink-
man et al. 2009: 77f.; De Bruijn et al. 2009: 12; Kibora, 2009: 119f.; De Bruijn and 
Brinkman, 2011; Boesen et al. 2014: 5; Marfaing, 2014: 45f.).
Elites and other important persons with whom Fulani herders have personal con-
tact, are often involved in resolving various issues within their sphere of competence 
and possibilities, and with the sustainability of pastoralist livelihoods in mind (cf. 
also Juul, 2005a: 126f.). All of this shows that the crisis faced by pastoralists does not 
always correspond to the end of pastoralism. As I have just shown, communication 
and transport technologies offer tremendous opportunities for Fulani herders who 
can afford to move back and forth between crisis zones and favorable areas for the 
preservation of their pastoral economy. This ability to cope with shocks is not unique 
to seenuŋon [scattered] Fulani households. There are other Fulani households that 
still do better, as I have also demonstrated through those locally stereotyped as the 
“awakened” or “modern Fulani” (dariɓe gite).
My ethnographic study in Gogounou District reveals the emergence of a new 
class of pastoralists. Following the profiles and routes of Fulani herders that consti-
tute this class reflected clearly the deep level of transformation reached by local pas-
toralists, as well as the forms that pastoralism might take in the future. Technological 
innovation and socio-cultural integration is at the heart of future paths of livestock 
farming in Benin. I join other scientists (Juul, 2005a; 2005b; Moritz et al. 2009), 
who have skillfully shown that West African pastoralists seem to deal well with crises 
and uncertainties. Despite the jungle described in Chapter 6, there are those Fulani 
herders who manage to establish manure contracts, even in other regions of the dis-
trict, and use ox-carts to carry straw in order to feed their animals in more efficient 
ways. It is encouraging to meet Fulani herders who have formal agreements and the 
energy and will to pay to graze in forest reserves. Although they sometimes make 
fun of this option – gossiping that forest officers only collaborate with them because 
there is no better browse species or valuable feeding grass left in the classified forests 
(cf. Chapter 7) – it is quite obvious that many herders also take advantage of the 
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poor enforcement of forestry laws to develop their pastoral economy within forest 
reserves. Cases of individual and collective arrangements with local forest officials 
reported in Chapter 7 are examples in point.
One of the impressive innovations in the adaptive trajectories of Fulani pasto-
ralists in Gogounou is training animals to adapt to dietary change. In this case, the 
less palatable tree species have now become favorite feeding resources of livestock. 
This remains one of the most innovative and effective strategies alongside the forage 
technologies introduced and supported by pastoralist associations and various devel-
opment programs and agencies. By adopting and using agro-industrial by-products 
and mineral supplements, some Fulani in Gogounou are doing well with a kind of 
stepping up (Devereux and Scoones, 2008, Catley and Aklilu, 2013), which allows 
them not only to maintain dairy cows, but mainly to propose different animals, once 
totally emaciated, to various local and regional markets when they are better fed. 
Although still adopted on a limited scale, cottonseed cake – the availability of which 
has even been limited in recent years by concerns related to the cotton oil plants in 
Benin – has become part and parcel of the pastoral economy, as an alternative sought 
by some pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. These changes align perfectly with the 
dynamics already observed in other African countries and particularly in the West 
African sub-region (cf. Ayantunde et al. 2000; Boutrais, 2000: 184; Moritz, 2003; 
Mortimore, 2005; Juul, 2005a; La Rovere et al. 2005; Moritz et al. 2009).
Mobile phones have been the subject of particular attention in this study without 
exploring deeply the contours of its social and cultural appropriation. However, I 
observed that this technology, which has become inseparable from the pastoral life 
of Fulani, is a tool for economic development and social integration, improving also 
their business sensitivity (cf. Brinkman et al. 2009; Molony, 2009; Pfaff, 2009). 
With mobile phones, herders plan their collaboration with other players; they also 
learn new languages including French, enlarging thereby their income diversification 
pathways. As ample proof, I would like to remind the reader of the case of the many 
pastoralists in Fana-Peulh village (cf. Chapter 7) who benefitted from the availabil-
ity of educated youth, with whom they establish learning contracts to strengthen 
their ability to handle mobile phones. With this added knowledge, phones can be 
more skillfully used to access markets, veterinary services, natural resources, as well 
as the human resources necessary for resolving various issues. Several young Fulani 
also benefit from the informal economy induced by the mobile phone market, to 
create small jobs and small businesses through which they support their parents or 
themselves in the sense of building up their own herd. The cases of Sanda, Arouna, 
Abou and Amadou, presented in Chapter 7, are striking examples. I have confirmed 
the transformative power of mobile phones among pastoralists (Sangare, 2010; Kos-
soumna Liba’a, 2012; Stockton, 2012; Keita, 2015) and argue that the future of 
pastoralism might also depend on the path that these communication technologies 
will take in the future, since the rapid technological changes taking place foreshadow 
undoubtedly that “the realities of tomorrow will be different from those of today” 
(De Bruijn et al. 2009: 13). And, as I have already shown above, transport technolo-
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gies always come to complement this mobile phone-based livestock keeping, ensur-
ing their success and improving the wellbeing of herders.
Some Fulani herders in Gogounou District draw increasingly substantial income 
from crop farming. When talking about cultivation by the Fulani pastoralists, it 
always seems to be understood by small-scale food cropping and crop-livestock inte-
gration. My study has revealed that beyond the small-scale food cropping, which is 
often integrated with livestock, some Fulani herders are also involved in cash crop-
ping, especially cotton and maize. This market-oriented farming, which also make 
significant use of pesticides (cf. Chapter 7), seems in line with what some political 
ecologists conceptualize as follows: “If you can’t beat them, join them” (Blaikie and 
Brookfield, 1987; Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 160). This means that, without being 
able to politically condemn and punish the abuse or ban on the way local farmers use 
chemicals, herders might also decide to follow the same trend.
This might be seen as one resistance strategy of marginalized groups (cf. Scott, 
1990), which, in this case, is to follow the ways of the stronger groups and to par-
ticipate in the prevailing socio-ecological dynamics. For Fulani pastoralists, they will 
continue to be squeezed and driven out, unless they make their presence be known 
on the land by also using herbicides. Though some may be involved in degrading 
the environment, Fulani pastoralists found it to be a good way to control portions 
of land not yet acquired by those who claim to be the sole owners and holders of all 
rights. These realities call into question the earlier observations of some ethnogra-
phers who claim that the Fulani in Benin are only engaged in subsistence agriculture 
and that very few are market-oriented (Schepp, 1989: 32ff.; Guichard, 2000: 95). 
Herbicides, which were hardly known and even unappreciated in pastoral societies 
some years ago (cf. Boutrais, 2000: 185), have become for Fulani in Gogounou a 
resistance technology to deal with farmers, who use these chemicals to assert their 
power over local lands.256 Readers should be reminded that the land control practices 
by local crop farmers have been denounced by the Fulani pastoralists as being part of 
an “ethnic catch-up” by farmers who would be guided by jealousy towards them and 
their herds (cf. Chapter 7).
Livelihood diversification has proven to be central in the way forward for many 
Fulani pastoralists who live in Gogounou. Although not all livelihood trajectories are 
scrutinized in detail in this book, it is however very clear that the Fulani who are able 
to sustain more in the face of the current land and social crisis, are obviously those 
who are able to broaden their social networks, forging alliances (manure contracts 
with farmers, arrangements with forest officers, inter-ethnic marriages, activism in 
pastoralist associations, etc.), and those who seek additional revenue in a wider range 
of economic activities. As I have demonstrated in the case studies of Sidi Fana and 
Sanda Wesseke (Chapter 7), trade and seasonal jobs strongly support cultivation and 
herding, constituting important sources of income for them. They are also prepared 
256 The Mbororo pastoralists in northern Cameroon also use herbicides, but in subsistence crop farm-
ing, which is oriented towards self-consumption (Kossoumna Liba’a, 2012: 97).
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for different kinds of compromise, which might even mean selling ones ethnicity for 
urbanity and modernity, for which they are defamed locally. This is why the concept 
of dariɓe gite, which is used to refer to such individuals, also evokes a sense of be-
trayal to the genuine culture or tradition of the Fulani (Chapter 7).
The pastoral ideology and Fulani cultural values have sometimes completely faded 
in the lives of these kinds of pastoralists (cf. Boutrais, 1994b: 175). Hodgson (2011: 
208) has also reported on how Maasai pastoralists in Tanzania reshape their cultural 
attitudes and practices in order to make money. There is no longer any barrier for 
some Fulani, who accept all stereotypes used against them, in order to integrate as 
much as possible with other socio-cultural groups and access resources to overcome 
poverty in a context of pastoral resources shortage. The bush, the village and the 
town are all arenas where the Fulani are intended to be more enterprising, more 
competitive and more open to innovations that are sustainable. The prevalence of 
this mobility rationale among pastoralists who are and considered sedentary, shows 
that mobility should not be seen only spatially. It also encompasses all of the socio-
economic and political dynamics of innovatively appropriating various resources (cf. 
Boesen et al. 2014; Grémont, 2014). This is why my study also calls for redefining 
Fulani ethnicity in this new socio-technological context. An earlier volume by Diallo 
and Schlee (2000)257 The Fulani ethnicity in new contexts: the dynamics of frontiers also 
shows, more broadly, how these new contexts shape Fulani ethnicity.
The boundaries between Fulani ethnicity and local ethnic groups must also be re-
defined by taking into account school education, which now occupies an important 
place among the Fulani. The importance of formal education for herders is largely 
due to the fact that it opens up new horizons for their children in terms of resource 
access and more secure jobs. Based on the many interviews I conducted with under-
graduate and graduate Fulani, and their proud parents, I agree with other authors 
(Lesorogol, 2005: 1968f.; Devereux, 2006; Homewood et al. 2009; Hodgson, 2011: 
197f.), that school education for children is now received among pastoralists as of-
fering diversification benefits.258 This is only one of the perceived benefits, as many 
herders consider the presence of school educated children in their camps as a way to 
reduce the likelihood of land expropriation and to ensure greater justice in the case 
of conflict (cf. case of the Fulani student in Binga camp as reported in Chapter 7). 
This mediating role is also observed among Maasai pastoralists, whose school edu-
cated children ensure the connection with the non-Maasai world including officials, 
health workers and development bodies (Hodgson, 2011: 198). All this causes Fu-
lani herders to willing to send their children to school, despite the poor infrastruc-
tural conditions and the deficit of teaching staff and school officials in the context of 
northern Benin. The lack of education policy, which specifically targets pastoralists, 
257 “L’ethnicité Peule dans des contextes nouveaux: la dynamique des frontières”.
258 Marfaing (2014: 48) has also observed among non-exclusively pastoralist migrants in the Sahara-
Sahel area that there is a correlation between diversification strategies and school education.
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however, reflects badly on their commitment to send their children to school (cf. case 
of Wesseke Fulani School in Chapter 7).
My research also makes a significant contribution to the recent debate on the 
struggles of non-governmental organization in African pastoral societies (Igoe, 2003; 
2006; Igoe and Kelsall, 2005; Hagberg, 2011; Hodgson, 2011). By combining the 
perspective of development brokerage – free of all prejudices concerning the doings 
of rural activists – (cf. Bierschenk et al. 2000), and the dynamics of positioning and 
repositioning conceptualized by Hodgson (2011), I have shown how some Fulani 
elites ambiguously defend pastoralists with the intention of ensuring sustainable 
livelihood practices. Beginning with a case study, based on the national association 
of professional organizations of ruminant herders (ANOPER) and its multi-scale 
branches, the research found that identity claims, economic development and socio-
political actions are closely linked and carried by the same spokespersons that purport 
to be pastoral civil society. Through a main technological and institutional showcase, 
namely, the autonomous livestock market (MBA), which is associated with other 
technological innovations promoted over years, some Fulani leaders have emerged 
in northern Benin as professional brokers between grassroots Fulani pastoralists and 
external actors including international donors, government officials and so forth.
By mobilizing a number of assets detailed in Chapter 8, they have managed 
to deeply transform local pastoralism through their active involvement in promot-
ing technological change, supporting and advising herders and managing conflicts. 
This progress is conceptualized in development discourse as “professionalization” (cf. 
L’Haridon, 2012). My study has revealed that traditional pastoralism called “old-
fashioned” (Devereux and Scoones, 2008: 3) is progressively changing in Gogounou 
District and obviously in many other regions of Benin. The herder associations 
claiming to preserve the cultural values associated with mobile livestock keeping 
are giving more priority to a seemingly new way of farming livestock. The famous 
scenario 4: “The family livestock farmers change their farming system”259, recent-
ly adopted by ANOPER in its strategic policy document for 2030 (cf. ANOPER, 
2014: 43ff.), remains the expert opinion passed on to Fulani leaders by pastoral 
development planners through a so-called participatory approach. This model, sup-
ported by transnational development agencies, does not hope for anything good 
from traditional pastoralism, in which an unavoidable disappearance, inspired by 
the famous tragedy of commons (Hardin, 1968) is assumed. Taking this position, 
Fulani association leaders are driven towards a discourse which emphasizes that pas-
toralism will be transformed, but the Fulani socio-cultural assets associated thereto 
will be preserved (ANOPER, 2014). This seems simply an ambiguity and, one thing 
is certain: nothing will ever be as it was for Fulani pastoralists. Whether innovations 
come from outside or from themselves, they must now deal with tough technological 
neutralizing practices from farmers who use chemicals to assert power over land and 
natural resources; and consequently undermine access by Fulani (cf. Chapter 6).
259 “Les éleveurs familiaux modifient leur système d’élevage”.
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Therefore, it seems increasingly clear that many innovations will gain ground in 
the coming years in pastoral communities in northern Benin. Forage technologies 
such as hay, silage and other straw conservation practices will continue to attract the 
sedentary pastoralists. Modern veterinary products and services will most likely con-
tinue to attract herders if their supply conditions are consistent with their needs and 
financial capabilities. Individual water wells or community boreholes will probably 
increase as livestock mobility areas are reduced. Thus, the semi-modern or trans-
formed livestock farming that Fulani leaders wish to see copied by all pastoralists, 
could gradually take shape and become a reality in the medium and long term.
The supra-local legitimacy enjoyed by pastoralist association leaders through open 
membership (Hagberg, 2011; L’Haridon, 2012), gives them a broader scope, in that 
they may attempt, as applicable, to represent both the marginal groups (Fulani) and 
the dominant groups (haaɓe). This enables them to obtain the necessary influence 
for retaining their local and external “clientele” as needed to fulfill socio-political 
ambitions (Blundo, 1995; 2000). Access to media (radio, television, print media, 
newsletters in local languages) allow Fulani median-level actors to develop not only 
local or regional anchoring strategies (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 31f.), but also national 
influence, through enlisting a host of external donors who fund a variety of initiatives 
towards “pastoral development”. Complacent with ambiguities, pastoralist leaders 
manage to use key concepts of “civil society”, “advocacy”, “lobbying” etc., to assert 
their influence and power at all territorial levels from local to national. While all this 
is assumed to be for the better inclusion of Fulani herders in socio-economic and po-
litical settings, it is clear that the basic needs of Fulani pastoralists, namely, access to 
land and pastoral resources, are not yet satisfied. However, the new methods of man-
aging pastoral conflicts by using legal experts, the more overt involvement of Fulani 
leaders in politics (cf. case of Fulani elites in Gogounou reported in Chapter 8) and 
the forthcoming adoption of a pastoral code, are certainly about to become catalysts 
for further changes. From this study in northern Benin, it has become convincing 
beyond any doubt that the West African pastoralism, while adapting to threats and 
being transformed at the same time, has started a new chapter in its history.
Policy recommendations9.3 
My research has demonstrated a need for efficient integrated development interven-
tions drawing on findings related to the exacerbated social exclusion of Fulani as 
result of straddling agricultural, environmental and land policies. This sheds light on 
recommendations for policymakers in certain respects. The Government of Benin 
now cannot successfully change anything without modifying its line of governance, 
which, at first glance, includes having lots of good policy documents that do not 
however serve a harmonic rural development approach. International partners must 
play a major role in lobbying the political powers for change. The local organizations 
– both pastoral and non-pastoral – should be strong enough to be able to set their 
294 Georges Djohy: Pastoralism and Socio-technological Transformations
own agenda and “to sell” it to donors (because Benin will be needing, at least for the 
near future, financial aid from outside the country). If the institutional environment 
is cleaned up and the role of each player recognized, more specific policies must now 
be implemented. In this regard, I would like to make some proposals in the follow-
ing sections.
Citizenship policy
The issue of Fulani local citizenship must be definitively settled. There are still too 
many blurred boundaries around the issue of local citizenship of bush-Fulani in Be-
nin. As amply demonstrated in this book (Chapter 6), many Fulani are still consid-
ered strangers in regions where they live and where they contribute to the animation 
of the socio-cultural, economic and even political life. When it comes to accessing 
land and natural resources, the restrictions observed locally are too strong and gen-
erate increasingly violent conflicts. I suggest a forum be organized to permanently 
resolve this challenge. Cautionary notes at regional and municipal levels may hence-
forth prevent competing groups from holding this kind of discrimination against 
them. This approach is not to suggest that all Fulani are national citizens or local 
citizens in the different regions of Benin. It will rather provide useful clarification on 
the ones who hold citizenship and those who do not. Necessary information must be 
given on naturalization routes for those who are willing to settle permanently in the 
country. The difference would be clearer between Fulani nationals/locals, resident 
immigrants and seasonal immigrants.
Forestry policy
As long as forest management and the wood trade policy is still export oriented, this 
will continue to impact negatively on the access of Fulani pastoralists to tree forages 
which are currently an indispensible feed resource for pastoral activities in Benin. 
Therefore, decisions must be taken about reforming the forestry sector and enforcing 
the forestry laws in pursuing participative approaches so as to ensure fair access to 
all local stakeholders. The fraudulent export of targeted and endangered species to 
the Asian market must be controlled with strong forestry laws and good practices in 
sustainable management of natural resources. Fulani pastoralists must be trained on 
methods of selecting branches or leaves from fodder trees to ensure their reproduc-
tion and to preserve biodiversity.
Pesticides supply policy
The development of pesticide and especially herbicide-based agriculture in Benin 
without any form of regulation upstream will inevitably lead to, in my opinion, an 
ecological crunch and a social fracture to be fueled by violent clashes. Policymakers 
must act promptly to stop the use of tons of pesticides, which turn the landscape of 
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interdependence and cooperative relations into one of exclusion and confrontations. 
The input supply policy must be improved, and this requires better production con-
trol of the cotton sector, which remains the economic priority of the Government. 
The agricultural promotion and extension bodies must implement an environmental 
education program to improve awareness of the impacts of chemical products on 
livestock, environment, human health and so forth. Technical and financial resources 
need to be deployed to obtain quick results in light of the rapid expansion of mal-
practices and abuse related thereto.
Livelihood diversification policy
The outmigration of Fulani pastoralists is a major social phenomenon. Its socio-
economic impacts are widely demonstrated in this research. They are manifest in 
Fulani households where herd delocalization has impeded on the socio-economic in-
dependence of women. Livestock transactions have decreased considerably as well as 
animal product processing and marketing. Pastoralist associations and municipalities 
are suffering enormous costs. Therefore, it is important to undertake concrete actions 
causing emigrants to come back and to prevent successfully the herders who are still 
on site from escaping with their herds. Awareness campaigns should be organized to 
assure the security of their belongings through a real institutional framework pro-
moting equitable access to resources. A gender-sensitive agro-pastoral policy is nec-
essary, empowering women and vulnerable people and sympathetic towards Fulani 
pastoralists engaged in livelihood diversification. The three categories of pastoralist 
households presented in this study must be given a very specific approach that values 
their strengths and addresses their respective weaknesses. 
This does not mean neglecting some common aspects that could benefit all of 
them. Communication and transportation technologies, and infrastructure facilitat-
ing their profitable use, should be strengthened. For instance, mobile phone financial 
mechanisms could be promoted within pastoralist communities to improve money 
transfer operations and economic management. All this will increase the sensitivity 
to business, in a context of technological innovation oriented towards job creation 
and trade invention. Central Government, decentralized collectives and pastoral civil 
society organizations must work harmoniously in promoting social dialogue, which 
is key to governing common resources and achieving sustainable development. 
Accordingly, priority should be given to friendly and impartial methods of man-
aging conflicts. A more neutral consultation framework managing objectively the 
conflicts between actors would be preferable to the current partisan approaches. Al-
though pastoralist association leaders and their legal advisor have so far been helpful 
to the pastoralists, it remains that the position taken, in one case or another, is often 
full of bias. Transhumance committees are currently not very operational in Benin 
and are also politicized bodies, since they are often led by the political authorities at 
various territorial division levels (prefects in provinces, mayors in districts, etc.). It is 
important to establish an independent observatory for the management of pastoral 
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mobility within the country. An actor-oriented intervention is also needed for each 
category of Fulani herders.
Emigrant herders: Sensitization and advocacy must be organized for their return 
back to Benin, while trying to create the conditions upstream for equitable access to 
natural resources. This must be done in partnership with Fulani organizations, and 
also in collaboration with the Fulani leaders of the host countries especially Togo and 
Ghana. It is also important to change the policy of demarcation and markup of live-
stock corridors. The current approach consumes budgets more than it corresponds to 
the dynamic needs of pastoralists for livestock routes. Mobility should be facilitated 
on the livestock routes mentioned in this book for Fulani pastoralists of Gogounou. 
More effort should also be made to have a formal regional and national directory of 
Fulani mobility routes, which must be equipped with useful pastoral infrastructure 
(water points, grazing areas, rest areas, vaccination parks etc.). The latter should not 
be considered as a permanent achievement and frequent updates must be carried 
out, for instance, within a five-year term, to ensure the pastoralist dynamic is well 
captured.
Semi-sedentary herders: The intervention should follow two dimensions. The first 
part must address the desperate on-site household units, which depend less on live-
stock or do not even have animals at all. A policy promoting income-generating 
activities is necessary. For migrant household units in social divide, it is important to 
develop actions that prioritize modern communication technologies such as the mo-
bile phone, which contributes enormously to social cohesion. Mobile money transfer 
technologies and communication infrastructure would be useful while increasing the 
opportunities of able-bodied young Fulani in search of employment. Support needs 
to be given with veterinary care. Fulani small-scale crop farming, which currently 
seems to be more integrated with livestock, deserves particular attention in order to 
strengthen and improve agro-pastoral integration as a rural development strategy.
Sedentary herders: They practice integrated crop-livestock farming, and must be 
helped in several other domains too. First, they need a certain security of land tenure 
for their agricultural activity. The herders open to modern technologies (fodder culti-
vation, fattening, etc.) and who are less mobile and more market-oriented, should be 
supported in these ways. It might be good to develop some actions for strengthening 
semi-modern Fulani livestock farmers. Access to veterinary inputs and care must be 
improved for them. The public, without interfering in the management of livestock 
markets, must participate in the establishment of a trustworthy partnership between 
pastoral leaders and Local Government officials. This will limit conflicts between 
the proponents of livestock markets and municipal authorities. Livestock markets 
should also be more equipped with infrastructure facilitating transactions, handling 
and mobility. Education in Fulani communities must be strengthened through pro-
viding infrastructure and recruiting teachers in sufficient numbers. This would be an 
important support to the Fulani herders who want to better educate their children. 
In this regard, Benin Government may also consider formal education programs 
through mobile schools and teachings based on media-coverage for mobile pastoral-
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ists. Women and youth occupations within sedentary households must be accompa-
nied by specific programs to facilitate their development.
Land privatization policy
Land tenure must be made a major concern for policymakers. The research has shown 
that the land individualization policy, which is still in its testing phase in northeast 
Benin, has to be redesigned and better crafted. Otherwise, land expropriation will 
further develop and Fulani pastoralists will eventually be totally excluded from local 
lands, with disastrous consequences not only for their ethnic group, but also for the 
whole country. Therefore, it is important to clarify the question of ownership, and 
find solutions for areas where land ownership is unfairly denied to the Fulani pas-
toralists, before going ahead and completing the rural tenure plans. Expropriation 
and mass eviction of Fulani from land will not always remain without ripostes from 
their victims. The northern regions are gradually approaching the time when Fulani 
pastoralists will stand up and defend their legitimacy to own land (cf. speech of the 
Fulani leader quoted in Chapter 6), and this must be avoided as soon as possible. 
Policymakers now need to find a mechanism to recognize Fulani property rights. 
This property right may need somehow to be “invented” (Barrière and Barrière, 2002; 
Gonin, 2014). The public authorities should ensure that the ongoing land privatiza-
tion process does not compound the long-standing land marginalization and pave 
the way for inter-ethnic confrontations. The pastoral code being developed is a good 
way to proceed. However, care should be taken not to promote it as a panacea in an 
environment full of susceptibility and suspicion between actors. An effort should be 
made upstream to strengthen dialogue between stakeholders for a peaceful resolution 
of disputes. All land and pastoral laws should be further harmonized, disseminated 
and enforced without favoritism and discrimination.
Research policy
My research recommends some avenues for further studies in order to provide more 
scientific evidence of various problems raised. The real impact of pesticides on live-
stock and human health, soil and environment globally must be scientifically ap-
proved. Common privatization and land grabbing phenomenon must be further 
observed more deeply and their impacts on pastoralists further shown. The impacts 
of rural land plans on Fulani pastoralists, as a marginalized social group, should be 
further elucidated. The findings of all these studies will help review the land privati-
zation approach for better integration of pastoralists and to minimize the effect on 
them. I also suggest a gender-oriented assessment of pastoral livelihood trajectories, 
to better take into account all the livelihood dynamics of women, youth and other 
vulnerable Fulani groups within this context of crisis.
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Conclusion9.4 
To the question: “Will pastoralism be sustainable through the technological adapta-
tion practices and the associative struggle in a context of land crisis and resources 
dwindling?” my answer in this research highlights a nuanced view showing that pas-
toralists adapt to shocks, but that pastoralism has also changed and will probably 
continue to be transformed. As Latour (1986: 267) states in his argument about 
technological translation, I too think the fate of pastoralism is “in the hands of the 
people”. Technologies in a globalized world have unpredictable paths, leaving the 
human-human and human-nature interactions in the greatest uncertainty. Who 
could imagine that herbicides would become land control tools and weapons in 
social struggles in rural areas? Who could imagine that the chainsaw would be used 
to eliminate targeted browse forages within Fulani settlements so as to prompt the 
pastoralists’ own move decision-making or to evict them completely from coveted 
lands? The manufacturers and promoters of these technologies have certainly never 
imagined their use in this way. However, these events have become common in pas-
toral regions of northern Benin. If crop farming technologies have become tools of 
social exclusion, making land potentates in northeast Benin, this is also the result of 
the socio-economic and political changes at the global level. Dealing with chemical 
farming products has made the pastoral crisis more evident than in the past. Liveli-
hood diversification remains the most favored way out for many Fulani pastoralists 
who must humbly seek refuge in various other forms of life. Those of them more 
integrated socially, school educated and more open to change and modernity seem 
the most able to have a better future in the Benin society. The findings of this study 
should be used to undertake advocacy and lobbying, and move away from the com-
mon patron-clientage model, to a supranational level to avoid an ecological crunch, 
which is threatening to follow a possible social tension in pastoral areas in Benin. 
Urgent actions are needed to create a framework for more equitable access to natural 
resources and a more harmonious cooperation between rural actors. I am really look-
ing forward to seeing my suggestions considered by decision-makers and transna-
tional partners in the future, and to changing the current dramatic trend by offering 
a glimmer of hope for pastoralism and its practitioners.
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 Abbreviations and Acronyms11.1
°C  .............................. degree Celsius
ACCFP  ...................... African Climate Change Fellowship Program
ACCPA  ..................... Agent Communal pour le Contrôle des Produits  
d’origine Animale
ACP  ........................... African, Caribbean and Pacific
ADMA  ...................... Agence de Développement de la Mécanisation Agricole
AEV  ........................... Adduction d’Eau Villageoise
AFD  .......................... Agence Française de Développement
AfDB  ......................... African Development Bank
AFDI  ......................... Agriculteurs Français et Développement International
AFU  .......................... Alliance Force dans l’Unité
AIC  ........................... Association Interprofessionnelle de Coton
ALGMB  .................... Association Locale de Gestion du Marché à Bétail Autogéré  
de Gogounou
ALIVE  ....................... Partnership for Livestock Development, Poverty Alleviation 
and Sustainable Growth
ANCB  ....................... Association Nationale des Communes du Bénin
ANOPER  .................. Association Nationale des Organisations Professionnelles 
des Eleveurs de Ruminants
ANR / ECliS  .............. Agence Nationale de la Recherche / Projet Elevage-Climat-
Société
APDA  ........................ Afar Pastoralist Development Association
APESS  ....................... Association pour la Promotion de l’Elevage en Savane et au 
Sahel
APIC  ......................... Action pour la Promotion des Initiatives Communautaires
APIDEV  .................... Association pour la Promotion des Initiatives de Développe-
ment Durable
ARELIMOK  .............. Poverty Reduction and Livestock Modernization in Kara-
moja
ASECNA  ................... Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en 
Afrique et à Madagascar
ASPEB  ....................... Action pour la Sauvegarde et la Promotion de l’Elevage au 
Bénin
ATA  ........................... Alpha Tidjani Aboubakar
AU-IBAR ................... African Union Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources
AVSF  ......................... Association de solidarité internationale – Agronomes et 
Vétérinaires Sans Frontières
B/A  ............................ Borgou and Alibori Provinces
BAA  ........................... Bureau d’Appui aux Artisans
BCEAO  ..................... Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
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BF  ............................. Borne Fontaine
BIT  ............................ Bureau International du Travail
CAADP  ..................... Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
CAIA  ......................... Centrale d’Achat des Intrants Agricoles
CAPE  ........................ Cellule d’Analyse de Politique Economique
CARDER  .................. Centre Agricole Régional pour le Développement Rural
CCI  ........................... Centre du Commerce International
CD  ............................ Compact Disc
CENAGREF  ............. Centre National de Gestion des Réserves de Faunes
CENATEL  ................ Centre National de Télédétection et de Suivi Ecologique
CES  ........................... Conseil Economique et Social
Cf.  ............................. confer
CFA franc  .................. Franc of the African Financial Community (XOF)
CFR ........................... Certificat Foncier Rural
CIRAD  ...................... Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche 
Agronomique pour le Développement
CNMA  ...................... Conseil National de Mécanisation Agricole
CNUCED  ................. Conférence des Nations Unies sur le Commerce et le 
Développement
CODESRIA  .............. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in 
Africa
CONORET  .............. Confédération Nationale des Organisations des Eleveurs du 
Tchad
CORAF / WECARD  . Conseil Ouest et centre Africain pour la Recherche et le 
développement agricoles / West and Central African 
Council for Agricultural Research and Development
CTA  .......................... Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Co-operation
CTAF  ........................ Cellule Technique d’Aménagement Forestier
CUMA  ...................... Coopérative d’Utilisation des Machines Agricoles
DANIDA  .................. Danish International Development Agency
DDC  ......................... Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
DED  ......................... Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst
DERANA  .................. DERANA-ONG “Groupe Solidarité”
DGDGL  .................... Direction Générale de la Décentralisation et de la Gouver-
nance Locale
DGFRN  .................... Direction Générale des Forêts et des Ressources Naturelles
DOS  .......................... Document d’Orientation Stratégique
DSNMA  .................... Document de la Stratégie Nationale de Mécanisation 
Agricole
DVD  ......................... Digital Versatile Disc
ECOWAS  .................. Economic Community of West African States
EISMV  ...................... Ecole Inter Etats des Sciences et Médecine Vétérinaires de 
Dakar
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ENSAP  ...................... Ecole Nationale Supérieure Agro-Pastorale de Gogounou
EU  ............................. European Union
f.  ................................ folio (on the next page)
FA  .............................. Faculty of Agronomy
FAO  .......................... Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAOSTAT  ................. Food and Agriculture Organization Corporate Statistical 
Database
FARM  ....................... Fondation pour l’Agriculture et la Ruralité dans le Monde
FCBE  ........................ Force Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent
ff.  ............................... folios (on the next pages)
FLASH  ...................... Faculté des Lettres, Arts et Sciences Humaines
FPM  .......................... Forage de Pompes Modernes
FSA  ........................... Faculty of Agricultural Sciences
GDP  .......................... Gross Domestic Product
GERED  ..................... Groupe d’Etudes et de Recherches sur l’Environnement  
et le Développement
GHA  ......................... Greater Horn of Africa
GIS  ............................ Geographic Information Systems
GITPA ....................... Groupe International de Travail pour les Peuples  
Autochtones
GIZ  ........................... Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(former GTZ)
GPER  ........................ Groupement Professionnel des Eleveurs de Ruminants
GPFER  ...................... Groupement Professionnel des Femmes Eleveuses de 
Ruminants).
GPS  ........................... Global Positioning Systems
GSM  ......................... Global System for Mobile Communications
ha  .............................. hectare
HDI  .......................... Human Development Index
ibid  ............................ ibidem (in the same place)
iCA  ............................ Initiative du Cajou Africain
IDP  ........................... Internally Displaced Persons
IDRC  ........................ International Development Research Centre
IDS  ............................ Institute of Development Studies
IEMVT  ..................... Institut d’Elevage et de Médecine Vétérinaire des Pays 
Tropicaux
IFPRI  ........................ International Food Policy Research Institute
IGN  ........................... Institut Géographique National
IIED  .......................... International Institute for Environment and Development
IITA  .......................... International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
INSAE  ....................... Institut National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economi-
que
IPNC  ......................... Inspection de la Protection de la Nature et de la Chasse
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IRAM  ........................ Institut de Recherches et d’Applications des Méthodes de 
développement
IRD  ........................... Institut de Recherche pour le Développement
IRDR  ........................ Inter-Réseaux Développement Rural
KAPEPS  .................... Karamoja Peace and Environmental Protection Services
KAWUO  ................... Karamoja Women Umbrella Organization
kg  .............................. kilogram
KIT  ........................... Royal Tropical Institute
km  ............................. kilometer
LEAD  ........................ FAO Livestock, Environment and Development initiative
LGCP  ........................ Local Government Capacity Programme
loc. cit.  ....................... loco citato (in the place cited)
MAA  ......................... Inyuat-e-Maa
MADEFO  ................. Matheniko Development Forum
MAEP  ....................... Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et de la Pêche
MBA  ......................... Marché à Bétail Autogéré
MCA  ......................... Millennium Challenge Account
MCRI  ........................ Ministère Chargé des Relations avec les Institutions
MDG  ........................ Millennium Development Goals
MDGLAAT  ............... Ministère de la Décentralisation, de la Gouvernance Locale, 
de l’Administration et de l’Aménagement du Territoire
MEF  .......................... Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances
MEHU  ...................... Ministère de l’Environnement, de l’Habitat  
et de l’Urbanisme
MEPN  ....................... Ministère de l’Environnement et de la Protection de la 
Nature
MISPC  ...................... Ministère de l’Intérieur, de la Sécurité Publique  
et des Cultes
MP  ............................ Member of Parliament
MTFP  ....................... Ministère du Travail et de la Fonction Publique
MUHRFLEC  ............ Ministère de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat, de la Réforme 
Foncière et de la Lutte contre l’Erosion Côtière
NGO  ......................... Non-Governmental Organization
NICHE  ..................... Netherlands Initiative for Capacity development in Higher 
Education
NPK  .......................... Nitrogen, Phosphorus, Potassium (fertilizer)
NPT  .......................... Netherlands Programme for Institutional Strengthening of 
Post-Secondary Education and Training Capacity
NTIC  ........................ Nouvelles Technologies de l’Information et de la  
Communication
ODI  .......................... Overseas Development Institute
OECD  ....................... Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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OIT /ILO  .................. Organisation Internationale du Travail/ International 
Labour Organization
OMC  ........................ Organisation Mondiale du Commerce
op. cit.  ........................ opere citato (in the work cited)
ORTB  ....................... Office de Radiodiffusion et Télévision du Bénin
OSD  .......................... Orientations Stratégiques de Développement
OSIWA ...................... Open Society Initiative for West Africa
PA .............................. Programme Annuel
PAC  ........................... Port Autonome de Cotonou
PAF  ........................... Projet Accès au Foncier
PAFILAV  ................... Programme d’Appui aux Filières Lait et Viande
PANA  ........................ Programme d’Action National d’Adaptation aux Change-
ments Climatiques
PAPA  ......................... Programme d’Analyse de la Politique Agricole
PAS  ............................ Structural Adjustment Program
PASC  ......................... Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee
PASDeR  .................... Programme d’Appui au Développement du Secteur Rural
PCI  ............................ Pastoralist Communication Initiative
PDC  .......................... Plan de Développement Communal
PDDSE  ..................... Plan Décennal de Développement du Secteur  
de l’Education
PDE  .......................... Programme de Développement de l’Elevage
PE  .............................. Political Ecology
PFR  ........................... Plan Foncier Rural
PGTRN ..................... Projet de Gestion des Terroirs et des Ressources Naturelles
PhD  ........................... Philosophiæ Doctor (Doctor of Philosophy)
Plur.  ........................... Plural
PNOPPA  ................... Plateforme Nationale des Organisations Paysannes et de 
Producteurs Agricoles du Bénin
PPA  ........................... Pastoral Parliamentary Association
PPAB  ......................... Programme de Professionnalisation de l’Agriculture Béni-
noise
PPG  ........................... Pastoral Parliamentary Group
PPLPI  ........................ FAO Pro-poor Livestock Policy Initiative
PPMA ........................ Programme de Promotion de la Mécanisation Agricole
PRESAO  ................... West Africa Food Security Capacity Strengthening and 
Research Program
PSIJA  ......................... Programme Spécial d’Insertion des Jeunes dans l’Agriculture
PSRSA  ....................... Plan Stratégique de Relance du Secteur Agricole
RBM  ......................... Réseau Billital Maroobe – des Organisations d’Eleveurs et 
Pasteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
RDR  .......................... Responsable du Développement Rural
RGPH  ....................... Recensement Général de la Population et de l’Habitation
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RIPIECSA  ................. Recherche Interdisciplinaire et Participative sur les Inter-
actions entre Ecosystème, Climat et Societé en Afrique  
de l’Ouest
RLMS  ........................ Réseau Luumondji Mareefuji Sago
ROPPA  ...................... Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de 
l’Afrique de l’ouest
SCDA  ........................ Secteur Communal de Développement Agricole
SCEPN  ...................... Section Communale de l’Environnement et de la Protection 
de la Nature
SCRP ......................... Stratégie de Croissance pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté
SDA  .......................... Spatial Data Analysis
SERHAU-SEM  ......... Society d’Etudes Régionales d’Habitat et d’Aménagement 
Urbain
SFER  ......................... Société Française d’Economie Rurale
SIM  ........................... Subscriber Identity Module
SIMPROMEAT  ........ Sustainable Improvement of the Productivity of Meat value 
chain for food security in West Africa
Sing.  .......................... Singular
SNU  .......................... Système des Nations Unies
SNV  .......................... Netherlands Development Organization
SOCOLAIG  .............. Société Coopérative Laitière de Gogounou
SONAPRA  ................ Société Nationale pour la Promotion Agricole
SOS  ........................... Save Our Souls
SRAI  .......................... Strengthening Regional Agricultural Integration  
in West Africa
STS ............................ Science and Technology Studies
SWAC  ....................... Sahel and West Africa Club
TCP ........................... Technical Cooperation Programme
TLU  .......................... Tropical Livestock Units
TSF  ........................... Télécoms Sans Frontières
TV  ............................. Television
UAC  .......................... University of Abomey-Calavi
UAGPER  ................... Union d’Arrondissement des Groupements Professionnels 
des Eleveurs de Ruminants
UCOPER  .................. Union Communale des Organisations Professionnelles des 
Eleveurs de Ruminants
UDOPER  .................. Union Départementale des Organisations Professionnelles 
des Eleveurs de Ruminants
UGP  .......................... Unité de Gestion des Partenariats
UIL  ........................... Institute for Lifelong Learning
UIOPE  ...................... Union Interafricaine des Organisations Professionnelles 
d’Eleveurs
UNDP  ....................... United Nations Development Programme
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UNESCO  .................. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization
UNICEF  ................... United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNOCHA  ................ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitari-
an Affairs
UP  ............................. University of Parakou
URCUMA  ................. Union Régionale des Coopératives d’Utilisation des Machi-
nes Agricoles
URPA  ........................ Union Régionale des Producteurs d’Anacarde
USCIRF  .................... United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom
Vb.  ............................ verb
WAEMU  ................... West African Economic and Monetary Union
WAMIP  ..................... World Alliance of Mobile Indigenous People
WFP  .......................... World Food Programme
WHC  ........................ World Herders Council
WU  ........................... Wageningen University
WWW ....................... World Wide Web (internet)
ZAE  ........................... Zone Agro-Ecologique
ZFD  .......................... Civil Peace Service of German Development Cooperation
ZOC  .......................... Zone d’Occupation Contrôlée
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 Forage species most used by pastoralists in Gogounou11.2 260
Formerly used forage species
















Gumehi/Gumeeje Vitex doniana 
Ibe Ficus abutifolia
Ibi Ficus vallis-choudae 
Jokuru Hyparrhenia involucrata














260 This freelist was validated by a Fulani ecologist: Yacoubou Boni of APIDEV-NGO (cf. Chapter 5).
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Newly used forage species
Fulfulde name Scientific name
Batahi Isoberlina doka
Burdabehi Bridelia ferruginea
Ɓuyki/Ɓuyde Combretum (collinum, nigricans)
Gogehi Combretum sericeum
Kaju/Iriboje Anacardium occidentale (leaves and apples)
Karehi/Kareeje Vitellaria paradoxa 
Konkehi Detarium microcarpum
Legele Azadirachta indica
Lekko Eucalyptus camaldulensis 
Luɓuŋan Hyptis suaveolens






Akayuuje (sing. akayuy)  .............  Cashew (referring to the trees)
Alankaliiɓe (sing. alankaliijo)  ....  Legal advisor, judicial counselor
Attal   .........................................  Paths
Azawak  .....................................  Cattle breed
Baba  .........................................  Father
Banjibanji  .................................  Logging (In the sense of an abuse in tree felling)
Ɓatiiru  ......................................  Transhumance
Batuure  .....................................  White people
Blondu dakiten  ..........................  French cattle breed Blonde d’Aquitaine
Buditol leɗɗe  .............................  Woodcutting
Bunaji  .......................................  Cattle breed
Buto  ..........................................  Keys of mobile phone
Ceeɗe  ........................................  Money / fund
Ceeɗoɗi (sing. ceeɗol )  ................  Long-range transhumance practiced in dry season
Cirbooɓe (sing. Sirboowo)  ..........  Judge, referee, mediator, umpire
Dagu  .........................................  Indigenous information system among Afar 
pastoralists in northeast Ethiopia
Dakume  ....................................  Dahomey (now Benin) / South Benin /  
Abomey plateau (depending on the case)
Dakumejo  ..................................  Dahomey (now Benin) nationals /  
Benin southerners / Abomey plateau locals 
(depending on the case)
Danki fuɗo  ................................  Fodder shelf
Danki nyadu na’i  .......................  Cattle feed shelf
Dariɓe gite  ................................  Awakened or modern Fulani
Dummoɗi (sing. dummol )  .........  Short-range transhumance practiced in rainy 
season
Durooɓe (sing. duroowo)  ............  Mobile livestock farmers / pastoralists
Egirol/egiru (sing. egugo; vb. egi ).  Long-range migration with intention to return 
back
Eguɓe (sing. egowo)  ....................  Practitioners of egirol migration
Faaba Men  ................................  Our blossoming / our development
Fadama  .....................................  Lowland
Fore  ...........................................  Forest
Fuɗɗo  ........................................  Forage / fodder, grass, weed, bush
Fulɓe (sing. Pullo)  .....................  Fulani in Fulfulde
Fulfulde  .....................................  Language of Fulani/Way of Fulani
Gannukeeɓe (sing. Gannukeejo)  .  Descendants of slaves
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Garso (plur. Garsooɓe )  ...............  Head of transhumance mobility in a given area
Gure  ..........................................  Hamlet
Guyka na’i  .................................  Livestock rustling
Haaɓe (sing. kaaɗo)  ...................  Non-Fulani people
Haala Fulɓe  ...............................  Talk of Fulani / secrecy of Fulani
Haɓɓanaaye/ haɓɓana’e  ..............  Solidarity institution characterized by a heifer 
loan between Fulani
Haccaɓe wuro  ............................  Farm-keepers/sedentary Fulani Household 
(sing. haccaɗo wuro)    made of elderly people and emptied of  
able-bodied people
Hakkune Fulɓe  ..........................  Space between Fulani/ secrecy of Fulani
Hoore haala  ...............................  Editorial
Horejo  .......................................  Authority / Chief
Horiiɓe wuro  .............................  Sedentary Fulani Household with 
(sing. horiiɗo wuro)    able-bodied people
Iriboje (sing. kaju)  .....................    Cashew (referring to the leaves and the 
apples)
Jatigi  .........................................  Host of Fulani in their new migration areas  
(also written Jategui, diategui, Jatigui, etc.)
Jihad  .........................................  Holy war in connection with Islamic faith
Kaɓorɗe (sing. haɓorde)  .............  Herds/or gathering sites of many herds of cattle
Kiisoowel  ...................................  Chainsaw
Kossam  ......................................  Milk
Laadi na’i  ..................................  Livestock passageway
Laamu leydi  ...............................  Paramount chief / Father of the Nation
Laawol  ......................................  Way
Laawol Fulfulde  .........................  Way of Fulani
Leɗɗe (sing. leggal)  ....................  Wood / timber
Lekki fuɗɗo  ...............................  Herbicide
Luumo  ......................................  Market
Marooɓe (sing. maroowo)  ...........  Cattle owners / Non-mobile livestock farmers
Mawɗo  ......................................  Chief
Mawɗo leydi  ..............................  Land chief / highest authority
Na’i  ...........................................  Cattle
Na’i batuure ...............................  Western cattle breeds/exotic breeds
Narehi  .......................................  Parkia biglobosa
Nyinijo  ......................................  Chief
Pasijo  ........................................  Friend
Perol/ ferol (sing. ferugo)  .............  Permanent and irreversible migration
Peruɓe (sing. peruɗo) / feruɓe  ......  Land refugees / practitioners of perol or 
(sing. feruɗo)    ferol migration
Potabu  .......................................  Mobile phone
Potal men  ..................................  Our assembly / our association
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Pulaaku  .....................................  Way of Fulani
Pular  .........................................  Language of Fulani
Regi-regi  ....................................  Chainsaw (referring to the ‘frustrating’ noise of 
the machine)
Sedeeɓe  ......................................  Witness of livestock transactions within an 
autonomous livestock market
Seenuŋon wuro  ..........................  Fragmented, broken or scattered household
Senteene .....................................  Sense of honor (included in the Pulaaku)
Suudu  .......................................  Houses
Takkore (sing. takkiɗo)  ..............  Something / somebody in the vicinity of some-
thing or in the neighborhood of somebody 
(coded language among pastoralists to mean a 
herd within a forest)
Tampiri  .....................................  Tant pis (adapted from French language)
Teetere leydi  ...............................  Land grabbing
Toolon tirol (vb. tolaago)  ............  Jokes / laughable matters
Wagashi  .....................................  Local cheese of Fulani
Walde men  .................................  Our community / our association
Wuro  .........................................  Farm / household
Yaha yeeso  ..................................  Fulani tradition is moving forward
Batonu terms
Batonu  ......................................  Language of Batoumbu or Bariba
Bogoumbo  ..................................  Herbicide having industrial names of Amino-
force, Atraforce and the like
Boro  ..........................................  Friend
Dahume  ....................................  Dahomey (now Benin) / South Benin /  
Abomey plateau (depending on the case)
Dahumegi ..................................  Dahomey (now Benin) nationals / Benin south-
erners / Abomey plateau locals (depending on the 
case)
Dame  ........................................  Selective or non-selective herbicide having 
compacting effect on soil
Danirawo  ..................................  Friend
Gando  .......................................  Descendants of slaves
Kpake  ........................................  Non-selective herbicide
Logoligi  .....................................  Coded language among forest people for  
“business” (manipulation of forest laws to extort 
money from herders “found” guilty of violating 
these laws).
Seko  ..........................................  Blacksmiths
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Somboure  ..................................  Herbicide with the industrial name of Bic  
and the like
Sunon bi  ....................................  Prince
Tangi  .........................................  Selective pre-emergence herbicide
Tem   ..........................................  Land / soil
Tem bamsu tereru  .......................  Land certificate / land title
Tem kpa  ....................................  New land
Tem toko  ....................................  Old land
Wasangari  ..................................  Batoumbu princes / warriors
Yangatime ..................................  Selective pre-emergence herbicide
Arabic and Hausa terms
Azawak   ....................................  Cattle breed
Dillali  .......................................  Trade brokers within traditional livestock market
Id-al-Adha  .................................  Muslim celebration in which rams are sacrificed 
(in Arabic / also called Tabaski or Aīd al-Kabīr)
Rahaji  .......................................  Cattle breed
Sadaqa  ......................................  Voluntary donation in Muslim societies
Wadara  .....................................  Cattle breed
Zakat  ........................................  Compulsory donation in Muslim society
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 Abstract / Zusammenfassung / Résumé11.7
Abstract
The main objective of this research is to analyze the socio-technological transforma-
tions in the Fulani communities in northern Benin. Regardless of their length of stay 
in Benin, the Fulani pastoralists are often regarded as strangers, having practically no 
rights to land and natural resources. This marginalization has taken various forms 
since the pre-colonial period, during the French colonization and the postcolonial 
nation-state with its various governance regimes. Within a context of technological 
breakthrough and globalization, many changes have occurred, tending to challenge 
the sustainability of pastoralist livelihoods. Meanwhile, several grassroots organiza-
tions have also emerged to defend the rights of pastoralists in order to ensure them 
greater political inclusion and socio-economic wellbeing. 
The study was carried out in Gogounou District located in the Benin northeast-
ern province of Alibori, where pastoral activity remains the second most important 
way of life after crop farming. The fieldwork was spread over a total period of ten 
months between July 2013 and October 2014. An ethnographic approach has been 
adopted which focused on the uses of various technologies and collective action. 
Participant observation, a key data collection tool, was carried out together with 
open-ended and semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with various 
stakeholders. 
One main result of the study is that the overlapping state policies in relation to 
agriculture, environment and land tenure have allowed several technologies (e.g. trac-
tors, pesticides, chainsaws, plant seedlings and rural land title) to be widely spread. 
These technologies, however, have contributed to reinforcing inequalities in power 
relations between rural actors. Those crop farmers, who have better access to these 
technologies, have adopted them – changing their meanings in some cases – and 
have used them to increase their control over land and natural resources. This has led 
to the eviction of Fulani pastoralists from lands with adverse consequences on the 
cooperative relationships between rural actors and a more conflictive coexistence.
Facing this ‘crisis’, Fulani households respond with multiple and varied strategies. 
The study reveals that pastoralists – according to their socio-economic and techno-
logical capital – rely on geographical, social and technological strategies of mobility 
to deal with and sustain threats. Livelihood diversification has proven to be the more 
promising strategy among Fulani pastoralists. The study has identified extroversion 
strategies and development brokerage as examples for collective action that aim at 
the socio-economic and political inclusion of pastoralists. Fulani association leaders 
embrace a diversity of actions oriented towards fulfilling international donors’ agen-
das and aligning with government policies in order to achieve their own goals. Fulani 
civil society organizations have thereby contributed significantly to the transforma-
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tion of pastoralism without however resolving the main issues of local pastoralists, 
which include long-standing land rights and fair access to resources.
Keywords: Pastoralism, Fulani herders, Technologies, Livelihood diversification, Col-
lective action
Zusammenfassung
Hauptziel dieser Arbeit ist es, die Zusammenhänge zwischen sozialem und tech-
nologischem Wandel in Fulbe-Gemeinschaften in Nordbenin zu analysieren. Fulbe 
wurden und werden – ungeachtet der Dauer ihrer Anwesenheit in der jeweiligen 
Region – in Benin als Fremde konzeptualisiert. In der vorkolonialen, kolonialen 
und postkolonialen Periode nahm diese Konzeptualisierung jeweils unterschiedliche 
Formen an. Im Kontext von Globalisierung und technologischen Neuerungen ent-
standen neue Herausforderungen für Viehhalter. In der jüngeren Vergangenheit ge-
gründete zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen hatten unter anderem zum Ziel, die 
Rechte von Viehhaltern zu vertreten, ihre politische Teilnahme zu ermöglichen und 
ihr soziales und wirtschaftliches Wohlergehen zu sichern. 
Die insgesamt zehnmonatige Feldforschung zwischen Juli 2013 und Oktober 
2014 fand im Bezirk Gogounou im nordöstlichen Département Alibori statt. In die-
sem Département stellt Viehhaltung die zweitwichtigste Lebensgrundlage nach dem 
Feldbau dar. Die ethnologische Forschung fokussierte auf die Nutzung verschiedener 
Technologien und das kollektive Handeln der erforschten Gruppen. Darin wurde 
teilnehmende Beobachtung als wichtigstes Instrument zur Datenerhebung mit of-
fenen und halbstrukturierten Interviews sowie Gruppendiskussionen kombiniert.
Die der Arbeit zugrunde liegenden Forschungsergebnisse zeigen eine weite Ver-
breitung von strategisch eingesetzten Technologien, zum Beispiel die Nutzung von 
Traktoren und Kettensägen, den Einsatz von Pestiziden, die Nutzung von Pflanzen-
sprösslingen oder den Nachweis von Privateigentum an Land. Jedoch haben diese 
Technologien die asymmetrischen Machtverhältnisse zwischen den verschiedenen 
Akteuren in ländlichen Gebieten verstärkt. Die Gruppen von Landwirten, die bes-
seren Zugang zu solchen Technologien hatten, nahmen diese an und verhandelten 
teilweise ihre Bedeutung und Benutzung neu, um ihren Zugang zu Land und natür-
lichen Ressourcen zu festigen. Aufgrund steigender Landknappheit mussten Vieh-
halter das Land der Bauern verlassen, was Konflikte verstärkt und die Kooperation 
zwischen diesen Akteuren gemindert hat.
Auf diese Entwicklungen reagierten Fulbe-Haushalte mit unterschiedlichen 
Strategien. Sie setzten, je nach sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und technologischen Mög-
lichkeiten, auf geographische, soziale und technologische Mobilitätsstrategien, um 
mit Einschränkungen umzugehen und ihnen standzuhalten. Diversifikation der 
Lebensgrundlage erwies sich in dieser Hinsicht als die aussichtsreichste Strategie. 
Im Hinblick auf kollektives Handeln konnten insbesondere Extraversionsstrategien 
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und ‚brokerage‘ beobachtet werden. Vorsitzende von Fulbe-Vereinigungen wandten 
eine Reihe von Maßnahmen an, um die durch internationale Geldgeber gestellten 
Vorgaben zu erfüllen und sich nach den Programmen der Regierung auszurichten, 
um ihre eigenen Ziele zu erreichen. Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen der Ful-
be haben in diesem Zusammenhang einen bedeutenden Beitrag zum Wandel ihres 
Lebensstils geleistet, jedoch ohne eine Lösung für ihre wichtigsten Probleme wie 
prekären Zugang zu Ressourcen und unklares Recht auf Landbesitz und Landnut-
zung zu finden.
Schlüsselwörter: Pastoralismus, Fulani Tierhalter, Technologien, Diversifizierung der 
Lebensgrundlage, kollektives Handeln
Résumé
L’objectif principal de cette recherche est d’analyser les transformations socio-tech-
nologiques dans les communautés Peules du Nord-Bénin. Quelle que soit la durée de 
leur séjour au Bénin, les éleveurs Peuls sont souvent considérés comme des étrangers, 
n’ayant pratiquement pas de droits d’accès à la terre et aux ressources naturelles. 
Cette marginalisation a pris diverses formes durant la période pré-coloniale, pendant 
la colonisation française et à l’avènement de l’État-nation postcolonial avec ses diffé-
rents régimes de gouvernance. Dans un contexte de percée technologique et de mon-
dialisation, de nombreux changements ont eu lieu, tendant à remettre en cause la du-
rabilité des moyens d’existence pastoraux. Pendant ce temps, plusieurs organisations 
locales ont également vu le jour pour défendre les droits des pastoralistes afin de leur 
assurer une plus grande intégration politique et un bien-être socio-économique.
L’étude a été menée dans la commune de Gogounou, située dans le département 
de l’Alibori au Nord-est du Bénin, où l’activité pastorale reste le deuxième moyen 
d’existence le plus important après la production végétale. Les travaux de terrain ont 
été conduits sur une période totale de dix mois entre Juillet 2013 et Octobre 2014. 
Une approche ethnographique a été adoptée, et s’est focalisée sur l’utilisation de dif-
férentes technologies ainsi que la mise en œuvre d’actions collectives. L’observation 
participante, comme outil clé de collecte de données, a été conjointement réalisée 
avec des entretiens ouverts et semi-structurés et des discussions de groupe avec divers 
acteurs.
L’un des principaux résultats de l’étude révèle que plusieurs politiques étatiques 
en lien avec l’agriculture, l’environnement et la propriété foncière ont permis le déve-
loppement de plusieurs technologies (Ex: tracteurs, pesticides, tronçonneuses, plants 
et certificats fonciers ruraux). Ces technologies, cependant, ont contribué à renforcer 
les inégalités dans les relations de pouvoir entre les acteurs ruraux. Les agriculteurs 
ayant le plus accès à ces technologies, les adoptent – en leur changeant de significa-
tion dans certains cas – et les utilisent pour accroître leur contrôle sur les terres et 
les ressources naturelles. Cela conduit à l’expulsion des éleveurs Peuls des terres, avec 
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des conséquences négatives sur les relations de coopération entre les acteurs ruraux, 
et donc une coexistence plus conflictuelle.
Face à cette ‘crise’, les ménages Peuls recourent à des stratégies multiples et variées. 
L’étude a révélé que les éleveurs – selon leur capital socio-économique et technolo-
gique – mobilisent des stratégies de mobilité géographique, sociale et technologique 
pour faire face aux menaces. La diversification des moyens d’existence s’est révélée 
comme la stratégie la plus pertinente parmi les éleveurs Peuls. L’étude a aussi identi-
fié les stratégies d’extraversion et de courtage en développement comme des formes 
d’action collective visant l’inclusion socio-économique et politique des éleveurs. Les 
leaders d’associations pastorales embrassent une diversité d’actions orientées vers la 
réalisation d’agendas de bailleurs internationaux et l’alignement avec des politiques 
gouvernementales, en vue d’atteindre leurs propres objectifs. Les organisations de la 
société civile pastorale ont ainsi contribué de manière significative à la transforma-
tion du pastoralisme, sans pour autant résoudre les principaux problèmes des éleveurs 
locaux, à savoir l’acquisition de droit foncier et l’accès équitable aux ressources.




































Pastoralists throughout Africa face increasing pressures. In Benin, governmental development policies and programmes in crop farming are changing power relations 
between herders and farmers to favour the latter. How are the Fulani pastoralists responding 
to these threats to their existence? Georges Djohy explores the dynamics in local use of 
natural resources and in inter-ethnic relations resulting from development interventions. He 
combines the approaches of science and technology studies – looking at the co-construction 
of society and technology – and political ecology – looking at the power relations shaping the 
dynamics of economic, environmental and social change – so as to throw light on the forces of 
marginalisation, adaptation and innovation at work in northern Benin. Having worked there for 
many years, Djohy has been able to uncover gradual processes of socio-technological change 
that are happening “behind the scenes” of agricultural development involving mechanisation, 
herbicide use, tree planting, land registration and natural resource conservation. He reveals 
how farmers are using these interventions as “weapons” in order to gain more rights over larger 
areas of land, in other words, to support indigenous land grabbing from herders who had been 
using the land since decades for grazing. He documents how the Fulani are innovating to ensure 
their survival, e.g. by using new technologies for transport and communication, developing new 
strategies of livestock feeding and herd movement, and developing complementary sources of 
household income. The Fulani are organising themselves from local to national level to provide 
technological and socio-cultural services, manage conflicts and gain a stronger political voice, 
e.g. to be able to achieve demarcation of corridors for moving livestock through cultivated areas. 
They even use non-functioning mini-dairies – another example of development intervention – 
to demonstrate their modernity and to open up other opportunities to transform their pastoral 
systems. This book provides insights into normally hidden technical and social dynamics that 
are unexpected outcomes of development interventions.
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